not perceive that there is a point here which has the closest relation with the question concerning evil. The restored unity of freedom and necessity, reconciliation, is the goal in the epos of the history of the world, which presents an Iliad and an Odyssey of manhood. This epos begins with the higher natures, gods and heroes, who were the first educators of men, and vanished from the earth with its growing deterioration. But since sensible existence, like finite existence in general, is the counterpart of true being, the longing for an individual immortality is a desire after that from which the wise man, of course, seeks to be free. It might, accordingly, be said that the more worthless a man is the more he deserves continued existence; the more perfect he is, the sooner will he, as pure Idea, without any other accessory, be eternal. If in the reconciliation the falling-away is annulled, the result is not the mere point of departure, but the falling-away has become the means of the perfected revelation of God, inasmuch as the Ideas which were, as it were, sacrificed in the intuited object that has become personality, come to be again in absoluteness, as occurs in perfected morality. Since, as will be shown later, the altered doctrine of Schelling had overcome the opposition between the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, it is conceivable that Fichte, in the time of his greatest anger towards the latter, should find this work the most tolerable. What he did not openly acknowledge and what, on the other hand, Schelling, often going too far, pointed out in his controversial work against Fichte, is, that much of this work of Schelling passed over into Fichte's later doctrines. Schelling was in the habit of remarking, with pride, that the title Way to the Blessed Life, was not invented by Fichte himself.

9. At the same time at which the Bruno and the Philosophy and Religion were written, there was in process of execution another work, which received its final completion in the year 1805; it is the System of the Whole of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Nature in Particular, which remained unprinted and first appeared in the complete edition (Works, vi. pp. 131–576). If Schelling himself had published it, the charge that he had nowhere given the concluding chapters would have been refuted by it still more than by the Philosophy of Art. Perhaps he regarded it as useless, because Klein's Contributions to the Study of Philosophy as the Science of
the All (Würzburg, 1805), which Schelling had praised as a good exposition of his own doctrines, gives, in its second section, (the first, which is historico-critical, is Klein’s own work), with tolerable completeness, what is to be found in this division of his Würzburg lectures (for that is the System of the Whole of Philosophy). The General Philosophy (pp. 137–214) is therein first treated, and it is here shown more at length and in part more clearly than in the Authentic Exposition, that the absolute, here always called God, is not at all affected with the opposition of subjective and objective, affirming and being affirmed, and that rational knowledge is distinguished from reflection by the circumstance that the latter always starts with opposition as the prius, and at most only attains to syntheses of differences; whereas, for the former, opposition does not exist, the affirmed is, as such, affirming. Reason, as the self-knowledge of God, has, therefore, God as its only immediate object. But this must not be understood in the sense of Dogmatism, for which God becomes, by the application of finite forms of thought a mere highest, an object beside which there exist other objects; whereas for rational knowledge God is the One, out of which no other springs but which is the affirmative of itself. Besides the absolute as the sole being there can as little be assumed another being, as it can be doubted that it, being, is. What is, is, in so far as it is, the absolute; so far as it is finite, it is not. Reason, therefore, for which there is no finite being, does not inquire after the origin of the absolute. As there is no finite being, so also is there for rational knowledge no opposition, hence also, in the self-knowing of the absolute, there is not on the one side mere subject, on the other mere object, but on each entire identity; and quantitative difference of the individual stages (potencies) exists only when one of these is isolated. In the whole there is no difference; hence, also, no quantitative difference. The standpoint of philosophy, therefore, is that of the Unity of the All; philosophy assumes only the being of the one distinctionless eternal All, which appears to the finite mode of thinking simply as everything, as the infinite number of things. This definition must yield a variety of points of contact with Spinoza. In scarcely any work of Schelling’s are there to be found so many propositions that are borrowed verbally from Spinoza’s Ethics, as in this. (If I said this
earlier—Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation, ii. p. 193,—of the Aphorisms in the Jahrbücher für Medicin, the two statements are easily reconciled: the Aphorisms are extracts from this work.) For the rest, it must not be supposed that the dependence upon Plato, as shown by the Bruno, had vanished, leaving no trace, and that Schelling had returned to Spinoza pure and simple. As we know otherwise also, Plato and Spinoza were to him at this period by far the greatest philosophers, and, accordingly, he joins immediately with the purely Spinozistic propositions just now referred to, those which relate to the Ideas as the eternal essences of things in God, and warns us against conceiving, with Spinoza, the Ideas as mere modes of thought. Between the latter, which would be subjective only, and things, which would be only objective, or, rather, above them as their identity—must stand the Ideas, the primary forms of things, the heart, as it were, of them. As the Ideas are above the opposition of the subjective and objective, the opposition, also, of universal and particular has as regards them no meaning—by it they would be converted into mere thought-things. Rather, they are, i.e., the being of things in the All is, the only truth of things, and mere particularity and finitude are the non-being of things. The latter is what is called their phenomenon. Phenomenon is what is called concrete reality; concrete because being and non-being are united in it; reality in the ordinary sense of the word. In it fall simplicity and the being conditioned by another concrete; taken all together, as totality, phenomena form the reflection of the All, natura naturata, in which (not in the natura naturans) falls the opposition of the real and ideal All, each of which must necessarily appear as a totality of finite things. In reason the two are united again, so that it is related to the absolute as indifference to identity, or the image to the archetype. The second, or Special, Part (pp. 215–576) falls into three subordinate parts, the first two of which cover the philosophy of nature, inasmuch as there is first given in the General Philosophy of Nature the construction of the real All (pp. 215–277), then in the Particular Philosophy of Nature the construction of the individual potencies of the same (pp. 278–494). After it has been concluded, here, from the identity of affirming and being affirmed, that there is in nature nothing absolutely without soul, time and space, as forms of the being-in-self or particularity of things in general, thereby,
however, of nothingness also, are deduced, in a similar manner as in earlier works on the philosophy of nature, only more at length and in part more clearly; then matter is deduced, with its two attributes of rest and motion, which, since it is related to real substance as mere ground, as a maternal principle, is gravity. Opposed to it as essence, as paternal principle, stands light, which is active in motion, or, rather, is motion itself, only without anything movable. In it the proper life of things is active, as in gravity their being held together by the All, for by this they tend to fall towards each other. The various relations of the two give the quantitatively different potencies of nature, which, now, are taken into consideration in detail. First, are laid down twelve highest principles or axioms of the philosophy of nature, which sum up the previous speculations, and then is first considered, similarly as in the *Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process*, the formative or dimensional process, in connection with which the law of polarity, as also that of triplicity as the type of all differences in nature, is discussed. Steffens’s investigations concerning absolute and relative cohesion, as also concerning the cohesion-series of bodies, are here variously used. If motion (form of the particular life) had here appeared subordinated to being; the opposite is the case in the second potency. Magnetism, electricity, and the chemical process, to which sound, light and heat are said to correspond, are gone over, fire is briefly discussed as the solvent of all forms, and then the third potency, or organic nature, is taken up. Of this Part, now, in particular, what was said above holds true, viz. that Schelling’s philosophy of nature is not so much a torso as many suppose. After the deduction of the organism in general comes that of the opposition of the kingdoms of plants and animals, as also of their point of indifference and of the world of infusoria, and then are taken up the functions common to them all, it being shown, first, that the first dimension and magnetism are repeated at a higher potency in reproduction, the second, as also electricity, in irritability, the third dimension and the chemical process in sensibility. (Earlier, Schelling had given a different parallelism.) In each of these three functions, however, all the three are repeated, so that resorption, secretion, and assimilation exhibit the same trinity in reproduction, and circulation, respiration, and voluntary motion in irritability. In sensibility, as the synthetic unity
of both, Schelling shows that all earlier forms are repeated in the senses in clarified form. Hence even the animals stand higher or lower in their series of stages according as they display a small or great degree of the sense-faculty. (The completed systematic on the basis of the senses is borrowed from Oken.) Whereas the animal in its highest life-phenomena borders on the potenceless, i.e., on what is above the limit of all potencies, this latter appears first in the heavenly bodies, and then also in man. In the latter, the soul rises to consciousness and to reason, by means of which it can surrender itself to the All and can here sacrifice that which the sensuous-minded would still have after death, memory of past experience, selfhood, etc. At this culminating point of the philosophy of nature there begins, as a continuation,—so that it could in so far be said that philosophy is merely the philosophy of nature,—the third section of the Second Part, the Construction of the Ideal World and its Potencies (pp. 495–576). The three potencies here are knowledge, action, art. In the first are distinguished self-consciousness, sensation, and perception, corresponding to the dimensions in the real, and then are discussed at great length the forms of reflected knowledge which the ordinary logic empirically assumes and teaches us to extend beyond the sphere in which they have validity. Absolute knowledge is placed in opposition to this. Under the head of Action, freedom is extremely discussed, and is stated to consist in conscious necessity; arbitrary choice is declared to be a mere delusion and the worst kind of volition. The ordinary view of religion and of immortality is sharply criticised, and the pagans are held up as patterns, because they would have simply drunk of Lethe. The eternal life is life in the Ideas. In treating of art, Schelling refers to his Lectures on Ästhetics.

10. The altered doctrine of Fichte was presented in the Chief Characteristics of the Present Age of the World, and in it a sharp polemic against Schelling’s philosophy of nature, which, of course, was preceded by an equally sharp one on Schelling’s part. At the same time Schelling had been apprised of the manner in which Fichte expressed himself in his lectures on the philosophy of nature, and subjective and objective grounds thus combined to make Schelling’s public disavowal of Fichte so bitter in its tone as it is. The Statement of the true Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Altered Doctrine of
Fichte (Tübingen, 1806), set forth the point of difference between the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity in such a manner that the latter, which had hitherto occupied the chief place by reason of the fact that the entire Science of Knowledge (as Transcendental Philosophy) was contained in it as a half, forfeits this position and sinks to the level of a diametrical opposite to it, exactly in the same way as, in antiquity, the higher theory of Heraclitus sank, by its polemic against Eleaticism, to the level of a correlate to it (vid. § 44). This controversial work very frequently mentions the speculations in Philosophy and Religion, and charges Fichte with having borrowed much from these and other writings of Schelling. Right and wrong are blended at this point, which, for the rest, has little positive interest. Much more important, on the contrary, is the way in which Schelling formulates the opposition of the original Science of Knowledge to the System of Identity. Fichte is held not to have the true conception of knowledge (which is rightly conceived only as the self-affirmation of God), as he regards it only as our knowledge of the absolute; hence he never gets beyond his own consciousness, admits only facts of his own consciousness, whereas the philosophy of nature to which he is inimical, proves the self-affirmation of God also in the facts of consciousness, not, however, in them alone, but everywhere, even in nature. Further, Fichte, like our whole culture, is ruled by a self-imposed un-nature which opposes subject and object, one and many, even declares thought, which, arbitrarily, ignores true reality, to be a necessary limit. Accordingly, he has no pre-sentiment of the truth that, according to Schelling, things which as individuals exist only through this thought, exist neither in nor out of thought, but are merely the product of a corrupted reflection; just as little, that the one apart from the many, likewise, exists only for the arbitrary reflecting thought, whereas reason, which is distinguished from the understanding not as a wholly different faculty, but merely by the fact that the understanding views everything in non-totality, the reason in totality, recognises the truth only in the union of unity and plurality; in the vital unity, as which, God, like the plant, which is one by the fact that it combines in itself many things, is the copula of the one and the many. If God be so conceived, it is also recognised that His being consists in His revealing Himself in the real, and being real activity. Philo-
sophy is consequently the philosophy of nature, since God is essentially nature. If, per impossibile, there were no nature, and I thought God clearly, the real world would be fulfilled for me, which is just the meaning of the so frequently misconceived unity of the ideal and real, which asserts that for true knowledge the world of thought has become that of nature. The true knowledge of God is, therefore, a viewing, a seeing; but when we will to descend from this seeing, then we do so, and the seeing of that union is changed into the reflected thought of the many on the one hand, and unity on the other. The problem is, to have one’s self freed from this pictorial thought (imagination), and to return to the simplicity of seeing and meditating, in order to see things as eternal, instead of, as we now do, thinking them as temporal and spatial, i.e., as nothings.

B.—RECEPTION OF THE SYSTEM OF IDENTITY.

§ 319.

1. The more rapidly philosophical systems succeeded one another after Kant, the more numerous were the standpoints from which Schelling would have been attacked, even if—a circumstance now added—he had not by his arrogant tone called forth such a state of things. That those who looked upon the Kantian philosophy as an error regarded the System of Identity also as one was natural. In their attacks upon this system the contributors to Nicolai’s Neue Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek, and the theologians Franz Berg, in his Sextus (Würzburg, 1801), and Jenisch, in his Critique of the Idealistic System of Religion and Morals (Leipsic, 1804), met upon common ground. The school of Jacobi followed its master in his polemic against Schelling’s Pantheism, and Köpper, von Weiller, and particularly Salat, were pre-eminent in the violence of their attacks upon it. With the Kantians and Semi-Kantians, who antagonized the System of Identity still more than the Science of Knowledge—with C. Chr. Ehrh. Schmid, Bouterwek, Krug.—Fries associated himself, then Reinhold, and not less his opponents Ænesidemus-Schulze and Beck, as well as Mackensen, who in many respects suggests Beck. These opponents, however, who had, more or less, combated also the Science of Knowledge, were finally joined by the author of the latter, Fichte, who expressed
himself with an unparalleled asperity concerning his earlier associate, whom he naturally counted among the realists and empiricists, whereas Reinhold and others had charged against him simply a one-sided idealism and his a priori constructions. While all those named combated the System of Identity in the name of another philosophy, there grew up another opponent of this system in the form of the empirical natural sciences. The chief representatives of these declared against Schelling's philosophy of nature, partly because they had foisted upon it an entirely different meaning from its true one, partly because a variety of circumstances, among which the respect for Goethe was not the least important, had made Schelling and his friends unjust despisers of Newton. Lichtenberg was loud in his expressions against the Philosophy of Nature. Gilbert's Annalen became the organ for a number of attacks. Cuvier, in spite of the fact that he, like Schelling, was indebted to Kielmeyer for a number of ideas, came to the front of the opponents of the German philosophy of nature in France. In Germany, among the most solid of the attacks against that philosophy were those of Link, who criticised in it particularly the fact that it did not respect the limits within which the law of polarity has validity.

2. As regards the adherents of Schelling, the conditions for forming a closed phalanx of followers were not given when method and terminology so often changed, and the most of the writings of the master remained fragments. As a Schellingian of entirely strict observance is to be named, properly, only the above-mentioned Georg Michael Klein (8th of April, 1776 to 19th of March, 1820), whose chief work, the Contributions to the Study of Philosophy (1805) is really what Joh. Josua Stutzmann's (1777–1816) Philosophy of the Universe was falsely alleged by his opponents to be,—a Schellingian note-book. Klein appears more independent in his Theory of the Understanding (1810), his Attempt to Establish Ethics as a Science (1811), and the Exposition of the Philosophical Theory of Right and Morals (1818); but these writings altogether have not the interest of his chief work. Stutzmann, also, did not arouse such attention with his later works: The Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1805); Chief Features of the Standpoint, Spirit, and Law of Universal Philosophy (1811), also his pseudonymous Monument erected to the Year 1813, by Machiavelli the Younger
(1814). To a certain extent may be placed with Klein and Stutzmann Georg Anton Friedrich Ast (1778–1841), whose *Handbook of Ästhetics* (1805), and *Outlines of Philosophy* (1809) have found much less favour than his *Outlines of the History of Philosophy* (1807), in which a construction of the same is attempted. The monograph on Plato (1816), occasioned by Schleiermacher’s work, is lacking in judicious criticism. Finally, there belongs here a man who gave a popular expression to the pantheism of the System of Identity and thereby extended it to a wider circle, Bernhard Heinrich Blasche (1776–1832), whose *Evil in the Harmony of the World-Order* (1827); *Philosophy of Revelation* (1829); *The Divine Attributes* (1831), and *Philosophical Theory of Immortality* (1831), are to be mentioned. If we designate by the name of adherents of Schelling, or of Schellingians, all who were stimulated by his ideas and elaborated these in a particular way, the system of which it was just now said that it counted only a few adherents is one of the richest in that regard. Above all was it the natural sciences in which the influence of these ideas may be pointed out, and when, as is common, this is complained of at the present day, it is forgotten that, even supposing that the anti-philosophic natural science of the present day should be a higher step, it could not possibly have become so without that lower one. It borders on blindness to regard the works of an Autenrieth, Döllinger, Carus, Nees von Esenbeck, Treviranus, Burdach and others as valueless, or to say that they would have value in spite of their being coloured by the Philosophy of Nature. Less numerous are the works in which ideas of Schelling have been applied to the sphere of the theory of mind, of ethics and history, and here are prominent the names of S. Ehrhardt, Thanner, Fessler and others. Finally, in the works of Görres and others the sciences of nature and of mind are combined. More complete accounts, and particularly a list, of the works of these men are to be found in § 36 of my larger work, which has been frequently mentioned.

3. Between the adherents and opponents stand the *emendators* of the System of Identity, as regards whom reference is to be made to § 38 of my work just now named. These are divided into two groups, one group modifying the System of Identity as the Semi-Kantians (*vid.* § 305) had modified Criticism, by an amalgamation with other elements, whereas
the work of the other may be compared with that of Reinhold and his opponents (§§ 307 and 308), who undertook to make a change in Criticism by working from within outward. Of the former are to be mentioned here, first, Eschenmayer and Schubert. Adam Carl August Eschenmayer (4th of Jan., 1771 to 17th of Nov., 1852), stimulated first by Kielmeyer's lectures and the Kantian philosophy of nature, the influence of which is recognisable in his Doctor's Dissertation (1796), as also in his Theorems from the Metaphysics of Nature (1797), came in consequence of this into correspondence with Schelling, a correspondence by which they were mutually benefited. Entirely in agreement with Schelling and his friends in the philosophy of nature, Eschenmayer early believed he had found out that there must be assumed outside of and above the All a Master of it, which philosophy does not know. Hence the title of his work, Philosophy in its Transition to Not-Philosophy (1803), which Schelling called a noteworthy production, and which, as was above stated (§ 318, 8), occasioned the composition of his work, Philosophy and Religion. The same thoughts were developed in a popular dress in The Hermit and the Stranger (1805), as also in the Introduction to Nature and History (1806), and again, as in the first-named work, happiness was set above finitude, infinitude, and eternity, the soul above sense, understanding, and reason, conscience above thought, imagination, and intellectual perception,—belief, in short, above speculation, though it does not do away with that, inasmuch as it has to do with the sphere between which and speculation the absolute forms the limit. After 1811, he was professor of medicine and philosophy in Tübingen, where he was deeply interested particularly in the phenomena of animal magnetism, and, again incited by a work of Schelling's, the treatise on Freedom, he published his Letter to Schelling (1813), which Schelling answered in the same journal. In the year 1817 appeared his Psychology, in three parts, which, in the year 1822, went through a second edition. Connected with this, as its foundation, is the System of Moral Philosophy (1818), and the Normal Right (2 vols., 1818–19), and finally, at the apex of the system, the Philosophy of Religion (3 vols., 1818–24), which sets supernaturalism above rationalism (Kant's, Fichte's, Schelling's, Chr. Weiss's) and mysticism (Swedenborg's and Böhme's). In the last period of his life it was his blind fondness for spiritualistic manifestations, and the not less blind
hatred toward the Hegelian philosophy, that made his writings rather insipid. The *Outlines of the Philosophy of Nature* (1832), the *Hegelian Philosophy of Religion* (1834), the *Iscariotism of our Day* (1835; against Strauss), the *Characteristic of Disbelief, etc.* (1838), the *Main Features of a Christian Philosophy* (1838), exhibit him in this stadium of his development.

4. In many respects suggesting Eschenmayer, though differing widely from him in others, is Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert (26th April, 1780 to 1st July, 1860), who, as a pupil, was personally stimulated by Herder in Weimar, and as a student in Jena by Schelling, and whose first works are wholly in the philosophy of nature, *e.g.*: *The Presentiments of a Universal History of Life* (Leips., 1806–21); the often-reprinted *Views of the Dark Side of Natural Science* (1808); *On the Quantitative Relations and Eccentricities of the Universe* (1808), which were later described by him as works that in the thought of the mirror (Nature) forget the visage (God). Even in the *Handbook of Natural History* (1813), still more in *Old and New in the Sphere of the Inner Knowledge of the Soul* (1817), and in the *Universal Natural History* (1826), which was later worked-over into the *History of Nature* (3 vols. 1835–37), the religious element is very conspicuous. *The Primeval World and the Fixed Stars* (1823), as also *On the Unity in the Structural Plan of the Earth-mass* (1835), are the last works of Schubert's that relate to nature below man. After the appearance of his often-reprinted work, *History of the Soul* (1830), from which the *Text-Book of the Science of Man and the Soul* (1838) gives only an extract, he occupied himself almost exclusively with psychology. The *Diseases and Perturbations of the Human Soul* (1845) treat of a single topic in this branch, and present, particularly in the way in which somnambulism is treated, a much more judicious view than that of Eschenmayer. The religiosity, also, that animates Schubert is much more healthy than that of Eschenmayer. But, finally, he is distinguished from Eschenmayer by a modification of what he drew from Schelling, a modification that places him, much more than Eschenmayer, in close relation with those who advance beyond the System of Identity (*vid.* §§ 322, 323). According to him, that is to say, opposition exists only between separate steps, *i.e.*, real opposition, which requires the same level for the things
opposed, does not exist. Hence as male stands opposed to female only as it is above it, so also spirit is not so much opposed to, as, rather, above, nature. As this fundamental principle secures Schubert against the pantheistic coordination of God and the World, so does it determine the position which, in spite of the fact that he delights in the saying of Oetinger, "Corporeality is the end of the way of God," he assigns to the soul, a position far higher than to the body. Not only does this make it difficult for him to show clearly how the third principle in man, the spirit, is related to these two, but he often thereby incurs the danger of falling into the errors of those whom he himself severely criticises, who regard the body of man as an outer vesture, the soul alone as the whole man. The various relations in which Schubert lived, as practising physician, miner, school-director, tutor of a prince, and professor of natural history, and the journeys he made, give to the otherwise very attractive personality a variety of interests which made it doubly amiable; hence the extended circle of acquaintances, friends, and admirers in all ranks, confessions, sexes, ages, for whom his warm love-craving heart beat.


5. Where a system is modified by the incorporation of theories of religion, even he who would forbid in a history of philosophy all confessional considerations must admit that this modification takes on a different form when the reviser is a Protestant from that taken on when he is a Catholic. Hence the efforts of Eschenmayer and Schubert are to be distinguished from, in fact to a certain extent to be opposed to, the labours of the elder Windischmann and Molitor. CARLIERONYMUS WINDISCHMANN, born on the 24th of Aug., 1775, at Mainz, passed over, from the study (in Würzburg) of philosophy to that of medicine, which he continued in Vienna under P. Frank, and lived, next, as court-physician in Aschaffenburg, at the same time, however, occupying himself with philosophy, in lectures and writings. In this he allied himself so closely with Schelling that the latter received his performances into his Zeitschrift, e.g., the dissertation on the Conception of Physics (1802), and commended them, whereas others charged him with "apish repetition." Besides a
translation of the Platonic *Timaeus* (1804), which is dedicated to Schelling, and the annotations upon which are filled with an enthusiasm for the ἐν καὶ πάρ, the correspondence with Schelling respecting which was for a long time very angry, Windischmann published *Ideas for Physics* (Würzburg, 1805), which was followed by the work, *The Self-Annihilation of Time* (Heidelberg, 1807), in which subjective idealism is antagonized and the thoughts suggested already in the *Timaeus*, concerning time and eternity, are carried out. The *Investigations relating to Astrology, Alchemy, and Magic* (Frankfort, 1813) evince something of the fondness, then prevailing with many Schellingians, for magnetic and visionary states. Very important was it for Windischmann's development and activity that in the year 1818 he went to Bonn as Professor of Medicine and Philosophy. Here he soon became the centre of the circle of intellectual men, particularly the Catholics, in the Rhine province and its vicinity. At the same time his own antagonism and that of his friends to the Hermesians, became conspicuous (vid. § 305, 8–11). In what Windischmann wrote in Bonn there is plainly perceptible the influence of Hegel, whose opposition to the philosophy of reflection (vid. § 329, 1) he had earlier severely criticised, but who had greatly influenced him by his *Phenomenology*, and still more by the *Logic*, and the oral conversation relating to it. Appearing first as a supplement to the *Evening Hours* of the Count of Maistre, but afterwards published as a special work, was the *Critical Considerations regarding the Fortunes of Philosophy in Modern Times* (Frankfort, 1828). Here the dependence upon Hegel proceeds so far in individual passages that the latter himself complained about it. Perhaps this would not have occurred, if the work which had previously appeared: *A Desideratum in the Art of Medicine* (Leips., 1824), had not, by its strict Catholic standpoint's having close affinity with Hegel, prejudiced Goethe, for example, against Windischmann. When this essay appeared, Windischmann had been labouring for thirty years upon his extensive work: *Philosophy in the Progress of the World's History* (4 vols., Bonn, 1827–1834). In the literary disputes beginning after the death of Hermes, Windischmann did not take part, although he is accused of having caused the condemnation of the doctrines of Hermes at Rome. Certain is it that these disputes drove him more and more into an extreme position, which did not really accord
with his nature. When he died, on the 23rd of April, 1839, he was to many the head of the Rhenish Ultramontanes. —The two-fold character of Windischmann's calling made it easy for him to combine the pathologico-therapeutic standpoint with the philosophico-historical, and he accordingly sees in the movements of philosophy a process, often interrupted by arresting crises, of fallen humanity. To him one of the most significant of the phenomena of modern times is Hegel's *Logic*, because it has taken a great step toward the knowledge that only by surrendering to the Eternal Logos, whose movement the *Logic* is, is philosophy to be rescued. He will not dispute with Hegel when the latter particularly urges that, in order to attain that end, man must toil hard and subject himself to the strictest discipline. He hopes, especially after his *viva voce* conversations with Hegel, that even Hegel may see that toiling is only the first step, and the fulfilled perfection lies in the knowledge that our apprehension of the Logos is only its spontaneous revelation in us. Without this fulfilment more mischievous errors than all that have hitherto existed connect themselves with Hegel's *Logic*. Add to this, that in this as in his other works Windischmann espouses mysticism as against the understanding imprisoned in the finite, and one may wonder that he did not adopt rather the views of Franz von Baader (*vid. § 325*), who, for his part, was prepared to praise Windischmann highly. One reason, among others, was that the Mystics in whom Baader delighted were particularly Master Eckhart, prior to the Reformation, and the Protestant Böhme, whereas Windischmann, when he celebrated the Mystics, had in mind particularly Malebranche—circumstances that explain why Windischmann appears the more orthodox and Baader the more liberal. The chief work of Windischmann aimed so to present the history of philosophy that in it the history of intelligence in the progress of the world's history might be recognised. The faith in truth which was divined by the believers in innate ideas and which is ineradicable from the human mind, develops into the knowledge of the same, so that the history of philosophy is the history of the conception of truth in the human species. According to the plan of the work, the First Part was to have presented the foundation of philosophy in the Orient, the Second the completed structure of philosophy in classical antiquity, the Third the
full content, the critique and scientific extension of philosophy in the Christian periods of the world. The First Part was not completed, since its four divisions, in as many volumes, treat only of China and India; but of the Russians and Egyptians, with whom the transition to Greek philosophy was to have been made, nothing was written. What we have, does not, indeed, evince the intemperate over-estimation of Hindoo wisdom which prevailed among some when that wisdom first became known, but constantly idealizes too much, if not the present, at least the original, condition among the Chinese and Hindoos. The Introduction discusses the relation of philosophy to the history of the world, and repeatedly arrives at the result that the attainment of wisdom and growth in it are not to be conceived as the work of man, but as the self-revelation of the highest wisdom.

6. Like Windischmann, whom he highly respects, Franz Joseph Molitor (1799–1860) was first stimulated by Schelling. As such he appears in his Journal for a Science of Right to be Established in the Future, which he edited with Köllmann (Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1802). So also in his Ideas for a Future Dynamic of History (Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1805), only that in this he requires that Schelling’s ideas be supplemented by the theories announced by Fr. v. Schlegel and Görres. Next is very conspicuous the influence of Baader’s works. This appears already in the Turning-point of the Ancient and Modern (Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1805), but still more in his letter to Sinclair, On the Philosophy of the Modern World (1806). But it makes itself much more perceptible in his chief work, which remained incomplete: Philosophy and History, or On Tradition (1st vol., Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1827; wholly re-written in 1855; 2nd vol., Münster, 1834; 3rd, Münster, 1839; 4th, Münster, 1853 [First Part]). The chief impulse to this noteworthy book was given by the earnest studies relating to Judaism and particularly the Cabala, to which Metz had incited him. But at the same time, Molitor recognizes the great merits of the later Schellingian writings of Schubert, Eschenmayer, Baader, Günther and others. Since among these are to be found some who will be treated only in the third volume of this work, the doubt might arise whether Molitor also ought not to be assigned to it. This was not done, however, because the influence that he exerted as the intellectual centre
of a wide circle, which was greater, almost, than that of his works, was at its height thirty years ago, and his views were at that time already fully developed.—Since there intervenes between the publication of his first and that of the fourth volume a quarter of a century, it is explicable that what is mentioned at an earlier point is discussed later more in detail; hence the repetitions and sudden transitions that increase the difficulty of reading the work. In the first volume, in ten sections, the history of oral tradition among the Jews is narrated, the importance of the same for Christianity is discussed, investigations relating to speech and writing and to M’sorah and tradition of law are instituted. The second volume abandons historical ground; discussing the speculative knowledge of God, in the first section; attempting, in the second, to develop the universal principles of theosophy; considering, finally, in the third, the necessity of a divine revelation and the relation of knowledge to faith. The third volume, on the other hand, returns again to historical investigations, the first of its three sections discussing Paganism, Judaism, and Christianity, in general; the second, giving a special account of Judaism, particularly the Jewish doctrine of impurity; the third, closely connected with the foregoing, treating of purity and reconciliation. The fourth Part is announced in its first section as a supplement to the fifth and sixth sections of the first Part, inasmuch as, like that Part, it shows the importance of the Cabala to Christianity, whereas its second section, which treats of Christian philosophy, connects itself with what was developed in the second Part. The exposition of Molitor's doctrines will have to confine itself particularly to these two volumes. Since the human mind bears within itself only the germ of knowledge, it requires on account of this femininely-receptive nature, a fructifying influence from without; this is exerted upon it, on the one hand by the world, on the other by the self-revealing Godhead, so that all knowledge, without exception, begins with the a posteriori, which is elevated by the self-activity of the mind to a higher a priori state. As regards, now, divine revelation, there has always been, besides the written revelation, which, being sententious, requires explanation, the explanatory one, which is transmitted orally only; to the former as body the latter constitutes the soul. Since only a small portion of mankind, in the transition of mankind from the period of
childhood to that of youth, preserves the immediate intuition of God, the immediate feeling and experience of God, akin to somnambulism, whereas the rest of mankind fall away wholly into reflection and even idolatry—for this reason, that small remnant (the Jews) have remained in exclusive possession of writing and tradition. (That the latter also was later written, happened only because the living spirit that was its bearer became lost.) As the written law within Judaism is related to mystical tradition, so is Judaism itself related to Christianity. The latter is only the completion and fulfilment of Judaism; and, as in the law and the history of the patriarchs the entire future of the Church of Christ lies concealed in a figurative form, the new covenant of grace is thus united in the typical covenant of the law, and in such a manner that it lacks, properly speaking, the Thorah, is only oral tradition, mystically transformed Judaism. Here also, for the rest, appears an age in which this mystically ideal condition yields to the realism of a Church with dogmas and statutes. That the ideal does not lose itself in these, is the care of a higher mysticism, which, because it occupies the same position towards the Church-doctrine as tradition and Cabala do towards the Thorah, must present relationship with that; and again, since in it the unity of the ideal and real is attained, has for its basis modern speculation, which is real-idealism. It is thus clear why Molitor in developing this higher mysticism always employs the formulas: Under the guidance of the Cabala a deduction is here made from the principles of modern speculation, or, What the Cabala teaches dogmatically is here speculatively construed, and the like. The erroneous extremes which this higher mystic, i.e., the Christian philosophy, has to avoid are given as pantheism, atheistic atomism, likewise spiritualism and materialism. Whereas deism does not get beyond an inconsistent halfness, the theory of the personal (triune) God is just as consistent and not so one-sided as pantheism. Particularly, it alone is able to supply a living knowledge of nature, a knowledge embracing even magic, and to conduct to an ethics which teaches true purity and sincerity, which consists in the being permeated by God, the "deification" of the older Mystics. Finally, it alone enables us to estimate rightly the meaning of evil, and to perceive that the being permeated by God, not in the quietistic, but in an active manner, in the three stages of sanctification, illu-
mination, and transfiguration, is a real God-service. The self-active sacrificing of one's own personality to God is neither a (pantheistic) being-absorbed, nor an (atheistic) assertion of the same.

7. In a manner altogether different from that of Eschenmayer and Schubert or of Windischmann and Molitor, Wagner and Troxler attempt, nearly contemporaneously with those men, but with a very different result, to improve the System of Identity. What leads them to a modification of the system is not a religious interest, to say nothing; therefore, of a confessional interest, but the knowledge that the system falls behind its own requirements. For this reason it would be improper here, as it was necessary in dealing with the aforementioned, to lay stress upon the fact that both belong to different confessions. It has its ground, not in the fact that they present a sharper contrast than the two Protestants and the two Catholics, but in a suggestion that may be found in the author of the System of Identity itself. Since Schelling had himself distinguished in many passages indifference of opposites from identity, but in both the opposition is negativd, though in an opposite way, the indifference-point, in the schema of the System, is, exactly taken, extended to a line and consists in the crossing of two opposites, and the rhythmus of the system is not triplicity but quadruplicity. This fact was perceived by the acute Johann Jacob Wagner (21st Jan., 1775 to 22nd Nov., 1821)—who in his Theory of Heat and Light (1802), and his Nature of Things (1803), as also in the work On the Principle of Life (1803), had shown himself to be a pure Schellingian—at about the same time that he recognised that Schelling was on the point of abandoning his System of Identity. In his, System of Ideal Philosophy (1804), and in the works: On the Nature of Philosophy (1804); Outlines of the Science of Politics (1805), the principle of method: To construe is to cross, is, in part, merely advocated, in part, carried out. To it Wagner remained true in all his works. So in the works, Philosophy and Medicine (1805), and Ideas for a Mythology of the Ancient World (1808), which more than any other work maintains the pantheism of the System of Identity, whereas the originator of that system had already pushed beyond that; so, above all, in his Mathematical Philosophy (1811) and his State (1815), as also in the work, Religion, Science, Art and State Considered in their Mutual
Relations (1819), and the Organon of Human Knowledge (1830). As, according to Wagner, Schelling had not done in regard to form, what, properly, he should have done, so he had not at all, or at least not sufficiently, in regard to matter. The parallelism of the ideal and the real, to which Schelling had rightly drawn attention, demands that the agreement between the laws of knowledge and of the world, which is the most decided of all, be demonstrated. Since, now, the former are mathematical, mathematics and knowledge coincide, thought is calculation, words are fractions, even and odd are the same as masculine and feminine, chemical analysis is a division, in which the reagent employed functions as a divisor, etc. Wagner was so convinced of the necessity of viewing everything methodically, that he not only, in his System of Private Economy, treated every detail tetradiically, but he greeted with pleasure the fact that another pursued an exactly similar course with the implements of a distillery. Conscious, tetradiic method was so much the alpha and omega of thinking, that he asserted that the period in which genius was required in a poet had departed with Goethe. His School of Poets (2nd ed., 1850) gave a method by which entirely without genius one might produce works of art of the highest order, particularly mythological works of art.

8. In agreement with Wagner as regards quadruplicity of members in the correct method, is Ignaz Paul Vital Troxler (17th August, 1780 to 6th March, 1866). He also had shown himself in his first works: Ideas for the Foundation of Nosology and Therapy (1803); Essays in Organic Physics (1804); Outlines of a Theory of Medicine (1805), and the works: On Life and its Problem (1807); and Elements of Biosophy (1807), so faithful an adherent of Schelling that his opponents called him a plagiarist of his master, who gave to him, apropos of this, a very commendatory testimonial. The Glances into the Nature of Man (1812) is his public disavowal of the Philosophy of Nature. In this he first states the requirement that the governing method should everywhere be that of fourfold division through mutually crossing opposites; then it is also brought to light, how, nevertheless, from a presupposition entirely similar to that of Wagner he draws an entirely opposite consequence. Since the laws of the (real) All can be no other than those of the (ideal) emotional nature, this middle-point of the mutually
crossing opposites body and spirit, body and soul, Troxler, in order to comprehend the former, buries himself in the study of the latter, bases philosophy on anthropology, converts it, to employ his terminology, into anthroposophy. Hence also his most important works are: The Natural Theory of Human Knowledge, or Metaphysics (1828), and Logic (3 vols., 1830). Regarding his relation to Schelling on the one hand, and Jacobi on the other, he has expressed himself in his Basle inaugural programme, On Philosophy, etc. (1830). While professor in Bern he published his lectures on Philosophy as Encyclopedia and Methodology of the Philosophical Sciences (1835). The full agreement, often reaching literalness, between Wagner's and Troxler's theories does not preclude, in fact alone, renders possible, their diametrical opposition. This opposition begins with their theory of knowledge, in which Troxler lays the greatest stress upon instinctive immediate knowledge, whereas Wagner makes even the poem proceed from cool reflection. It continues through their political and ethical views, when Wagner concedes to the total-organism decided preponderance, says a word first for the absolutism of the monarch, then of the State, whereas Troxler is a republican, who honours Milton, Buchanan, and Rousseau as his teachers. It shows itself, finally, in the highest of all regions. Wagner, being a pantheist, never feels the longing to know his individual existence as immortal, whereas, according to Troxler, personal immortality is the real question of the day. It accords, finally, with these contrasts, that Wagner accepts only the earliest, Troxler, on the contrary, particularly the latest, of Schelling's writings.

§ 320.

Concluding Remark upon the System of Identity.

1. The requirement stated by Fichte, and already adopted by us, that philosophy should be ideal-realism or real-idealism, has obviously been more fully met by the System of Identity than by the Science of Knowledge, and Schelling can, in the consciousness of its superior position, incorporate the Science of Knowledge into his system as one part, and complain if that system is called the Philosophy of Nature, as if it contained only the second part. Just so has
he satisfied more fully than Fichte the problem stated by Fichte, and likewise adopted by us, that Kant's theories should not be rejected, but should be more deeply founded; inasmuch as he takes the *Critique of Judgment* as the basis of his system. Were these, therefore, the only problems put before the most modern philosophy, the System of Identity would be the last fruit of this philosophy. But besides that first Fichtean requirement, there was given (*vid.* § 296, 2) above as the second, that the opposition of the pantheistic philosophy of the seventeenth, and the atheistic philosophy of the eighteenth century, be reconciled in a higher unity. And, again, there lay contained in the Fichtean historical require-ment, also the requirement that the fourth of Kant's master-pieces: *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, be wrought into the texture of philosophy. Schelling, as thus far ex-pounded, had not performed either of these tasks, but he had prepared the way for them; for the first, that is to say, by the System of Identity itself, for the second, as will be shown, by the fact that he outgrew it.

2. It has been remarked above (*vid.* § 318, 10) that, as in antiquity Heraclitus, by his polemic against the Eleatics, came, in spite of his higher standpoint, into opposition to them, and hence sank to the same level with them, so a somewhat similar experience befell the System of Identity, because of the polemic of its author against the Science of Knowledge. This polemic, in so far as the severe criticisms made upon the Science of Knowledge really affect it, is of minor importance. Decisive, on the other hand, is what Schelling regards here as an objection, for in so doing he declares the opposite of that to be the truth. Just the same holds true of the not less severe criticisms which Fichte pours out upon the System of Identity. If, therefore, Fichte charges Schelling with returning to Spinoza, or places him wholly with Locke, on the ground that he raises questions in which, since Leibnitz, there could be no meaning, it is clear how fully he places himself upon the side of the latter, of whom he says, accordingly, that Leibnitz had been perhaps one of the few philosophers who were convinced by their doctrines, which had been impossible with Spinoza. When, on the other hand, Schelling in a posthumous essay constantly places Fichte and Leibnitz together as representatives of the philosophy of reflection; when he calls the philosophy of the first a philosophy of the
Fall of man, because it sets the individual Ego above everything else; when he brings the charge, that it is really only a plagiarism of Rousseau (Pygmalion), or also, that it is at bottom only psychology, there may be read out of these, in part unjustifiable, objections, what he also expresses in this period, that the only true philosopher is Spinoza, who denies individuality. Thus have these two philosophers, who began with Kant and went beyond him, again revived, upon a Critical basis,—as Reinhold and his opponents called back to life the opposition that divided the eighteenth century, and which, as it appeared, Kant had resolved,—the opposition of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in such a manner that, whereas Kant had given it a provisional solution, it reaches now a definitive one. The Science of Knowledge exhibits the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century transformed by Criticism, with its view of nature as merely a means to the (according to Fichte, moral) ends of man, with its interest for the individual personality and its immortality, with its atomistic-revolutionary politics, its plans of education aiming at the regeneration of the race, its prosaic view of a work of art, and its religion of right-doing, which, if taken seriously, must reduce God to a mere moral postulate. (At this point may be entirely omitted the many points of contact between Leibnitz's monad and Fichte's Ego, between Leibnitz's corporeal world, which is only a confused idea, and that of Fichte, which is produced unconsciously, between the pre-established harmony of the former and the moral order of the world of the latter). Just so in Schelling, not only innumerable thoughts but the whole spirit of Spinoza, only as permeated by Criticism, celebrate their resurrection. Nature is here the absolute, even is, in unguarded moments, called God, and, in the heat of the battle against the enemy of nature, there happens to Schelling what he constantly forbids in his opponents: he calls his (whole) system the Philosophy of Nature. Individual being as such is nothing true, but is a creation of our isolating mode of thought. Personal immortality appears as the wish, and perhaps as the punishment, of miserable egoists, surrender to the absolute as eternal life. In politics it is the total-organism, as opposed to which the individual is as nothing; and the French Emperor, who tramples revolution to the earth, is explained to be almost a superhuman nature. In
the place of ceaseless labour, there appears here a contemplative rising even to quietism; opposed to the atheism of Fichte, who conceived God not as being but as Ought, there appears a pantheism to which God is the only being, a being unaffected by manifoldness and change.

3. As, by the advent of Reinhold and his opponents, the problem was more fully propounded than it had been by Kant, of reconciling Locke with Leibnitz, Berkeley and Wolff with Hume and Condillac, so, by the conflict between the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, there is more completely stated than had previously been done, the requirement of resolving the dispute between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the solving of this problem, Kant, as was above (vid. § 301, 1) remarked, remains much further from a true solution than in the case of the first; hence the two members of the opposition to be resolved must show themselves much freer from what had already been accomplished by him. If he regarded Fichte not as a hypercritical friend, as he did Reinhold, Maimon, and Beck, but as a blundering corrupter of his doctrine, his judgment concerning Schelling would, had Schelling’s works been known to him, hardly have sounded milder. Here those who kept nearer to him, have, instead of him, been those who complained.

FIFTH DIVISION.

Pantheism, Individualism, and their Mediation upon a Critical Basis.

A.—HERBART AND SCHOPENHAUER.

§ 321.

Critical Reaction against the System of Identity and the Science of Knowledge.

1. What, already, the common father of the two conflicting systems had maintained, had been constantly insisted upon by both of these systems, viz., that true philosophy must transcend all partial views, reconcile all oppositions. But that they themselves formed an opposition in which each represented only one side, is so obviously in conflict with this
requirement, that the philosophic spirit could not but strive to get beyond them. In this transcendence are to be distinguished a negative and a positive moment. The first is the explanation that these two systems are untrue, that they fall short of what Kant had begun. The second recognises in each of these a half-truth. Since this latter is equivalent to recognising truth and untruth at the same time, he who maintains the positive moment allows the negative at the same time, and therefore has more to offer than he who merely asserts the negative moment. Herein lies the reason why, when systems make their appearance simultaneously, of which, the one, in the name of rightly understood Kantism, rejects the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, while the other seeks to unite both in a higher system, the former must be unable to get a hearing, and the latter alone is heeded. The time when those will be remembered who combated each of the component elements, will have come only when men become doubtful as to the truth of these mediating doctrines. Thus is explained how Herbart and Schopenhauer, who are filled with equal reverence for Kant and contempt for the "fashionable philosophy," i.e. the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, remain so long unnoticed, and why the period of deserved recognition could first come to the two only a short time before their death. But that the two form between them an opposition which is almost as sharp as that between the systems combated by them, has its ground in the fact that Criticism had reduced to unity a variety of oppositions the members of which could, when they once became free, enter into a variety of combinations with each other, inasmuch as it was not impossible that the first member of the one should combine with the second of the other, etc., and that, demonstrably, the Science of Knowledge, the System of Identity, Herbart's and Schopenhauer's doctrines present four separate combinations. By its antagonism to the one-sided idealism of the Science of Knowledge, the System of Identity had acquired a prevailing realistic, as the Science of Knowledge had acquired, through Fichte's antagonism to Schelling's pantheism, a one-sidedly individualistic, character. Herbart, overlooking these special one-sidednesses as such, censures the former for his pantheism, the latter for his idealism, and himself advocates an individualistic realism. Schopenhauer does the reverse: to
him idealism is the only true philosophy. But he equally maintains the complete nullity of the individual, and his doctrine is, consequently, pantheistic idealism. Each, of course, criticises in Fichte and Schelling and commends in Kant exactly the opposite of that which the other criticises and commends. And, equally of course, the one would leave out of the Kantian doctrine all that must lead to idealism and pantheism, whereas the other rejects, as Kantian weaknesses, what might become the germ of realism and atomism.

2. Johann Friedrich Herbart (4th May, 1776 to 24th August, 1841) often called himself a Kantian, but then added that he was a Kantian of the year 1828, who rejected Kant’s idealistic theories of time, space, and the categories, and his Critique of Judgment. This is all literally correct: he really took his starting-point with Kant, but at the same time waived what had led Kant’s followers to idealism and pantheism. Among his works, which his pupil Hartenstein has published in twelve volumes (Leipsic, L. Voss, 1850–52), that which gives the best prospectus of the whole system is the Text-Book for Introduction to Philosophy (first appeared 1813, Wks., i. pp. i ff.). For the theoretical philosophy the most important works are: Chief Points in Metaphysics (1808, Wks., iii., pp. 1 ff.); Universal Metaphysics, together with Elements of the Philosophical Theory of Nature (1829, Wks., iii. and iv.); Psychological Investigations upon the Strength of a Presentation (1812, Wks., vii. pp. 29 ff.); On the Possibility and Necessity of applying Mathematics to Psychology (1822, Wks., vii. pp. 129 ff.), and particularly: Psychology as a Science (1824–25, Wks., v. and vi.). Finally, for practical philosophy: Universal Practical Philosophy (1808, Wks., viii. pp. i ff.) and Analytical Examination of Natural Right and Morals (1836, Wks., viii. p. 213).

3. In opposition to the polemic against the philosophy of reflection, which had become the fashion, particularly among the Schellingians, Herbart emphasises the thought that all philosophy springs from attention to conceptions, hence from reflection, and, precisely viewed, consists only in the elaboration of conceptions. This elaboration, however, is different in the different parts, and upon this fact depends a difference of method in the individual parts. Thus in Logic, with which, just for this reason, the beginning must be made, this elaboration has to do solely with rendering conceptions clear.
and distinct, which happens particularly through the judgment,—the first through the negative, the second through the positive judgment. Depending upon this is the syllogism, the first two figures of which correspond to the positive and negative judgment, and are classed together under the name of the syllogism of subsumption; whereas the third, which, however, has only four valid moods, is termed by Herbart the syllogism of substitution, because it has validity only in case a certain substitution (of the minor) is admissible. Logic supplies, as an unalterable result, to all parts of philosophy the principium identitatis and the principium exclusi tertii (which coincides with the other), according to which, whenever conceptions are self-contradictory, they must be rejected and their contradictory opposite assumed. If, now, we pass from the merely logical, formal aspect of conceptions to their content, we find them divided into two leading classes. There are, that is to say, conceptions by means of which we apprehend the given, i.e., what passes as real for us, or what we call the world; in other words, conceptions by means of which we have a physics. The elaboration of these is, hence, appropriately termed Metaphysics. But, further, there are conceptions that have nothing whatever to do with the reality of the conceived, being applied equally to the obviously supposititious case, and these are the conceptions that are accompanied by approval and disapproval, and which are treated of by Aesthetics, of which practical philosophy forms a part. These two classes of conceptions are to be strictly distinguished from each other, which Kant, who has, nevertheless, the great merit of having opposed to one another theoretical and practical reason, Being and Ought, has not sufficiently done; hence he bases his practical philosophy upon the theoretical conception of freedom,—has, in fact, introduced the absurd expression “metaphysics of morals.” In order not to violate “cleanness of conceptions,” upon which Herbart constantly insists, and to facilitate the forgetting of all theoretical views in the consideration of what should be, he places in his Text-Book for Introduction to Philosophy practical philosophy before metaphysics, in which my complete exposition of the system of Herbart follows him. If the opposite is done here, it is to make more apparent the connection of Herbart with Kant and his relation to Fichte and Schelling.
4. By metaphysics Herbart understands, as does Wolff, whom, among all the philosophers, he had first learned to know, the entire theoretical philosophy. In this, according to him, Kant has happily gotten us out of the mire, by showing (in opposition to the earlier dogmatism) that the complex of all that is given, which we call Nature, as also all that we know, contains only phenomena, but at the same time (in opposition to idealism), distinguished things-in-themselves from phenomena, and so recognised the principle, which must not be given up, that as the smoke implies a fire, so does appearance being, so that as much manifestation of being is given as there is appearance given. All theoretical philosophy must start with the given (the phenomenon), but not stop there (in that case it would be mere physics), but must inquire after the being manifested by the phenomenal, and thus become metaphysics. The necessity for that lies in the fact that the given, i.e., that which we cannot help perceiving (to which belong not only sensations but whatever else is connected with them,—forms, which Herbart calls experience-conceptions), shows itself, upon closer attention, to be self-contradictory, and hence, according to the prime law of logic, requires an elaboration of these conceptions, which may be described as the making of experience-conceptions conceivable. If, for example, change is given in the world of phenomena, change being a self-contradictory conception, there arises, since the real cannot be self-contradictory, the problem of explaining under what conditions the appearance of changes can arise. (That every one in thought adds to change a cause, is a proof that the unchanged thought of change is unbearable.) Metaphysics therefore, should not, as the Kantians would have it, be repudiated but reformed; it should not be converted into psychology, as it was by Fries, but into an integration of the experience-conceptions, since it passes from the self-contradictory appearance to the real underlying it. The division of Metaphysics follows the Wolffian, but in such a manner that the first part is termed Universal Metaphysics, in which ontology would be only a part; the particular or Applied Metaphysics is divided into the Philosophy of Nature (for the expression Cosmology is too lofty), Psychology, and Rational Theology. (That the last forms no integral portion of the theoretical philosophy, is evident from the little that Herbart says concerning it. He is unable to get a foundation for it
without practical points of view.) The first part of the universal metaphysics, the Methodology, is so connected with the logic that it might just as well be regarded as a part of it. A contradiction in the given occurs wherever conceivable and validity do not coincide, hence wherever two members (M and N) are only separately conceivable, their combination, on the other hand, being given and hence valid; as, for example, in the combination of ground and consequence, where the ground, as preceding the consequence, must be thought as not like it, but as containing the consequence, as like it. This contradiction is solved by thinking M as the plurality of such as, not being individually like N, the consequence, produce the consequence when taken together. Since the being-taken-together is a relation, this method, which consists in following the rule, What must be thought but cannot be thought as one, we should think as many, is called the method of relations. Herbart compares this procedure with the analysis of a direction into several as its components, and, since this analysis of the one direction is accidental, he calls the method also the method of accidental views, a fact that has given occasion for misconceptions. For the rest, he here appeals to the ordinary consciousness, which regards a concurrence of conditions as necessary to inference. Following, now, the Methodology as the second part of the Universal Metaphysics is the Ontology, which,—again, with a laudatory recognition of Kant because in his refutation of the ontological proof it is implied that the conception of being contains no What, is mere position,—analyzes the conception of the existent into Being and What or quality, which latter, in conjunction with being, may be termed essence, apart from it, an image (like Plato's Ideas). Since only what is positive is compatible with being as mere position, the quality of the existent excludes all negation, but therewith also all gradual differences and all becoming; it is absolutely simple and unchangeable. The Eleatics have the merit, in their polemic against the Many in One, this bane of all metaphysics, which coincides with the absurdity of immature being, of having first rightly grasped the conception of the existent. The Atomists, who taught that the existent is to be thought as manifold, are their complement. Hence: many real beings of absolutely simple but different quality, which are sometimes, though seldom, called also monads, which are non-spatial, non-temporal, and exist in extremely great numbers, and among
which the best known to us are our souls. Only by the assumption of many real beings or a "qualitative atomism," can the contradictory but given conception of an inherence of many properties in one substance be explained by a reduction to causality, without which there is no substantiality, but which is not to be conceived as causa transiens; just so, the equally absurd conception of change, which for the rest, as has already been remarked above, even the ordinary consciousness integrates by the assumption of a cause. In this explanation we cannot confine ourselves to what appears, but must descend to that which takes place in the existent (hence what really takes place). There it is discovered that because of the absolute simplicity of that, nothing takes place in the isolated individual nature, but it is conceivable that the meeting of two or more produces in each of them a disturbance and, in consequence of this, a resistance, or a self-conservation as we experience it, for example, in our souls (the only nature the inner occurrences of which are accessible to us) in its ideas, or even, approximately where we observe contrasts in colours or tones. By these disturbances and self-conservations, now, all the phenomena given in experience, of physics and empirical psychology should permit of being explained, so that they, therefore, form the basis of the philosophy of nature and (rational) psychology. But between them and these two parts of Applied Metaphysics are inserted the third and fourth parts of the Universal Metaphysics, so that Synechology forms the transition to the philosophy of nature, Idolology, on the other hand, the transition to psychology. They can therefore be expounded together with these.

5. **Synechology**, so called because the *continuum* is its most important problem, seeks to show that the space-relation is, indeed, mere appearance, but not, as Kant maintains, a subjective, but an objective, appearance, inasmuch as wherever there is objectively given many, not united but capable of being united, there the form of externality must be assumed for *every* intelligence, not only, as with Kant, for man. This space, which is valid for every intelligence and hence intelligible, is not to be conceived as continuous, but each of its dimensions is a fixed (discrete), and, according to the amount of the contiguity (which is the greatest proximity of simple beings), a different, line. If, now, points of two such fixed lines (extremi-
ties of two catheti of equal length) be united by a third (hypotenuse), this appears, on account of its incommensurability, as exceeding the definite number of the contiguity by no integer, and, since there is no reason for assuming this excess between two definite elements of the line, it is assumed between any and every two, and the contiguity becomes the over-plus; hence also pure or independent lines are never thought as continua, though dependent lines are so thought, such as those of the geometricians, which are limits of surfaces. The most important conception in this construction is, therefore, that of the imperfect contiguity, according to which conception the points lie thicker than points lying contiguously together. As space, so also time, which is the number of change, is a sum of (time) points, the contiguity of which is here a succession, and which, therefore, would not exist, either if there were only a single being, or if there were no observer. Exactly as space, it, also, is no continuum, though it appears so because, besides a series of changes, there begin others, the starting-point of which (like that of the hypotenuse) does not coincide with a time-point of the first line. By the combination of the causality deduced in the Ontology with time and space the data are given for explaining matter, inasmuch as now can be explained the apparent attraction and the just as apparent repulsion, which, therefore, are not to be regarded as primary forces of being but of matter, i.e., of what appears to be concurrence of existent things. Just because space is accidental to being, the fact must also become apparent, that essences lie outside this relation, hence motion cannot—much the rather might rest, i.e., the case, among the numberless ones, in which the velocity equals zero—appear wonderful and requiring explanation. Without an observer there would, of course, as little be motion as time and space, one factor of motion being time, the other velocity: \( m = ct \). The Outlines of the Philosophy of Nature, which is connected with the synechological investigations, seeks to show how the four cases—that in which the opposition of the elements is strong and nearly equal on both sides, that in which it is strong and very unequal, that in which it is weak and almost equal, that in which it is weak and very unequal,—suffice to explain the most important chemical phenomena, with which, as the most elementary, the philosophy of nature has to begin, viz. caloric, or heat-stuff (non-matter), the motion of which gives the phenomena of heat, electricum and its phe-
nomena in electricity and magnetism, finally, in the fourth case, the phenomena of gravity and light,—without taking refuge in such absurd assumptions as that of effects produced at a distance.

6. As Synecology is related to the Philosophy of Nature, so is Idolology to Psychology, the name *idology* implying that this branch aims to explain the *éthos* contained in our souls. Here, now, is first recognised as a merit of the Science of Knowledge that it begins with the Ego. This is really, though of course in another sense than Fichte had supposed, the starting-point,—the only one, as inherence and change had been for ontology. The Ego is, that is to say, a contradiction; a material contradiction, because the knowledge of knowledge presupposes again a knowledge of this, etc., hence never arrives at a full realization; a formal contradiction, because it is absurd that a presented object should be identical with its subject. The appearance of such identity must, therefore, be explained. The soul, which is, like all that is real, absolutely simple and consequently indestructible, cannot, as ontology has shown, be the substratum of various so-called faculties. Its quality also is, like that of every other real, unknown; it, on the contrary, is the only real as regards which what really occurs in it, its acts of self-conservation against disturbances, is known to us. These are the occurrences that begin with sensations and, for want of another term, may be called presentations, which, as idealism has rightly shown, can be neither the images of things nor effects of them, but are produced by the soul, wherever there is a meeting of it with other (disturbing) beings. Only then does it become a power that produces them. A fundamental investigation necessarily begins with the simplest and most primitive presentations, as sound, colour, etc. Even the circumstance that these are qualitatively different, then, too, the further circumstance, that acts of self-conservation, being positive, cannot annihilate, but only arrest one another, a fact confirmed by every felt contrast, and that, as regards any such kind of arrestings and contrasts, e.g., the harmony of musical tones, it is established that they are subject to mathematical conformity to law, recommends the application of mathematics to these investigations. (If one recalls what Kant [*vid. § 299, 5*] had said regarding the minimum of such application, and combines with that hints contained in his work on Negative Quantity, this innovation does not appear so strange.) As the basis of
the investigation may be taken the proposition, Every arrested
presentation remains in the soul as tendency to presentation.
This proposition, which follows from the fact that in all
changes of what is presented the quantity of the presentation
remains the same, justifies the comparison with elastic bodies,
and the presupposing, so long as other grounds do not forbid,
that as regards presentations arresting each other the same
laws hold as those to which (wholly) elastic bodies are subject.
Accordingly we have first, a Statics of the Mind, which treats
of the equilibrium of presentations, and, first of all, fixes the
conceptions of the sum of arrest and of the relation of arrest.
By the former is understood the quantum of the presentation
that is arrested in two meeting presentations; by the latter
the relation (corresponding of course to their strength) in
which the loss is distributed between the two. What is not
arrested but converted into tendency is called the residuum
of presentation. If the numerical values of their strength be
given, the calculation proves that one presentation only, even
though ever so strong, does not suffice wholly to suppress
another, though two can do so. The point that forms the
limit between existence as tendency and as unconscious pre-
sentation is the (statical) threshold of consciousness, and a
calculation of the same proves that the possibility of more
than three presentations subsisting in consciousness at the
same time is comprised within very narrow limits. Besides
the mutual conflict among presentations, there follows from
the fact that they exist in one soul, also the further fact that
they combine: these combinations, when they occur between
presentations of different groups (e.g., sound and meaning)
are complications: where the presentations belong to one and
the same continuum, they are fusions. Of the first are to be
distinguished perfect and imperfect complications, according
as the combining presentations are not arrested or are mere
residua. The fusions, again, are divided into those which
follow the arrest, where residua combine, and those which
precede the arrest and which appear as the tendency to fusion
(the formulae discovered by calculation are then also given
as laws expressed in words). Much more difficult than the
Statics is the Mechanics of the Mind, in which the motion of
presentations, their falling and rising, is treated, and the revival
of presentations, their association, as well as the susceptibility
for them and their renewal, are subjected to calculation; but
the mathematical formulæ are always translated again into words. What was won in the Statics and Mechanics of Mind by the synthetic method, receives, in the Analytical Part (the second) of Psychology, such an application as shows how, without the absurd supposition of various faculties of the soul, all phenomena given in experience can be explained by the formulæ developed. So in particular the problem that led to Idolology. The Ego, which, when subject and object are conceived as one, is an absurdity, is, on the other hand, entirely comprehensible when, according to the method of relations, the presented is conceived as manifold. Of course it is only the empirical Ego that is explained; there is no Kantian-Fichtean pure Ego (this position is characteristic of the anti-pantheists. Cf. supra, § 301, 1). Not only this, however, but the foregoing development puts us in a position to explain how the human mind comes by the conceptions first to be considered in the Logic and the earlier part of the Metaphysics, as also in the Practical Philosophy. This explanation is without any value for logic, metaphysics and practical philosophy, and it is a great and, unfortunately, wide-spread error when those sciences are founded upon psychology, in fact, perhaps entirely converted into psychology. Only for the sake of its own completeness does psychology inquire (not what the conception is, for to answer this question is the business of logic, but) how we come to form conceptions, to judge, etc. Exactly so is space an important psychological problem, the solution of which, however, does not at all enlighten us regarding the nature of space; this the Synechology has to develop. The confounding of psychological space, which is a continuum, with the intelligible, which is not, is one of the greatest errors that Kant committed. What is true of space is true of time; and just so of the categories, which, when rightly treated, coincide with the forms of language, and the system of which is, therefore, impossible, so long as we have no universal grammar. Exactly so, finally, psychology must and can explain how the soul comes to be displeased or pleased by anything, although this is a matter that is entirely irrelevant to æsthetics.

7. As regards, now, Æsthetics and the Practical Philosophy coinciding with it,—just as holding fast to the Kantian thing-in-itself would have saved philosophy from becoming idealistic, so the complete separation of theoretical and practical philo-
sophy will prevent philosophy from conducting, as with Fichte, to mere praxis. Ästhetics, as the science of that which pleases as being beautiful, and that, too, without cause, involuntarily for us, has first to distinguish this from that which is desired, which is something incomplete, and from the agreeable, which is related only to a subjective condition, and then to analyze it into its simplest elements, i.e., since only relations please, to establish the simplest relations that produce a pleasure devoid of desire. Only in one application of Ästhetics, or one branch of the theory of art, has this been done, viz., in music; and what thorough-bass does for this, the other branches of the theory of art have likewise striven to do for themselves. Among these there is, now, one that concerns the art that is required by every one, namely, the theory of virtue, or Practical Philosophy. This will have first to establish the simplest relations of will, that please as being (morally) beautiful, to inquire Why regarding which would be just as foolish as to inquire why the [musical] third or fifth pleases. That these relations, which may be called pattern-conceptions, or Ideas, are unconditionally valid, tell what should be, Kant has felt; he is, on the contrary, very much to be censured for having debased this character of the should-be by combining it with metaphysical conceptions; for example, with the conception of being, when he reasoned from the should-be to the can-be, i.e., to the being possible; but particularly with a conception to the denial of which, properly speaking, metaphysics leads, and which only the assumption of a chimerical intelligible character rescues, viz., with transcendental freedom, from the assumption of which neither punishment nor education is explicable, since both presuppose that acts are the fruit (i.e., necessary consequences) of character. With that confusion Kant's expression "metaphysics of morals," and the conversion of ethics into mere physics by his followers are in harmony. Again, the theory of freedom has led to the conceiving of ethics only as a theory of duties, i.e., to considering only arrested morality, so that it is explicable why Kant arrives at the revolting theory of radical evil. Of such Ideas, now, Herbart enumerates, from the beginning of his activity as an author, five: the two more formal ones of inner freedom (agreement with one's own judgment) and perfection (magnitude), then those of well-wishing, right, and equity, with which complicated relations immediately connect themselves, where several beings
become one through a mutual understanding; hence where the Ideas become social. Civil society, which hinders strife, the system of rewards, with which the idea of equity is connected, the system of administration, which corresponds to well-wishing, the system of culture, to which the idea of perfection leads, finally, the idea of spiritual society, which corresponds to inner freedom, are the five derived ideas in ascending series. If, now, to the totality of ideas there be joined the unity of the person, there results the conception of virtue, which as opposed to the natural limits (which do not at all secure against blame) becomes duty and the imperative. Duties are divided into those towards self (self-education), towards society, and, finally, duties lying in and relating to the future of both, for which the home-life as well as public-life labours. As in psychology the analytical part follows the synthetical, so a critical comparison of the principles here developed follows, as the test does the calculation, what, according to recognised authorities, is established in natural right and morals. For the former, Grotius is cited as an example; for the latter, Plato and Cicero, Wolff and Schleiermacher, and it is shown that each of these had held primarily one or another of these ten ideas.

8. In all separation of the theoretical and practical philosophy there are, notwithstanding the separation, two points of contact between them, in the treatment of which an acquaintance with both is presupposed. From the union of practical philosophy with the philosophy of nature there results the Theory of Religion; from its union with psychology pedagogics. The former, Herbart has not specially treated of; occasional expressions show that to him belief belongs entirely to the practical sphere, that the (according to his system) absurd conception of a ground of all reality has no practical consequence, whereas that of a highest wisdom (to which physico-ethical teleology points), which takes advantage of the flexibility of the elements, appears compatible with that of the most excellent nature. All metaphysical knowledge of a God would endanger humility. In this metaphysical indefiniteness there can be found room for the play of tradition, even of phantasy, if it only does not conceive God's well-wishing as nepotism, and His participation in the world as egoism. (Herbart's system is a new proof that in individualistic systems there is no place for that which the religious man, because he sees in it [also] the ground of all reality, calls
God). With all the greater partiality has he occupied himself with *Pedagogics*. Of this, the end is the development of the moral character or of virtue. Hence, it is possible neither under the theory of freedom, nor under the fatalistic view that makes man come forth as a flower out of the seed. The practical Ideas and the psychological knowledge of the fact that, and the conditions under which, certain numbers of ideas, become so firm that they re-act against newly introduced ideas are the guides for the educationalist. Government and instruction should unite to bring forth many-sidedness of interest. With both is connected discipline, which has for its end to give to morality strength of character, and to lead the educated to undertake self-education. Herbart sees what is in a certain respect an enlarged pedagogics, in statesmanship, which, according to him, must rest much less upon the forms of State than, the rather, upon custom. The parallel between the State and the individual subject in the Second Part of the Psychology is ingenious, in many places very witty.

9. A not less negative position towards the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity than that of Herbart is taken by **Arthur Schopenhauer** (22nd Feb., 1788 to 21st Sept., 1860), whose works: *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813, 2nd ed., 1847); *On Sight and Colour* (1816); *The World as Will and Idea* (his chef d'œuvre; first appeared in 1819, 2nd ed. in 2 vols., 1844); *On Will in Nature* (1836, 2nd ed., 1854); *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (1841); and *Parerga and Paralipomena* (2 vols., 1851), for a long time unheeded, first became known in their true significance in the last ten years of his life, a significance that, perhaps, lies midway between that claimed in the over-estimate of Frauenstädt (*vid.* among other works: **Arthur Schopenhauer. Von ihm, Ueber ihm**, 1863. *Aus Schopenhauer’s handschriftlichem Nachlass* (1864), of Gwinner (**Arthur Schopenhauer aus persönlichem Umgange dargestellt**, 1862. *Schopenhauer und seine Freunde*, 1864) and others, who see in him the Messiah of speculation; and the under-estimate of Haym (**Arthur Schopenhauer, in the fourteenth volume of the Preussische Jahrbücher**), who sees in him not really a philosopher, but merely a brilliant writer.

10. The subjective turn, to have given which to philosophy is, according to Schopenhauer, Descartes’ greatest merit, is carried further by the fact that Locke has shown regarding
a number of qualities of things, that they lie only in the soul. Berkeley went still further, and Kant furthest of all, who applied Locke's assertion also to his primary qualities, e.g., extension, and whose doctrine that time, space and the categories lie merely in us, is among the greatest discoveries that have ever been made. Hence he has succeeded, also, by a consistent course of argument in converting all objects of our knowledge into phenomena, i.e., mere presentations, and has in the first, which is the better, edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, expressly said that if the reflecting subject be abstracted from, there is neither world of sense nor nature. What is to be censured in Kant is that he assumes twelve categories, among them even a monstrosity like reciprocity, whereas by the fact that he constantly gives preference in thought to causality, he betrays the feeling that a reduction to this one is necessary. By such a reduction of all radical relations to that of ground and consequence, of all laws of thought to the principle of ground, still a second defect of Kant's is remedied—his too great separation of perception and thought, for even time and space, succession and co-existence show themselves to be one of the four forms of the ground, viz., ratio essendi, besides which are three others, ratio fiendi, agendi, cognoscendi. By the supervision of the ratio fiendi, i.e. causality, upon the wholly subjective sensations, the object arises. Not that we infer an object from the sensations, but the transition takes place, immediately, the understanding here acts intuitively, the perception is intellectual. Through the supervision of causality the object becomes; so that, therefore, an object that was not subject to the law of causality, e.g., a last cause, would be just as great an absurdity as one that were neither temporal nor spatial. For every condition of change the understanding must think a cause,—which is its function, as it is that of the stomach to digest; since, now, a condition of change presupposes a permanent somewhat, causality cannot be thought without substance, but this is limited to what is temporal and spatial, and there is nothing actual that is not material. All theistic ideas are, therefore, old wives' philosophy, "material substance" is a pleonastic expression, creation of matter an absurdity. As the investigations relating to the ratio essendi, or time and space, coincide with those relating to sense-perception, so those relating to the ratio fiendi, or causality, coincide with those relating to reason, which is not the
creative, but the receptive, feminine faculty of abstract presentation, and whose discursive thought is wrongly placed above the intuitive understanding, from which it receives all content. The fourth form of consequence or effect, finally, is that based on the ratio agendi, or the motive. Motivation is causality become inward, hence is necessity as much as it, and to assume freedom in the world of phenomena is an absurdity. The result of the entire investigation is: The principle of Ground rules the world; but since it is only a law of our thought, the world is only idea (presentation),—the whole world, hence also the part of the world which is my immediate object, my own body, which may be termed the microcosm, just as the world may be termed the macrocosmos. This is what we have in mind when we pronounce the word I; the Ego is therefore phenomenon, and has, just for that reason, the form of individuality, for temporality and spatiality are the real principium individuationis.

11. All the foregoing propositions are held and declared by Schopenhauer to be purely Kantian. But now presents itself a point in which, though adopting Kant, he yet separates from him. That there is in philosophy no other starting-point than consciousness, had been accepted since Descartes. In this, now, there lies, first, that we find ourselves to be beings of time and space, subject to the principle of Ground, i.e., to be phenomena. At the same time, however, we have of ourselves a consciousness that we are something different, and this our in-ourselves lies in the will, of which I am conscious, therefore, not in an objective manner, but immediately. Kant himself appears to have had a presentiment of the fact that where the subject is conscious of its own willing it perceives more than merely its phenomenon, for when he speaks of things-in-themselves he always has in mind practical, that is, volitional, determinations. (If Schopenhauer had not been full of a so blind animosity towards Fichte, he would have confessed how much he here owes to the author of the Science of Knowledge.) As our phenomenal Ego is related to the phenomenal world, just so must our in-ourselves be related to that which the world-in-itself is; and hence there is to be added, as complement, to the first, chief principle of Schopenhauer's doctrine: The world is idea, the second: It is will. By this word, that is to say, is to be understood the stress pervading all phenomena, which impels
the heavy body to the centre, the iron to the magnet, plants to grow, man to action. To the will as the in-itself of the world must, of course, be attributed the opposites of the predicates that belong to the phenomenal world. It works without ground, it is only One, it is that \( \epsilon \nu \ \kappa \alpha i \ \pi \acute a v \) which the oldest and hence the truest theory has proclaimed. The merit must be allowed Schelling, that he has spread it again to wider circles. Although Schopenhauer does not fear the name pantheism, he yet forbids himself the use of it; he has never said \( \pi \acute a v \ \theta \epsilon \omega s \); rather, he denies what the religious man calls God. As man’s character consists in his will, just so also does the quality of things which constitutes their character, consist in the stages that the will has attained in them. These eternal stages of the will are the unchangeable species, which one may, with Plato, call Ideas, which alone endure, whereas individuals pass away. To this, human individuals form no exception. Everything individual is mere appearance, \( M a i a \), illusion. Nature, which is bountiful of individuals, forms them to preserve the species at their cost; even human community of sexes has for its end the production of a being in which the emotional qualities of the father, and the intellect of the mother, shall be united. Whereas the Hindoo theory asserts the nullity of the individual, Judaism introduced the delusion of an immortality. Christianity, descending from both, vacillates between them. The origin of this delusion is, for the rest, explicable partly by the egoism of man, partly by the impossibility of thinking the world without us. (Impossibility, for the world exists only in us.) Hence not I, but Man, is immortal. The eternal species form a series of stadia in which the higher, by reason of their overpowering assimilation of the lower, stand above these (\( s e r p e n s \ \ s e r p e n t e m \ \ c o m e d e n s \ \ f i t \ \ d r a c o \)), spending, of course, in such overpowering force, on account of which every individual stands a stadium behind its Idea. On the lowest stadium appears mere matter as the product of forces (\( i.e., \) blind willing); the will rises much higher where an activity follows upon a stimulus. Finally, the will objectifies itself in organisms that do not have to wait for the stimulus, but are motivated by thought-objects; and seek for nourishment that is to be assimilated, and therefore require the knowledge through which stimuli become motives. To this end the organism requires a brain, in which, therefore, the highest objectification of the will presents
itself. But with this organ is given, once for all, the world with all its forms, subject and object, time, space, plurality, causality. The brain with all its ideas is, primarily, merely an instrument of the will, which has to serve the will and preserve the life of the individual. Since cognition, or the functioning of the brain, appears first upon the highest stadium, we cannot speak of an end of the will. It is without knowledge, blind, mere will to live, impulse to objectify itself. As it has no motive, there do not apply to the one will, as the in-itself, the other forms of ground; and the question as regards the why of willing has no meaning, and is the limit of philosophy, as the irrational is the limit of reason. The question, so much discussed, regarding the relation of the real and the ideal is therefore to be answered as follows: Philosophy has an ideal, transcendental, or ideological side, and a real, materialistic, physiological side, and we have to pass from each to the other; so that we have to do here, properly speaking, with two identities. If we pursue the idealistic method, we begin with perception, discover a priori space, time, and all other relations, and hence do not get beyond phenomena, i.e. presentations. At last we discover that we ourselves also have to be regarded as mere phenomena, but, at the same time (as in the grotto of Posilippo, where it is darkest, there the light of day begins), it is evident that we ourselves are also something in-itself, i.e., will; hence, also, the world has reality, inasmuch as the will, in the highest place in the brain, objectifies itself in it. Hence it is now immaterial whether one says, idealistically, The world is idea, or, realistically, It is functioning of the brain, whether one says, idealistically, Locke treated sense, Kant the understanding, or, realistically, The former the sense-organs, the latter the brain. As the body, therefore, is on the one hand, my idea, so is it, on the other, my will; brain is cognition of willing, the genitals are the will to procreate, etc.

12. The subsidiary position, which, therefore, primarily, the intellect occupies towards the will, namely, that it exists only in order that life may be preserved, is the permanent and only one in the case of animals and of the ordinary, brutish-minded man. It is otherwise as regards artistic and philosophic genius. This rises to a disinterested knowledge, a knowledge not merely subservient to the end of living, but one in which the brain becomes a parasite of the
body, which preys upon it, and is not an advantage to it but, the rather, endangers its well-being. In art and philosophy genius rises to the perception of the pure What, does not inquire after the Why of phenomena: just so does it rise above the individual to the perception of the Idea. Where art and philosophy are subservient to the end of living they become degraded. (Hence Schopenhauer's antipathy towards "the professors of philosophy," who, according to his view, do not live to philosophize, but vice versa.) Because genius transcends the principle of Ground, we often find among men of genius an aversion to mathematics; because it transcends the end of preserving life, it creates nothing that is useful: that is its patent of nobility. The power of art as well as of philosophy to bless and to comfort lies in the fact that they so represent life, which is, in part, pitiable, in part, terrible, that it becomes a significant drama, and because they lift it to a standpoint where interest and will cease, and the world remains and is known only as an idea. From this it follows that there is no practical philosophy; all philosophy is theoretical. But art and philosophy are not the only means by which man rises to the standpoint of Ideas. This also takes place in a way that is not merely momentary and dependent upon the contingency of genius, i.e., in holy living, to the consideration of which are devoted partly the Fourth Book of his principal work (the Third had treated of art) and partly the ethical work: The Fundamental Problems of Ethics. If the individual so yields to the will to live, which objectifies itself in him as in all others, as that will expresses itself in the iron command to nourish the body, to multiply, etc., that this will fills his whole life without being destroyed by knowledge, this is affirmation of the will, or egoism, in which man as this individual regards himself as the in-itself, or the absolute. In greater measure does this appear in optimism, the wicked spirit of realistic Judaism, and of the newest, hence the worst, religion of Islam, to which phenomena are the truth. In opposition to this the oldest religion, which forms the kernel even of Christianity, teaches that all existence is an evil and a sin, and this pessimism is avowed even by the profoundest Christian dogma, the dogma of hereditary sin, as also by the fact that world and evil are synonymous. What mockery, to speak of a best world where the most fortunate knows no better moment than that of sleep, the most
unfortunate no worse than that of waking. The spectacle of suffering in the world, in which there is no one who is fortunate, brings us, like that of every tragedy, to the perception of eternal justice, before which every individual thing is nothing, and which, therefore, punishes the man who violates it. The Vedas say, Thou thyself art all. The knowledge of absolute nothingness makes all distinction between self and others vanish, capacitates us, therefore, for sympathy, the only moral motive-force, and makes even the highest act of morality possible, that negation of the will which is called resignation, abnegation, absence of will, in which, as in the enjoyment of art, felicity, since unwilled knowledge is present, finds place; so man with will ceases to will, makes the will the quieter of willing,—a contradiction in will, which is called self-denial. If in the works of genius the opposition of the real and the ideal, the Idea and the individual, is resolved, so, here, is that between freedom and necessity. To the right conception of the relation of the two, Kant led by his distinction (coinciding with the distinction of thing-in-itself and phenomenon) of intelligible and empirical character, one of the greatest discoveries that man has ever made. The unchangeable character, the necessary fruits of which our actions are, is rightly called empirical, since we learn to know it after it comes into existence for us. It is the spatial and temporal phenomenon of the intelligible character, or of that non-temporal indivisible act of will, for which, in the pangs of conscience, I accuse myself, not because I act so but because I am so, and must, therefore, act so. The condition of the holy one, in which the cloak of the individualizing Maia was rent, and the knowledge that between me and others there is no difference whatever, became a quieter of the (individual) will, does not obtain as an (impossible) change of the character, but as the birth of a new character, which, like the origin of genius, is a work of grace, and can only come to be where the emptiness of individual existence becomes perfectly clear to us, hence, often in the case of condemned criminals, shortly before death. The so-called working of grace is the only immediate expression of transcendental freedom, an entering of freedom into necessity, i.e. of grace into nature. Suppose that the will to live ceased to exist in all, then all individuals, hence also their ideas, the world, would vanish, a result which, to him who is full of will, appears to be nothing, but for which, nevertheless,
as after the Nirvana of the Buddhists, all those long who deny the will in themselves, and perceive the nothingness of the world.

13. The parallel which I drew years ago in my larger work (§ 41), and in the Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, I hold at present to be correct, and cannot admit what Schopenhauer has said in opposition to it, viz., that his philosophy stands related to Herbart's as the true to the false. Rather is this relation something entirely special, inasmuch as in the manner of their philosophizing, the content of their metaphysics and ethics, the manner and way in which, now positively, now negatively, they connect themselves with other philosophers, etc., they are diametrically opposed. It is evident from this fact that I must also disagree with those who charge me with having thereby placed upon a level a philosopher of great importance with one who is of no significance whatever. As regards the genesis of Schopenhauer's system, particularly the debts, not acknowledged by him, to philosophers whom he treated so contemptuously, very learned and pertinent remarks are to be found in the above-cited dissertation of Haym, which appeared in a special reprint in the year 1864 (Reimer, Berlin).

B.—VON BERGER, SOLGER, STEFFENS.

§ 322.

RECONCILIATIONS OF PANTHEISM AND SUBJECTIVISM.

1. In part contemporaneously with the reaction, just described, against the System of Identity and the Science of Knowledge, in part before and after it, attempts were made to get free from them in a positive manner, by transcending their opposition. The latter attempts,—which, because they had been in some measure related to the last-named systems as Empiricism was to the Sceptics and Mystics (§§ 277, 278), made the former attempts appear, in the eyes of the authors of the latter, and in the eyes of the public, as unimportant,—are distinguished from one another by the fact that, in the one case, the point of departure was a standpoint which coincided with, or at least lay close to, that of the Science of Knowledge, in the other, just such a one as coincided with, or lay close to, that of the System of Identity, so that, on the one hand, sub-
jectivism, and, on the other, the opposite of that, were later supplemented with the other moment, which, naturally, since warp and woof are not of equal importance for the web, will present a different appearance. But to this is to be added, that subjectivism itself had received a different form, according as it appeared as ethical subjectivism, as with Kant and Fichte, or, as aesthetic and emotional subjectivism, as among the Romanticists, or, finally, as in the religious peculiarity of Schleiermacher. By both these circumstances the performances of von Berger, Solger and Steffens were modified, which in many respects are in close agreement, and which may here be placed together as has been done in my extended presentation of them (Entw. d. deutsch. Spec. seit Kant, § 42).

2. Johann Erich von Berger (born Sept. 1st, 1772; died Feb. 23rd, 1833, as professor of philosophy in Kiel, where for a long time he had in vain looked forward to the professorship of astronomy), introduced by Reinhold’s works to Kant, then by these, but particularly by Fichte’s, carried beyond Criticism, became later a disciple of Schelling; although he always preserved a reverence for Fichte, so that his chief aim was to put an end to the discord between the two masters. Among his works are especially to be named: Philosophical Exposition of the All (1808), and (his chef d’œuvre) Outlines of Science, 4 vols. (1817–27). The first-named work, left incomplete, developed, in a manner which did not long satisfy the author himself, the parallelism between the laws of the All and those of the perceiving mind, assigning, at the same time, to the latter so much autonomy that Fichte, recognising the fact, says that Berger does not here lapse into the philosophy of nature hated by himself, and its denial of idealism. As regards his chief work, the date of the first volume, and still more, consequently, of the tardily appearing later volumes, leads to the expectation that notice will be taken of phenomena such as the writings of Hegel. Perhaps from this fact a number of points of agreement are explicable. Since the principle and method of science cannot be laid down before science itself, but both rule not only the course of our thoughts but also of things, the first part of the system (and the first volume of the work) is devoted to the consideration of knowledge, to Logic, which closes with the proposition that by means of reason the mind knows that all which it fundamentally (divinitus) perceives also is, and appears to
the finite mind as external, whereas to the highest mind (even in us) it appears as transparent. Again to recognise in it spiritual relations is the problem of the second Part of the system, the *Physics* (2nd vol.: *The Philosophical Knowledge of Nature*, 1821). A recapitulation of the Logic, in part modificatory, forms the entrance to the philosophy of nature, which begins with the opposition of light and gravity, requires an inner union of mathematics and physics, treats, in the first Book, of the physical universe as a whole, in the second, of the Earth, and first of inorganic and then of organic nature, and, in the systematic account of plants and animals, rests upon Cuvier, Goldfuss, and, particularly, upon Oken. Man as the highest animal, perhaps descended from the ape, forms the mediation between physics and *Ethics*, and is treated in the third volume of the *Outlines* (*Anthropology and Psychology*, 1824), whereas the fourth and last volume (1827) contains the Outlines of Morals, Right and the State, as also of Religion. Though giving full recognition to Spinoza and Fichte, von Berger sees in both partial views that have to be mediated; just so he requires that Kant's separation of the legal and the moral be done away with. Although the conception of a moral organism is not wanting to him, yet he maintains with emphasis that the State is a compact, and, accordingly, antagonizes distinctions of class. Monarchy should be limited by a written fundamental law of the State. In the philosophy of religion he emphasizes the practical moment, often expresses himself regarding dogmas with a certain tone of depreciation. He is prejudiced against all mysticism. Hence evil is conceived by him as the victory of sense, and he declares not only against the doctrine of Satan but also against that of radical evil and intelligible freedom.

3. Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger (born Nov. 28th, 1780; died as professor of philosophy in Berlin on the 25th of Oct., 1819), to whose Erwin (1815), which was published by himself, and *Philosophical Dialogues* (1817), are to be added his *Posthumous Works and Correspondence* (2 vols., 1826) and his *Lectures on Aesthetics* (1829), passed over from philosophical and æsthetical to philosophical studies, in Jena, with the assistance of the lectures of Schelling, and of intercourse with the two Schlegels and other Romanticists. From the lectures of Schelling, now first before the public, on the philosophy of art, it may be seen how much Solger owes to
him as regards aesthetic theories. He first heard Fichte later, in Berlin, on the Science of Knowledge. There was thus very naturally developed a standpoint from which he sees in Fichte and Schelling the greatest philosophers, indeed, but one-sided philosophers, and from which he avoids pantheism in that he places in God the moment of negation by means of which He can enter into nullity, and in the individual being, the power by means of which it can give up its nullity, can sacrifice itself. This reciprocal surrender and self-negation appears to him to be most fitly designated by the expression Irony, which plays a great part, particularly in his aesthetical speculations, which remain his favourite ones. That in this position neither the monological exposition of the subjectivists nor the mathematical one of pantheism, which denies Egos, satisfied him, but that he gives preference to the form of the dialogue, must be termed characteristic. Dialectics, which, according to Solger, has to provide the foundation for the system, reaches, by a comparison of the ordinary with the philosophical consciousness, the result, that in the latter not relations but essence itself, the absolute, God, presents itself in us; which may be termed the rule of the Idea in us. By this relation to ordinary thought, which moves in the distinctions universal and particular, the Idea embracing these sides of the opposition is sundered into the idea of the True and of the Good; philosophy becomes theoretical and practical, Physics and Ethics. Above these, resolving their opposition, stands the Idea not only of the beautiful, but also of the divine, the former having a theoretical, the latter a more practical, character; and besides those two parts of philosophy, we have also Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Religion. On the subject of physics there are in Solger merely suggestions, which agree essentially with Schelling. In the Ethics it is shown that, as the two sides of man, nature (instinct) and understanding, give the system of the (four Platonic) virtues, so also in the State nature (necessity) leads to Rights and understanding to Politics. The right of punishment, which is grounded on the principle that evil as a nullity must experience the fate of nullity, leads from the former to the latter. The State presents to us individuals not as a totality but as an individual, as a people. To classes, particularly to the nobility, Solger attaches great importance. He does not enter into the closer consideration of classes.
Solger’s speculations have value chiefly as regards the beautiful. *Æsthetics* is his proper sphere, and he appeared all the more original in that by the fact that Schelling’s Jena lectures had not been printed. The distinction of symbol and allegory, and the distinction, parallel with that, between the antique and the Christian; further, the distinction between poetry and art had been maintained by Schelling. Peculiar to Solger is the emphasising of irony, as the certainty that it is the fate of the beautiful to become extinct, because even what is most admirable in the actual is nothing in comparison with the Idea. The system of arts is developed, and it is pointed out how all arts at last become religious, how into the place of the drama in the antique world there has entered in the Christian world the worship of God, in which all arts are united. On the subject of the *Philosophy of Religion* only fragmentary expositions are to be found, in the *Posthumous Works and Letters*. What is said exhibits many points of agreement with the *Æsthetics*. To the antithesis of symbolical and allegorical in the latter, correspond in the former that of the mythical and the mystical. The theory of evil is the central point in the throughout mystical Christian religion. The annulling, by God, of that which is in itself nullity, the love in which God annihilates His nothingness and has slain death, mediates the return of God to Himself. What in Christ, the pivotal point of history, was done for the race, is repeated subjectively in every believer.

4. With von Berger and Solger is associated Heinrich Steffens, though he is to be rated higher than both, partly because the subjectivism by which he surmounts pantheism is a higher subjectivism than that of his two companions, partly because he has developed his views more completely than they theirs. Steffens was born in Norway on the 2nd of May, 1773, was educated at Copenhagen, Jena and Freiberg, and was, after 1804, an incorporated citizen of Germany and particularly of Prussia, which he served as professor in Halle, Breslau and Berlin, and died on the 13th of February, 1845. His autobiography in ten volumes (*Was ich erlebte*, 1840–45) shows that he has a very clear consciousness of his position, and also of how he attained to it. It merely confirms what an attentive study of his writings shows, that the point of departure was with him the Spinozistic-Schellingian doctrine of the All-One, but that by his own branch of study, mineralogy
and crystallography, he was early made aware of the peculiarity of natural existence, and by geognosy, again, of the succession of periods through which the earth has passed. Hence the two leading thoughts of his works in the philosophy of nature, the historical view of nature and the recognition of peculiarity in nature, clearly stand forth already in his first, and, in many respects, his most original work, the Contributions to the Inner Natural History of the Earth (1801), a work that introduced to the public for the first time a natural philosopher richly equipped with empirical knowledge, and hence made a great reputation. By a combination of the results of chemical investigations relating to earths as well as to organic bodies, with what Werner had said about schist and lime formations, Steffens here comes to the result that the same opposition that appears within the sphere of animal life as that of sensibility and irritability is to be perceived again, in another form, in the opposition of animals and plants, but just so also in the geological opposition of lime and silex formations, and finally, in the chemical opposition of nitrogen and carbon; and that we have to do with the theoretical, i.e., genetic, deduction of this opposition. This deduction begins, now, with the metals, the quantitatively and qualitatively different cohesion of which necessitates the assumption of two different series, which have their common point of intersection and centre in the heaviest; so that these radical metals, since they exhibit the least individual formation, exhibit the lowest stage of corporeal existence, which, therefore, also forms the core of the earth. From this point, now, there is assumed, to start with, a double cohesion-series, according as the cohesion presents itself as ductility or hardness; and if the metals are arranged according to this principle, the central position among them would, in one series belong to iron, in which ductility and hardness stand in inverse relation, because the harder it is the more brittle it is; in the other series, the central position would perhaps belong to zinc. By classing the earths among the metals, Steffens arrives at the conclusion that at the extreme end of the one (the silex) series pure carbon presents the maximum of contraction, and may have its antipode in nitrogen in the other (the lime) series, so that if metals were at all analyzable, they would consist of these. Not to be compared with these but to be regarded as active principles working upon the series of the passive, are the two elements
which stand opposed to one another, oxygen and hydrogen, which are at the same time representatives of electricity, as in the former cohesion-series we have magnetism, which, in the one nodal point, iron, emerges free. This opposition, and hence the activity of magnetism, is, now, shown to be the active principle in earth-formation, and is confirmed by the different character of the two hemispheres, by the different proximity to the equator in which the different metals are deposited, etc. In brief, the opposed activity, which appears on the earth in vegetation and animalization is, like the opposition of repulsion (expansion) and attraction (contraction), contained in it, and is efficient in its own formation. But the principle of this formation and, particularly, of organization is, that nature seeks the most individual formation, hence also, as Kielmeyer first showed, the gradual descent, in the animal series, of reproduction towards irritability, of the latter towards sensibility, presents a series of stages in which animals attain only to reproduction of the species, whereas in man, where reason is reached, the tendency of that reproduction coincides with that of the reproduction of nature. The most individual formation presents the truest manhood.

5. Less originality, a quality, however, that cannot be required in a compendium for academical lectures, is shown by Steffens in: The Outlines of the Philosophical Natural Sciences (1806), published during his professorship in Halle. Familiar intercourse with Schleiermacher, in which neither of the two held himself merely in a receptive attitude, and the high respect that both had always paid to individuality explain why, although, particularly at the beginning of the work, agreement with Schelling’s Authentic Exposition is very perceptible, there are here so many points of contact with Schleiermacher, which the latter always recognised. For example, there is instanced as a cardinal problem of natural science the knowledge that all opposites are relative, and that, accordingly, quadruplicity must everywhere prevail. (How natural this was for a Schellingian, Wagner and Troxler had already shown.) The demonstration of the presence of quadruplicity everywhere contributes greatly to synoptical clearness of arrangement, but often wrongly leads Steffens to emphasize parallelism in such a manner that he applies expressions that are correct only as applied to one stage, to another, a fact that has given him as well as many Schellingians, particularly Oken,
the character of one who puts ingenious analogies in the place of real thought-determinations. The central point of all organization is defined, at the close of the Outlines, to be man; so that the individual spheres of organization are to be regarded as disjecta membra of the human organization, and man is to be regarded as the microcosm in which, for that reason, the quadruplicity ruling in nature is repeated in ages, temperaments, etc. This last thought, now, forms the theme of the Anthropology, which, though written much earlier in separate parts, was not published until 1822 (Breslau, 2 vols.). Steffens here puts before himself the problem of presenting man in his continuity with the whole of nature, a line of thought which only he can decry as materialistic, to whom, because he has turned away from nature, the living All becomes a plurality of isolated things. The Anthropology considers man as the key-stone of an infinite past, as the middle-point of an infinite present, as the beginning-point of an infinite future. Since the first portion of the treatise relates to occurrences prior to man, which geological investigations have brought to light, the First Part is entitled, Geological Anthropology. It fills the entire first volume. The first dissertation proves that the core of the earth is metallic, and connects itself closely with the Contributions to the Inner Natural History of the Earth, inasmuch as it at the same time takes into account what had been discovered in twenty years for its confirmation or refutation. In that, particularly Oerstedt's discoveries are reckoned, because they prove magnetism to be a property of the whole metal series. The second dissertation, the History of the Development of the Earth has, because of the fact that Steffens identifies the individual periods with the six days of Moses, called out expressions of hostility and eulogies, of which it is difficult to say which did him the more credit. He seeks to show that as everything pertaining to animate being (e.g. a peculiar talent) develops through six stadia, so also in the development of the earth must be distinguished six periods, in the first of which its embryonic life is such that our system of planets is, we may say, related to a distant central body, as now the planet is to the sun. In a second period, in which the primal metal remains enveloped and air and earth separate, the earth is not endowed with motion on its axis nor with fixed east and west polarity, hence is like a moon. Following this is a third, a
transition period, in which the earth circles comet-like about its
own central body and about a foreign sun, under the influence
of which the tropical vegetation arises which is exhibited in our
fossilizations. This (schist and vegetation) period is followed
by a fourth, in which takes place, together with animalization,
the breaking away of the earth from the foreign sun, hence its
becoming a planet, and hence also the conversion of its central
body into a sun. This period is, at the same time, that of
porphyry. The lime formation and the lower animals belong to
the fifth period. Finally, to the sixth belong the higher animals
and man, who, not only "in his kind," as a being of class and
species, but as an eternal personality, is an image of God.
The transition to the Physiological Anthropology, which forms
the Second Part of the work, is made by Steffens by means
of the following consideration: If we maintain the unity of
human nature with that outside of man, we must suppose that
with the innocence of man, the condition in which the demonic
powers lying in him are united, there runs parallel that con-
dition in which self-will, the dark principle in nature, was ruled
by the universal ordering power. But, now, geognostic facts
teach that a destroying catastrophe, which was accompanied
by a very sudden change of climate, took place, and that, too,
when men were already in existence. Both necessitate the
hypothesis, confirmed also by revelation, that at a period in
which there prevailed in the north-west portion of the earth
the most luxuriant vegetation, an animal world of monsters, and
every fiendish violence of human life, the sea flooded the now
naked land and buried the insolent world. At the same time
volcanic fires might have subverted the continent in the south-
west, the remains of which now form the fifth of the grand divi-
sions of the world. How the appetite of man could penetrate
and taint the whole of nature can of course be shown only by
a complete physiological anthropology, which, just on that ac-
count, would have to consider the meaning of all life, even the
sub-human, in order to show how all forms of that finally cul-
minate in man, who, in the two sexes, repeats the opposition of
animals and plants, and in whom the eternal personality mani-
ests itself in what may be called one’s endowment (his
“talent” in the Holy Scriptures), which makes him the central
point of an infinite present, the beginning-point of an infinite
future. The Third and last Part, the Psychological Anthro-
pology, considers the human race as regards the destiny
it has, to bring to an end, by the appropriation of grace, the conflict set loose by it. The conflict of the races with historical peoples forms the beginning-point of this development. In the former, the germs contained in man have been only partially developed by external circumstances; in the latter, the Good remains, i.e., the whole man, is still potent. The goal is, that the love that appeared in Christ be confirmed in every one by the eternal personality.

6. The conclusion of the Anthropology forms the transition from Steffens’s Physics to the second main division of the system, which in the Outlines he has called Natural Right, later Ethics, often also Science of History. He has treated ethical questions at length only in his work: The Present Age and How it has Become (2 vols., 1817), and the Caricatures of the Holiest (2 vols. 1819–21). The title of the latter work is explained by the fact that he first lays down the Idea of the State as the manifestation of freedom and morality, the end of which is to protect individuality (hence property also), and then shows how, through sin, this peculiar principle of the phenomenal in its opposition to its Idea, the individual moments of the Idea become isolated and give caricatures, the complete sum of which makes perceptible the Idea, though, of course, dismembered. The construction of the classes of society, and the characterization of them,—the brilliant portion of the work,—are based on the opposition of being and knowledge, nature and mind, which pervades the All; and show how this opposition is, in man, resolved in innocence, on the one hand, and in wisdom, on the other; both of which stand opposite to us as lost and never attained, but which approach us in the State, in the working classes and the profession of teachers. In the former are distinguished peasant, burgher, and noble, to which three correspond in the latter, the learned man, the talented man, and the genius. The profession of teachers performs its civil functions in education and lawgiving; the chief instrument of both is literary activity, the press. The errors of the present in its demands regarding the peasant, burgher, etc., are discussed in a manner that resulted in Steffens’s offending all parties. His citing gymnastic exercises among the caricatures of education estranged his best friends. The ethical speculations are followed in the Second Part of the Caricatures by those in the philosophy of religion. Moreover, certain works are
devoted to these solely, of which are to be mentioned particularly an essay of the year 1821: Relation of Philosophy and Religion (in Works, Old and New), and The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, published in 1839 in two volumes; since the two works, On False Theology, and How I became a Lutheran, do not pretend to be so much scientific investigations as confessions. As, almost always in his later lectures, Steffens bases his investigations in the philosophy of religion on Hume and Kant. The first had, according to Steffens, guaranteed by faith the reality of that which religious belief declared to be worthless; the second had assigned to faith the law, from which it is precisely faith that sets us free. Further, Kant is to be regarded as the Copernicus of German speculation, because he has directed thought to the fact that there is something higher than finite phenomena. But since he has assumed a threefold fact beyond phenomena, it was possible that wholly different views should be based on him, and, accordingly, Fichte took as the absolute the moral, and hence action; the System of Identity the beautiful, and hence intuition; Hegel, finally, the conception of organism, and therewith thought. All these three one-sided views have been transcended by Schelling's later doctrine (vid. § 323), with which Steffens professes himself to be in entire agreement in all essential points. Here the main thing is that philosophy takes as its leading idea personality, so that speculation becomes the personal comprehension of the personal God. But to this elevation neither pantheism (not even the Hegelian), which sees in personality only sickly subjectivity, individualization, nor Fichte, who really puts the latter in the place of personality, attains. Neither can comprehend that, in the mutual surrender of the Christian to God and vice versa, I am of as much consequence to God as He is to me. This strengthening of our personality by the divine is love, and in it consists religion as well as speculation. Their difference consists in the fact that the former does not suffer itself to be perturbed by finite thought, and that the latter, on the other hand, by exhibiting its nullity, overthrows it, and so reproduces faith, but at the same time makes possible the tolerance that does not rest upon indifference. Personality has for its natural foundation, natural peculiarity, talent, which is the culminating point of nature; so that the philosophy of nature becomes teleology, and shows how in man, in his talent, not the species
(as in instinct) but individuality, is the governing force, is the centre of all and conditions the position of all, such that his inner conflicts are mirrored in the revolutions of the earth. Hence the parallelism between geology and mythology. As humanity is related to the All, so is the Saviour to humanity; so that there must be assumed three moments in creation: a cosmical, as the planets arranged themselves about the sun; a telluric, as the earth found its central point in man; a historical, when the Saviour appeared as the Sun of humanity. The development of His kingdom, the appearance of which the monster of the Roman empire preceded, as animal monsters preceded the appearance of man, makes distinguishable three periods, the expired Petrine, the begun Pauline, the future Johannine. With teleology connects itself, as second part of the philosophy of religion, (religious) Ethics, the chief subject of which is Evil, which has its ground in the will, hence in a personality, not, indeed, an actual, but always merely an ideal, one. The possibility of evil belongs to the full human personality; hence the fact that Christ could be tempted. Realized, evil suffers its annihilation, which, according as the sinner will, is felt as punishment or pardon. Salvation and damnation are correlates, redemption is a non-Christian error; whoever predestinates himself to the damnation that grace does not will, is damned. To decide whether one will or not were impious. As the first Paradise passed away and the second appeared in Christ, so also the latter vanished with his death, and the third appeared in the Church, which, resting upon the revelation given in the Bible, is preserved by faith, sacrament, and preaching. Inasmuch as, according to the idea of the preacher, the preacher is he who has overcome the opposition of the worldly and the divine consciousness, and this, according to the first definition of the philosophy of religion, was its nature, the philosophy of religion returns, with this its self-justification, to its beginning.

7. Similarly to von Berger and Solger, so also Steffens proves that an incorporation of subjectivism into the System of Identity not only neutralizes the pantheism of the latter, but also has, as a necessary consequence, a changed arrangement of the individual parts of philosophy. Since, that is to say, subjectivism (in its most logical form the Science of Knowledge) can see in nature only limits or unreason, nature, wherever a right is conceded to subjectivism, must descend from its
high position of being a co-ordinate of the mind. Even though it remain a phenomenon of reason, it can be so only in the form of inferiority to mind. Both, the worship of nature in the System of Identity, and the contempt of it in the Science of Knowledge, are avoided and yet receive their proper dues, in a milder form, if nature becomes the vestibule of the mind, and the philosophy of nature teleology, to employ Steffens's phraseology. Thereby, further, the twofold beginning in the System of Identity is avoided, to which there corresponded the twofold ending: the theory of mind in its culminating point, the theory of religion, closes the system, which, therefore, no longer has for its schema the magnet, but moves forward in a continued straight line. There thus makes its appearance that difference between these three men (which is, perhaps, the only one in which Steffens falls behind the other two), which lies in the fact that von Berger and Solger would preface the philosophy of nature by logic or dialectic, and, just in so doing, avow their agreement with Hegel, whereas Steffens requires that the beginning should be made with the consideration of the natural All, and speaks of the man who saw in the philosophy of nature only applied logic, with a bitterness quite unnatural to him. Still another person experiences this unjust criticism, namely, Oken, who made the attempt to convert it into mathesis. It is characteristic, that precisely these two are placed very high by von Berger, who stands over against Steffens, who, otherwise, is allied with him, as the rationalist over against the mystic. From Solger, with whom Steffens agrees precisely in that in which he diverges from von Berger, viz., in the theory of evil, in the exaltation of corporations in the State, in clinging to the symbols of faith, etc., he differs, in that while the former is completely an artist, he is always the religious man, so that the expositions of the one aim at being works of art, whereas those of the other often border on the method of edification.

C.—SCHELLING’S DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM.

§ 323.

1. Earlier, in part much earlier, than the men last named, whose standpoint was closely allied to his, had Schelling himself made attempts to overcome the pantheism of the System of Identity. This was done in the doctrine which, because it was first presented to the world in the Investi-
gations relating to Freedom, and because this work was also later cited by himself and his disciples as an authority, will here be designated as the Doctrine of Freedom, in contradistinction to the earlier doctrine of the All-Unity. Since these attempts fall in the period in which his dispute with Fichte, which was carried on partly in letters, partly before the public, was most violent, he would hardly at that time have confessed, what was acknowledged by him at a much later period,—that the apotheosis of the Fall of man, which he then condemned in the Science of Knowledge, was a permanent discovery; that is, that, as the System of Identity had driven the author of the Science of Knowledge beyond his own doctrine, just so the Science of Knowledge made it impossible that the father of the System of Identity should still hold to his own doctrine. He would not have been wholly in the wrong if he had denied this, for what gave the first occasion to the new direction to his philosophizing was, not the study of Fichte but of another Lusatian, to whom his attention had been very particularly directed by Baader—Jacob Böhme. Even the one leading idea in his treatise on Freedom, viz., that nothing has reality except the will, an idea of which it has been said that Schelling, just as Schopenhauer did later, borrowed it, without doubt, from Fichte, might very well have been taken from Böhme. This fact, now, that the theosophy of the Middle Ages became for him the instrument whereby he should deliver himself from pantheism, together with the fact that the much greater influence (connected therewith) which this theory of his has had and still has, justifies the fact that in this account it is separated from the attempts just named, and, in spite of the fact that it existed merely as a fragment until Schelling's death, is placed after, i.e., ranked above, them.

2. The Philosophical Investigations relating to Freedom, which appeared in the year 1809 in Schelling's Philosophical Works, with which connects itself as supplementary to it, the Memorial of the Work on Divine Things, which appeared in 1812, as also the Letter to Eschenmayer, written in 1813, (the former in the seventh, the two latter in the eighth, volume of the Collected Works), take for their problem the obviating of pantheism, which makes God the author of evil, and of dualism, which is a system of entire distrust of the reason, by answering the question as regards human freedom.
This is possible only in a system the soul of which is the idealism which, alone, Fichte admitted to be valid, and the body of which is the realism which, alone, Spinoza maintained, and as little fears the charge of naturalism as that of mysticism. This system starts with the position that there is, in the last instance, no other being than willing, that willing is original being; and combines with that the distinction that had been made already in the Authentic Exposition, between essence, in so far as it exists, and, in so far as it is only a ground of existence, and arrives at the principle that, therefore; even in God, the true real, a distinction must be made between God as the ground of existence and as the existing God. The former would be that in God which is not God, and may be termed eternal nature; the latter, on the contrary, may be termed understanding because in it God exists, is revealed. Both are will, the former dark, intelligenceless, natural will, longing, the latter, on the contrary, the expression of this longing; in their identity God is love, mind, free-creative will. As such, He is to be distinguished from the presupposition of that opposition, the indifference, the original ground, which as being impersonal is not at all affected with that opposition, is God as alpha, whereas the personal God is God as omega. As all personality rests upon a dark ground, inasmuch as it is natural selfhood transformed by the mind, so also does the Divine personality. God becomes personality by transforming this dark ground, that which was earlier called the Absolute, and the irrational, since it is the extreme opposite of the mind, into personal mind. Between that point of indifference (alpha) and this of identity (omega) there falls, now, the "separation of forces," as Schelling here calls it, which is necessary that a perfect subordination of the dark principle to the light may take place. The philosophy of nature shows how natural existences form a series of stadia, in which everywhere is recognisable a duality of principles, self-will and universal will, of which the former appears everywhere in the irrational residuum that is not embraced under the law, but is not to be regarded as evil although evil may spring out of it. This happens in man, in whom both principles, the nature of which is to form, as vowels and consonants, the word of transformed spirituality, are separable, that man may subject the dark principle, self-will, to the light, the universal will. If this is done,
the spiritually transformed selfhood rises superior to them both. But—and to this the natural will continually solicits—if self-will is exalted above universal will, then arises thereby evil, which, therefore, consists not in self-will, nor in the separation of the same from the universal will, but rather in a false unity of the two. Evil is not a privation, but it is opposition to the good, just as also, in the good, self-will is not wanting but is subordinate to the universal will. In animal appetite and in instinct, both come to light, but not good and evil. Man can stand only above or beneath the animal. The first ground of evil is contained, of course, in God, in that in Him which is not God, but not evil itself. The irrational, the horror-exciting in nature, which still is not the evil, also has its root in that dark ground. Hence the analogies between that which the realm of nature and that which the realm of history present, the periods of which run parallel one to another. The universal necessity that sin become purified and the necessity that the evil be, nevertheless, arbitrary choice, that the Fall be one’s own sin, coincide, as, already, Kant has shown by his doctrine of the “intelligible” character, which is in the most exact harmony with that of radical evil; so that the nature of man from which his transgressions flow is his own deed, which lies in eternity, i.e., which does not indeed affect his nature as a state pre-existent to life but non-temporally. As such a nature man posits himself from all past eternity, as such a nature, a certain bodily organization being added, is man born. Hence it is a predestination, which, because a self-determined predestination, does not destroy freedom. And it is conceivable that the original act implicitly contains in itself conversion also. Through the false union of the two principles there makes its appearance, inasmuch as the personal God is ideal, another spirit, the inverted God, that nature having the character merely of a potency, which never is but always merely will be, and can be really comprehended (actualized) only by the false imagination (νόθρο λογισμος), which is just sin, the self-nullifying and self-consuming contradiction. Hence the destination of the evil is not a conversion of it into good but a reduction to the condition of a potency. This subjection is the final goal. But the perfect is not in the beginning, since God is a life and therefore also has a fate. He is subject to suffering and becoming, as the holiest mysteries confess in the doctrine of a suffering God and the promise,
that He will be (not is) all in all. A completed God were no God. The new kingdom, which follows the appearance of that in which God became man in order that men might again become God, reveals God as spirit, i.e., as actu real. Herein consists His personality, which therefore realizes itself by a process of transformation entirely similar to that by which human personality forms itself by the fact that feeling is actualized through the understanding.

3. More at length than in the treatise on Freedom this last point is discussed in the Stuttgart Private Lectures, which were delivered immediately after the appearance of that treatise and first appeared in print after Schelling's death (Wks., vii. pp. 418-484). Here the thought is, If we demand a God whom we may regard as a living, personal being, we must assume that His life has the greatest analogy with human life, that, in a word, He has everything in common with man, dependence excepted (Words of Hippocrates). All that God is, He is of Himself; He begins with Himself in order at last also to end purely in Himself. God makes Himself, and hence He is not already from the beginning a completed being. As human life begins in unconsciousness, so also does the divine, as the silent thought of itself, without expression or revelation, a condition, which may be called the indifference of the potencies, because the two principles, which, as in us, so in God, are the dark unconscious and the conscious, are unseparated. As in us self-formation consists in the fact that we transform the former by the latter and attain to clearness, and begin to separate ourselves in ourselves, to elevate the better part above the lower, so also does God. The two principles in God are being (real), which is the predicate of the existent, and the subject of being, the existent (ideal) itself. In order to exist as a living being, God, according to the fundamental law that without opposition there is no life, must as existent separate Himself from His being (in this making of self independent of self consists moral growth even in man), must separate Himself from that which may be termed God's nature, matter, the individual, the selthood, or even the egoism in God. When God makes this a substratum of the universal, and ceases to be the Self-enveloped, the Dark,—this is love, through which He, expanding, becomes the being of all beings. If the egoism prevailed, there would be no creature; the overcoming of the divine egoism by the divine love is
creation (nature=subdued force). Divine egoism is the matter out of which real living nature is created. In the *Answer to Eschenmayer*, of April, 1812 (Wks., vii. pp. 161–193), Schelling expresses himself as follows: "You would seek the irrational in the heights; I in the depths. I call that which is most opposed to mind being as such, or what Plato called the non-existent. God has the ground of His existence in Himself, in His own primal nature, to which God as subject of His existence belongs. I have called it elsewhere, in order to distinguish it from the subject of existence, not God but the Absolute. Those persons are shy of the humanization of God who would fain be regarded as philosophers by profession. But suppose it were discovered by continued speculation that God is really self-conscious, personal, living, in a word, man-like, that He is human, who can offer any objection to that? You say, God must be absolutely superhuman. But if He would be human—if He would humble Himself? Understanding proceeds from that which is without understanding, light from darkness, but darkness extinct, overcome, as salvation proceeds from extinct sin, as heaven were effectless without hell, which it vanquishes. If God is and shall live in man, the Devil must die in Him. But just for that reason must be earnestly repudiated the calumnious assertion that the ground in God is the Devil. That the evil is actualized only in the creature, is repeatedly asserted in the treatise." Shortly before this *Answer to Eschenmayer* was written, appeared the merciless reply to Jacobi: *Memorial of the Work on Divine Things* (Tübingen, 1812, Wks., viii. pp. 19–136), in which he defends his doctrine particularly against the charge of naturalism. I asserted, he would say there, that nature is the (as yet) non-existent (merely objective) absolute identity. Since, further, the existent in general must be above that being which is merely the substrate of its existence, it is manifest that the existing identity (God as eminent being, God as subject) is placed above nature. Hence was it, even in the *Authentic Exposition*, said of nature that she lies beyond the absolute being of identity. That is to say, the absolute being of identity is the subjective; nature regarded from the absolute standpoint is yonder side of mind, from the finite standpoint, this side. Here, therefore, the existent identity, or God as subject, is explained to be supernatural, as *vice versa*, the mere being of
identity is explained as sub-divine. As the real desideratum, is given, further, a scientific theism that conceives God as personality. But this is possible only if it be maintained as a fundamental principle that the ground of development always stands below that which is developed, and after it has served to the development, subjects itself as matter or instrument to it. Hence must even God, so surely as He is causa sui, have something before Himself, namely Himself; ipse se prior sit necesse est, if it be not an empty word that God is absolute. This view, which, like the ecclesiastical aseilas, puts prior to the real essence of God the nature of this essence, does not exclude naturalism but surmounts it, makes it the foundation of theism. This fundamental being presents a double aspect. First, God makes a part, a potency, of Himself the ground, in order that the creature be possible; that is what has been termed the condescension of God to the act of creation; but likewise, secondly, He makes Himself the ground of Himself, that, by the subordination of the non-intelligible part to the higher, He may live free in the world, precisely as man, by the subordination of the irrational part of his nature, transforms himself into a moral nature. Such a God is not, of course, for those who would have a God complete once for all, i.e., a dead God. These deny that in God without which He would be subjectless, without personality. God is, therefore, first and last, alpha and omega; only as this last is He, God, sensu eminenti, hence the former should not at all be called God, or at least should be so called only with the addition that He is Deus implicitus. This latter, God as alpha, is it which in the Authentic Exposition is called the impersonal indifference, in the treatise on Freedom the original ground; only of it have the earlier works treated in treating of the Absolute; these works, therefore, give a knowledge of God only implicite, inasmuch as they treat of that which has still to transform itself into God. They have not given, did not profess to give, a theory of the real personal God, but only of that which is the absolute prior of all, hence also of the personal God. That this becoming-personal of God has for the proper theatre of its manifestation the human spirit, particularly the religious consciousness, is variously suggested in the treatise on Freedom. Just so the idea that mythology forms the entrance to the most perfect religious consciousness. If, therefore, the work the composition of which Schelling
undertook immediately after the treatise, viz., *The Ages of the World*, of which a number of sheets were printed in the year 1811, and again in 1813, but were not published, and the first part of which first appeared in the Collected Works (vol. viii. pp. 195-344) in a redaction of the year 1814, had been then published by Schelling himself, there would not have been seen in the academical lecture *On the Divinities of Samothrace* (1815, Wks., viii. pp. 345 et seq.), with which Schelling bade farewell for a long time to the reading public, a declaration that he had substituted mythology for philosophy. Just as little would the title of the withheld work and the circumstance that the suppression of the already printed sheets coincided with the fall of Bonaparte, have furnished ground for the error that it related to the philosophy of history, particularly of modern history. And, finally, astonishment would have been less great, when in North Germany it became known, first after Hegel’s death, that Schelling propounded a system in which the philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of revelation constituted the chief parts. It also proved, that the treatise on Freedom and the polemical works against Jacobi and Eschenmayer had not been read with very great attention. The *Ages of the World* were to treat, in three Books, the Past, i.e., the Age before the World; the Present, or the Age of this World; finally, the Future, or Age after the World. Only the first Part, as has been said, was published. It develops still more completely what was suggested in the treatise on Freedom and further carried out in the *Stuttgart Private Lectures*; inasmuch as, maintaining the saying of Hippocrates, that the truly human is the divine, and that the true divine is human, he everywhere shows the parallelism between the growth of personality in man and the self-realizing divine personality. The dark ground in God is here identified with necessity, and it is pointed out that freedom is to be thought not without it, but as transformation and subordination of it. As already in the *Stuttgart Private Lectures*, so also here he speaks of the relation of his philosophy to pantheism in general and Spinozism in particular. He recognised in it the grandest phenomenon in the course of modern philosophy, but at the same time declares that it is only the foundation of the true philosophy, which has to explain the personality and freedom not only of God but also of the creature—a thing that to him
remains unintelligible. His agreement with Jacob Boehme appears in individual passages still more here than in the works thus far described. Just so is to be remarked the appreciative manner in which the Bible, particularly the Old Testament, is brought forward. At the point at which Genesis begins the first Part closes.

4. Since the doctrines of Schelling that became known later are, according to the plan of this account, discussed in another place, the critical observations on his Doctrine of Freedom find here their proper place. That by this doctrine he has sought to overcome pantheism not by excluding it, but by incorporating it into his system, he has stated so often that not another word need be spent on that topic. That this is done by emphasizing the two points which Spinozism and the System of Identity deny, personality and freedom, which with Fichte had been everything; and hence by an approximation to Fichte, Schelling would not at that time, perhaps, have confessed, though he did so later. As his Doctrine of Freedom herein occupies a place beside the doctrines of von Berger, Solger, and Steffens, or rather as those doctrines fall in with Schelling’s Doctrine of Freedom, so their agreement appears also in another point following naturally from that, which was discussed in § 322, 7. That nature is the absolute, is to be reconciled with the fact that it is only for us, or relative, if we see in it something absolute but not existing in an absolute manner, i.e., if we regard it as a lower stage, as the sphere of transition to the absolute mode of existence of the absolute. This has already been done, very distinctly. At one time nature is characterized as a stage in the becoming of mind; at another overlapping subjectivity is spoken of; at another it is said that identity has the office of being instrument for it as subjective; at another, finally, man is characterized as the terminal point of nature, who has to lead it to God, a fact by which finality in nature is explained, etc. (In verbal agreement with the last expression is Steffens’s assertion that the philosophy of nature becomes teleology.) Accordingly, the schema of the magnet is as little suited to Schelling’s Doctrine of Freedom as to the theories of the men last named; the rather, the system advances from the beginning-point of the absolute, the prius of nature and spirit, to nature, and from this through its goal, man, to spirit, since its highest point proves to be spirit
living in spirits, and the spirits living in God. Since in this modiﬁcation nature has, as before, the absolute and the intelligence awakening in man as its limiting points, it is entirely explicable why Schelling treats the philosophy of nature as for ever valid. It is otherwise as regards spirit. This, now, has nature for its presupposition, does not any longer require to be treated, as earlier, in such a manner that nature is entirely abstracted from. Thus is explained why Schelling says of the treatise on Freedom, Now for the ﬁrst time (as if he had not written the Transcendental Idealism) something is laid before the public from the ideal part of philosophy. The earlier ideal-philosophy had in fact entirely lost its meaning, for it had been made co-ordinate with the philosophy of nature. Now, on the other hand, the theory of spirit is to have for its foundation the philosophy of nature, and such a theory of spirit has really not hitherto existed.

§ 324.

Transition.

Summing up, according to the foregoing presentation, what Schelling achieved in philosophy—we ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that as the earliest adherent of the Science of Knowledge, and still more as the author of the System of Identity, he solved more perfectly than any one before him the ﬁrst problem of the most modern philosophy; for if any system can be called ideal-realism and real-idealism, it is his. But, secondly, in advocating, ﬁrst, the Science of Knowledge and becoming clearly conscious in so doing that in this the choice between the Ego and God (vid. § 269, 2) falls in favour of the former, and then the System of Identity, in which choice falls in favour of God, he brought to light in these two phases the opposition of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, within the philosophy of the nineteenth century (Criticism). Thirdly, as the precursor of his friends, von Berger, Solger, and Steffens, he attempted to solve the problem presented by this opposition, the second problem of the most modern philosophy, inasmuch as he proposed a theory that reduced pantheism and the theory of Ego- hood, “apotheosis of the Fall of man,” to moments in a concrete monotheism, and thereby surmounted them. One might be tempted, respecting the solution of this problem, to place the three men named above Schelling, because they have presented
the result of their speculations in more or less complete, rounded systems, whereas Schelling had communicated to the world only individual fragments of his own; still more because they set forth their resolution of pantheism in strict scientific form, in a method and terminology, which since Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant had been universally received as such form, whereas Schelling in a manner suggesting the Theosophists and, in particular speculations, the Schoolmen, in short, the Middle Ages, not so much deduced as, as he announced in the very first lines of the *Ages of the World*, stated or related. To the former, one is obliged to grant the preference, even though one would include the works written by Schelling in that period, but withheld. Such finished expositions as are presented in Berger's *Outlines*, or Steffens's *Anthropology*, Schelling’s Doctrine of Freedom had not received; it remains a mere fragment. Not so simple is the decision as regards the second point; what may be criticised as a defect in Schelling's Doctrine of Freedom is, on the contrary, precisely a merit. As, that is to say, he had by his adoption of the entirely opposite standpoints of the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity opened up for himself and those who went with him, the problem of reconciling the two theories, just so must the opposition between the philosophizing which produced the treatise on Freedom and the *Ages of the World*, and that out of which the *Authentic Exposition* had sprung, make it intolerable to the subject of both, and to those who had followed him in that, to allow the two to remain unreconciled. How could he—to repeat Schelling's own words—give up the philosophy that he himself had founded earlier, the invention of his youth? And again, ought not he and those who had been stimulated by him to combine it with what the mature man taught? Such an attempt, however, coincides with the solving of the third problem which, above (§ 296, 3), was assigned to the most modern philosophy. In fact, not only individual doctrines of the System of Identity, but its whole spirit is naturalistic, pagan. Reflect upon the antipathy to the Bible which Schelling avows in his *Lectures on Academical Study*, on his admiration for the Neo-Platonic philosophy, which had found so much that was speculative in the wretched stuff of the Bible and its Jewish fables; reflect upon the deification of nature and the position allowed by the System of Identity to the State. Consider how high the youthful Schelling sets
art above religion, and how these theories, certainly not accidentally, appear in a classical presentation so often suggesting the ancients, and compare with that what Schelling wrote after the year 1809. Not Plato, nor Giordano Bruno, nor Spinoza, is his guide, but Jacob Boehme, and always there appear in the forefront of his speculations the conceptions of the mediæval Aristotelians, potestia and actus. The Stuttgart Private Lectures explain the State as an institution merely of fallen man. The Ages of the World exhorts to inquiries in the Bible, and particularly in the Old Testament. Later dogmas are neglected as the product of the saddest period of philosophy, for the historical facts of the plan of salvation; religion and its mysteries are the culmination of development; over Nature is cast a veil of mourning, which conceals only with a light covering, dread, horror, etc. In short, if Schelling had, as a naturalist who was pagan and antique in his thought, produced the System of Identity, his Doctrine of Freedom presents to us the mediæval-minded theosophist; and as the appearance of Reinhold and his opponents had proved that even by Kant the opposite tendencies of the eighteenth century were not yet definitely fused, and the opposition of the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity had proved the like as regards the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so now does Schelling, the young man and the old, prove that not only naturalism, but also theosophy can draw nourishment from Kant's writings. It cannot be regarded as an accident that Schelling first began to occupy himself with Kant's Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason after his Doctrine of Freedom. If the fact that the two opposite standpoints were occupied one after another by the same man had suggested the problem also of the objective union of the two; this, nevertheless, could hardly succeed so long as both were before the public in so fragmentary a form, which failed to perceive many connecting links; indeed, whole parts of the system, and, as was shown above, very important ones. It is otherwise when the naturalism of the System of Identity and the theosophy contained in the Doctrine of Freedom are presented in a complete exposition, an exposition embracing every detail. The only thing that makes it possible to do this is the devotion of an entire life to this problem; and there appear two men, friends of Schelling, in whom the two sides which he had exhibited in suc-
cession are so separated that the one occupies, throughout the whole of his long life, the naturalistic standpoint, to which he rose with Schelling's assistance, but from which, however, he has supplied to Schelling a variety of material for the improvement of the System of Identity; the other was throughout his life, longer by some years than that of the first, a grateful pupil of the Mystics and other philosophers of the Middle Ages, and might, before all others, have contributed to the circumstance that Schelling also, who highly honoured for a long time the man who was about ten years his senior, entered this path. Both are to be considered in the following section.

SIXTH DIVISION.

Cosmosophy, Theosophy, and their Mediation upon a Critical Basis.

A. — OKEN AND BAADER.

§ 325.

1. Although since the time when in the work of mine which has been frequently mentioned, I designated Oken and F. Baader as the two men who had, in fully finished systems of philosophy, advocated separately, and hence with much greater logical consistency, the two views which Schelling had successively put forth, when a young man and when advancing in years, this position has been disputed, particularly by friends and pupils of Baader, I cannot acknowledge myself disabused of my opinion; and hence refer to § 44 of my often mentioned book, because up to the present I know of no exposition of the philosophy of Oken more complete, and because, although my respect for Baader has since then been made still higher by the works of Hoffman, Lutterbeck, and others, I hold essentially the same view regarding his place as I then held.

2. Lorenz Oken (born Aug. 2nd, 1779; professor in Jena after 1807, in Munich after 1827, and after 1832 in Zürich, where he died Aug. 11th, 1851) had written, already in the year 1802, his Outlines of the Philosophy of
Nature, of which only a synopsis appeared in print, but copies of which exist in the handwriting of Eschenmayer and others; probably of Schelling also, for his Würzburg lectures contain much that had been first said by Oken,—for example, that the classes of animals are representations of the sense-organs, and hence are to be arranged according to these. Before the Outlines appeared he had given to the reading public his work: Procreation (1805), as also the Commemoration treatise: On the Significance of Skull-bones (1807), and the, On the Universe (1808). The thoughts contained in the first-named work would, perhaps, have met with approbation earlier, if he had called the "vesicles," which he supposed to be the elements of all organic bodies, and which in water are formed into animals and in the air into plants, cells instead of infusoria. The second work develops the thought which, unknown to Oken, had been broached by Peter Frank, that the skull is a combination of modified vertebrae, and has become epoch-making in morphology. The third, finally, is occupied with the glorification, in an oratorical fashion, of nature as the only absolute; and shows how the macrocosm is given inward existence and is concentrated in the microcosm, so that we can just as well call the senses the qualities of the universe become inward, as the universe a continuation of the sense-system. In the same year in which The Universe appeared, appeared a second Commemoration treatise, Ideas for a Theory of Light, Darkness, Colours, and Heat (1808), in which light is conceived as a tension of the aether, produced by the polarity of the central body and the planets, the motion of light being heat, which therefore appears whenever light is materialized. Finally, in the year 1809, appeared in its first edition his Text-Book of the Philosophy of Nature (Jena, 3 vols.; the second edition in 1 vol.; likewise the third, much revised, Zürich, 1843, in which he at the same time expresses himself regarding his performance). His Text-Book of Natural History has been characterized by investigators of nature as his most solid work; his Natural History for all Classes has found the largest circle of readers (13 vols., Stuttgart, 1833-41).

3. Oken's express declaration that his doctrine is through-and-through physica contradicts neither the fact that he defines the philosophy of nature as the theory of the eternal conversion of God into the world, nor the fact that in his theory he treats of art, science, the State, etc.; for by God he
understands merely the Whole, or the All (hence in the third edition he employs these terms also); while by the world he understands individuals; and art, science, etc., are to him only natural phenomena. The Philosophy of Nature treats, in its three parts, of the Whole, Individuals, finally the Whole in Individuals, and falls accordingly into Mathesis, Ontology, and Biology (earlier Pneumatology). Mathesis, or the theory of the whole, treats as the highest mathematical conception "zero," which another would rather perhaps have designated by the term indefinite quantity. From it flow by virtue of opposition definite quanta. This separation into plus and minus is the primal act of the self-revelation by which the Monad becomes numbers, Unity many, God the world, and hence self-consciousness. The particular phases in this transition are:—primal rest as the substantial form of the primal act, or as the essence of God; motion as the entelechy of God, or the entelechy form of the primal act, with which the All is time; finally, permanent time, space, or the form of God, who must be thought as a sphere, so that the existent God, or the universe, is an infinite globe. Hence also every image of the same or everything that is a totality. These same stages repeat themselves, only in a more real way, in the primal matter, the æther, in which the first stage would be mere æther, darkness, chaos, gravity; the second would appear as the æther under tension, light; the third, finally, would give heat, which extends itself in all dimensions, hence tending to fluidity, i.e., the nullification of all definite dimensions. All the three are united in fire. The fire-ball of æther forms the transition to the Second Part of the Philosophy of Nature, Ontology, as the theory of the individual. The Cosmogeny, in which the attempt is made "not to create the world by thrusting and knocking but by imparting life," and to present central body, planets, and comets as the work of the self-effecting polarity, and the Stoichiogeny and Stoichiology connected with that, which discuss the elements, earth, water, air, fire, as also their functions, it being here expressly pointed out that these elements must be chemically composite stuffs, form the transition to the individual provinces of nature, and in such a manner that the combination of the earth-element gives, according as this combination is a combination with only two, or three elements, binary, ternary or quaternary combinations, i.e., minerals, plants, or animals,
The first are treated, under the superscription Mineralogy and Geology, still in Ontology, and are divided into earth-, water-, air-, and fire-, minerals, i.e., earths, salts, inflammables, and metals, of which the first form the real body of the planets, the rest its interior portion. As regards the formation of the planet, it is shown what share magnetism, electricity and chemism have in that. Plants and animals are treated in the Third Part of the Philosophy of Nature, Biology, and in this is first considered, in the Organosophy, life in general, to which the transition is made through Galvanism. The primal slime, out of which everything was formed, is a soft mass of carbon, or earth-stuff, mixed with air and water, and exists as sea-slime, out of which even men originate; perhaps only in a single favourable moment. The primal slime mediates also the transition of life from one individual to another, by virtue of which the individuals cease to exist and only the whole subsists. The first elements of all that is organic are the vesicles, or organic points, into which the dead organism is again resolved. Thrown upon the land, these primal vesicles become plants, in which the planetary life repeats itself; thrown into the water, they become animals, in which the cosmiical life repeats itself (microplaneta, microcosm). The former are treated in the Phytosophy. The plant is defined as an organism fixed to the earth, which depends upon carbon and is drawn into the air towards the light. The necessary organs of the plant give at the same time the system of the vegetable kingdom, for this kingdom is only the independent exhibition of these organs, is the plant anatomized by nature itself. Hence the entire vegetable kingdom falls into the three sub-kingdoms of the pith, sheath, and joint plants (acotyledons, monocotyledons, dicotyledons) each sub-kingdom again into several provinces, etc. Following Phytosophy is Zoöosophy. The animal may be called a self-movable flower, because in it there is added to the highest function of the plant self-locomotion. As the plant was merely a planetary organization, so the animal is also a solar and cosmic organization. It shares with the plant the sexual activity, but has individually the power of sensation. The three parts of Zoöosophy, which correspond entirely to the three of Phytosophy, are:—Zoögeny, which treats of the tissues of the animal organism; Zoöonomy, which treats of its functions; finally, Zoölogy, which treats of the system of the animal kingdom. Also here what is an
organ of the (whole or highest) animal, appears as an independent animal. The animal kingdom is dismembered man. Hence we have, first, the two sub-kingdoms of vegetative animals (ruminating animals) and carnivorous animals (flesh-animals). The former comprise in three sub-divisions nine classes. These latter comprise, in the first of their two sub-divisions, the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth classes (fishes, amphibia, birds), in the second, the class of mammiferous animals, which divides into five sub-classes. These are the animals having senses; and the highest place among them is occupied by the eye-animal, man. He forms only one sub-class and one family; only one genus, is distinguished merely into species (races), which, again, differ as the senses do, the eye-man being the European. The highest functions of the animal, and particularly of the highest animal, are treated in the last part of Zoology, Psychology. By the soul is to be understood the activity not only of an organ but of the whole body. The lowest phenomena of the psychic life, therefore, will be those above which the lowest animals never rise; since man in the abnormal condition of somnambulism falls back to that, Oken calls the condition of the molluscs, in which the functions of hearing and seeing are performed indiscriminately by one organ, mesmerism. From that point the animal rises though the feeling of caution (snails), of strength and fitness of members (insects), etc., to the point where all its organs become objects to it, where, therefore, it is like the animal kingdom, and the universe becomes man. His understanding is universal understanding; in it God has become flesh; in it the art-impulse has become art-sense, comparison has become science. As in the art-impulse of the lower animals, so also in the actualization of human art, the highest is that which nature aims at. This we call beautiful. Since, now, nature aims at and produces nothing higher than man, man is also the true subject of art. The man whom art represents is in heathen art the hero, in the Christian, the saint; for the gods of the heathens were men; Christian saints, however, are men who were gods. In science, which is the exposition of the world of reason, are to be distinguished various stages in which the various arts repeat themselves. Philosophy occupies the highest place, and, within it, the art of govern- ment. But all arts and sciences are united in the art of war, i.e., the art of freedom, of right, of the condition of blessedness.
of man and humanity, the principle of peace. Hence is the
hero the highest man. Through him humanity is free; he
is God.

4. Oken's conversion of the whole of philosophy into the
philosophy of nature is a carrying out of what Schelling in
the period of the System of Identity only touched upon, and
Blasche is not to be censured when he characterizes Oken as
the perfecter of the philosophy of nature; what one does ex-
clusively one usually does with mastery, and up to this very
day one who makes the philosophy of nature his problem
would be able to learn more from Oken than from any other
man. That, now, among natural phenomena the State occu-
pies the highest place of all, is, like the apotheosis of the
statesman (hero) with which the system closes, entirely apart
from the fact that it suggests Schelling's divine conqueror,
something that may, indeed, seem foreign to the Christian
view, but is, on the other hand, vital to the ancient, according
to which man was a political animal. But how strenuously
Oken exerted himself to place himself outside the Christian
mode of view is proved most strikingly by the circumstance
that he assigns to the pagans the hero, to the Christians the
saint, but finds no place in his system, which embraces every-
thing, for the community of saints. The Church is not men-
tioned among the human, i.e., natural, phenomena. On ac-
count of this position it cannot seem strange, if in his sea-
slime theory he suggests Anaximander (§ 24, 3), if in his
reduction of physics to mathematics he appeals to the Pytha-
goreans, if in the stress that is laid upon the spherical form
of the All, as of the human skull, he recalls to memory
Xenophanes and the Platonic Timaeus (§ 28, 5), etc. But just
as natural will it appear that there are, throughout, no points
in common with mediaeval ideas, and that just so soon as the
first traces of an inclination to these appeared in Schelling,
Oken, who had dedicated to him as his friend his juvenile work,
turned a cold shoulder to him. If, again, Schelling in his
Munich period calls Oken's theory almost childish, and yet
during his activity as teacher in Würzburg borrowed so much
from it, this is as explicable as that the man calls what he has
laid aside childishness. But though between these two men
there was possible, at least for a long time, the relation of
mutual recognition, such a relation could never exist between
Oken and the man in whom from the beginning to the end of
his scientific activity just those moments had prevailed to which Schelling first later, Oken never, had given place in himself. To Baader Oken stands opposed as Maimon to Reinhold, as Troxler to Wagner, as Schopenhauer to Herbart, indeed even more, for the opposition between the Middle Ages and antiquity is a sharper one than that between Hume and Leibnitz, or between the Eleatics and the Atomists. Whether it be an accident that this sharp opposition made its appearance between two who were born inside the Catholic Church, might be a question not without interest, but, at the same time not altogether easy to answer.

5. **Benedict Franz Xavier Baader** (born March 27th, 1765, in Munich, and died on the 3rd of May, 1841, in Munich) appears to have received his very first philosophical stimulus from Herder, then to have occupied himself with Kant, particularly as a counterweight to the sensationalist doctrines the influence of which he felt while in England, but found this still more in the writings of Jacob Boehme, to whom he had been introduced by Kleuker and St. Martin. Boehme, then also other philosophers of the Middle Ages, Mystics as well as Scholastics, later still the Church Fathers, were very important influences in his development, which never, as was the case with almost all his contemporaries, afforded place in itself for Spinozism. Hence, also, Baader, who even in the philosophy of nature was never merely receptive, rejected, when, after his return from England, he came into closer contact with Schelling, everything pantheistic in Schelling’s writings, indeed even combated it, though without naming Schelling. On the contrary, when Schelling, not without being incited thereto by Baader, began to make himself thoroughly familiar with Boehme’s doctrines, and traces of that became visible in his Doctrine of Freedom, it was explicable why Baader expressed his agreement with these later works of Schelling much more unconditionally. In doing so, he, similarly as Steffens, who likewise regarded the later works of Schelling as the more perfect, could hardly admit Oken to be a philosopher. But how far the denomination of Baader as a Schellingian, repeated up to the present day, is from being correct, was long ago shown by Franz Hoffmann in the preface (which has also appeared as a work proper) to the second edition of Baader’s short works (Baader in Relation to Hegel and Schelling. Leipzig,
1850). With the exception of the: *Fermenta Cognitionis* (6 Parts, 1822–25), the *Lectures on Religious Philosophy*, as also those on *Speculative Dogmatics* (4 parts, 1827–1836), all the works of Baader are separate treatises of only a few pages, originating partly in his extended correspondence and partly out of daily topics. I have given a complete chronologically ordered list of them in my larger work. Since then the edition of Baader’s collected works, which at that time was only begun, has been completed. Professor Franz Hoffmann in Würzburg, together with several friends, has the credit of having arranged these and of having added to every division, within which the works are chronologically arranged, a very instructive introduction. Of the sixteen volumes, the last contains a register of names and contents by Lutterbeck, the fifteenth a biography of Baader by Hoffmann, besides letters of Baader’s, the eleventh, extracts from his diaries.


6. To found a philosophy in which philosophy and theology should not be separated, by showing that the kingdoms of Nature and of Grace run parallel, that every natural event has also an ethical meaning—this Baader has repeatedly defined as his problem. To solve this, one must, obviously, take neither Aristotle among the ancients, nor Spinoza among the moderns, for his master, but must be guided by Master Eckhart and other theologians of the Middle Ages, by Paracelsus and Jacob Boehme. In contrast to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, he laments the breach between philosophy and tradition, and recalls, on every occasion, the heroes of the patristic, scholastic, and transition period of the Middle Ages, from whom we can learn to heal it. Not, of course, by returning to them *pure*, but in such a way that what they have taught be further developed, a requirement which persons of a mediæval turn have not forgiven Baader, whereas to the Enlightened it was much too mediæval in character. In contrast to the fact that Oken converts philosophy into mere *physica*, in which religion and Church are given no place, Baader demands that philosophy be through-and-through
religious,—that there follow upon the religious fundamental science a religious philosophy of nature, upon this a religious philosophy of mind, which, since mind realizes itself only in society, culminates in the religious philosophy of society, which is, at the same time, a philosophy of religious society. What Baader calls sometimes logic, sometimes transcendental philosophy, sometimes theory of knowledge, forms the introduction to the whole system, and is just for that reason prefixed also to the fundamental philosophy. He conceives it to be one of the greatest merits of Kant that he brought to light the necessity of such a theory of knowledge. Of course the presupposition that human knowledge is still a res integra, and the absurd attempt to begin with mere self-certainty and so (i.e., without God) try to find God, is a solipsism and subjectivism which Descartes introduced, and which is not to be approved of. From this solipsism and the opposite extreme, pantheism, which conceives our knowledge as part of the divine self-knowledge, the right doctrine, according to which our knowing is a participation in the divine self-knowing, a knowing with Him, true con-scientia, is far removed. From the fact that God’s being is not to be separated from His self-revelation and that, as Fichte has proved, every true being is self-consciousness, follows (what pantheism caricatures) that undoubtedly God knows Himself (also) in us. Here, now, is to be distinguished a series of stages, according as the divine knowledge merely permeates that of the created being, where the latter is constrained by God to know (as is the Devil), or is merely present with the same, which gives the ordinary empirical knowledge as also the belief resting on authority, or is immanent in it, whereby knowledge becomes free and speculative. Hence knowledge is not exempt from authority, but stands over against it free, and destroys the possibility of unbelief, not by introducing the use of the reason but by leading, through resignation to the divine reason, to the right use of the reason. In its truth, logic is the theory of the Logos, and those who make only the laws of thought its content forget that, as law and constraint, the Logos would speak only to the non-rational. To him who surrenders himself to reason it is not a constraining burden but a liberating pleasure. Fata volentem ducunt nolentem traheunt. As the self-revelation of God is a self-forming, self-shaping, so is the co-knowledge, a co-shaping; hence speculative knowledge is
creative, genetic, original. *Seimus quod facimus.* But originality as little excludes classicity as knowledge does authority, and the opposition of faith and knowledge, which both the Pharisees of faith (Pietists) and the Sadducees of (false) knowledge maintain, is the scandal of our age.

7. With such a theory of knowledge, it is natural that the real fundamental science with Baader should be *Theology.* Not to begin with God, he characterizes as a denial of Him. The development of his theology is such that he everywhere leans upon Jacob Boehme and St. Martin, often becoming merely a commentator upon these men. The two rocks, abstract theism, which conceives God as lifeless being and dead rest, and modern pantheism, which makes God first come to consciousness in man, Baader, after having finished his course (a logical course with Hegel and a historical with Schelling) attempts to avoid by distinguishing the *immanent* (logical) life-process of God (that eternal self-begetting of God, as his pupil Hoffmann termed it, or His self-production out of His unrevealedness), in which God is eternally manifest to Himself, as the active ternary embraced by a passive recipient (the Idea),—by distinguishing such a process from an *emanent* (real) process, in which God becomes a tri-personality, which takes place through the eternal nature, or the principle of selfhood, to overcome and sublate (to negate, conserve, and elevate) this principle being as necessary for God as for every other life which must rupture the mother in order to be born again and be perfect. If in the immanent, esoteric revelation God had expressed Himself, so in the emanent, exoteric, He unfolded Himself. Considering the great agreement of these doctrines with Jacob Boehme's, it is conceivable that Baader continually appeals to this authority, and these *Outlines* are justified in referring back to § 234. 3. But besides thus appealing to the authority of Boehme, Baader often attempts, particularly in the lectures on *Speculative Dogmatics,* to give to his doctrine a basis which he calls anthropological, or, also, retrogressive, because it reasons back from what results from the consideration of man (as a copy) to the eternal occurring in the prototype. A more complete account of these processes is to be found in an exposition by Fr. Hoffmann, which was written under Baader's eye and recognised in his preface as a correct exposition: *Speculative Development of the Eternal Self-begetting of God,* gathered
from Baader's Works. Amberg, 1835. This was employed in the more complete development contained in § 44 of my larger work. They have been very well presented since then by Lutterbeck in the summary of Baader's doctrine which he prefixed to the index to Baader's Works. Not only are the two processes confounded by pantheism, which puts the doctrine of the All-One in the place of the true doctrine of the All-in-One, but are confounded with a third, the Act of Creation, which, because it is an act of freedom, is not to be construed, but only to be described; to which God is brought by no necessity or want but rather by a superabundance. Hegel and other pantheists make God first return upon Himself in the act of creation, whereas it is only His image with which He unites, and only in this sense can we, with St. Martin, call creation a recreation of God. Not speculation but history teaches us that God enters into the process from love,—desiring to be born again image-wise in the creature. Moses does not recount the beginning, but a later section, of this history; but trustworthy myths tell of what preceded. Whether he reckons among these also Boehme's speculations, he does not say. Enough that here also the relationship is so great that we may refer back to § 234, 4, and Baader's doctrine may be very briefly presented. The matter out of which, and the efficient cause by which, the triune God produced the world is eternal nature, without which creator and creature would coincide. Of the two parts of creation, the intelligent (heaven, angels) and the selfless (earth, natural beings), between which, then, man falls, the former must be transient, in order that, by overcoming absolute necessary temptation, man may step out of involuntary innocence into the condition of a free child of God. Whereas true speculation places the possibility of evil in eternal nature (selfhood) and declares it to be necessary, the false, pantheistic speculation asserts this of self-seeking or real evil. True speculation says, further, that this fall could be of a double nature, through pride and baseness. To this, history adds that the first fall took place with Lucifer, who, through his rebellious hate, put himself out of the pleasure of God into His displeasure, and now experiences the fact,—fata nolentem trahunt. This lying spirit wills, hence is personality, but never attains what he wills, real being; he is the tantalizing longing to realize himself. He will have, as a means to that, man, to whom,
through the separation of the abysmal and heavenly regions, has fallen the destiny of becoming, through the devolution of Egohood to the Ego, the deliverer of the selfless creature corrupted by Lucifer’s fall, a destiny for which his *dominium in naturam* fits him. But that man be this restorer it is necessary that God withdraw for a moment in order that man may choose whether, by overcoming temptation, he will make sure this unmerited, and hence uncertain, good fortune of Paradise, or will trifle it away. What choice he will make speculation cannot determine, but can assert that whatever choice he may make, freedom of choice will give place to the being-determined, so that now man must *yield* to his inclinations and must act as he is made to act. History, now, teaches us that man also fell, not, like Lucifer, from pride, but through basely becoming bewitched by nature beneath him and becoming beast-like. Once fallen away from God and after a choice once made and hence a vanished choice, man and the whole of creation with him would quickly have been precipitated into Hell, if God had not checked them in their fall and held them hovering over the abyss. This detartrization, or founding of the earth, over which the morning stars rejoice, and with which the *opus sex dierum* of Moses begins, is effected through temporal-spatial, *i.e.*, material, becoming, so that matter, the concreteness of time and space, is not, as the Gnostics teach, the ground of evil but rather a punishment; hence a consequence of evil; it is at the same time also a means of defence against it. Since, that is to say, man has come into being out of eternity as the true time, which is the unity of all three time-dimensions and hence the Always, just so—as if out of the Everywhere into space, in which (apparent, or usually so-called) time is placed,—God’s love has therein shown itself temporizingly. Through constantly repeated mortifications man can now deny *en détail* what he had affirmed as a whole in the Fall; he who was subject to temptation now has time to withstand temptations. In this condition of suspension, the man living in the (apparent) time, is indeed removed out of eternity (true time), and, as one who only seeks or bewails the present (enjoyment), lives, properly speaking, without it; at the same time, however, he is thereby separated also from the more deeply fallen evil spirit, which lives in the false or the sub-temporal condition of despair which has no future; so that, therefore, matter—or, if one, in agreement with
the Holy Scripture, calls the first matter water, this latter is the tear of sympathy with which God extinguishes the world-conflagration. Matter, thus, conceals the abyss of chaotic forces, is itself not the solution of the contradiction but only its arrest, hence is nothing rational or eternal but is at some time to vanish. It is the pledge in which the true process of embodiment takes place, since man forever overcomes the material; a fact that, among others, is witnessed in culture, which is therefore not merely verbally related to cultus. Since in matter is given the enveloppe that defends against wrath, the rejected infra-natural spirit can win entrance to the material world only through man, so that that is true of the Devil which pantheism fables of God, viz., that only in man does he come to reality, i.e., activity.

8. With the meaning just now given of matter, the passage is made to Baader's Philosophy of Nature (Physiology, Physics), which appears as the Second Part of his Theology. Here, now, is to be mentioned, first of all, the decided opposition to materialism, which identifies nature and matter. The merit of Kant, and of the philosophy of nature based upon him, is that itcontains at least indications as to how to get beyond that point. That the essence of matter is placed in gravity points, since gravity is dislocation, the being removed from the centre, to the conclusion that material existence can be neither the original nor the normal existence. Just so the discord everywhere pointed out by Schelling, and by him regarded, of course, as the normal condition, should lead us to attend more to the condition preceding the discord, and to recognise that life consists merely in the overcoming of the opposition. But the modern philosophy of nature has won for itself the most decided credit by the fact that it has restored the conception of penetrability, which the mechanistic view denies, and has by dynamism pointed out that the visible is a product of immaterial principles, that, therefore, it is not inconceivable that the product may at one time be invisible. A primary law, obviously, which can perhaps be called the fundamental law of nature, has hitherto been neglected: that everything that has its ground and nourishment in occultation is deprived of these in manifestation, or that what as latency is necessary to life, is as potency hostile to it. (Hegel is the only one who recognises this, in his "sublation" [aufheben].) Without this law neither the main problem of Physiology,
How has the selfless creature become material? nor that of Anthropology, How has man become evil? which has the closest connection with the first, is solvable. The stages of this disintegration are carried out in agreement with the Mosaic narrative, just as by Boehme,—through appetite for the gratification of the animal function, sinking into sleep in consequence of that, becoming sexual, falling—and it is shown how, now that the trinity which man bears in himself as a counterpart of the tri-personality is marred, so that he who should by the spiritualization of body and soul be wholly spiritual, is so only in part, and is a merely composite, fragmentary nature, the three constituent parts of which may also be separated. It is so in death, in the equivocal and often morbid phenomena of somnambulism, and in religious ecstasy.


9. The third and last part of the system is, according to Baader, constituted by Ethics. Frequently he also says,—Anthropology takes its place beside Theology and Physiology as the third part of the system. As only matter that is removed from its centre is heavy, so also only to the man devoid of moral character has it appeared as a burden, i.e., as law. Hence the Kantian system of morals with its tantalizing striving towards an unattainable conscious goal is properly a system of morals for the Devil. The true, i.e., religious and hence Christian, Ethics knows that He who gives the law also fulfills it in us, so that from being a burden it becomes a pleasure and ceases to be law. Hence its cardinal point is reconciliation [Versöhnung] which has more than a merely verbal connection with the Son [Sohn]. Every system of morals that is without a saviour is without salvation; fallen man has not the capacity to reintegrate himself; hereditary sin, the seed of the Serpent, hinders him in this. But with this seed there remains in him, at the same time, the Idea, the seed of the woman, i.e., redeemability. This mere possibility is actualized by God’s placing Himself on a level with fallen man, and the reviving of the image of God that had receded before that of Satan, in the conception of Jesus by the virgin, the nuptial abode of God, so that in her Son man appears as he should be, the moral law become man, which is of course then not law, but is realized. Like hereditary sin,
hereditary grace propagates itself *per infectionum vite*, one may say. Prayer and particularly sacrament, by which man, who is only what he eats, eats into heaven, are the means by which *rapport* with Christ is produced, who effects in one, happiness, in another, a loathing of grace that is suggestive of hydrophobia. After the Saviour, by overcoming temptation, has destroyed evil at its centre, has crushed under foot the Serpent's head, it must be destroyed successively in the entire periphery, which is done by the constant mortification of Ego-hood, in which man co-operates with others in the attainment of his happiness,—is neither a solitary worker, as the Kantians would say, nor completely inactive, as Luther teaches. The good is not made a possession without heart-breaking, and this is not mere suffering. With the possession of salvation all disintegration is annulled, hence also indis-solubility and immortality are given. The guaranty of immortality lies in being unique, inasmuch as every individual completes the race to a totality; the guaranty of eternal happiness lies in the inamissibility of the same where temptation is destroyed. Since time and matter are the suspension of the alienation, this succeeds when they have ceased and the lodge is destroyed. Then follows the separation of Heaven and Hell, in both of which God dwells; only, in the former, he is immanent in co-operating spirits, in the latter he permeates the refractory. The restoration of all things in the sense that all, even the maligners of the Holy Ghost, shall at some time be forgiven, is declared by Baader to be a sentimental non-Christian doctrine. The fact that the "payment of the last farthing" becomes a "purification through the pool" by which only the lowest stages in the kingdom of heaven can be attained does not conflict, however, with "*ex infernis nulla redemptio.*" All the propositions that relate to the nature of man, so far as he is a member of a greater community, have been excepted from Baader's works and brought into a collection, under Baader's supervision, by Franz Hoffmann, in *Main Features of the Philosophy of Society by Frans Baader*, Würzburg, 1817. As the leading proposition amongst these must be regarded, That there is no union without common subjection, and hence all disunion is sedition. Hence also a bond between rulers and ruled is inconceivable. Without religious character, and to the false dogma, *état athée*, must be opposed
the correct one, état chrétien. Experience teaches that not this state, but the atheistic, causes tolerance to disappear. With the Christian character of the State appears also that unlikeness of the members which is indispensable to every true unity. Christianity, itself a world-association, is everywhere combated where there is a fight against associations and corporations. Impious practice in France, and still more impious theory in Germany, by the fact that in the place of the only sovereign, God, there has been put the sovereignty either of the prince or the people, and thereby the only defence against the despotism of the ruler (whether he be one or the mass), viz., the State or the corporation, been destroyed, has strained all relations; the mobile, money, has become immobile in the hands of the few; argyrocracy has the servants of the chamber for masters of the chamber; and the peasant, who should be attached, not to the soil but, through possession, to the territory, is made an outcast. Instead of the doctrine that the State is a contract with earlier and later generations, people see in it, with Rousseau, a contract between the individuals of one generation only, and suppose that it has a constitution only when every one can put it in his pocket. A presentiment of the truth is evinced, in our century of deputies instead of membership in the diet, in its caricature of the deputy, the chamber of representatives. Since such is the case, and since non progreedi est regredi, the way must be paved for new forms. Free associations must again beget an esprit de corps, and since instead of serfs represented by lords of the manor have appeared a proletariat, we have to do with the fact that these are not represented by deputed persons but are protected by an advocateship, which would be the only worthy function of the priest, who thereby best counteracts that hatred of priests which is, with most persons, the hatred of religion. Before all, must the delusion be given up that everything must be done by the government. Instead of overmuch formalism, the desideratum is the holding fast of certain vital truths: That property is a business, ruling a duty, and being ruled a right; that to be subject to merely human (especially one's own) authority is unfreedom, etc. The succession of the forms of State among the Jewish people—thecocracy, judge, king, is also that of the theories of the State that have appeared. These are related one to another as love, law, and authority. For the rest, the State
in which the nation stands as a distinct individual (party) over against other individuals, is a temporary institution, subsisting solely only so long as the Idea does not penetrate all persons. It is otherwise with the religious society, which transcends all nationalities and is thereby universal (catholic) viz., the Church. In analogy with his doctrine of the State, Baader constantly points out that where the antiquated is clung to men do not follow the good old times, which clung to the living. The opposite of stagnation is revolution, which Baader sees in rationalism, religious liberalism. This, with him, nearly coincides with protestantism. Since, upon the appearance of this the Church did not see in it, as it formerly did in every heresy, the stimulus for a new evolution, did not seek to answer the questions raised by the age of the Reformation (the relation of ecclesiastical and political authority, the relation of faith and knowledge), it has only prolonged an obligation which should have been discharged. Protestantism which, for the rest, in its original form is no longer divided inter vivos, but into pietism and nihilism, has accomplished still less, and it bears the blame, if, instead of Scripture, tradition and science forming a unity (tres faciunt collegium), one-sidedness have formed themselves, which they who speak of a Petrine, Pauline and Johannine Christianity would make perpetual. Nothing, therefore, is more needed than an alliance with speculation. An excommunication of intelligence, which the servile counsel, would be answered with an excommunication from intelligence. The Catholic has first to disabuse the Protestants of the delusion that they are the sole possessors of science. He does that when he shows that unscientific and irrational rationalism is a product of protestantism. Then he has to establish a really scientific theology, which, at the same time, is a true science of nature, in order that also the error of supposing that the physics of the present day, which is possessed by a real ideophobia, is the only rational physics, may disappear. In opposition to the alien blindly-believing party, which desires to know nothing of religion but pays others to know it for them, in opposition to the equally alien anti-religious natural science, it is time that the old German science should rise to the thought of how in the philosophus teutonicus it has had its hero, to guide itself according to whom is the problem of the present.

§ 326.

Transition to the Concluding Systems.

1. As in the presentation of the doctrines of Herbart and Schopenhauer the citing of particular instances of opposition could be omitted all the more that this would have been a mere repetition of what § 41 of my larger work has said, just so is it with a comparison of Baader and Oken, and what was said in that work in § 44, 19. Even where they agree, even verbally, the diametrical opposition still remains, and though Baader approves Oken's conception of man as the iron which has as its magnet that to which his attention is directed, Oken might have seen in the sense in which Baader understands this, such a perversion of his own meaning, as Baader would if Carl Vogt should say, that he entirely agrees with him in holding that man is what he eats. This opposition may be stated thus: By Oken the whole of philosophy is converted into the philosophy of nature, by Baader into the philosophy of religion. But just for that reason philosophy, if it should aim at being everywhere not both at the same time, as Baader will have it, but the one in one part of the system and the other in the other, will do well to seek instruction from Oken there, and from Baader here. But the latter was given (§ 296, 3) as the problem of the most modern philosophy; hence they have brought philosophy considerably nearer the solution,—more perhaps than if they had been less one-sided.

2. But if we review, now, the manner in which the moments combined in Kant have developed themselves, there has, in the first place, again made its appearance even within Criticism itself, through the opposition between Reinhold and his critics, who both regarded themselves as the true followers of Kant, the opposition that had divided the eighteenth century up to the time of Kant; and where it was again resolved (by Fichte and Schelling), there is given a more enduring reconciliation than Kant himself could have brought about. That philosophy must be ideal-realism, is settled. It has, in the second place, been shown in the opposition of the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, that the union of pantheism and individualism, as attempted by Kant, was far from being the complete solution of the second problem of
the latest philosophy, but that it was necessary to get beyond
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the setting up
of a theory that made possible a concrete monotheism and a
view of the State in which neither the individual is sacrificed
to the whole, nor *vice versa*. This, Schelling, together with
his friends, attempted in his Doctrine of Freedom. But now,
since, in the third place, the sides that had been united by
the bond of his personality, and which had caused to appear
in him, first, the philosopher who adopted ancient views and
defied Nature and State, then the philosopher who adopted
the mediæval way of thinking and immersed himself in God,
had become, in the most marked manner, free and distinct in
Baader and Oken, the period has come in which the third
problem also may find its solution, namely, the problem of
framing a system in which (without the giving up of the two
conquests just mentioned) Antiquity and the Middle Ages
appear in the service of the nineteenth century; where cos-
mosophy and theosophy become moments in anthroposophic
philosophy.

3. Of the three systems which until now appear to have
most fully solved this problem, the *panentheism* of Krause,
the *panlogism* of Hegel, and the *positive philosophy* of Schel-
ling, the third, since Schelling expressly confesses that he
gained through Hegel the insight that what he had taught
up till then was only a part of the whole system, and, because
the latter did not begin to become known till after Hegel's
death, and, even after being put forth in the *Authentic Ex-
position*, contains only individual parts entirely wrought out,
and, regarding many things, only fruitful hints, must be
separated from the other two and assigned to the section
which considers the ferment in German Philosophy since
Hegel's death. But it may be mentioned even here that the
union, not easily again to be found, of early ripeness, long
life, and youthful-minded old age, made it possible that the
same person should become a successor in that in which he
had been a predecessor.

**B.—KRAUSE'S PANENTHEISM.**

§ 327.

1. Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (born May 6th, 1781, after 1802 *Privatdocent* in Jena, after 1804 in retired
life in Dresden, in Berlin in 1814, in the following year again in Dresden, after 1823 Privatdozent in Göttingen, died, when about to habilitate himself in Munich, on the 27th of September, 1832). A complete list of his works, both those published by himself and those published after his death by his pupils, is to be found in § 45 of the work of mine which I have so often cited. As the most important are to be mentioned: *Plan of a System of Philosophy* (Jena, 1804); *System of a Theory of Morals* (1810); *The Prototype of Humanity* (1811); *Sketch of the System of Philosophy*: the first division, *Analytical Philosophy* (1825); *Sketch of the System of Logic* (1828); *Sketch of the System of the Philosophy of Right* (1828); *Lectures on the System of Philosophy* (1828); *Lectures on the Fundamental Truths of Science* (1829). To these are to be added the works that came out after his death through the exertions of von Leonhardi: *The Theory of Knowledge, The Absolute Philosophy of Religion, Spirit of the History of Humanity, Biology and Philosophy of History.* (His many works on mathematics, and on music, in which he was a virtuoso, as also the works in Freemasonry, which are decisive as regards the fortunes of his life, are here passed by.)

Lindemann: *Uebersichtliche Darstellung des Lebens und der Wissenschaftslehre C. Chr. F. Krause's und dessen Standpunktes zur Friemaurerbrüderschaft.* München, 1839.

2. According to Krause,—Spinoza, Schelling, Wagner and Hegel are right in representing philosophy as absolutism, *i.e.*, as the theory of the absolute. This theory, particularly as developed by Schelling in his riper (later) works, as, *e.g.*, in the *Memorial*, should not be called a theory of the All as God, but of the All as in God, not pantheism but panentheism, since it merely teaches that “God essentiates everything finite in, under, and through Himself.” To the philosophy of faith and feeling a theory is obviously repugnant which, in opposition to its unknowability of God, makes God the proper object of knowledge, in opposition to its certainty (only) of the finite, makes precisely this the most uncertain of all things. Just so also does it stand in opposition to the subjective science of self represented by Kant and Fichte, to which the individual rational being is the highest. And yet, in spite of this opposition to absolutism, true philosophy must concede to those subjective tendencies their due,
for its problem is to overcome all one-sided tendencies that have appeared in the entire course of philosophy, by the reconciliation of them. How this is done can be shown only after a survey of the entire organism (organic structure) of science. Here it is important, first, that this should not be identified with philosophy, since there is also a science of experience or history, which now has a place beside philosophy as its co-ordinate science, and, again, that it be subordinate to the first part of philosophy, the foundation science; and, finally, that it be united with philosophy also in a science—the philosophy of history. If, now, we abide by philosophy, this so solves the just-mentioned problem of the reconciliation of subjectivism and absolutism that it falls into two "courses," the first of which, the subjective-analytic, starts with self-consciousness as the first certain knowledge, rises gradually to the highest fundamental thought, from which then in the objective-synthetic course we descend to that with which we started; whence it appears in an obvious manner that in the whole system everything twice comes to view.

3. The Subjective-Analytic Course, on which, particularly the Fundamental Truths, The Lectures on the System of Philosophy, and the posthumous work, Theory of Knowing, are to be consulted, shows how the question regarding the relation of knowledge to the object, which the pre-scientific consciousness does not at all put to itself, introduces us into philosophy, which therefore begins with the question: How do we come to ascribe to ourselves a true knowledge of objects? Primarily, we know only of our bodily conditions, with the help of the phantasy, which functions according to definite non-sensuous presentations (time, space, motion), and of the understanding, which functions according to definite conceptions, judgments, and syllogisms, these become external objects; and thus that first question drives us further back, to the question: How come we to know of our bodily conditions? It appears that this happens only because we attribute them all to a single Ego. In the self-viewing of the Ego, of the truth of which there can be no doubt, is found a fixed starting-point, as also a subjective criterion of truth. What is as certain as I am, is. But if we inquire more closely into what or how we find ourselves in this Inner, it appears that the self-viewing of the Ego contains a unity of body and mind (soul), or is human Ego. Further, the finitude which is to be
found in the self-viewing of the Ego, leads beyond the Ego, both because of the being limited by other Egos, of whose existence I cannot doubt; and of the fact that the individual functions of the Ego limit themselves. Finitude or limitedness belongs only to what is part of a whole; since the part stands related to the whole as the consequent to the ground, not every existence, but every finite existence, postulates a ground or whole, in which or by which it is founded. The Ego, since it is a unitary essence and is also finite, points to two wholes—to nature, of which its body (it as bodily nature) is part, and to reason, of which its mind (it as thought-nature) is a part. But just so do these two, since they are limited, point to an essence that is above them, which may therefore be termed original essence (Urwesen). But even this points to a still higher thought. The syllable ur (=ueber, over) indicates a relation; that which transcends all relations, hence is absolutely non-relative, is to be designated God or essence absolutely, hence not with the article. The viewing of essence or God is the one and unconditioned viewing which as presentiment accompanies all others and gives them support, so that “As true as God lives” is the highest asseveration, and guarantees reality to all that, without the intuition of essence, would have only the validity of a problematical thing, a dream. The viewing of essence, Schelling’s intellectual perception, Hegel’s absolute Idea, is the terminal point of the Analytical Course, which is necessary because we find ourselves outside it, and philosophy is, therefore, the theory of essence, knowledge of God; the expression knowledge of the world is far from being adequate.

4. If, in the Analytical Course, subjectivism received due recognition, so does absolutism in the Objective-Synthetic Course, which, just because it is the correlate of the former, follows the diametrically opposite way. In the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences accompanying his posthumous work on Knowledge, Krause gives a conspectus of the organic structure of this, by far the more important, part of his philosophy. It begins with the consideration of “Essence,” and science as occupying itself with essence, before the latter is conceived as original essence, and hence, as pure theory of essence, constitutes the real Foundation-Science, is at the same time Ontology and Theology. With the exception of Hegel, the moderns have unjustifiably neglected this, a fact that has
led them also to judge so unjustly the Schoolmen, but particularly also Wolff. All other sciences are reached by descending from the foundation-science, which contains their principles. First is reached the science that considers essence-as-original-essence, and could, therefore, be distinguished from the highest science, the theory of essence, as the theory of original essentiality, unless one prefers to incorporate it in the foundation-science as its last part. If this is done, the foundation-science has nothing else to consider than essence in itself, just as in geometry we must first know what space is in itself before we can know what it is within itself, i.e., what it contains. In this investigation there presents itself an organic body of essentialities, a system of categories, which constitute the content of the foundation-science, or metaphysics. Although the tables of categories of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel are defective, it is yet a merit to have laid down such tables. Krause pays the penalty for his otherwise unfortunate fancy for substituting for all technical expressions that have been naturalized in German newly-formed German ones by disheartening his readers; and to make one's way through his theory of categories, which he regards as a chief merit, has thereby been made a much more difficult labour than it would otherwise have been. For this reason not many are wont to undertake it. The investigation of essence inquires first what it is, i.e., regarding its essentiality, and finds in this, since God is One, i.e., a Self and a Whole, that in the essentiality, unity, sameness and wholeness are to be distinguished; but at the same time they must be united to constitute essential unity or unitary essentiality. The positive character which we find in the essentiality of God leads to the conclusion that to Him belongs propositionality, by virtue of which He is assertive essence. In propositionality are distinguished moments exactly analogous with those distinguished in essentiality (rightness, compass or comprehension, unity of propositionality) so that if they both are again combined into a unity in "propositional essentiality" or beingness (existence), it will appear strange to no one if, in the moments of these last combinations, the first, second, third members of the first two triads always again make their appearance (to selfhood and rightness there corresponds here relationality, to wholeness and compass, containedness or intention, to unity of essentiality and of proposition, unity of being). Since everything must be considered with reference to imposition-
ality, oppositionality, and compositionality (i.e., thesis, antithesis, and synthesis), there must then again be opposed to these categories their opposites (hence to wholeness parthood, to rightness counter-rightness as, in negative quantity, limit or finiteness is opposed to comprehension, etc.); finally, those opposed to one another must be combined with one another in order to have the entire organic structure of the absolute essentialities, under which at last appears perfection, also, as the actual proof that it is attained. The combinations of individual categories, the possibility of which lies in the fact that of every essentiality of God every other can be predicated, are to be numerically determined by calculation of combinations. (Krause very often praises the Schoolmen just because of that for which they are ridiculed, viz., the fact that they had formed such words as alteritas, quiditas, haecceitas. This is explicable: the last-mentioned words show a literal agreement with Lully [vid. § 206, 5], of whom he otherwise appears to know nothing.) Whereas the theory of essence as such, or the eternal essentialities, forms the foundation for a group of philosophical disciplines which Krause designates as formal theories, or theories of essentiality, like mathematics, the fundamental conception of which results from a union of wholeness and limitation, etc., the content of the material theories, or theories of essence, is formed by the answering of the question as to what God is within and under Himself. (Instead of is, it would perhaps be better to say has, since Krause expressly says, What God is in Himself, signifies entire essentiality of essence; while what God is [has] within Himself is only a partial aspect of essence; and in another place, Beauty is an essentiality not only within, but in [as] essence.) The transition to this is formed by the fact that if we consider, more closely the notions oppositeness, order and ground, which were found in all the complete tables of categories, this leads to the result that essence must be conceived as original (i.e., over-) essence. Whereas, now, essence only feels and thinks itself; is in itself or within itself, essence-as-original-essence is within that which is comprehended by it, the totality of things, the world, thinks the world and in relation to it. Therefore the ordinary consciousness, when God is in question, always thinks of essence-as-original-essence. The pre-supposition to that, essence, transcends its horizon.

5. The essences which God is within Himself or which stand
in and under essence, out of and under essence-as-original-essence are embraced under the term world; and hence that part of philosophy which follows the foundation-science may be called Cosmology, which, therefore, considers the things that fill God's essence and display the God that is like-in-Himself and affected with no opposition. Here first meet us, as the first eternal parts, Nature and Reason as the finite (real) and infinite (ideal) unity of the infinite and finite, which, if the Analytical Philosophy had found them in its ascent by induction, whereas the Synthetic Philosophy has deduced them, are now construed. Since both are united in man, there are therefore three parts of Cosmology: The Science of Reason, Philosophy of Nature, and Anthropology. On the first of these, which shows the necessity that reason exist as a realm of conscious essences, there are to be found suggestions in Krause's System of the Theory of Morals; on the second, the System of the Philosophy of Nature of the year 1804, and, likewise, the Theory of Morals enlighten us. As coordinate with the realm of mind, nature must present a parallelism with it. If there the antithesis of Ideas and the individual was the supreme antithesis, here that of suns and planets is, which, inasmuch as their atmospheres interpenetrate, generate the dynamical processes. As the crown of these, there appears the living being, which corresponds to the marriage of the Idea with the individual, to the beautiful. In details Krause allies himself in many things with Schelling, but particularly with Oken; with the latter also in that he puts mathematics very much in the foreground. Much more extendedly treated than the two theories of Essence just named is that of unitary Essence, Anthropology; partly in the above-named works, partly in the Prototype of Humanity, the Fundamental Truths, the Philosophy of History, and in other places. Man is, it is true, not the only, but the highest, union of nature and reason, since here the highest syntheses in the realm of reason, viz., self-conscious spirits, are united with the highest in the realm of nature, the most perfect animal bodies, in unchangeable never-increasing number, since the humanity of the All never grows. Only one part of humanity, earthly humanity, do we now know. The highest destiny of man is, not to remain in self-union but to rise into union with others, finally with God. Hence the philosophy of religion forms the terminal point not only of Anthropology but of all theories of Essence, because
it shows how man comes, here, to manifest God in his life, and how God comes to resign Himself to man, which is not to be understood as if God lapsed into any change. God is not love, but He displays the attribute of love. Man means here not only the individual; even the combinations of men have for their basis the Divine bond, to which the Church is related merely as a weak reflection, since it does not even embrace the whole of earthly humanity.

6. Besides the various theories of Essence, which, as material philosophical disciplines, had treated of what is within God, there are, in the second place, the formal disciplines, which, inasmuch as they draw further consequences from what God is in Himself, can be called (applied) theories of Essentiality. Here appears first Mathesis, which, since magnitude unites the two categories of wholeness and limitedness, may be termed the theory of wholeness; and when it treats of the whole as regards its content it is analysis, when as regards its form, the theory of combination, when these united, combinatory analysis; in its application to time, space, motion, and force, chronology, geometry, mechanics, and dynamics. The endeavour to replace formulæ by words, and the demonstration that all arithmetical combinations express not only numerical operations but real relations, often place Krause in coincidence with J. J. Wagner. Next in the series after Mathesis, as the second formal science, is Logic, which has, not merely, as heretofore, to describe analytically and historically, but also to show that the laws and forms of thought have objective validity. Hegel, who obviously errs when he makes logic the whole of metaphysics, is the only one, says Krause, who has divined the true significance of logic. He then points out violations of the three well-known laws of thought, which govern thought because the categories upon which they rest are essentialities of Essence, to which (Essence) all thought is directed. Just so, conception, judgment and inference are not only subjective forms, but, since Essence is a self, we must self-view (comprehend), since it is relation, we must view relation (judge), etc. As the third formal science, is to be mentioned Aesthetics, because beauty, whose realization in art it treats of, is a characteristic of Essence, so that all represented beauty is properly God-likeness, harmonious union of unity and multiplicity. Krause sees in the opera the perfect work of art; just as all other
works of art will become realized when the artists shall have united themselves in an art-union and this is united with the science-union. In view of the recognition which as a tribute Krause pays to Herbart’s application of mathematics to psychology, one might be tempted to regard also this as an agreement with him, that his Ethics follows Aesthetics as the fourth formal science. But the agreement goes no further. Besides the Theory of Morals, are to be employed, as sources for Krause’s ethical theories, the Prototype of Humanity, the Philosophy of Right, and the posthumous works, particularly the Philosophy of History. As the category of beauty forms the foundation for Aesthetics so does that of life for Ethics. The sum of Ethics is the essential represented in life, or the reproduction in life of that part of the highest good (God) which can be actualized by man. Inasmuch as the original and fundamental will works in the volition of the fully conscious man, it operates therein in archetypal conceptions, as universal will and law. "Do thou will and do the good as good," is the ethical formula which Krause lays down, and out of which he deduces, among others, also the Kantian. Evil embraces both badness and misfortune, is conceived by Krause as nothing positive, as mere limitation, as transitory, indeed, in the majority of cases, as mere illusion. The theory of morals (theory of rational life), however, treats man not only as a particular individual but shows how he makes himself a member of society, which must be regarded as higher man. This is done in a society of the virtuous, the description of which is given particularly by the Prototype of Humanity. Since the fulfilling of the destiny of man is conditioned not by him alone but also by temporal circumstances, and, among these, by such as depend upon the freedom of others, the organism of these temporally free conditions of rational life, i.e., the Right, is to be considered more closely. Every one is a person of right, i.e., has a claim of right and an obligation of right, for the protection of which the State exists. But conversely, only the person has rights, though it does not conflict with the conception of the person, that he should become a means for a higher person of right. Only, from this must not be inferred that the individual person first gets his right through society; he has it from God. Just as little is there a right of the State that is first given by the State-compact, but, on the contrary, right is prior, the compact only the form of its.
existence. Among the powers of the State, which in the immature condition of the State do not at all work in separation from one another, though in the perfect condition they work autonomically and harmoniously, the judicial is treated most fully, and in particular, punishment, which is regarded merely as an educating agency. The theory of retaliation and punishment by death find in Krause a decided opponent. Constitutional monarchy he considers as a transition to the perfect form of the State. In no form of the State has the individual the right of revolution, in all there is error, but providence leads to the goal, even through blood and tears.

7. Although, with the foundation-science, the theories of essence and the theories of the essentialities, philosophy, according to Krause, properly, is concluded, it is nevertheless entirely correct, when an adherent of his theory designates the Philosophy of History as the real culminating point of his system. In this, that is to say, there unite themselves philosophical and historical knowledge, which he had first opposed to one another in his discussions on science. Inasmuch as both sides of science are here united, this is not only the crown of science in general but also of philosophy, and must therefore be considered here. As is ethics, so also is the Philosophy of History connected with the foundation-science by the category, life. To what was developed there, is added here the narrower qualification that the life, not, it is true, of essence absolutely considered, nor even of the infinite essences in God, nature, reason, and humanity, but in limited humanities and individuals, passes through the three stages of germination, youth, and maturity, each of which again exhibits the same three in diminished scale. Earthly humanity, which had its origin through generatio equivoca (as Oken holds), has its germinal period of life, in which it lived in a magnetic primitively serene condition with the original essence, behind it, and only the memory of which continues in the sayings about the golden age. The age of growth closed its first period, that of polytheism, with Jesus, who allied himself with the society of Essenes; its second period, that of the monotheistic union with God, which led to contempt of the world and to the rule of priests, with the restoration of the sciences. Its third, the two opposite tendencies of which produced the powerful secret organizations of the Freemasons and the Jesuits, expires, and there dawns the age of maturity, in which
will fall the consummation of all partial societies, as also that of all genuine human endeavours, of the life of right, virtue, and union, in great as in small. Certainly all members of earthly humanity and, perhaps even it itself, as a member of the great humanity, will join in social union with all others. Perhaps such an intercourse transcending earth will be possible for us only after we have become spirits. But it must appear; for, since the number of spirits does not increase, there must, after maturity is completed and death has appeared, begin another, higher life. But even the present is not the first; the fruit of every life passes over into the next, perhaps up to a higher planet. Genius is such a fruit of the fore-life. Just for this reason also approaching old-age, is, neither for the individual nor for (partial) humanity, a mere misfortune, for at the same time approaches also the new birth to a higher existence. Just for this reason the highest goal, the universal union of humanity, approaches ever nearer.

§ 328.

Transition to Hegel.

Of a system the author of which boasts that it may bear all names that have ever been given to a philosophical view, but has in particular mediated and united absolutism with subjectivism, it may be demanded that none of the sides that have hitherto had validity, be allowed by it to fall short. If this be done, it is discovered that the (one-sided) view represented by Spinoza and Schelling is much more favoured than that of which Kant, Fichte and Jacobi are representatives. Even the fact that the Analytical Course has more the character of a mere introduction, and that the possibility is assumed that no one can place himself without it on the standpoint of the viewing of Essence, proves this; although Krause by the fact of his dependence upon the analytical philosophy for his deductions repeatedly proves that it is still more, the concessions to subjectivism appear almost as if they were made against his will. And now, indeed, in the content of the Theory of Essence,—the eagerness with which everything is banished from God that could make Him a process, contrasts so strongly with Fichte's assertion that God is a suc-
cession of occurrences, that one cannot avoid remarking a preponderance of the System of Identity. Just on that account, hardly an adherent of Schelling is so frequently cited as he who was an adherent only so long as Schelling advocated the System of Identity, viz., Wagner. But, for this reason, Krause does not get beyond conceiving nature and the realm of spirit as standing upon a level and as ranged one beside the other. Fichte's contempt for nature made so little impression upon him that he was unable to conceive nature as the point of transition to spirit, as did Schelling in his Doctrine of Freedom. But just in consequence of this, spirit remains, with him, merely soul, which is of course co-ordinate with the body, and he attributes spirit even to animals. With this harmonizes that fondness which Krause displays for the naturalist Oken, and the aversion which he displays towards the theosophist Baader. Like the former, he sees in evil at most only a lawless accident, which does not at all change the course of the whole, and nothing fills him with such indignation as the theory of the Devil and the punishments of Hell, to which the latter so often recurs. Hence the contrast with what Baader teaches at this point, regarding the conception of the person of Christ, who is for Krause only an enlightened Essene, of the Church, which is to him only a religious association, and of the ecclesiastical philosophers, who have no other merit than to have introduced new terms. On account of this one-sidedness, and because Hegel himself does not go so far where the opposite one-sidedness prevails, as Krause does in his, the former must be given a place above the latter. But this does not prevent the recognition of the fact that Krause has, in his Foundation-Science, analysed, like Hegel, most precisely that prius of nature and spirit, the consideration of which Schelling, before the philosophy of nature and spirit, only demands, and has given again to philosophy the ontology of which Kant had robbed it. One may always criticise his theory of categories; that also his critics themselves regard such a theory as necessary, is his justification. With this merit is joined another: by the union of the two Courses, and the position harmonizing with that, that in the system of philosophy everything must be twice considered, viz., in the ascent to Essence and the descent from it, he has again suggested what Fichte had demanded of philosophy, and yet had just as little accomplished as the System of Identity
and the Doctrine of Freedom, viz., that the course of philosophy should be a line returning upon itself (cf. § 316, i). One who retains the line to which the magnet of the System of Identity gave place in the Doctrine of Freedom converts, with Krause, that prius of nature and spirit, or that God as alpha, that God who is not God, into a system of categories, and who, like the Doctrine of Freedom, and, like Krause, passes from this ontology to the philosophy of nature, and proceeds from that point, like the Doctrine of Freedom, but otherwise than Krause, to spirit, as that to which nature is subordinated, and then like Krause, but otherwise than the Doctrine of Freedom, bends the terminal point of the line back to its beginning in such a manner that it becomes a closed curve,—to him will necessarily be given the evidence that he more than all the rest has accomplished what is required by the philosopher of the nineteenth century. This honour would remain his even if it could be shown that he had discovered much less even than many others, and that a great part of what he reaped was sown by others. The system of Hegel to which this place is here assigned presents, in performing all this, that justification which has hitherto always been called philosophico-historical necessity. The world-historical necessity lies in the fact, that the human mind had become weary of permitting the omnipotence of a brilliant despot lawlessly to appear against all individuals, that the extremes of anarchy and despotism to which he had gone had aroused against him the longing for a condition that obviated both. In the same way as, in France, the Restoration was related to the Empire and the Republic, so, in Germany, Hegel's Panlogism is related to the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity. This name, Panlogism, is intended to designate a system according to which the reason is everything, or what means the same thing, unreason is nothing. It is misunderstood, if there is found in it the suggestion that only the All (in opposition to individuals) is reason and actuality. How reason and individuality are related is an investigation the result of which that name does not at all anticipate, so that it does not in any way designate the same that others have called logical pantheism.
C.—HEGEL'S PANLOGISM.

§ 329.

1. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL was born in Stuttgart on the 27th of August, 1770, allied himself in Tübingen with Schelling, who was five years younger than himself, but to whom at that time he always subordinated himself, lived several years, as family tutor, in Switzerland and Frankfort, in the latter of which places the ideas that until then had been in a chaos of ferment crystallized into a system, the main divisions of which were Foundation-Science, Science of Nature, and Science of Spirit. In the year 1801 he betook himself to Jena, and published, before he habilitated himself as Docent, his Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling (1801), a work the title of which is really the foreshadowing of Hegel's definition, that to decide means to place one's self on a higher standpoint than the contending sides. Hegel at that time supposed himself to be wholly in agreement with Schelling. But when he applies the formula, first employed by Schelling, that the System of Identity is objective idealism and the Science of Knowledge subjective idealism, there lies in that formula really the confession that philosophy must transcend both, must be subjective-objective, i.e. absolute idealism. A real deviation from Schelling, and a proof that the Fichtean element is powerful in him, is that Hegel assigns to art a place below religion. From 1801 to 1806 Hegel lectured, first as Privatdocent, then as extraordinary professor, at first as a colleague of Schelling, with whom he edited the Kritische Journal für Philosophie. The fact that a dispute could arise, regarding the authorship of one of the articles appearing in the Journal, proves how much the two men were in agreement with one another. (My view that the dissertation, On the Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy in General, belongs to Schelling, whereas those on Rückert and Weiss, as also that on Construction in Philosophy, belong to Hegel, is supported by the testimony of trustworthy contemporaries. Weiss himself ascribes the first dissertation, Bachmann the second, to Hegel. The late privy-councillor, Joh. Schulze, possessed a copy of the Kritische Journal of his student days, in which an index, written by himself at that time, ascribes the Intro-
duction to the two Editors, the dissertation on the Philosophy of Nature to Schelling, the two other Essays to Hegel. The editors of Schelling's works are, as regards both, and Haym as regards one of them, of different opinion.) In the essay by Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, the Science of Knowledge is represented as the culminating point of the philosophy of subjective reflection and Enlightenment, which is of course necessary in order that we may come to true speculation. Not this itself, but the striving towards it, is said to be displayed in Schleiermacher's *Discourses on Religion*. In the essay, which is, likewise, Hegelian, *On the Scientific Methods of treating Natural Right*, appears for the first time the distinction between *Moralität* (abstract, individual morality) and *Sittlichkeit* (concrete, social morality), as also the proposition that spirit stands above nature and reaches beyond it. His view of the State approximates very closely to that of the ancients. After the year 1804, Hegel was occupied with the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which as the first (introductory) part of philosophy, was to be followed by the Logic, as the second, the Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit, or the two "real sciences," as the third and fourth parts. When the printing of the *Phenomenology* was finished (1807), its author had already left Jena, to edit the *Bamberger Zeitung*. Called to Nürnberg a year later, as Director of the Gymnasium, he published there his *Science of Logic* (two vols., 1812–16), (Wks., iii.–v.) In the year 1816 he accepted the professorship of philosophy in Heidelberg, where his *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Wks., vii.) appeared in the following year, as also his *Criticism of the Würtemberg Assembly of the States* (Wks., xvii. pp. 214–360). In response to a new call he went, in the year 1818, to Berlin, where, in the year 1820, his *Philosophy of Right* appeared. The *Berliner Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*—to the founding of which he particularly contributed, while its appearance marks the highest point of his influence—contain some reviews by him. Otherwise his entire activity was devoted to his lectures. One of these, on the *Proofs for the Existence of God*, was prepared by Hegel himself for the press, when he was snatched away by the cholera, on the 14th of November, 1831. Immediately after his death friends combined for the publication of his works, which appeared in eighteen volumes from the house of Duncker & Humblot, in Berlin.
Of these, vols. ix.–xv. and xviii. contain the lectures published after his death, all the rest having already been printed.

K. Rosenkranz: Apologie Hegel's gegen Dr. R. Haym. Berlin, 1858.
The same: Hegel als deutsche National Philosoph. Leipzig, 1871.

2. It is necessary, in the first place, to avoid the extremes presented by Fichte and Schelling, in that the former gives us to understand that only moral turpitude hinders man's rising to intellectual perception, whereas the latter would grant the capacity for this, like poetic talent, only to a select few. Both had brought philosophy into an equally negative relation to the ordinary consciousness, in that they, and particularly their adherents, could only say, in the one case, that it would not, in the other, that it could not, rise to the absolute standpoint. This assumed superiority, particularly of many Schellingians, who with their master regarded any explanation regarding philosophy as a desecration of it, and contemned it as a lapsing into the philosophy of reflection and mere metaphysics of the understanding; Hegel, now, antagonized in his Phenomenology, the preface of which has not unjustly been called a public disavowal, addressed, if not to Schelling, nevertheless to his school. He recognised therein not only the "wonderful power of the understanding," which has a right to be considered in rational knowledge, as also the justification of reflection, by which the absolute knowledge becomes a mediated knowledge and no longer, as if shot out of a pistol, begins with the absolute; but he says expressly that the common consciousness can demand that a ladder be furnished it upon which it can ascend to the absolute standpoint. This demand is especially justified by the character of the present age. The powers which, as the spiritual substance of the individual subjects, earlier ruled this age have lost their might; just so is man weary of empty and mere subjectivity; it is required that the subject may again become certain of that lost substantiality, hence that the true be not only substance but subjective. This comes to pass just by the fact that the true, which is primarily only spiritual substance, becomes, in uniting with self-consciousness, absolute spirit, or science. The Phenomenology, now, undertakes the problem of showing in its necessity, the growth of science from the lowest form of knowledge to the highest, by pointing out