nection of experience in the proper sense of the word is to assume the place of the accidental connection of perception. This application is effected through the transcendental schemata, through time-relations. But since the schema of necessity had been "Always," I can say that fire necessarily produces warmth, or (not "will" but) must produce it, only if I have perceived that it always does so. But since "always" is an Idea, an approximation-value, which is never attained, there is, as regards objects of experience, no apodictical knowledge, but only probability, and Maimon is fond of calling himself a critical sceptic, as contradistinguished from the critical dogmatist Kant. Wholly different, however, is it as regards mathematical objects. As in the example given, I can with certainty apply to the succession of fire and warmth the category of causality, although that fire and warmth are always in a succession remains questionable; so, also, to other time and space relations this and every other category can be applied; and here Maimon opposes Reinhold, whom he criticizes as assuming the possibility of doubting mathematical propositions, and as having, as did Kant, treated the cases of mathematics and experience as the same. Hence he says that they are both empirical dogmatists and rational sceptics, he on the contrary being a rational dogmatist and empirical sceptic. The difference, that is to say, lies in this: that in mathematics we have to do solely with that which is made out of the a priori given matter of space, hence with real objects of thought, something absolutely certain.

6. In no part of his theory does Maimon differ so much from Kant as where he considers the Reason, and as regards the practical questions so closely connected therewith. Like Reinhold, he approves of conceiving reason as, in the first instance, the faculty of inference or, as he prefers to say, of drawing conclusions. From that he concludes that the reason only points out what we have to seek, hence lays down demands, which impel us ever further,—a thing which only the imagination, which conceives the progressus in infinitum as finite, converts into so-called Ideas or Ideals, which the Kantians so delight in because they have gotten, by means of them, at least a shadow of metaphysics. In his criticism of metaphysics, Kant has called illusions of reason what are illusions only of the imagination, which converts, not without detriment, perfection (among other things), towards which we
have to strive, into a totality of perfections, which is an object of thought. All Kant's antinomies are, therefore, to be solved by assigning one assertion to the reason, and the other to the imagination. In practical philosophy, he censures Kant for having supplanted the only motive to action, pleasure, by an unpractical principle. Pleasure is not to be taken as physical. The highest is that of knowledge, and because it recognises this fact, the Ethics of Aristotle is much more useful than the Kantian.

Cf. Sal. Maimon's Lebensgeschichte, von ihm selbst geschrieben, herausg. von K. P. Moritz, 2 Parts, 1792. [Eng. tr. by Murray, 1888, Ed.] Sabattia Joseph Wolff: Maimoniana, 1813. Dr. J. H. Witte: Salomon Maimon, Berlin, 1876. I can refer to my own account of Maimon's theory in my Entwicklung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant (§ 21), which appeared in the year 1848, as the most complete, although a reviewer in the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung would have it that Maimon was first made known by Kuno Fischer.

7. Decidedly the most important of the opponents of Reinhold, and in general one of the most important among those who called themselves Kantians, is Jacob Sigismund Beck. (Born in 1761 in Lissau, near Danzig; studied in Königsberg, read from 1791 to 1799 in Halle, and died on the 29th of August, 1840, as professor at Rostock.) As a pupil, who stood in very close proximity to Kant and to whom, indeed, Kant left the original introduction to the Critique of Judgment in manuscript, he was led to write an Illustrative Abridgment of the Critical Writings of Professor Kant (1793), the first two volumes of which Kant praised highly, and Kantians employed as a compendium. The third volume: Only Possible Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy must be Judged (1796), was the occasion of Kant's beginning to reckon Beck also, as earlier Reinhold and Maimon, among his "hypercritical" friends, and of Beck's theory being, after the example of Reinhold's, designated as the Standpoint-theory. He developed it more concisely in his Outlines of the Critical Philosophy (1796), upon which he caused to follow his Commentary on Kant's Metaphysics of Morals (1798). In Rostock he first published the Prolegomena to every Scientific Study (1799), a work which, like his Outlines, has also been translated into English, and in which he, like Reinhold earlier, is fond of speaking of philosophy "without nickname," instead of, as earlier, of the Kantian, or Critical, Philosophy. He wrote, besides, Principles of Legislation
(1806), and text-books on Logic, and on Natural Right (both in 1820).

8. According to Beck, most of the Kantians, not excepting even Reinhold, who, however, came nearest to the true meaning of Criticism, agreed much more with the Leibnitzians and other dogmatists than they supposed. The difference is very slight between the unknown things-in-themselves of the Kantians, and the half-known things-in-themselves of the Leibnitzians. The Kantians, further, who think Kant's assertion that objects affect our senses has reference to things-in-themselves, make of him a dogmatist wholly of the traditional sort, as Locke was. Finally, there is scarcely any difference to be discovered between the way in which most of the Kantians conceive the categories immanent in the understanding, and the Leibnitzian theory of innate conceptions. The ground of this relationship, and at the same time of a number of contradictions in which Reinhold, like the Kantians, is involved, is that they attempt to answer a question, instead of exposing its absurdity. This is the question: How are our presentations related to things-in-themselves? Thus Reinhold himself destroys the desert which he had won for himself by showing that the matter of the presentation is something entirely different from its object, since he introduces the unintelligible expression, the matter of the presentation "corresponds" to the object, a relation which again points to such a bond of union between things-in-themselves and presentations. Here Berkeley saw much more clearly, for he explained it to be impossible that our presentations could be effects of things. Hume also all but showed that the question with which the Kantians were contending was absurd. These two prepared the way for what the Critique of Pure Reason accomplished in establishing the standpoint of the transcendental philosophy. That Kant was misunderstood by so many at this point was natural, because he had in view readers who still occupied the standpoint of dogmatism, and who were to be carried gradually to the middle point of the transcendental philosophy. Here the opposite way should be taken. That this is more correct, all attempts to give the Critique a deeper foundation have recognised, that of Reinhold taking the lead. With entire correctness Reinhold observed that we have to begin at a single point, and that this point is presentation. His error is that, in presupposing the fact of presentation, he begins with
the conception of presentation and not with presentation itself. This defect and all hypothesis are avoided, if at the beginning we take as postulate the bringing to pass the fact of presentation, hence "original presentation," not presentation in any particular manner. Since there is placed at the beginning no dogmatic principle but a postulate, we cannot start with a definition of the original presentation, but the reader must be led up to the fact of original presentation; then this presentation itself in which the use of the understanding consists (not possibly any single presentation) must be considered and made intelligible by the deduction of conceptions from it. The transcendental philosophy is, as regards this, the art of understanding self.

9. What makes the understanding of the transcendental philosophy much more difficult, is the continual confusion of the original presentation, in virtue of which there is objectivity in general, with the thinking or judging by which we unite an objective somewhat with definite marks of distinction, and thus place before ourselves definite objects. The first precedes, as the synthetic objective unity of consciousness, and is that synthesis (not of conceptions, but a synthesis making conceptions first possible) of which Kant says that it must be conceived as prior to all analysis. Although the original and the secondary (logical) use of the understanding are different, yet we can reason back to the former from the nature of the latter, and if we can distinguish in thought combination and recognition (the synthesis of the understanding, and the subsumption of the judgment), so also in the original presentation are to be distinguished transcendental understanding and transcendental judgment, which both together constitute the act by which we generate the presentation of object in general, but do not have that of any definite object, for this can happen only by our giving marks of distinction to an object already generated by us, or, thinking the same. This objective synthetic unity, or objectivity in general, belongs only to the product of the original presentation. All, therefore, that cannot be deduced from the original use of the understanding has for us no objectivity, nor meaning.

10. The analysis of the original presentation, which, therefore, is the highest problem of the transcendental philosophy, arrives now at the result, that the original presentation consists in the categories, which are not ready-made conceptions,
but ways of the understanding; likewise also in space and
time, which are not at all distinguishable from the original
presentation, but are pure perception itself, since space is only
in my description, is, in fact, my description itself. What
Kant has indicated in his profound theory of the schematism
of the pure reason, what he still more clearly gives us to
understand where he explains it as possible that the act which
unites the sensations into a perception may be the same as
that by which experiences are produced, is here held fast in
the most decided manner by Beck, who attributes Kant's
separation of Ästhetic and Logic merely to his regressive
method of procedure. Hence, in fact, Kant referred also the
categories to the understanding, the schemata to the tran-
scendental judgment, but both are, in fact, the two sides of
the original presentation. Just for this reason is substantiality
not conceivable without spatiality, causality not without suc-
cession, etc. Time, space and categories, as the way of my
posing object in general, are, consequently, of course, ways
of the being of object in general, hence also, if I abstract from
all more concrete determinations of an object, these, only,
remain to me (spatiality, reality, substantiality, etc.). This
objectivity in general is now what is called phenomenon;
that, therefore, there are no other objects than phenomena
is self-evident, and we do not know things-in-themselves, not
at all because they always remain hidden from us as do the
dwellers on the moon, but because it is absurd that the non-
phenomenal should be, have effects, etc., i.e. appear. Objects
are, as such, phenomena and not things-in-themselves.

II. It is intelligible why Beck designates this his stand-
point as Critical Idealism, in contradistinction to the realism
which he had charged against Reinhold. On the other hand,
he is perfectly in the right when he emphasizes the great
difference between his theory and Berkeley's, and asserts that
he does not so offend the healthy human understanding as
empirical idealism does. This knows no difference between
dreaming and waking, and can give no reason why I now see
a table and not a tree. It is otherwise with the critical
idealist. Within the province of objects, of which he knows
that they are phenomena, he makes, and properly, a distinction
between presentations that are produced by the impression of
objects and those that are not. Objects are in fact pheno-
mena; that these can be causes, the Critique has not denied
but, the rather, proved, and the unheeded proposition of Kant: Phenomena are the undetermined objects of perception, states that to the phenomena produced by the original presentation, more proximate determinations are first given by the secondary presentation. (If, therefore, Berkeley conceives perception as the dream of a painting, Beck conceives it as the viewing of a painting that one has painted beforehand in a dream.) Against Berkeley it is, therefore, to be asserted that presentations are effects of real objects; against the dogmatic Kantians, that things-in-themselves are never causes, hence cannot be causes of presentations; against both, that in general we may not inquire after a bond of union between things and their presentations but between phenomena and their presentations, since this question has a meaning only in the empirical sphere.

12. As transcendental philosophy, rightly understood, is opposed to all dogmatism, so also is it to what may be termed speculation or speculative reason (Kant’s Metaphysics of the Supersensible). The essence of this consists in that it applies conceptions that in general have meaning only where phenomena are concerned, outside of this realm. Hence Kant in the critique of psychology, cosmology, and theology, ought not to have opposed the previous metaphysics with the sceptical non ligit, as if it were possible that the soul were immortal, only that it was not to be proved, etc. But he should have shown that it is an absolute absurdity to apply to a non-spatial nature the category of permanence; that if spatiality be denied to the most perfect nature but reality be granted to it, this is a dogmatic trifling with conceptions. Faith is for Beck the confidence of the right-minded man that the goal, the best world or the highest good, will be attained. In the fact that man knows himself as homo noumenon consists the faith in immortality; in the fact that man obeys in himself the inner judge, consists religion. With Fichte’s view that God must not be regarded as a given object, Beck declares himself to be in entire agreement. (I know of nothing more complete regarding Beck’s theory than I gave in the year 1848, in the place cited, pp. 537–554.)
§ 309.

Transition to Fichte.

1. Reinhold's assertion, made already in the Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, and often elsewhere, that in Criticism all views that had hitherto prevailed (that is to say, in the eighteenth century, of which, particularly, he was thinking) are reconciled, could hardly be more strikingly justified than it was by his own and his opponents' conception of the Kantian doctrines. That, of the three men who (if we except Schulze of Königsberg) had displayed the most striking evidence of their understanding of the author himself, one could give the system so dogmatic, another so sceptical, one so realistic, the third so idealistic, an interpretation, shows how much Criticism had adopted of Leibnitz and Hume, Locke and Berkeley. But, at the same time, that these elements became free upon the basis of the new system was a proof that they had not as yet been so united as it appeared to the eulogistic adherent, and that there is needed a new fusion, which, just because it has to overcome the new separation, will be more close, just as, after the elements of Socraticism had become free in the minor schools, Platonism united them all the more closely. That, where this happens and, hence, the first problem of modern philosophy is completely solved, as by Kant, he who does it calls his theory not merely, as did Kant, realism and idealism, but real-idealism or ideal-realism, will, in accordance with what was said in § 293, 8, not necessarily be regarded as unjustifiable; nor as unessential, since the discovery of such a name fixes, in a manner never to be forgotten, the problem had in question. Where this Criticism which gets beyond the latest one-sided conceptions of it expresses itself concerning its relation to its predecessors, hence, above all, to Kant and to the hypercritical friends of Kant who have just been considered, it cannot fail to happen that, in spite of all recognition, it will conceive many things otherwise than they do, and will give to their words another meaning than they themselves joined to them. Even though this re-interpretation be always an improvement, that it should not always be accepted lies in the nature of the case. What has been merely fabled of Socrates, is, as regards Kant, literally correct: he bitterly complained that this disciple lies so much about him.
2. Not only did the opposed one-sided views of Reinhold and his critics demand a progressive movement; but the example set by the former in the deeper foundation of the system invited to an imitation, and all the more, of course, that Maimon and Beck had maintained that Reinhold, no doubt, had dug deeper, but had hardly reached the deepest point. As in Kant, sense and understanding had sprung up out of the soil beside one another, so likewise beside these rose the stem the crown of which, just as those two bore physics, had been ethics. With Kant, there stood opposed to the theoretical reason (if we understand by that, sense and understanding) the practical reason. As that tantalizing "perhaps" relating to these two, and, further, the hint that both have to do with presentations, made Reinhold’s attempt one that could hardly miscarry, so had Kant, inasmuch as, besides the suggestion that lay in the common name reason, he had often repeated that the reason is only one, or, in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, he had spoken of a root (explained by him, of course, to be inscrutable) of the theoretical and the practical reason, given an exactly similar hint. What wonder if Fichte writes to Reinhold that the latter has given to Criticism the only basis that it needed, if Kant had written only a Critique of Pure Reason. But now that also a Critique of Practical Reason was in question, there was required a founding of the system by which even Reinhold’s first fundamental principle would be made to appear as derivative and dependent. But how to think this unity of the theoretical and practical faculties, where the tap-root is to be sought to which the root discovered by Reinhold should be related as a branch-root, on this point Kant had left no one who had eyes, in the dark. The oft-repeated observation that the practical reason has the primacy over the theoretical, the entire theory of assumptions resting upon practical need, the acknowledgment, hardly to be withheld, that the unconditioned is thought, that the final end of the world as a whole is the fulfilment of the moral law,—all this pointed so plainly to a conception of the transcendental philosophy, according to which reason is primo loco practical, but in order to be so,—hence merely as a means,—is theoretical, that this conception had not to be long waited for. After the preparatory labours of Kant, Reinhold, Ænesidemus-Schulze and Maimon, to whom Fichte always recognised that he
owed an infinite debt, his practical idealism lay so near, that a philosopher who, like him, was so completely practical reason, must have maintained that theory. Fichte's theory is one of the many proofs of the principle enunciated by himself, that the philosophy of a man is always just what he himself is.

3. But such a philosophy as Fichte's Science of Knowledge was also the only possible formula for the universe for an age which was conscious of its freedom and independence, only when it regarded the existent, merely because it existed, as a limit that must be broken through. The overthrow of all that had had validity, merely because it had had validity, even though it were as simple as the week of seven days or the name of the month, is, practically, what Fichte stated theoretically in the following formula: The existing world is the worst conceivable. That the author of the Science of Knowledge sympathized with the Jacobins is as easy to understand as that his great antagonist was an enthusiast on the side of the French Emperor. It was with equal right that, quite independently of one another, the essence of the French Revolution was placed in the circumstance that men had attempted to construct a world merely out of thought and to abstract from all historical presuppositions, and, again, that it was said by Fichte that he was the first who had in earnest set before himself the task of constructing wholly a priori a wholly presuppositionless philosophy. To the hatred towards authority on the one hand, there corresponds on the other, an ethics that declares conduct resting on authority to be want of principle; to the fanaticism of liberty which gave birth to a committee of public safety before which every one trembled, there corresponds here an exclusive State and a school separate from all the world, in which men should become fortunate by the fact that they cannot breathe freely, and free by the fact that they grow up, live, and die in chains. Indeed, it is one and the same spirit which accounts it a fine thing to have put the decade [ten days] in place of the week, and which believes the human race in its majority to be interested in the question whether the traditional word "philosophy" shall be retained or be exchanged for a new, a rational word. Both are a breach with custom.
THIRD DIVISION.

The Science of knowledge and its Offshoots.

A.—FICHTE AND THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

§ 310.

Fichte's Life and Writings.


Johann Gottlieb Fichte, born on the 19th of May, 1762, in Rammnau in Upper Lusatia, educated as a theologian in the schools of Meissen and Pforta and the universities of Jena and Leipsic, and, as it appears, greatly attracted by Spinozism, learned to know, after he had been for some years a family tutor in Switzerland, first Kant's philosophy and then Kant himself personally, and wrote, upon this occasion, his Critique of All Revelation (1792), which at once made him a famous man, extolled by the Kantians. In this work is developed the idea that the moral law that is sovereign in us is changed by an "alienation" which we (at least, the most of us) need, into a law-giver; and, through this ingredient of theology, loyalty to duty becomes religion. Revelation as sensible attestation of the truth is a need felt by weakness, which is of course very wide-spread. In Switzerland, whither Fichte again betook himself in the year 1793, to get married, he published anonymously a discourse: Revendication of Freedom of Thought (1793), and Contributions towards the Rectification of the Judgments of the Public relative to the French Revolution (2 Parts, 1793). In the latter, which was occasioned by Rehberg's diametrically opposite views, he defended (against Kant) the right of the people to alter its State-compact, and violently antagonized the nobility, the Church, and the toleration of the Jews. Criticisms in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung, particularly of Schulze's Ænesidemus (1794), show how his views had already crystal-
to Reinhold, and began his lectures there on the 26th of March, 1794. The little work, *On the Conception of the Science of Knowledge* (1794), may be regarded as the programme of these, and the following-named works which came out in sheets while the lectures were in progress may be regarded as syllabuses for them: *Basis of the Entire Science of Knowledge* (1794), and *Outlines of the Peculiarities of the Science of Knowledge* (1795), which connects itself with the preceding. Of more extended works, he published in Jena: *Basis of Natural Right according to the Principles of the Science of Knowledge* (1796), and *System of the Theory of Morals according to the Principles*, etc. (1798). The cry that was raised, particularly in the Electorate of Saxony, against certain would-be atheistical essays in his periodical, caused him to write his *Appeal to the Public* (1799), and was also the cause of his losing his professorship in Jena and withdrawing to Berlin, where he lived, first in a private capacity, then as professor in Erlangen, with permission to spend the winters in Berlin; and finally, from 1809 until his death (27th of Jan., 1814), as professor in the University. In Berlin he printed: *The Destination of Man* (1800); *The Exclusive Commercial State* (1800); *Sun-Clear Account for the Larger Public of the Essential Nature of the New Philosophy*, etc., (1801); *The Characteristics of the Present Age* (1806); *On the Nature of the Scholar* (1806); *Way to the Blessed Life* (1806); *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808). The last four works are public lectures which he delivered, partly in Erlangen, partly in Berlin in the Academy-Building. After his death, his son edited his *Posthumous Works* (3 vols., Bonn, 1834) containing, partly the lectures delivered in Berlin, partly smaller compositions, which were followed by the *Complete Works* in like style (8 vols., Berlin, 1845). If it becomes necessary to prepare a new edition, it were to be wished that the posthumous writings should be incorporated with the others, and all arranged in a strict chronological order. One who prefers the logical to the chronological order will find a much better one than that observed in the Complete Works, in the fifth volume of Kuno Fischer's works, pp. 338–346.
§ 311.

The Science of Knowledge.


1. The same reason for which in § 307 we spoke only of Reinhold’s *Elementary Philosophy*, although he declared the *Synonymics* to be a much riper work, holds here, if, as the basis of the following account, only those works of Fichte are taken which he wrote and published in the eighteenth century. Monographs upon Fichte and his theory can, it is true, appeal to his practice and his express explanations when they put aside the self-positing of the Ego, the being-posed of the non-Ego, the divisible Ego and non-Ego, the antitheses and syntheses, the undeducible opposition (*Anstoss*), etc., as something external and collateral, and, distinguishing between his system and the first presentation of it, hold, rather, to the lectures published after his death. But he whose aim is to exhibit the course of the history of modern philosophy must pursue a different method. The premises of that first presentation of his system were furnished particularly by Kant, then by Reinhold, Schulze’s *Æneisidemus* and MAïmon, and only in it is the connection of the system with its predecessors to be understood. And only in it, again, has that system had its lasting influence, by causing Schelling to commentate upon and, later, to supplement it, by calling out objections from the youthful Herbart and giving to him a tendency for life, by becoming for Hegel the subject of his first work, and for all who came later the teacher of method. If one compares the lasting influence that this first presentation of the system exerted upon Reinhold, Forberg, Schad, Schlegel, and others, with Fichte’s activity in Berlin, though one place the latter ever so high as regards the diffusion of ideal, or, even, national, sentiment, then Fichte has not had a direct influence upon philosophy since he had left Jena. Very naturally. What he had printed of the lectures that he delivered was such as would not bear being measured by the standard of strict science, as Schleiermacher’s verdict on the *Characteristics of the Present Age*, or as Hegel’s on the *Addresses to the German Nation*, has proved. Again, the profound lectures on the Science of Knowledge, of the years 1801, 1804, 1813, on the Facts of
Consciousness and on Transcendental Logic, he did not have printed; and that these should have produced a greater effect upon any one at a single hearing than Director Bernhardi, who passed for a Fichtean, once confided to Benecke, is not to be believed. Before Fichte's son brought out, in the year 1834, his father's posthumous writings, he was perhaps the only one who could say that these had won him to philosophy. He is therefore in the wrong when, in the preface to Fichte's Complete Works, he is impatient because in the accounts of the history of philosophy much more stress is laid upon the most imperfect form of the Science of Knowledge than upon the later versions. In the former it at once kindled a flame, in the latter, it did not begin to have effect, if at all, until after Hegel's death. If, as regards the author of the present account, it happens that the expositions of Harms, the younger Fichte, and particularly of Löwe, have certainly led him to regard the chasm between the original and later Science of Knowledge as much narrower than formerly appeared to him, but as still apparent; this is to him a further reason for holding, in the exposition of the Science of Knowledge, only to that which Fichte had printed up to the year 1801.

2. Fichte considered the epoch-making achievement of Kant, whom he always, except in moments of displeasure, placed above all other philosophers together, to lie in the fact that he brought philosophy to transcendental investigations, so that, whereas all sciences are an apprehension or knowledge of the objects which they treat, philosophy, on the contrary, considers only apprehension and knowledge themselves. Hence, in order that it be not placed upon a level with the sciences, it should be called the science of the sciences, the science of knowledge, a name which Reinhold already had suggested. But just because it occupies itself only with knowledge, or apprehension, there exists for the philosopher nothing whatever objective, no thing-in-itself, and it is the great merit of Maimon and Beck that they have rid philosophy of this ghost. In this they understood Kant better than Reinhold did. Similarly as to the sciences, is, philosophy related to practical life. These two do not cross one another, for science has to deduce, to comprehend the standpoint of life, hence begins where life ends, i.e. rises above this as biology rises above life. Compared with the standpoint of practical life and of the sciences, the philosophical standpoint may

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be designated as counter-natural or artistic. Just as little as the philosopher has to do with apprehended objects, so little has he to observe the apprehending subject, as those do who put psychology in the place of philosophy. The Science of Knowledge has for its aim to comprehend, not the knowing mind but knowledge, not an active some-
what, but an act. This it aims to do, however, in a sci-
entific manner, and hence the Transcendental Philosophy or
Science of Knowledge must, as has been shown by Reinhold,
who, after Kant, has thereby won for himself the greatest
desert as regards philosophy, be deduced from a single first
principle. The fault to be found with Reinhold is that he,
just as if Kant had written no Critique of Practical Reason,
laid down a first principle which serves as a basis for theo-
retical philosophy only. For that reason he contents him-
self with theoretically establishing the fact of presentation,
whereas if one goes still deeper and seeks the common
origin of the theoretical as well as the practical activity,
one discovers this only in activity in general, and then
will lay down a first principle that formulates a fact-act.
In this, Beck saw more acutely than Reinhold, who, because
he did not get beyond the fact of presentation, in which the
Ego is limited, is not rid of the mischievous prejudice of the
“given stuff.” If we could succeed in deriving from a primal
fact-act all others, even that of presentation with which Rein-
hold begins, and hence to explain how and why knowing is
a perceiving, understanding, etc., then the Science of Knowl-
edge would have solved its problem. Since among the
activities to be explained consciousness also is to be found, it
is self-evident that the acts to be unfolded by the Science of
Knowledge do not fall within consciousness. But, for that
reason, the Science of Knowledge has not to do with inven-
tions, but its problem is to draw forth into the light the
concealed mechanism by means of which consciousness is
realized, that is to say, to bring into consciousness what does
not fall within consciousness, because it is a conditio sine qua
non of consciousness (hence it is called a priori). Since this
never occurs to the ordinary consciousness, the standpoint
of the Science of Knowledge is an artistic one. It is with
these unconscious acts as it is in mathematics, where the
mathematician considers the figure without knowing that he
he has to do with his own space-limits. It will have to be
required of the Science of Knowledge as the basis of all sciences, that it contain the principles of all sciences and establish their scientific form. (Even logic constitutes no exception here.) As a science, again, it must be a system. For this, it is, in the first place, requisite, as was remarked, that it rest upon a first principle in which the matter and the form of knowledge so condition one another that that principle requires no other that conditions it as regards form and content. (With this it is quite compatible that there be joined with it two others, one of which is conditioned as regards form, the other as regards content.) Secondly, it is requisite that if everything be deduced from this first principle, that which is deduced forms a closed circle. Where, therefore, from that primitive fact-act the principles and presuppositions of the practical life and of the sciences (experience) are explained, and the starting-point is again reached in a methodical progression, there the Science of Knowledge has solved its problem.

3. With these discussions, which have all been taken from the work, On the Conception of the Science of Knowledge, connects itself the laying down of the principles of all the sciences, which Fichte develops first in the Basis of the Whole Science of Knowledge (Wks. pp. 83–328), in its First Part. The most primitive act he assumes to be that by which the unity of the subjective and objective is posited, and he describes this in his first First Principle as follows: The Ego posits absolutely its own being. The descriptive form of this proposition, and the fact that the discussion of it is bound up with the law of thought A=A have caused many to suppose, erroneously, that it was to be demonstrated. Of that there is no intention whatever; but Fichte's aim is to show to those who regard the proposition A=A as an unalterable principle, that this proposition holds only for the case where A is posited, hence presupposes the positing in which that act consists; in fact, that the Law of Identity is only a form abstracted from the self-positing of the self. Hence is it an explanation of its own proper meaning, and therefore an improvement, when, later, instead of describing, he, the rather, makes the requirement that a conception be thought, and then that it be observed not what one does when one thinks, but what one must do: here it will be discovered that what is contained in thought, or, rather, pre-
cedes it as a *conditio sine qua non*, is a self-positing of self. This improved statement does not do away with, but strengthens, still another misunderstanding, produced by the term *Ego*, by which many understand the individual. But Fichte opposes this most vigorously. He cannot understand by the Ego the individual, because individual is a very complex conception, not deduced till much later. Since, that is to say, the individual Ego can be thought only by means of a *thou*, and a *thou* is an *it*, which is an *Ego*, the individual is the unity of the Ego and the it, *i.e.* the non-Ego. But by *Ego* he understands what Kant probably had in mind when he opposed to the empirical Ego the pure Ego, the pure consciousness, which is in all empirical consciousness that which speaks to us in the moral law. If one remembers that this was with Kant called the practical reason, and that what the practical reason demands was nothing else than reason, it may be comprehended at once why Fichte says instead of *Ego* also *reason*, and again why he places the nature of it in the positing (obligating) of self or reflectivity. The essential thing is that that absolute, not individual, Ego be conceived as pure act (not as something active), as pure or absolute knowledge (neither as a knowing nor as a known somewhat), as the self-penetration, for which there is no other word than Ego-hood. To bring to consciousness this Ego-hood underlying every Ego is therefore something entirely different from mere self-observation; it is rather an intellectual intuition before which one's own being vanishes, and which makes its appearance, which is no kind of being, but an act. To surrender one's self to this act (reason) is what is required by the Science of Knowledge, which, accordingly, instead of being egoism, as has been said, the rather drives out all egoism. But now it is to be comprehended how Fichte comes to be so ready to leave the requirement to bring that action-in-self to consciousness, to the conscience of him upon whom it is laid. That the fact-act described in this Principle really explains all facts of consciousness, further development must show. But even here can be deduced by reflection upon the form of this action, what otherwise is in logic usually merely described, namely, the Law of Identity and the category of reality. If, that is to say, in employing this Principle, which may also be formulated thus: Because the Ego is posited by itself, it therefore is, we abstract from the circumstance that we have to do with the Ego, there remains
only the connection between being-posed and being, and this constitutes the content of that law of thought. Just so, since categories are laws of the Ego only as they may be applied to objects, reality is given to an object only by its being posited by the Ego. That categories do not have application to what lies beyond the Ego has been demonstrated by Maimon.

4. The Second Principle is introduced in a manner entirely similar to that in which the First was introduced, that is to say, originally in a descriptive form, later in the form of a postulate. In the first form it runs, To the Ego is opposed the non-Ego; in the second it is required to bring the original opposition into consciousness. Since, as regards what takes place by this act, nothing new enters (it is posited), but there does as regards the way in which it takes place, Fichte calls the act itself, and likewise the principle that formulates it, conditioned as regards matter, and unconditioned as regards form. Just for that reason, also, is the product of this act designated by the expression non-Ego, which indicates a relation. That by abstraction from the content of this act we arrive at the formal law of thought, A is not B, as also to the stem-form of thought, negation, cannot but seem natural.

5. If these two postulates are granted, the Third, since these are opposed to one another, follows of itself, that is to say, the combination of the two, without, however, the identity of consciousness being lost sight of. Since these two annul one another, the act which shall combine the positing of the Ego and its opposite can consist in a reciprocal partial negation or limitation (determination) of these. If, therefore, the postulate of this partial negation be carried into effect, there results an act which Fichte describes thus: the Ego opposes to the divisible Ego a divisible non-Ego. Since this Principle presents nothing new as regards form, inasmuch as positing and opposing were already given, but the conception of limitation is a new one, not to be derived from those by analysis, Fichte calls this Principle unconditioned as regards matter; and with it the circle of possible Principles is exhausted. Reflection upon the form of this Principle should yield first the law of thought of the Ground, because Ground (of relation and distinction) lies only in the partial coincidence and falling asunder. (Already Wolff [vid. § 290, 4] had affirmed that which determines to be one with the ground.)
There results, further, from this Principle the third qualitative category: Determination (with Kant, Limitation). But, at the same time, because "partial" is a quantitative conception, the categories of quantity are therewith known in their proper source.

6. The consideration of the three Principles, which are related to each other as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, has established the foundation of the entire investigation, has expressed the totality of these. Since, that is to say, in this primitive synthesis, as will be shown, are contained all other syntheses that we have to make when we think, whereas the entire problem which Kant had placed before the Transcendental Philosophy (Science of Knowledge) was none other than that relating to synthetic judgments (syntheses) a priori, there is contained in this Principle the whole of the Science of Knowledge in a nut-shell. We shall develop it out of this implicit form by observing whether in this synthesis there appears a new antithesis, which then is resolved in a second synthesis. In the search for antitheses (analysis) and the uniting into syntheses consists philosophic method. This would continue to infinity if the thesis which stands above all antitheses and syntheses did not afford a goal. Where absolute unity, that Ego-ego with which we began, is again reached, even if only as an Idea, i.e. as an ideal never to be completely attained, there the circle is closed. Between the point of beginning and that of ending, will the individual, the finite (limited, divisible) Ego fall, so that the former is not yet, the latter no longer, an individual. Since the principle (the Third Principle) which contains the entire Science of Knowledge and which can be more concisely formulated thus: Ego posits Ego and non-Ego as mutually determining themselves, contains two principles, that is to say, (a) Ego posits itself as determined by the non-Ego, and, (b) Ego posits itself as determining the non-Ego, the Science of Knowledge falls into two parts, the theoretical and the practical. The first has to solve the problem which Kant had proposed for the Æsthetic and Analytic, namely, to answer the question: How does the Ego (the reason) come to assume anything objective? The second takes the place of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic and Critique of Practical Reason, and answers the question, How comes the Ego (the reason) to ascribe to itself causality?
§ 312.

Theoretical Science of Knowledge.

1. The starting-point in the investigation is, the first of the two principles last laid down; the method, that just described; the goal, to lead the reader to the point where Kant and Reinhold take him up, so that for their assertions, The Ego has perceptions, conceptions, consciousness, etc., is supplied the proof, which shows how the having of all these comes about. If the answer to this question really consists in that principle, it is at once clear, that two opposite answers can be given to it. In that principle, that is to say, are contained two others, opposed to one another. In other words, there lies, first, in the principle that the Ego posits itself as determined, the principle, plainly discernible, the Ego is determined. If we rest with that, the Ego is conceived, manifestly, as suffering, and accordingly one view asserts that the Ego gets its presentations in a passive manner, it receives them as effects of things. This view may be termed realism; it explains ideation, experience, etc., by the category of causality, and leads, if consistently carried out, to attributing to the Thing sole activity and existence, and denying to the Ego both these. Hence Spinoza is to be regarded as the most consistent realist. Instead of the term "realism," "empiricism" is also often employed, and hence it comes about—that what has alienated many—that Fichte speaks of Spinoza as of a representative of empiricism. (Had he known Hume’s views of the Ego he would perhaps have cited them. But then also every ground of estrangement would have fallen away.)

2. But with equal right can the opposite answer be read out of the principle. For, since there is manifestly contained therein that the Ego posits itself as determined, this may be urged, and presentations accordingly be deduced from its activity, be explained as its creation, as accidents of its nature as dreams are, so that we can say that, underlying this view, idealism, is the category of substantiality. Berkeley, before all others (but Leibnitz also), may be called a representative of this view. Kant has quite correctly perceived that it has the same justification as the view above cited, and for this reason places the two side by side. He is, as he himself says, an (empirical) realist, and also a (transcendental) idealist. But
such an idealism, on equal footing with realism, cannot satisfy, for, that those two principles upon which they rest should be derived from a single one demands a real reconciliation. If there were any, this theory of the origin of presentations of the objective should be called ideal-realism, or, also, real-idealism.

3. Fichte reaches this result by the application of the conception, first introduced by Kant, of the productive imagination, by which he understands the activity of the Ego which has power to limit itself, so that it may be considered as composed of two opposite elements, a centrifugal, infinite subjective, and a centripetal, finite objective. If we suppose, now, that objects presented to the Ego arise by the limitation of the Ego's own activity (somewhat as waves arise upon level water because of an arresting of its flow, or as visions do because of stagnation of the blood), idealism is as much wrong in representing them as originating through the activity of the Ego as realism in representing them as originating entirely without the activity of the Ego. (The category of ideal-realism would then be neither causality nor substantiality, but reciprocity.) Since presentations arise to the Ego because the Ego arrests its activity, they appear to it as an arresting obstacle, hence as a foreign object. One may call this illusion, but it is not a groundless illusion. Objects are, therefore, creations of the imagination; not of a conscious imagination, for mechanism lies behind the productive imagination, or, if one will, before consciousness. Through its operation consciousness, also, originates. The presented objects, therefore, would be arresting obstacles which the Ego, unconsciously of course, puts in the way. (The repulsiveness which this development has had for many and still has, would be lessened if, where Fichte says, "posit objects," they should say, instead, affirms, or if they should put to themselves the question, whether they really mean that an impression produced by things could alone cause us to mentally place them before us.)

4. But in order that this may be something more than a hypothetical view it is necessary to show how, by the assumption of that capacity of self-limitation, the origin of presentations and of all phenomena of consciousness, from which as admitted facts Kant and Reinhold start, can be explained. The deduction of presentations is given, now, in a pragmatical history of intelligence or of human knowledge, which pursues a method that is, in a certain measure, opposite to the one
hitherto followed, and not so much inquires after the primal fact that is possible to thought, as, the rather, shows by this forward movement the well-known facts to be forms and stages of the productive imagination. For this pragmatical history, now, Fichte has given in the Basis, etc., only brief hints. These are fully supplemented in the Outlines of the Peculiarities of the Science of Knowledge (vol. i., pp. 331–416); at the same time, however, must be combined there-with what he says, partly in the two Introductions and the New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge (Wks., i., pp. 417–534), partly in the Introductions to the Natural Right and to the Theory of Morals. The guiding thread of this development is, that since there can be nothing in the Ego except what it itself posits, it also again posits this its positing, and makes this an object; so that,—to employ here a term current later, which, moreover, Fichte himself uses,—it also becomes for itself that which it had been at first in itself, or, for us. By the fact that the Ego reflects the stages of the Ego, or makes them an object it transcends them. The development begins with the very lowest step of that unconscious act of creation, that state in which intelligence first discovers what is already, it is true, in-itself, viz., sensation. This is taken as the state in which no distinction is as yet made between external and internal sensation, and just as little between that which feels sensation and that which is felt as such. Inasmuch as the (centrifugal) Ego transcends sensation, it distinguishes itself from it, and the latter thereby acquires a reference to something beyond itself. This looking-beyond converts sensations first into observed points the mutual dependence of which gives co-existence, space, and the one-sided dependence of which gives succession, time. With this passage, in which Fichte appears as the faithful disciple of Maimon, the Outlines suddenly breaks off with the explanation. The reader is here brought to the point where Kant’s Transcendental Ästhetic takes him up. The further presentation of the pragmatical history must be gathered from more isolated hints to be found strewn throughout the work just mentioned, and, besides, in the works of Fichte first published after his death. Exactly as sensation becomes perception through limitation, so is the undetermined, vagrant perception brought to a stand and fixed by the understanding, which, since it gives rise to fast limits to activity, is quite pro-
perly the faculty of the real, so that all finite being is properly only in the understanding. The transition from perception to understanding is made by the (re)productive imagination, to which Kant rightly assigns the mediating schemata, and of which Fichte says that all that enters the understanding enters it only through the imagination. What this gives order to (thinks) are, therefore, merely fancies, presentations, which through it become fixed. The matter obtained by looking inward and outward is as yet in a rude, chaotic state (Kant’s world of sense); by the understanding or thought it is first rendered something definite and so known (with Kant, nature). The laws of this determination are the categories, just as space and time had been modes or laws of perception. By the categories, therefore, are not to be understood ready-made empty pigeon holes; but they arise, with objects, out of the ground of the imagination (hence at the same time with the schemata). That, therefore, the known, the real, is subject to the categories, or is phenomenon, lies in the nature of the case. A deduction of the categories is, of course, here no longer required, since this had already been given in the consideration of the Principles and the analysis of the Third Principle. But Fichte was right in saying here, exactly as he had said above, that the reader is now brought to the point where Kant’s Transcendental Analytic takes him up. But, finally, he attempts to show that if the (centrifugal) transcending of the limits set by the understanding be continued, intelligence becomes reflecting and abstracting judgment. If, now, this, again, be made object, there arises the consciousness of the power of abstraction generally, i.e., the consciousness of pure reason (devoid of all imagination) or self-consciousness proper. Here a twofold result is reached. First, knowledge arrives at a doubling of the object, in which it distinguishes from it its presentation (more precisely: from the presentation, the presentation of the same). In this distinction, properly speaking, consists that act which Reinhold had placed at the beginning as an act of consciousness, so that the reader now is brought to the beginning of the Elementary Philosophy. But a second, more important result is this: In the deduced (rational) consciousness intelligence has reached the point at which there is for the Ego itself what we had recognised as the sum and substance of the Theoretical Science of Knowledge, viz., that the Ego posits itself as determined. But having reached the
starting-point, the Ego positing itself as determined by the non-Ego, the Theoretical Science of Knowledge contains neither too many nor too few principles; it is a circle returning into itself, a closed system.

5. The Theoretical Science of Knowledge has therewith accomplished what, according to what was said at the very beginning of this section, it set out to accomplish. A single point, obviously a cardinal one, remains undiscussed. What cause has the Ego, or what gives it occasion, for arresting or diminishing its activity? Since it has been established that the Theoretical Science of Knowledge will consist merely in the analysis of the above-stated principle, but this principle contains and pre-supposes self-limitation, obviously the citing of such a ground would be to establish that principle, hence, to transcend it, i.e., to step outside the Theoretical Science of Knowledge. This cannot explain what occasion the Ego has; it only establishes the fact that such an “opposition” exists, just as also Kant had declared it inexplicable for the theoretical reason that it assumes things-in-themselves. But Fichte here goes further. He knows that these so-called things are illusions, fancies. But what causes intelligence to impose upon itself with these cannot be deduced; that is to say, not at this point.

§ 313.

Practical Science of Knowledge.

1. As the Theoretical Science of Knowledge had to answer only the question, How comes the Ego to affirm objective existence? so the Practical Science of Knowledge has to answer only the question, How comes the Ego to be conscious of its own activity in the external world? The answer must be contained in the principle, The Ego posits itself as determining the non-Ego. Here, also, may this principle be designated as the starting-point; and as the goal, may be designated the perception of why, as Kant has said, the practical reason has primacy over the theoretical. Now symmetry would have demanded just such an analytico-synthetic treatment of the second principle. But Fichte, who is afraid of nothing more than of a spiritless calculation instead of a self-active creation, takes another way; being all the more justified in so doing by the fact that he knows (beforehand) that the case with the
practical activity of the Ego is different from that with the theoretical activity. Accordingly he starts with the result deduced in the Theoretical Science of Knowledge, that the Ego is limited, finite, objective, *i.e.*, is occupied with the objective. But now it was said, nevertheless, in the First Principle that the Ego posits absolutely only its own being, and there arises then the question, Is, and how is, the limited objective activity which has been deduced, to be combined with the infinite unlimited or pure activity which has been recognised as the essential nature of the Ego? In only one way: When the finite activity is conceived as subordinated to the pure activity as means to end. But this actually takes place when we conceive the Ego as striving towards the infinite, or when we conceive it as practical, *i.e.*, as knowing itself as causality, as activity. It can do this only by overcoming resistance; to do this it must meet with resistance; that therefore it should have something objective (resistance \([\textit{Widerstand}]\) = object \([\textit{Gegenstand}]\)) is necessary for it in order that it be practical. It must affirm something objective not in order that it may respect it, but that, on the contrary, it may annul it. The real why or, rather, where to of the affirming the objective or of existent intelligence lies for the Ego in the fact that it cannot otherwise be practical or will. The opposition, therefore, which the Theoretical Science of Knowledge could not deduce is here deduced. It lies in the practical being of the Ego, of which, for the rest, one may convince himself also by the fact that nothing makes us certain of the existence of things so much as the resistance they offer, *i.e.*, our (arrested) action upon them. For the rest, we may also here recall to mind Kant, who likewise maintains that it is from practical need that we come to affirm things. Of course there makes its appearance here the great distinction that, according to Kant, these things were things-in-themselves, which, as unknowable, remain opposed to the Ego, as impenetrable limit, whereas, according to Fichte, they are nothing in themselves, but only for us, and thus present to us a material to which we give form, and hence are not impenetrable (unknowable), so that he answers the question as to what things-in-themselves are, not with a *Nescio*, but with, They are what we shall make out of them. Here, therefore, is it asserted, with Reinhold, The thing-in-itself is entirely absorbed by the noumenon, whereas with Kant the
opposite often seems to be threatened. (It was so when he called duties things-in-themselves.) The question, therefore, concerning the origin of presentations is now completely answered; the Theoretical Science has shown how, the Practical, why, the Ego gets them. If, now, the view that places the source of presentations merely in the Ego must be called idealism, so must the Science of Knowledge be so called. But since it does not discover the source in the theoretical Ego but in the practical, it is Practical Idealism. It is this because it has been in earnest with the primacy of the practical reason, and understands this to mean that the reason, which is pre-eminently practical, makes itself, in order to be this, theoretical reason, as the only means by which it can fulfil its true destination. As regards the content of the Practical Science of Knowledge there is given here, exactly as in the theory of intelligence, a series of steps the principle of which is, likewise, that what the Ego is, must become for it. To the imagination, in the theoretical Ego, there corresponds as fundamental form the striving of the practical Ego. The further-going reflection converts it into impulse, which, at first the impulse to presentations, becomes the impulse of creation and satisfaction, and finally culminates in the impulse which is self-end, the ethical impulse.

2. The transcendental investigations of Kant relating to knowledge had been carried back by Reinhold to the common starting-point; these and those relating to will had been carried back by Fichte to the common starting-point, and thus had the transcendental philosophy been presented as a real system. But, now, the Transcendental Philosophy was not yet in Kant the whole of philosophy; but after it had shown that the faculty of knowledge and likewise the faculty of problems contained within itself the matter for synthetic judgments a priori, i.e., of a metaphysics, this last (metaphysics) itself was given. Out of the two-stemmed faculty of knowledge had grown, to repeat the expression employed earlier, the "crown" of the Philosophy of Nature, out of the one-stemmed faculty of willing the crown of the Metaphysics of Morals. There had not, of course, taken place the slightest change in these two as a result of Reinhold's union of the stems of knowledge. The case is otherwise with Fichte. Here the crown of the Philosophy of Nature necessarily vanishes. If we understand by nature, as all are accustomed to do, the complex of existence in so far as it con-
tains reason, Fichte denies nature. For, since he conceives the objective as non-Ego, the Ego coinciding with reason, there remains for that only the predicate unreason. Hence his indignation at all optimism, his assertion, that the world is, rather, the very worst, because the farthest removed from that which we have to make out of it, etc. Further, since a scientific consideration of nature is barely possible, when it is treated as a self-end, whereas Fichte sees in things only a means for the realization of our (moral) ends, he acknowledges no other mode of viewing nature than the teleological, which, however, must be of such a character that morality is acknowledged by it as the end. In his moral theology Kant maintains theology only in so far as it rests upon morals; just so does Fichte as regards physics. It may be said that he maintains only a moral physics. He says expressly: Our duty is the only thing-in-itself and is converted by the laws of the sensuous idea into a world of sense. That light and air have in themselves a necessity does not occur to him, but he believes, in all seriousness, that he has "deduced" both when he directs attention to the fact that, without them, men could neither see nor hear one another; without this, could not understand one another; without this, could not enter into moral community. This viewing, now, of nature from the point of view of the highest moral end makes it clear why Fichte, who has not attempted to give a deeper basis to Kant's Critique of Judg-ment, and has adopted from none of Kant's works so little as from this, yet sometimes praises it above all the rest and asserts that nowhere has Kant come nearer the truth than in it. It is the ethico-theological conclusion of the work, as well as the assertion that nature has man for its end only in so far as he is a moral being, that so appealed to Fichte. The affectionate sinking of himself in the contemplation of living being as the end of nature must have repelled him. He even expressly antagonizes this conception. Like Fries (vid. § 305-6), he sup-poses that the organism can be explained by mere reciprocity. To see ends in nature means to him to overvalue nature, and this is for him the worst thing possible. Never has a system breathed such hatred of nature as that of Fichte.

3. But there is also implied at the same time, that in the same measure the other crown, Ethics, must remain. In fact so much is this the leading feature in his system that his Science of Knowledge can be understood only through his Theory of
Right and of Morals. His *Basis of Natural Right* (Wks., vol. iii.) and his *System of the Theory of Morals*, particularly, are here to be discussed. Just as does Kant, indeed even more than he does, Fichte separates the spheres of Right (legality) and Ethics (morals). Hence he will not allow any relation of right to be morally established (e.g. the keeping of one's word from mere obligation), and he requires of the Theory of Right that it adduce the means by which legality shall remain secure, even though honesty and faith should have altogether vanished. Hence right ignores morality, and morality, indeed, does away with (legal) right, because there is for the wholly moral person no law that could constrain him. Because of this independence of the two, the beginning of the *Theory of Morals* does not join itself on to the *Theory of Right*, nor vice versa, but both to the discussions of the *Science of Knowledge*. Much is to be found both at the opening of the *Natural Right* and at the beginning of the *Theory of Morals*: for example, one of the most important points, the transition from the Ego that coincides with the universal impersonal reason, the rationality that ought to be, to the many individual Egos or Ego-individuals. The deduction of this reason is exactly similar to that which was given of the "opposition," as are all further deductions in the *Natural Right* and the *Theory of Morals*: by it is given not so much the *why* as the *wherefore*. The goal has been fixed: The Ego must know itself as activity. All that is recognised as a means to, and *conditio sine qua non* of, this goal is said to be deduced. It had been shown that, in order to have a matter to "break through," the Ego affirmed objects. It posited them, they are merely its presentations, for there is no other being than being in the Ego. But they offer resistance merely when the Ego is necessitated to the positing of them, when it must posit them. These two conditions are reconciled when the Ego is stimulated by the Ego, caused to posit the objective, *i.e.*, where the Ego multiplies (at least doubles) itself and each affirms the objective upon the corroborative witness of the other. Only of that of which others testify to me do I know that it is not merely my (dream-) world, but is the real world. The Ego which is to be conceived as prior to all consciousness, the infinite subject-object must therefore exist as a plurality of Egos or individuals, outside of which, obviously, it does not subsist as a particular being, but to which it is
related as man to men, as substance to its modes, as Fichte expressly says. To each of these Egos, now, is allotted a part of the common world as its exclusive sphere of freedom, and the limits of this sphere are precisely the rights of the individual, which the individual, if he existed alone (which is obviously an absurd supposition), would not, of course, possess. Within this sphere the Ego, or, as we must now say, every Ego, rightly ascribes to itself causality; for, since the world of sense is merely a being that is posited by me to explain my limits, I never get out of myself, even where I change these limits. “I change the external world” means, transcendentally expressed, I change my external condition. Those external conditions, now, which must necessarily be changed before others can be changed, or, what means just the same thing, that part of my sphere of freedom which contains the beginning-point of all the changes produced by me in the world of sense, is my body. It is, in the most eminent sense, mine; indeed, for all others it is I, and it must be regarded as the subject of right. Such, that is to say, do individuals become in limiting their freedom by the conception of the possibility of the freedom of the rest. Since only thereby do obligations originate, there can, of course, be no such thing as an obligation to enter the legal condition. But if one has entered it, the logical consequence is that he respect the legal condition; if he does not, he is treated as being without right. Thus is the right of compulsion given by the practical power of the syllogism. Nevertheless, since the validity of right depends upon empirical conditions, the actual, legal conditions, we cannot attribute to it unconditional validity as to the moral law. The former possesses necessity because it is; the latter the force of obligation, because it should be. Fichte, like Kant, sees in the State merely the institution which by physical power lends sanction to the law, so that it is, therefore, the pre-supposition for the reality of right, since without it neither right of compulsion nor of property is conceivable. The latter, which Fichte would have conceived as not so much the right to a thing as rather the right to exercise activity with reference to the thing, is to him the first consequence of the inalienable original right to be a personality, and, properly speaking, the only one for the protection of which the State exists. He does not vindicate higher than material interests to the State, which he conceives, therefore, as wholly
a relation of compact. It has nothing to do with disposition, piety, confidence; rather, it proceeds from a want of confidence. And in fact there is to be distinguished in it a three-fold compact; a property, defence, and union compact. Where- as the two first are concluded between individuals as such, in the third is concluded a compact with all, as the abstract con- ception of a compositum was changed by the imagination into a totum, a whole. Thereby the State becomes the sovereign. As regards the maintenance of its sovereignty, the so-called pouvoirs, Fichte will hear absolutely nothing of a separation of the judicial and executive powers, but unites the two in the one executive power; nor does he lay very great stress upon their being separate from the legislative, but all the more upon there being a supervising authority, an ephorality, to which belongs the right to introduce, in case of need, a State-interdict, i.e., to suspend the constitution of the State. There- by will be avoided the chief defect of all modern theories, the non-responsibility of the ruler. Origin ally greatly attracted by the democratic form of constitution, but brought by the later course of the French Revolution to distrust it, he sees in monarchy the best constitution for the present. Since the State is only an institution of safety and welfare, the citizen may demand both from it; hence the right to labour and the means of subsistence. From this Fichte has, next, drawn all the socialistic conclusions, in which his Exclusive Commercial State has anticipated modern phalansteries and national work- shops. The State as an institution for the protection of right is necessary only so long as right is in danger. The means of preventing such imperilment is punishment, which Fichte does not, with Kant, conceive as retribution, but which he justifies by its end, which should lie in the prevention of transgression and the reform of the transgressor. Only the murderer is fully ex lege, and is to be put to death by anyone; but since no private citizen will lend himself to this, by the State (secretly, since it is not an honourable business). The State is not eternal. As morality increases, it becomes superfluous, and since it can and should contribute towards this morality, it makes itself so. This transition from the present State (based on need) to the rational State, a transition which (among other things) he pictures in his Theory of the State of 1813, is accomplished by education. Since this pre-supposes a distinction of teachers and learners, and since the development of man can be con-
ceived only as education, and hence always consists therein, this distinction must be conceived as original, and hence the primitive condition of man must be so conceived that there appear as opposed two races, that of revelation and faith, and that of freedom and the understanding. The conflict of the two, in which, first one and then the other, takes the rôle of the teacher and leader, forms history, to the last phase of which the theory of knowledge begun by Kant is an introduction, since, denying authority as such, it itself produces that which is given by authority. At present we have to do with communicating to all the spirit of freedom, this conquest of the Science of Knowledge. This is done by popularizing education, the importance of which Pestalozzi, above all others, foresaw. If the people, accordingly, become so educated that the individual ceases to belong to a family or to have a separate possession, the race approaches a time when there need no longer be courts of justice, nor wars, and the last sovereign, having become useless, will surrender himself to the Volks-Schule, i.e., to the profession of teachers, that it may assign to him his proper place. (It is shown in The Addresses to the German Nation, which carry this out in detail, as well as in The Exclusive Commercial State, to what despotism the fanaticism of liberty conducts.)

4. Far more than in the Theory of Right, where, in addition to the pure Ought, to be determined a priori, there enters the empirical moment, is Fichte in his proper element in the Theory of Morals (Wks., vol. iv.). Like the Natural Right it subdivides into three principal parts, of which the first (pp. 13-62) contains the deduction of the Principle of Morality; the second (pp. 63-155) deduces its Reality and Applicability; the third (pp. 157-365) develops the System of Duties. The first deduction, which may also be called the Theory of the Moral Nature, has to explain scientifically the inner necessity which the moral man experiences in himself to act according to a certain norm, even without having in view an end to be attained thereby; and it does this by showing that true self-consciousness is conceivable only under the condition that the Ego determines its freedom, without exception, by the conception of independence. Here also the question how the Ego comes to know itself as free, i.e., to know changes in the world of sense as effects of a conception (thought), to know thought, therefore, as causality, is first
reduced to the correct (from the standpoint of the transcendental philosophy) formula. There, it runs, How do those changes in the Ego occur with which, at the same time, the view of our world is changed? Then it is shown how the tendency to these changes, the original impulse, is, by means of those initial points which formed the body, affected with limits not further deducible which constitute what is usually termed the nature of the individual. Here the original impulse appears broken, as it were, into two, the sensuous and the pure, impulse. The union of the two gives the moral impulse, which the real theory of morals as science has to consider; whereas regard merely to the sensuous impulse would lead to a theory of happiness, and regard merely to the pure impulse to an abstract metaphysics of morals. The moral impulse conducts to that satisfaction concerning which conscience decides, hence to peace of conscience; but this is attained when enjoyment, this goal of the merely sensuous impulse, which never makes its appearance when sought, is taken solely as a gratuity. Whoever calls it an austere and hard ethics that says. Thou shouldst eat and drink only for the sake of duty (the kingdom of God), forgets that there is no other. To act always according to conscience, for duty's sake, is the principle we seek, of a real theory of morals. Opposed to Right, which leaves the disposition wholly untouched, here stands a theory of morals which has so exclusive regard only to the disposition that an erring conscience is explained by it as impossible. Just so does the most admirable action lose its worth if done, not as a matter of conscience, but with regard to some authority. A history of the moral consciousness gives, as the stages of freedom through which the really moral man passes: formal freedom, which is to be found wherever one is conscious only of his impulse; willing in accordance with maxims abstracted from our impulses, in which man may be compared with an intelligent animal, and where everything aims at happiness; the heroic mode of thought, in which blind enthusiasm for the good makes men magnanimous but not just; finally, the stage in which man acts from duty and does not delight in his deed, but coldly approves it. Since the passing through these stages is not a necessity, but depends upon freedom, and indolence, this radical evil in human nature, hinders man in his passing through them, there is required a miracle, one, of course, which he himself
must perform, in order that he may attain to the highest stage. This is facilitated by the contemplation of exemplars, and to have been such is the merit of the founders of religion, the men of ethical genius. Although, now, the formula, "Follow conscience," suffices for life, science must nevertheless give material distinctions regarding the content of the moral law. Since complete independence, which is the highest goal, has as its condition the fact that I am an organized body, an intelligence, and one among many, there result the rules, first, to permit one's self to care for the body only as a means to duty-governed conduct; second, to pursue knowledge only from duty, not from idle curiosity; finally, to enter into association, in which the highest end, the subjection of all natural impulses to the law of morals, is most surely attained. The institution for mutual improvement through influence upon conviction is the Church. The formulary, as the sum of present convictions, is the starting-point for mutual understanding. To fix it as absolute is to forget that as the State is based on need, so also is the Church, which is but a means of transition to the absolutely moral human society, or community of perfect men. The chief means to the accomplishment of this transition is unrestricted interchange of opinion, which, with the Church-official, moves within certain limits set by his profession; with the author, must be free from all limits.

5. In speaking of Kant (§ 300, 9), it was pointed out that in spite of his asserted separation of the moral and legal, his ethnological and historical sense led him, in treating the history of the world, to combine the two points of view. For a similar reason, Fichte, an ideal husband, disputes Kant's assertion that marriage is only an institution of law, since it has a natural and moral character. Accordingly he treats it in the Theory of Morals. But the feeling that here, where the conscience is that alone which decides, a marriage of conscience may be construed as the highest of all, leads him to treat it in an appendix, apart from duties of vocation and all other duties. In fact, when, in the Third Part of his Theory of Morals, he divides duties as a whole, first, into conditioned or mediate, and unconditioned or immediate, and each of these classes, according as they are transferable or not, into particular and universal, he could not bring the duties of husbands under any of the four heads in such a way that at least supplementary considerations would not be required. These
have reference to the points in which most strikingly appears what a later system of ethics has emphasized, viz., that there are moral institutions which would be spoiled if the unifying element in them were conceived merely as legal or merely as moral. As regards the State, of which the same holds true; Fichte feels no need of separating it from the remaining merely legal relations; it remains with him, as with Kant, an institution of right and compulsion, with which moral disposition has nothing to do, and which, with Fichte as its spokesman, calls out to its citizens, “Love yourselves above all else, and your fellow-citizens for yourselves’ sake.”

6. As in most of the points hitherto considered Fichte had logically carried out what had been begun by Kant, so is it with regard to the way in which he conceived religion. The treatise, On the Ground of our Faith in the Divine Government of the World (Wks., vol. v. pp. 177–189), which drew upon him the charge of atheism, his Appeal to the Public (Wks., vol. v. pp. 193–238), finally, his Destination of Man (Wks., vol. ii. pp. 167–319), serve here as authorities. If we understand by being what is object for me, since every one calls the complex of all that is objective the world, to conceive God as being, is, properly speaking, a converting of the world into God, or of God into the world, i.e., Atheism. All who regard the absolute as a being, have extirpated it from themselves; one cannot know the absolute by looking outside himself. One must be it and live it in his own person. Just so can God be as little conceived as substance as being; for this means to conceive him as spatial, hence to be idolatrous. Whoever, finally, attributes personality to God makes of Him a finite limited being. The Science of Knowledge frees from such idolatry; it recognises as the absolute, i.e. as the highest, or the end of moral action, the moral order of the world; this is the only God. It asks after a ground of the moral order of the world as little as do its opponents after a ground of God. God is, therefore, the order of events; He is the established order, to fulfil duty in accordance with which makes blessed. To rest upon this order and to further it is religion. If our finite understanding converts this order or this law which rules us, into an existing being, it does exactly what we do when we call our sensation of cold coldness (which is independent of us). Existence is a sensible conception; just for that reason philosophy does not demonstrate the existence of God.
Its problem as regards religion is, a deduction of the religious consciousness. It recognises true religion—the religion of right-doing—but it is so much more certain of God (that law, or that order of events, this Ought) than of all being, that it must much rather be called Acosmism than Atheism. Persistent and firm adherence to the final end to be realized is faith; therefore, I believe because I will. My will coincides with that law, which may be called rational will. It is this law that announces to us that the sensible world is a material condition for the fulfilling of our duty; it, therefore, calls forth in us that world and may in so far be called the creator of the world. Hence moral conviction, or faith, is security for every other; the given world was the visible existence of the moral. Our life is the life of this law, hence it is itself eternal. I am immortal by the determination to live the law of reason, even though I should never actually so live. That life I already have in this. Fichte's *Destination of Man*, from which these last propositions are borrowed, falls into three parts, the first of which is entitled *Doubt*, because the ordinary consciousness, which finds itself, as a part of the world, dominated by the law of causality, is not able to extricate itself from the contradiction of constraint and the feeling of freedom. In the Second Part (*Knowledge*) he shows that the Science of Knowledge rescues freedom by teaching us to recognise the present objectivity as the deed of the Ego, but of course also changes it into a world of mere presentations, a dream-world, in which we have to do with copies, and (hence mere) pictures of the real. To this we attain (in the Third Part) by *Faith*, which guarantees the reality of that wherein and whereby we are to realize our ends. To call the doctrines developed in this work "Ethical Pantheism," was all the more justifiable that its agreement with Spinoza and Malebranche is almost literal. Only, there is great danger of forgetting that where two do the same thing it is not the same thing. Pantheism, *i.e.*, Spinoza, teaches the existence of a God who is a being without will, an eternal order of grounds and consequences in which ends and freedom have no place. The *Destination of Man*, on the contrary, teaches that of an absolute will which never is, a world only of ends, the activity solely of freedom. That he calls this "superterrestrial" world which (only) should be and grow, the best, does not conflict with, but rather supports, the earlier assertion, "The (earthly, present) world is the worst."
7. But with the moral order of the world, not only the highest, but also the terminal point, of the system is reached. This, it was stated, lies where the end of the thread returns to
the beginning, and the circle closes. Now, the system started
with the unity of subjective and objective, Ego-hood or the ab-
solute Ego, as it was before it became finite, limited,—before it
posited itself solely. It was then further shown how the finite
consciousness arose by the fact that the subjective entered into
opposition with the objective, and this limited Ego at the same
time divided into a plurality of Egos. This individualization
lost itself in the State, where the many formed a whole which
existed, rather, as a mere compositum; still more in the
Church as the ethical community, where, through an ever-
widening subjugation of the natural impulses, the natural man
more and more ceased to exist. But now, where it has been
shown that all life is, properly speaking, the life of the moral
order of the world, of the one humanity ever more and more
realizing its end, and that, moreover, this end is, that all that is
merely objective is subordinate to and serves the subjective—
this goal is, again, what was the starting-point, the unity of the
subjective and objective, infinite Ego, reason seeking, requir-
ing, realizing itself. The circle of the system is closed. But
here, where it has been shown that the Ego, the development
of which is the subject of consideration in the Science of Know-
ledge, is, at the last, the moral order of the world, is it also
possible to understand why Fichte could say above, that he
speaks of the Ego, the voice of which we perceive as the
categorical imperative, or also of that which men call God,
and why he speaks with a certain moral disgust of those who
are not able to make the infinite Ego, the absolute, live in them-
selves, to be it and live it. Where the moral law is concerned,
"I cannot" coincides with "I will not."

B.—RECEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

§ 314.

1. As was to be expected, a system that broke with the
already existing philosophy found many opponents. There
were, indeed, still, representatives of the pre-Kantian views,
but they had gradually become somewhat disheartened. Only
the intrepid Nicolai and his Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek
antagonized Fichte, as they had Kant; indeed, they even began at last to cry up Kant, as against Fichte, as an altogether sensible man. When, now, Fichte's arrogant work, Fr. Nicolai's Life, etc., appeared in print (against his will), Nicolai published first a very warm reply to it, and then a protest, just as warm and energetic, against Fichte's reception into the Academy. The expressions which became loud against Fichte from the Göttingen circle betrayed the feeling that they emanated from the rear-guard. Those who, when Fichte appeared, spoke with authority in philosophy, called themselves Kantians. Following Kant's own example, they had at first looked upon Fichte as a promising comrade, and C. Chr. F. Schmid's attack upon him, shortly before he came to Jena, appeared to be a case of personal irritation. But when the treatises on the Science of Knowledge threw down the gauntlet before all the Kantians except Reinhold, Maimon and Beck, who treated the master himself merely as a forerunner, this must, of course, produce bitterness of feeling. With the exception of Maimon, who remained silent, all those named declared against him, and at last Kant himself, in a very acri-monious way. The Allgemeine Literaturzeitung, which had gone with Fichte a little way, expressed itself against him; so also did Jakob's Annalen, in connection with which Beck, particularly, was active. That the Faith-Philosophy, which had already declared against Kant, should also declare against Fichte, was natural; and the fact that Fichte actually drew the consequences that Jacobi had declared beforehand to be inevitable deductions must have prepossessed the latter, in spite of the fact that he had a horror of them, in favour of the consistent thinker. Hence the respectful, even friendly relations between the two men. A view that had been attacked by the Pre-Kantians, the Kantians, and the Faith-Philosophers, must necessarily have the Semi-Kantians also, for opponents. Accordingly, Bouterwek, Krug, Fries repeatedly appeared on the scene of action to cast into the teeth of the Science of Knowledge its extravagant a priorism, or its "prejudice of transcendentalism." After these opponents, who rejected the whole problem that Fichte had raised, came, besides, the legion of those who adhered to individual parts of it. The expression Ego, by which, in spite of all protests to the contrary, was understood the individual, made the Science of Knowledge an easy prey for those who asserted that Professor Fichte regarded himself,
in all seriousness, as the Creator of the World. His doctrine of religion, and the disputes connecting themselves with that, regarding his atheism, brought religious interest into play, and the air swarmed with writings, serious and playful, religiously and anti-religiously coloured, personal and factual, which took the field against the "terrorism" emanating from Jena. In fact, the expression was not unfruitfully chosen, if one pay regard to the manner in which the adherents of the new doctrine defended it.

2. The author of this doctrine had, in the manner in which he announced—e.g., to C. Chr. Ehrh. Schmid—that he (Schmid) was "annihilated" and would henceforth be no longer regarded as existent, given an example of polemic which did not remain without imitators. One who before all others had avowed adherence to the Science of Knowledge, and penetrated so deeply into the meaning of it, that Reinhold and others were in the habit of characterizing him as the second author of it, was Schelling (vid. § 317 ff.). Like Fichte, he was rendered dissatisfied by Reinhold with Kant's achievements, and by Schulze's Ænesidemus and Maimon with Reinhold's, and was so influenced by Fichte's review of Ænesidemus as well as his programme, that in his work, On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy (1794), he attempts, in a manner similar to Fichte's, a deduction of the three principles with which the categories of quality, quantity, and modality, and the laws of analytical, synthetical and analytico-synthetical thought (principle of identity, of ground, and of disjunction) are said to be given. Much more important is his second work: On the Ego as the Principle of Philosophy (1795), in which the Ego that is not to be confounded with self-consciousness or the empirical Ego, and which stands above the opposition of the subjective and the objective, viz., the absolute Ego, which speaks to the empirical Ego, as an unconditional law, the command, "Be absolutely identical with thyself," is assigned all the predicates that consistent dogmatism (Spinoza) attributes to things; and in which it is shown that by this theory all oppositions of freedom and necessity, perfection and happiness, teleology and mechanism, are overcome. At the same time he here vindicates to the philosopher that intuitive understanding, of which Kant (vid. § 301, 8) had spoken only problematically, and in which Fichte placed himself in immediate alliance with him. But above all are to be mentioned
the Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1796), in which, in opposition to those who sought to establish a dogmatism wholly of the traditional sort, and particularly a theology on the basis of Criticism, it is shown that, according to Kant, God is only an object of conduct, and that Kant had failed to get beyond the indemonstrability of an objective God, instead of showing the incompatibility of such a nature with ours, because he examined critically only the faculty of knowledge and had not gone deeper. His question, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? proves, in fact, quite clearly that he placed himself in the sphere of syntheses, i.e., of the opposition of the subjective and the objective (hence makes Fichte's Third Principle the point of beginning). It therefore only remains for him to say that as the reason (viewed as practical) proceeds to posit the unity of the two, so also (theoretically regarded) it presupposes this unity. Since now this contradiction ceases as well where the object is posited as thing-in-itself, as absolute, and the subject vanishes as knowing, as also where, conversely, the object vanishes as something counterposed, the Critique of Pure Reason presents a choice between two equally possible but irreconcilable standpoints, objective and subjective realism, the first of which, Dogmatism (Spinoza), requires that the subject lose itself in the absolute, and teaches that the Ego is a mere modification of the infinite, the other, Criticism (Fichte), gives the command, Be! and teaches the absorption of the object by the subject, not, indeed, as being (for then it would itself be Dogmatism), but as the obligation to be. The goal is not attained, for blessedness is medium, as Lessing rightly says. Criticism, therefore, does not teach a drawing near to the Divinity, but, rather, the drawing near of the Divinity, by man's becoming of himself more and more free from himself, instead of trembling before an avenging judge. Choice must be made between these two standpoints, which alone are consistent. (Then would be enunciated, therefore, that dilemma to which, earlier (§ 269, 2), reference was made.) The New Deduction of Natural Right (1796), which followed the Letters, can therefore not be cited here, because Fichte was dissatisfied with it, and because, also, it contains a thought which transcends Fichte, namely, that the State lies in a sphere that stands above the moral and the legal. Still more does Schelling appear in agreement with Fichte in the Universal Survey
of the latest Philosophical Literature (1797), which was reprinted later (1809) as: Dissertations in Explanation of the Science of Knowledge. These contain, besides extended critiques of the standpoints of Kant, Beck, and Reinhold, exact discussions on theoretical and practical reason, on reason and will; and it cannot be called self-deception, if Schelling and Fichte regarded themselves as in entire agreement with one another. On the contrary, self-deception begins on both sides when the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature appeared, which is not to be mentioned further here, just as, after its appearance, Schelling is no longer to be mentioned among the Fichtean. Schelling was won to Fichte's idea only by his writings (he had seen Fichte in the chair only once); after that, personal intercourse may have united the two still more. It was otherwise as regards Friedrich Carl Forberg (1770-1848), who was one of the most apt of the pupils of Reinhold, and was, when Fichte came to Jena, Docent there, but was his eager hearer, and became the first occasion of the dispute regarding Atheism. Also Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer (24th March, 1766 to 1848), having come into contact with Fichte through a very creditable notice of his first work, was Docent in Jena when Fichte came there. He allied himself very closely with the new-comer, and soon became an open contributor to the journal founded by him, which was not only called, but was, the Fichtean journal. His works relate mostly to religion. Having gone later to Bavaria, his activity was devoted particularly to the school system. Of great importance it must of course have been for the Science of Knowledge, that Reinhold had decidedly gone over to it and publicly supported it—the Elementary Philosophy had been only an introduction to it. Fichte's rejoicing over that did not, of course, last long. Reinhold's inclining to Bardili caused Fichte, first, then Schelling and Hegel, to express themselves in a reckless manner concerning Reinhold, which his merits as a philosopher forbade. One of the most faithful of the followers of Fichte, after escaping by flight from the constraint of the cloister, was Johannes Baptist Schad, who taught a long time in Jena, then a long time as professor in Charkow, and after he was emerited there, again lived in Jena, where he died in the forties [1834.—Ed.]. His first writings were recognised by Fichte as good commentaries on his own. Later he approached Schelling more. Such was the case in his:
System of the Philosophy of Nature and Transcendental Philosophy (2 vols., Landshut, 1803). Allying themselves decidedly with Fichte, were Schumann and, in an almost slavish way, Michaelis, both active particularly in the province of political philosophy. Unmistakable approximations to Fichte are to be found in Mehmel, who died as professor in Erlangen. In the wider dissemination of the ideas of Fichte and Schelling, the Philosophische Journal was principally instrumental. That a notice so favourable as that of Schlegel could appear in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung, corroborates what was said above—that this was for a long time favourably inclined towards Fichte. The Erlangen Literaturzeitung, edited by Meusel, was for a long time accounted the warmest friend of the Science of Knowledge.

3. With Fichte’s removal to Berlin, the culmination-point of his reputation was, properly speaking, passed. But just at this moment was presented a phenomenon which is to be comprehended only in connection with the Science of Knowledge, to which it stands related similarly as the Semi-Kantians do to Kant. This phenomenon may be compared with the modification of Kantism made by Fries, all the more that there are demonstrable in its appearance the influence of ideas of Jacobi. We speak here of that Stand-point of Irony, which, because the school of poets acknowledging its adherence to it had called itself the Romantic School, it is the habit of some to characterize as the Philosophy of Romanticism. The founder of this tendency, and at the same time its most important representative, is Friedrich Schlegel (born on the 10th of March, 1772, the youngest of five distinguished brothers, and died on the 11th of January, 1829), whose epoch-making works in the History of Art, Æsthetics, and Philosophy, must be passed over in these Outlines, and whose later philosophical achievements must be omitted in this section, since they will be spoken of in what follows. Having become acquainted with the Kantian philosophy at a time when Reinhold and Fichte had already gotten beyond it, he sees in it from the beginning only half-truth, and requires that idealism be logically carried out. This leads him to Fichte, whose Science of Knowledge he places with the French Revolution and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister as the three greatest tendencies of the century. And yet he was, from the very beginning, repelled by an unsurmounted dualism in the Science of
Knowledge. The separation of the absolute Ego from the empirical has as its consequence the separation of speculation from life, a separation which Schlegel declares to be as abstract as that of faith and knowledge, which is connected with it. Fichte had said of the philosopher, that in him the absolute, or infinite, Ego rules and speaks. But, besides the fact that Fichte insists that no one should be a mere philosopher, the absolute Ego, since complete freedom remains an eternal ideal, is never attained to, even in the moments of philosophic thinking, and, in reality, Fichte does not get beyond the Kantian ethics, that jurisprudence "struck in" upon the inner members. Hence is it, also, no wonder that the transcendental philosophers, in spite of their extolled blessedness in the pure æther of thought, appear so disgusted and vexed, and do not rise to the licenses of high poetry, as distinguished from the grammar, of virtue. (As this last proposition is borrowed verbatim from Jacobi, so the dulness of the Critical moral philosophers suggests the circumstance that Jacobi had called life under the moral law, "life in a crane.") But Schlegel found among the so acrimoniously condemned transcendental philosophers of the Kantian, as well as the Fichtean school, a suggestion as to how and where the overcoming of such a division was to be discovered. Schiller had pointed out that in art man does not torment himself with labour, but has enjoyment, and plays, and had called the poet the true man. In fact, not only may there be found in Fichte himself a likening of the capacity for philosophic thinking to poetic talent, but there occurs in his Theory of Morals the proposition (regarding which, to be sure, many would suppose that it did not originate in the mind of Fichte), that art makes the transcendental point of view the common one, and that æsthetic contemplation finds in everything, even the moral law, not an absolute command but itself, and hence is related to the moral law as a free being, not as a slave. These thoughts, long since expressed by Jacobi, Schiller, and Fichte, Schlegel, now, adopts, in such fashion that he at the same time denies the distinction between the philosophic and poetical standpoints, and requires that every one be truly a philosopher, i.e., a poet. Whoever is not a poet is not a whole, a fully-formed, man; he belongs among the uncultivated, the shallow, the common. This life in true poetry is true religiosity. It consists in the giving of free play to genius; hence there is no other
virtue than that of genius; and, conversely, genius, which must, of course, appear paradoxical to those who are common, ennobles everything. The criterion of genius is that disregard of limits which rests upon the feeling of infinite creative power. Whereas the shallow person, the ordinary consciousness, sees in all surrounding it, already established limits, which must be respected, the transcendental, and hence the poetic and original, Ego sees therein only something posited by itself, therefore subject to being, as it were, revoked. Hence it is not in earnest as regards what it allows to be valid; it sports where the ordinary person seriously plods and labours. As the Grecian gods are idle, so genius rejoices in freedom from care and in inactivity, is not yet shut out from Paradise by industry, that death-angel with the fiery sword. This mode of thought, in contradistinction to the prosaic seriousness of common life, is called, now, sometimes genius, sometimes wit and humour, but particularly irony; and of it is said that whoever has risen to it offers sacrifice to the Graces. Whereas the spiritless man gives himself up entirely to his aim, and puts the law above everything else, the man of true intelligence acknowledges no law and knows that all aims are idle. In the ironical disregarding of the existence of law consists real morality, the first impulse of which is opposition to law and conventional legality. The rabble, therefore, often see transgressors and examples of immorality in those who, for the truly moral man, are precisely beings of his own class, fellow-citizens of his own world. The so-much decried romance of Schlegel, Lucinde, attempts a critical examination of marriage, as it presents itself in reality, from this standpoint; and in doing so makes war, in a manner exceeding what is permitted by the limits of the aesthetic, against the separation of the spiritual and the sensuous in the love of the sexes, as also against all that is conventional and traditional. Whereas the spiritless person, in part fears custom, and in part breaks it in the moment of appetite, the person of genius is once for all free from it. Since marriage is not to him a sacred institution, he disregards it, and is for that reason capable of true love, and natural marriage, in which no God nor superstition separates the lovers. Inasmuch as in the gratification of this impulse the subject, negatively considered, attains, through exaltation above the limits of marriage, custom, etc., to certainty of his infinitude,—positively considered, to the enjoyment
of the gratification of his spiritual as well as his sensible side, we have here the highest enjoyment of one's own freedom and hence religion. What the moralists reprove in egoism is, properly speaking, religion; for what God can be worthy of honour to the man who would not be his own God? In the earnest play of individuality the nameless, unknown Divinity is present.

4. All the foregoing statements have been taken from the *Athenæum*, a journal edited by the two Schlegels (1798–1800), the *Lucinde* (1799), and the *Characterizations and Critiques* (1801), because only in these writings does Fr. Schlegel occupy this standpoint. How different was his position, some years later, is shown by the lectures of the years 1803–6, edited by Windischmann (1837), still more by the *Philosophy of Life*, the *Philosophy of History*, as well as by the (Dresden) *Philosophical Lectures*, especially on the *Philosophy of Language*, while giving which he died. These may, therefore, be first discussed in the following section. The collection of his works, which he himself prepared (Vienna, 1822 ff., 10 vols.), does not contain all these, but they are to be found in the editions prepared later, e.g., in the fifteen-volume Vienna edition of the year 1846. (In this are wanting only the *Lucinde* and the lectures edited by Windischmann.) As Schlegel's later writings have been here ignored, so also have the men who, together with him, represent the view of life and the world just now characterized. Since polite literature is not a subject treated in this account, only Novalis and Schleiermacher, the two men who stood nearest Schlegel personally, could be discussed here. But since both so early supplement the subjectivism held fast to by Irony, by the introduction of objective moments, that the point at which this had not already taken place is scarcely to be fixed, they would, more appropriately, be treated where, not uninfluenced by both, Schlegel himself abandoned that standpoint. However transient had been the sway of this, we could hardly regard it, after the preceding course of philosophy, as one to be passed by. Further, it gives the formula for something which, as a phase of the great Revolution, was experienced and done by the people beyond the Rhine. To the folly which there decreed the existence of a being compared with which one is powerless, or that the maid-servants of vice should be goddesses of reason, there corresponds here a
wisdom that consists in the knowledge that all that man honours is his own work, all that has worth is mere inclination. As there the Age of Terror marks the turning-point to the rule of legal union, so the orgies of subjectivism, which philosophy celebrates in irony, ripen the need for a philosophy that is related to that extravagance almost as the stern discipline of the Empire to the Age of Terror. In both spheres there have been intermediate phenomena, and these transition stages between the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, which therefore, to employ the parallel once drawn, would correspond to the new political phenomena which fell between the rule of Robespierre and Bonaparte, are next to be considered.

C.—OFFSHOOTS OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.


§ 315.

1. It needs neither reflection on the spirit which, world-historical events evince, nor a comparison with what appears to those who have been born later as the real problem to be solved, but only a recalling to mind of what, according to Fichte’s own explanation, the Science of Knowledge was intended to be, in order to see that it stopped midway towards its goal. Repeatedly he reminds the reader that the true system is not mere realism, as was Spinozism, nor mere idealism, as were the doctrines of Berkeley and Leibnitz, but ideal-realism or real-idealism. That both names may be employed for the organic union of the sides of that opposition, plainly points to the fact that neither of the two sides can have the priority, neither of the two elements can have preponderance; that the system, therefore, must contain in itself both Spinozism and Leibnitzianism, alike surmounted. But that this is not accomplished, that the idealistic element is much the more conspicuous, we infer not only from the fact that Fichte expressly designates his system as practical idealism; it appears very plainly from his hatred towards the conception to which Spinoza had sacrificed the Ought, namely Being, and from his hatred toward nature which coincides with that. Still another thing supports this view: the defect (criticised
on every hand) as regards the sense of beauty, in the *Science of Knowledge*, and in its author, which, as was noted above, gave reason for doubting that the apotheosis of the artist in the *Theory of Morals* was Fichte's own idea. In fact, when one observes Fichte elsewhere placing the meaning of art particularly in the circumstance that by it our dwellings are made comfortable and pleasant, he appears to overlook, as was remarked in speaking of Leibnitz (§ 288, 6), the difference between materially useful skill and the activity of the artist, the aim of which is the beautiful. But not only from all this may it be concluded that the *Science of Knowledge* concedes too little to realistic interests. Fichte himself avows it. In verbal agreement with what Schelling had said in the *Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*, Fichte repeats very frequently that there are only two consistent systems, which are in diametrical opposition one to the other, the *Science of Knowledge* and *Spinozism*. But with this explanation it is also admitted that the *Science of Knowledge* is no longer on a higher level than *Spinozism* (considered as an element of it), but stands in opposition to it, is not supra-realism but anti-realism, hence one-sided. At first, he finds consolation in the thought that Spinoza was hardly convinced of the truth of his own system. He must express this doubt, because the consciousness of duty, of the ideal, was to him so firm, whereas according to Spinoza this was inexplicable, indeed, impossible. But what if a time should come for Fichte when, what according to the principles of the *Science of Knowledge* is contemptible, idle, comes to have a value for him? What if a time should come when the titanic feeling of power which causes him, with Lessing, to compare the enjoyment of blessedness with tedium, should yield to a recognition of the power of being, or the thought should more and more force itself upon his mind that the external world is not merely a limit, that it is a rational order, and so, as Nature in the proper sense of the word, something having authority for thought? Such a time comes. It is hardly worth while that we should consider in how far his destiny brought him to see that the will alone is not sufficient; it is of little importance whether it was the study of Schelling's writings that brought him to conceive an interest in nature, so that he began to study natural science. It suffices that it was so; and this, indeed, but, more than all else, the experience that
in him, who had bewailed the fact that there are natural impulses, there entered into the place of the earlier abstract cosmopolitanism a very clearly-marked feeling of nationality, must have reacted upon his entire previous view of the universe. To require of Fichte that he should give up the principles of this view, or that he should even only very essentially modify them, means to ignore the essential mark of distinction between him and Reinhold. It could hardly happen otherwise than it did. He seeks to remedy the defect of extreme idealism by supplementing it with doctrines of extreme realism, an attempt that might appear to him whom Spinoza had held in bonds before Kant, much less strange, perhaps, than to many others. Although, to employ Herbart’s very apposite expression, he carries this added ingredient over to the idealistic element of his philosophy, it still remains an added ingredient, which, because of this external relation, allows that to which it is added of course to remain, but acquires in connection with it somewhat of the character of a mosaic.

2. Because of this superficial union, it has become a disputed question, and may almost be called a standing puzzle, whether we can speak of a modified Fichtean doctrine. Those who deny that we can, may properly appeal to the fact that if the reader of the Science of Knowledge of the year 1801 is required to raise himself to a point or view from which he perceives the absolute knowledge which is not present in the ordinary consciousness, but makes all consciousness possible, which can be thought only in the form of being-for-self (as pure for), and contains, as totality of knowledge, individual knowledge, and as the point of concentration of all individuals, the sum of all Egos, and the universe, which, properly speaking, acts in me, etc.,—he then develops Fichte’s doctrine more clearly than ever before, and, particularly, prevents the confounding of the absolute and the individual, by avoiding the word Ego. Just so they can cite from the Science of Knowledge of 1804 the passages in which pure knowledge is defined as the bond of union between thought (subject) and being (object), but later, instead of pure knowledge, the term light is employed, which becomes intuition or reason, which we know by inner life as subject-object, when our reason contemplates reason; and they can maintain that by these and similar statements the original meaning of the Science of Knowledge is not at all altered, and is withal more easily
grasped than in the *Science of Knowledge* of 1794. Finally, there could hardly be one of the later writings of Fichte which so agreed with the earlier and yet at the same time so surpassed them in clearness and definiteness as do the lectures on the *Facts of Consciousness* of the year 1810, from which statements might be taken at random in which Fichte repels the charge of individualism,—which might, perhaps, be true of Kant, who really deduced much out of *his* consciousness, and thereby remains responsible for the proof that it holds true of the, or of all, consciousness. It is otherwise with the *Science of Knowledge*. This seeks to show how the life embracing all individuals comes to consciousness in the individual, how the universal thought produces Egos, and among them even me, so that it presents itself not so much as an Ego as a community of individuals that can be deduced as these definite beings from the fact that each shall do what only he can do. Just so does the *Science of Knowledge* lead to the becoming (theoretically) conscious of the one life and rising (practically) to the common end, to living for the species. As, for the individual person, the objective which he opposes to himself is merely a limit to be transcended, *i.e.*, a means, so-called Nature also has merely the character of the end-governed. It is nothing absolute, nothing real, in fact, for only individuals are real; the world of sense arises for them by the fact that they see their power, and find limits, in breaking through which consists the ethical problem. When this is solved, the sensible world falls away, etc. Here, as was said, the doctrine is not changed; the presentation has improved. But here also are discussed only the points which, in spite of the supplementary addition, may remain unchanged: the relation of the pure Ego to the empirical Egos, the meaning of objects, which even here remain a correlate and a limit to the subject, what justifies Fichte in repelling the charge that his idealism is a subjective idealism, etc. It is otherwise as regards another point, namely, the theory of being, in its later form. Originally, being was with Fichte only a means to the ideal, there was no other than the relative, sensible; and the highest conceivable was the ideal (law, moral order of the world, God). But now, *en rapport* with Spinoza, he adds to his previous theories an absolute being. Thus arises a subordinating of also the ideal to being. Thereby he has two sorts of being, but also two sorts of ideals. Always,
after either of the two is considered, the other pushes in before it as its truth, and the two become, to adopt here an expression of Löwe's concerning the ideal, something pro-
tean. In consequence of this pushing in of a new object there now makes its appearance behind the actual, the super-actual; knowledge, which had itself thus far been the absolute, becomes an image or phenomenon of the absolute, in short, being and the ideal duplicate themselves in this course of the world in a manner that recalls the expression about the "super-existent" unities of Jamblichus (§ 129, 2). Nowhere more than here does Fichte require that we yield to his peculiarity, which he had formerly contrasted as follows with Reinhold's: One can express the thoughts of the latter only in his own words, whereas as regards himself (Fichte) one must forget the words and look for a view of the whole, which is entirely independent of the words. As his hearers in Berlin were accustomed to wait for the "break-
ing through," so also should his reader wait; and for that rea-
son Fichte permits himself a freedom as regards terminology which very much increases the difficulty of understanding him. But even those who have most shown forbearance in this regard have nevertheless been obliged to confess that both being and the ideal have been "shoved out" of their original place; a displacement which, besides other things, has as a consequence a modification of his theory of immor-
tality. So long as the ideal is the highest, so long is it here as in the case of Kant: ceaseless labour is a guarantee of the working-time. But so soon as the absolute being appears in the fore-ground, he inclines to the Spinozistic view that immortality consists in the possession of the truth, or rather is compensated for by that. In no work is this recognition of, and respect towards, being, which contrasts so strangely with the earlier contempt for it, so conspicuous as in the Way to the Blessed Life, and in the Characteristics of the Present Age. If here, in opposition to moralism, the standpoint of religion is celebrated as that where pleasure and enjoyment supplement serious duty, and which, in so far, displays the greatest analogy with art-enjoyment; if a standpoint is rated high which stands related to that of pure morality as being to the ideal, and by occupying which, man, having been penetrated by morality, does not strive for happiness but is happy,—where religion is not action but being, etc,—the in verbis
simus faciles must be pushed very far in order for us to be able to say. That is, indeed, precisely the original religion of right-doing. Likewise, it might become difficult to bring the noble national pride and national hatred which the *Addresses to the German Nation* evince, the monstrous importance that is attached to the sentiment that the German language is not a mixed (i.e., an artificial) language, the regard for climatic conditions, etc., into agreement with Fichte's earlier cosmopolitanism, with his theory of the State, which assumes no other bond of union than the artificial one of the compact, etc. The feeling that he has not entirely succeeded in fusing views so heterogeneous, appears to be the reason why he snatches at ever new, always metaphorical, expressions, and is always promising that now complete clearness will be attained. That, at the same time, Schelling calls out to him that the System of Identity has found what he seeks, could not affect him agreeably. Hence, the ever greater estrangement of the two men, who only by a strange providence could ever have believed that they could, as regards their characters, remain friends. How they thought of one another in the year 1806 is shown by Schelling's public disavowal of Fichte, printed in this year, and his essay, first printed after his death: *On the Fortunes of the Science of Knowledge*.

3. More natural and easier than for the author of the *Science of Knowledge* was it for those to get beyond its standpoint who had carried the *Science of Knowledge* to its sharpest extreme in the subjectivism of irony. It was more natural; for the consequences of this doctrine are such that it can hardly seek elsewhere for its devotees than where the levity of youth still sparkles, wholly apart from the fact that the Ego, which allows validity to what it, nevertheless, recognises as vain, makes the discovery of its own vanity, and passes from the ironical playing with things to self-ironizing. It was easier also, since the principles that one did not himself discover are not usually held with such tenacity by him as by one who has himself laid them down, that one being, in the present case, Fichte. As regards Schlegel, in particular, it could not but make easier the transition to another view, that the two men who stood nearest him,—Novalis and Schleiermacher, and together with whom he could do to the fullest extent, what he so loved, viz., "sympathize," had, from the beginning, through their deep piety and moral earnest-
ness, hence resignation to objective powers, counterbalanced
the subjectivism of the standpoint. The first-mentioned was
taken from him by an early death; for Friedrich von Harden-
berg—much better known by his nom de plume Novalis—born
on the 2nd of May, 1772, died in his thirtieth year, in Schlegel’s
arms. From the second he was separated by changing his
country and his confession; and, in his further development
he was thrown completely upon himself, although it cannot
be denied that in the fragments which were left behind by
Novalis are many points that play an important part in the
later doctrine of Schlegel. In this later doctrine it is, first of
all, characteristic that instead of assertions of genius we find
an attempt at a strict method. From a logic which does not, of
course, rest upon the principle of non-contradiction, since life
and, in general, everything, rests upon contradictions; which,
further, lays down rules not merely for feeling one’s way
among things already given, but also for genetic thought, the
forms of which are at the same time forms of being, and
which, therefore, coincides with metaphysics, Schlegel, already
in the year 1804, expected the salvation of philosophy. As
regards this, he insists that the method should move in triads,
and promises constructions in which every member in turn
contains several trinities. By means of this logical basis and
method he seeks to solve the main problem of all philosophy,
the relation of the infinite and the finite, by conceiving neither
of the two as being, but both as becoming; hence he assumes
a becoming divinity, an infinite world-Ego: as parts of this
primal Ego we exist. Resignation to this is the destination
of man, who falls short of it by clinging to individual person-
ality. Hence the anti-revolutionary tendency of Schlegel in
politics as in the Church. He spent more than twenty years in
giving form to his changed doctrine, then he published in quick
succession the lectures delivered in Vienna, in which he
deﬁned as the most immediate subject and ﬁrst problem of
philosophy the restoration of the lost divine image. The
progress of the individual towards divinity is treated by
the lectures on the Philosophy of Life; that of the race by
the lectures on the Philosophy of History. The ﬁrst were
delivered in 1827, and appeared in 1829; the second were
delivered in 1828, and appeared in 1829. With these are
connected the lectures on the Philosophy of Language and of
Words, while giving which he died in Dresden. These ap-
peared in print in 1830. Compared with these three lectures those of the years 1804–6 are very pantheistic. These present the opposite extreme to the standpoint of Irony; to this extreme this standpoint was necessarily carried by the inevitable giddiness of self-ironizing. Hence afterwards, in his latest works, in which he had found the mean between them, Schlegel speaks of two standpoints that were defective because of fragmentary presentations, through which he had passed in the course of nine and thirty years. Although, now, the views which he had published in the years 1827–29 are much more mature than those expressed more than a quarter of a century earlier, yet because of the fact that, when they appeared, the System of Identity had already culminated, and Hegel stood at the summit of his fame, they have not commanded so much attention as would otherwise have been the case, not even in the Catholic world, in which Baader's most important writings had already at that time appeared. If it had been different,—had these lectures exerted upon the development of philosophy an assignable influence which could not have been derived from other sources than they, their content would have to be given, in part, in treating of Solger and Steffens, and, in part, in connection with the phenomena that followed the reign of the Hegelian system. As it is, it appears more suitable to treat Schlegel, whose later performances could by no means be passed over, here, instead of in various places. He designates his later doctrines as the Philosophy of Life, partly in order to contrast them with the wisdom of the schools, and partly because he proposes to himself the problem of the determination, by a consideration of the inner life, of the destined goal of the same. It is in accordance with the latter point of view that he decidedly emphasized the point that his philosophy is the science of experience. The course pursued by Schlegel in the fifteen lectures on the Philosophy of Life is essentially as follows: The first five lectures contain what he himself has called his Psychology, in which he begins with the investigations relating to the soul, as the middle point between sense and spirit, and defines the soul in general as the principle of all life, and the thinking soul as the central point of the human consciousness, and attributes to it reason and phantasy, whereas understanding and will are said to belong to the mind. From these four principal branches of the human consciousness all
others are said to issue as branches; so that to reason are assigned memory and conscience, to phantasy, sense and the impulses, which, all four, co-operate in the highest manifestation of the soul, love; but they also co-operate in knowledge, particularly in so far as language comes into play. In considering knowledge, now, we must not neglect the difference between reason and understanding; of which, the latter, but never the former, may be attributed to God. Reason is a perception and union of distinctions, the understanding a penetration and, in the highest degree, a looking-through. Hence our knowledge of God is an understanding, or an experience-knowledge, that is referred to the revelation of God, which is announced to us in conscience, nature, the Book, and the history of the world. Still more than the understanding, is the will the organ through which we receive the revelation. It is, now, a dangerous error of all philosophy that overvalues the reason, *i.e.*, rationalism, that it regards the present condition of consciousness as the normal one, whereas the inner discordance among the powers of the soul, further the relation of the soul to nature and to God, which are discussed in the fourth and fifth lectures, show visibly that this world is a bridge spanning the abyss of eternal death, a house of corruption, destined to become, through a higher power, a ladder to the resurrection. The ground of this discordance is that the understanding found pleasure in dead conceptions, the reason in dialectical play, the phantasy in subjective creations, the will in absolute (formal) volition. Only faith, love, and hope can prevent that. Here we have a way paved for the transition to the three following lectures (6–8), which Schlegel himself characterizes as a kind of Natural Theology, because in them are treated the divine order in nature, the relation of nature to that life and to the invisible world, the divine order in the realm of truth, and the battle of the age with error, finally the divine order in human history and in the State. The three following lectures (9–11), which contain what Schlegel himself calls his Logic or Ontology, but which may equally well be called Applied Theology, discuss the peculiar function of philosophy, as well as the apparent discordance and the real unity of right faith and the highest knowledge; further, the two-fold spirit of truth and of error in science; finally, the relation of truth and science to life; and they here show how the conflict of know-
ledge and faith, faith and unbelief, united faith and knowledge with faith, subsides. The conclusion is contained in the last four lectures, on the Metaphysics of Life as the theory of that which transcends nature, which may, if one pleases, be called also Cosmology, because it exhibits the supernatural principles in the actual. Art, and ecclesiastical and political life are considered, and, in conclusion, the, properly speaking, theocratic position of science. Islamism is cited as the type of the absolute or despotic State, the English constitution as the type of the dynamic State, which rests upon the discord of parties and religions, just as ethical and historical monarchy do upon the peace of religion and of God.

4. Besides the Philosophy of Life as pure philosophy, there is, as applied philosophy, the Philosophy of History, which will exhibit historically the restoration of the divine image in the various periods of the world, as the Philosophy of Life exhibited it in the inner consciousness. Here the first two lectures embrace, besides the general Introduction, the question of the relation of man to the earth, the primitive and uncivilized condition, the contrast between the two classes of men represented in Cain and Seth, those beginners of the world’s history, and finally, the division of the human race into various nations. The seven following lectures (3–9), show how the separation of reason, phantasy, understanding and will again makes its appearance in the Chinese, Hindoos, Egyptians, and Hebrews, and then give a characterization of those peoples, which, because they rise above these practical limits, have had a world-historical influence and great historical power,—the Persians, the Grecians, and the Romans. The peculiarity of these nations is formulated not so much by an a priori construction as rather by a steady regard to the principal turning-points of their history, and, in connection particularly with the Romans, the deification of the State is emphasized. With the tenth lecture, which, with the following eight, forms the second volume of lectures, Schlegel passes to Christianity, and considers, in connection with that, its historical beginning as regards external political relations, as also the decay of the Roman spirit; then treats of the early Germans and the migration of nations, as also the corruption of the world preceding the appearance of Mohammed; gives a characterization of Mohammed and the Arabian domination of the world, as also the reorganization of the European
Occident, and the restoration of the Ecclesiastical Empire; pictures the first formation and further founding of the Christian State connected therewith; characterizes, finally, the Ghibelline time-spirit and party disputes, as also the condition of art and science, which accompanies the anarchic condition of the Occident, with the delineation of which the five lectures (1-14) covering the Middle Ages close. The three next following lectures (15-17) treat of the religious wars, of the epoch of the Enlightenment and the age of the Revolution; the eighteenth and last, of the ruling time-spirit and the universal restoration. Here, now, he speaks more definitely and extendedly of the problem and method of a philosophy of history, which not merely must consider world-events as natural occurrences, but, at the same time, has to take into account the might of the free will, the power of evil and the guiding providence of God; and should, just for that reason, deduce the understanding of history, the knowledge of the leading ideas or the signature of every age, out of history itself, not out of a preformed system. Schlegel has himself followed this rule; hence his careful scrutiny of the grounds for such theories as are opposed to his own. His estimate of the Reformation is, thus, such a one as is rarely given by a convert to the Romish Church. True, the Reformation was not to him that which the Church, as regards that opposition (which appeared at the end of the Middle Ages) between the romantic-scholastic and the antiquarian-pagan enthusiasm, needed; and the polemical zeal which called it into life is to him a proof that it is a work of human origin. But this does not prevent him from recognising the greatness of Luther, nor even from admitting that when the Reformation was suppressed, the consequence was a worse one than when it was allowed to pursue its own course. As the chief consequences of the Reformation are mentioned, the religious peace which Germany enjoyed, the dynamical theory of the balance of power in political life, represented particularly by England, and finally, the Enlightenment and its attendant, the Revolution, which had for its chief instrument secret societies. Salvation must be looked for from science, which must abandon the delusion of the Absolute, whether this be placed in Ego-hood, in Nature, or the Idea of Reason, and come to the recognition of the living God; and should be a true philosophy of revelation.

5. It is interesting, now, to see how Schlegel, in what he
last put before the world, the Dresden lectures on the *Philosophy of Language*, returns to the expression so celebrated in his youth, *Irony*; of course, in such a way that this word now takes on a meaning entirely different from—one might almost say, opposite to—the earlier. After the assumption that the present condition of man is the normal one, has here, again, been condemned as the false presupposition of modern philosophy, it is demanded of philosophy, not that it assume, at the beginning, anything such as a paradise made known to us only by revelation and history, but that it recognise the undeniable fact that reason, phantasy, understanding and will, are not in accord, and that our consciousness is a discordant, indeed, a fourfold consciousness; and that it attempt to return from that point to inner unity. Here, now, it is evident that a means to this finding a home for self is presented in language, the common product of those four cardinal powers; inasmuch as all speaking, and hence also the inner speaking, thought, indeed even prayer, is a dialogue, and exhibits a resolution of opposition and, hence, in its highest products (in Socrates and Plato), that brighter irony which arises out of the feeling of finitude and the apparent contradiction of this feeling with the idea of the infinite, and meets us in, for example, the roguish railly of the loved one. The inquiries relating to the origin of language, with which the third lecture is occupied, declare against the common theories, especially because, according to them, language has grown mosaically, whereas, like every great work of art, it must, the rather, have come into existence, in its first outlines, suddenly. The analogy with the primitive and tertiary rocks serves in distinguishing original and mixed languages, as regards which Schlegel gives a caution against over-valuing the latter, and draws a parallel between what is Persian and what is English. Then language is again dropped, and, after defining it as the memory of the human race, the author passes to a critique of views that have prevailed with regard to the essential thought-forms. The fourth lecture corrects the doctrine of innate ideas and declares in favour of the Platonic doctrine of recollection, with which the false doctrine of pre-existence has become connected only because the relation of time and eternity is not rightly conceived. If one regard the former as eternity put out of joint, the latter as true and complete time, or if one distinguish two sorts of time and two sorts of eternity, the theory of
recollection gains an entirely different meaning, just as that death is called a return acquires a meaning. We might employ here the expression "Transcendental Memory." Only a correct theory of time and its dimensions yields the distinction also of the three stages of memory,—eternal love, hopeful longing after the infinite, and living, active faith. But in order to conceive it perfectly we must go down more deeply than has hitherto been done, to the primary elements of consciousness. The following three lectures give, accordingly, a supplement to what had been said in the Philosophy of Life. Between each two of the four primary powers that have been mentioned, there were assumed four derived or intermediate powers,—conscience, memory, impulse, and sense. To these is now added, as a ninth, feeling, which contains them all, as germ, and, as a goal again uniting them all, the Idea of God. Here now is the point at which a choice is offered between the systems of the absolute, the various forms of pantheism, and the doctrine of a living God, the philosophy of religion and philosophy of revelation. "Feeling is everything"; with this word of Faust Schlegel introduces the seventh lecture, in which he declares war against all strict school-terminology, and states the real problem of his philosophical expositions to be to call forth that primal feeling which reveals itself in the harmonic triad of faith, love, and hope, and makes accessible to men the fourfold revelation through the written Word, nature, ethical feeling, and devotion, which correspond to the four subordinate powers: memory, sense, conscience, impulse. In the lectures following thereupon the principal forms of scientific error are gone over, among them, and most at length, Spinozism. This is looked upon as the purest type of error, which consists in a one-sided deification of reason. As pantheism is related to reason, so is materialistic atomism to the phantasy, idealistic Ego-theory to the will, and scepticism to the understanding. But to these stands opposed true knowledge, which consists in the living thought of the actual and hence is an experience-knowledge, the true nature of which can be perceived only by an exact investigation of its elements, perception and understanding, judgment and conception, apprehension and recognition. Just at the beginning of this analysis, in the middle of the paragraph that should have treated of perfect understanding, Schlegel was stricken with apoplexy.
6. Though the performances of Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher in the philosophical sphere have not been up to the present time of such lasting effect as those in the sphere of theology, he might nevertheless have succeeded more than Schlegel, even more than the altered doctrine of Fichte, in fusing the two elements whose interpenetration is here in question, since the subjectivism emanating from Fichte requires to be supplemented by the principle opposed to it. With this is connected his leaning towards the System of Identity, a leaning greater in him than in any other of those treated of in this section. Born on the 21st of November, 1768, in Breslau, educated first in the schools of the Moravian Communion, then at the University of Halle, after 1796 Charity-Preacher in Berlin, he published while in this position the Discourses on Religion (1799); Monologues (1800); Confidential Letters on Lucinde (1800), in which he gives dignity to the subjectivism of the ironical standpoint by a religious and ethical spirit, delineates virtuosos in religion, morals, and love; and, by way of supplementing and toning down "Fichte's completed, rounded idealism," would oppose to it "the highest expression of the speculation of our day," "another realism" than that which Fichte's doctrine had refuted. If, on this occasion, Schleiermacher, in inspired discourse, recalls Spinoza, whom (as it appears to us, in spite of Dilthey's denial) he then knew only from Jacobi's representation of him, it cannot be overlooked that he, like Novalis, whom he also expressly compares with Spinoza, though having an enthusiasm for the whole, expresses like enthusiasm for every peculiarity, of which Spinoza has no presentiment. That self-resignation which is at the same time self-affirmation, and which is equally widely removed from the individualising tendency of sensible natures and the universalizing deification of conceptions, is, according to him, the essence of religion or piety, in which he who resigns himself to the All has at the same the enjoyment of this resignation. Hence religion is neither knowledge nor action, but feeling, a feeling of the common life, of the All and the Ego. By reflection upon the pious feelings are produced descriptions of these, which constitute religious first-principles and dogmas. If a mistake is made here, if it be supposed that in dogmas we have an extension of knowledge, mythology results, in which God is rendered finite, a personal nature, and the enjoyment of infinity is stunted into a hoped-for im-
mortality. The like obtains if religion be thought of as giving prescripts. Every religious action is, as such, superstitious; everything should be done with religion as an accompaniment not as a cause. He in whom pious tendencies of a new order have first arisen is the religious hero; by the communication of the same he becomes a founder of a religion; hence there are no other religions than historical, positive religions. Among these, the Christian religion has the peculiarity that in it there is reconciliation with the Infinite, hence the essence of religion itself, matter and content; it is, therefore, religion in a higher potency. The changing of pious emotions into dogmas, of these into symbols and compulsory statutes, which they have become particularly through the State, through the deplorable fact that the “purple has kissed the steps of the altar,” gives rise to the Church, an institution of force, against which the truly educated, i.e., the free, man fights, in order to further religion. He sees a future in which religious communities will be represented in pious domestic life. As the Discourses delineate the religion of the educated and free man, so the Monologues picture the man who, really free, opposes custom, steps in advance of the age in which there is for him a law that requires uniformity of action among all and a restless striving and working, and now revels in the proving of his own peculiarity and the recognition of that of others. The truly free man sees in all limits only his own deed, hence can anticipate by means of the phantasy even relations into which he has not yet entered, for they can bring to light nothing but new sides of his own nature. Also in the Letters, finally, is it particularly the thought of the justification of one’s peculiarity which runs as a guiding thread through this glorification of true love, which, a love out of one mould, does not forbid the sensuous side. All that is peculiar demands reverence, hence there is really only one rule for what is proper: Let no one interfere with any emotional state. The relationship of these thoughts to those expressed by Fr. Schlegel is, notwithstanding all diversity, not to be mistaken. It explains also the many points of contact with Jacobi, in whom also, in fact, appeared that superior subjectivity, which the subject, feeling himself free in every relation, exhibits in Schleiermacher’s delineation. The separation from this near friend was followed by Schleiermacher’s change of residence to Stolpe, where by the Outlines of a Critique of Previous Ethics,
(Berlin, 1803), as also by beginning a translation of Plato (first volume, 1804), he showed to the world that he had trodden a new way. In the year 1804 he came to Halle as extraordinary Professor of Theology, and University Preacher, but at the same time lectured on the History of Greek Philosophy, Ethics, and the Theory of Fundamentals. His intercourse with Steffens resulted in mutual influence. In Halle the Celebration of Christmas and the dissertation on the First Epistle to Timothy were written. Preacher in the Church of Trinity in Berlin after 1809, professor in Berlin University after 1810, and Secretary of the Academy after 1814, he developed an activity without parallel in all his offices and also as an author, until his death (12th of Feb., 1834). As the most important writings in the province of philosophy, are to be mentioned his dissertations: On Universities, On Heraclitus, his academical dissertations, his epoch-making works for theology, Theological Encyclopaedia (1811), and the Christian Faith (1822); to which may be added the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Dialectic, Psychology, Ethics, Politics, Pedagogics, which appeared after his death. The complete edition of his works (Berlin, 1835 ff.), is, unfortunately, because of the division into three series of works, and of the twofold title resulting, very inconveniently arranged for making citations, and does not even contain everything that had already been printed.


7. According to the views of Schleiermacher which, as it appears, had already been completely fixed in Halle, and in which it is not difficult to make perceptible points of agreement with the previously developed theories of Kant and Fichte as also with the System of Identity soon to be considered, science is organized as follows: In order that they have not merely the value of views and opinions, the special sciences must depend upon the highest or absolute science, which, if it were complete, would be a central science, transcendental philosophy, theory of science as science, and would have to treat of, and present, that which is exalted above all opposition, particularly that of the real and the ideal, viz., the absolute. But since such an absolute knowledge as an acknowledged system does not yet exist, there must appear, in place of the exposi-
tion of the absolute, the search for it, in place of the (transcendental) philosophy, philosophizing, in place of the fundamental science, the art of foundation. It is most fittingly termed Dialectic, and develops as mere theory of science (not science) the principles of philosophizing, which, because knowledge is a thought that is common to all, are at the same time the principles of dialogical speech. (Schlegel's "symphilosophizing.") The chief sources for an account of this are the Dialectic, edited by Jonas (1839), and the Introduction to the System of the Theory of Morals, which is to be had in the two editions of Schweizer (1835) and Twesten (1841). Since the dialectician does not set forth the absolute as object but is led by the idea of it, is it itself in a certain measure, it furnishes the criteria not so much of truth as of being scientific, that by which knowledge is distinguished from opinion. The previous separation of logic and metaphysics, the untenability of which from the side of metaphysics Kant has shown, but which is just as demonstrable for logic, is in dialectic done away with, but dialectic in the form of logic, because it must be a theory of an art, not (as with Hegel) in the form of metaphysics, for then it would have to be a science. Knowledge, the possibility of which self-consciousness, as the unity of the thinker and that which is thought, proves, is the agreement of thought and being. Their relation, which, if thought as well as being were undivided, would present no difficulty, is now less clear, since an individual consciousness proves the possibility of the correspondence of a divided thought with a divided being, though, on the other hand, every error shows that to no thought can there correspond a being. The annulling of the division of thought, agreement in understanding with other thinking beings, gives us the assurance that our knowledge is not merely opinion (even though a correct one) as the agreement with being gives us the assurance that it is not an (even though universal) error. Dialectic will therefore lay down the principles, by following which thought ceases to be merely individual and merely subjective. Considering thought more closely, we find in it the organic function through which we have sensations as necessarily as the activity of reason, which gives them unity. Chaos (of sensations), or matter, is therefore just as little a really realizable thought as a highest reason without organic activity. If we call that which corresponds to the organic function the real, that which corresponds to the activity of reason the ideal,
there is given in the thinking self-consciousness the identity of both. The preponderance of one or the other element in thought makes it either thought proper or sense-perception, between which stands as the higher mean pure perception, in which real knowledge is first given. Whereas absolute being, which stands above the opposition of the real and ideal, lies outside of pure perception and hence of knowledge, knowledge ever approaches the goal where it embraces all being, and is, therefore, philosophy. At the goal (which is never attained) there is no longer anything chaotic. The approach towards this goal may be made either in such a manner that in knowledge thought preponderates, hence also the form of conception and predilection for Being, which the subject constructs in the cognitive propositions by which it becomes speculative; or, on the other hand, in such a manner that perception, the form of judgment, the activities which are predicates of being, are made prominent, whereby knowledge, to which as speculative the exertions of substantial force in being correspond, becomes the copy of the causal-nexus and so, empirical, or historical. As this does not extend down to chaos, so that does not extend up to the identity of being and thought, which is the tacit presupposition of all knowledge as the unity of a being and a thought, and hence of that ground of all certainty which dwells in us. (Hence oath-taking.) Of all certainty; hence not so much the certainty that our thought is correct as of the certainty that our will has a validity by virtue of which we have in us that transcendental ground of all certainty in the relative identity of thought and will, i.e., in feeling, the ground being neither object of knowledge nor of volition, as Kant has made it. If the idea of God as the impulse of all knowing is the terminus a quo equally near which we ever remain, although the nearness can be more intensively felt, so, on the other hand, the idea of the world is the terminus ad quem to which we ever come nearer. In opposition to pantheism and dualism it must be asserted that those two ideas belong together; by means of which we have power to know of the being of God only in ourselves and in things, never as separated from the world, or in themselves. Of the methodological rules treated by Schleiermacher in the Technical part of the Dialectic, which forms the Second Part, the Transcendental being the first, the most important is that there is opposition only between such things as contain like elements but with a
different preponderance of one or the other of these; so that every opposition is (quantitatively considered) fluctuating. From that is then concluded that the sphere of knowledge subdivides into the two spheres of the unity of the real and ideal, with an ever preponderating reality and ideality. The former is nature, the latter reason. The meeting-point of these two is man, whether he be considered as the flowering-point of the earthly, or as the conversion of reason into nature. If now, we reflect that knowledge may be either speculative or historical, science, like everything systematically ordered, presents a fourfold nature: natural science, ethics, theory of nature, and history. All four belong together and are always involved in like progress. As dialectic is to the speculative sciences, so is mathematics to the empirical; so that there is in the empirical sciences only so much of science,—science is only in so far complete in them,—as they contain mathematics.

8. Of these four sciences into which philosophy is said to be divided, Schleiermacher has treated only Ethics, which is contained in the Schweizer edition of the transcribed parts in the Complete Works. (The Twesten edition makes many deviations, and has an admirable Introduction by the editor.) Ethics, as a speculative science, agrees with natural science as regards form in the circumstance that both treat of the laws which, on the one hand human conduct, on the other nature, observe. Actually observe; hence it is false to oppose to one another the laws of nature and of morals, as if the former had to do with mere being, the latter with the mere ideal. (An academical dissertation of 1825 treats of this opposition.) From this agreement, the fact that Schleiermacher institutes a parallel between the mechanical, dynamical and organic views of nature and his treatment of ethics as the theory of duties, virtues, and goods, are explicable. By its content, again, ethics corresponds with history, inasmuch as it lays down as fixed norms what the latter exhibits in action, so that ethics is never better than history. But this does not justify mixtures of the two, like the so-called philosophies of history and applied theories of morals. At most history can be critically considered from the standpoint of ethics, and experience give to the ethical philosopher technical hints. But criticism and technism are not science, but art; hence politics and pedagogics are arts. Ethics, since it considers the action of reason upon nature, presupposes and hence treats as falling without
nature, that potential being of reason in nature which is given before all action of reason, i.e., its being in the human organism, which natural science, or perhaps even a discipline (Anthropology) lying between it and ethics has to deduce. Likewise, the last goal of all action, the blessed life, lies outside of ethics, which has to do only with what lies between those two points, with the earthly (resistant) life. Although the thought carried out in the Critique of the Theory of Morals is strictly adhered to by Schleiermacher, viz., that ethics may, indeed if it would be complete, must, be treated as a theory of duties as well as in the form of a theory of virtue, and as a theory of the highest good (theory of goods), and that to none of these modes of treatment is due preference over the others, inasmuch as the advantages of one are counterbalanced by other advantages of others—as the theory of duties, ethics has the greatest technical usefulness on account of its dependence on history; as the theory of virtue it depends in the highest degree on speculative natural science; as the theory of goods it connects itself in the closest manner with the highest knowledge, the speculative theory of reason, and hence has in the highest degree a philosophical character). A predilection for the conception of goods is not to be mistaken, and the Theory of the Highest Good finds in Schleiermacher's Ethics a larger place than the other two parts taken together. This is divided into three parts. In the first (§§ 145–197) the Outlines are developed, an inquiry being made (according to the rule given in the Dialectic) after a double opposition in the conception of the good, which is in every union of nature and reason. Here it is shown that the action that produces this union does so in such a way that either the action accustoms itself to nature or makes and uses it as an instrument, since it may be called an organizing action; it embraces all forms of form-imparting, from the (formative) impulse that organizes the body, up to every kind of will that produces and transforms any instrument. Opposed to it is the action that results in changing everything into a symbol of the reason, which may therefore be called symbolizing or significative, and the first traces of which appear in the making of things perceptible, and the highest step in making things intelligible; so that sense and understanding, on the one hand, correspond to impulse and will on the other. This distinction which, like every distinction, is a fluctuating one, since every organ of
reason is also a symbol, every act of symbolizing is also the employment of something as a symbol, is joined with a second, so that by a crossing of the two arises the fourfold division required in the technical part of the Dialectic. The activity of reason is, that is to say, one that is identical, common to all, or it is peculiar; of course, again, in such a manner that in the former, identity, in the latter, peculiarity (only), prevails. If, now, one combines these two distinctions, the organizing activity gives, under the head of community, a sphere of common usage, or Intercourse. Under the head of peculiarity, the organizing activity gives Property. Between the extreme of community, the earth as the dwelling-place of all, and the maximum of untransferableness, one's life as the exclusive possession of one's own body, there present themselves the two relations of Right and Free Sociability. The former conditions acquisition by community and vice versa, while wrong seeks gain without community; the latter recognises the peculiarity of others in order to disclose it, and discloses its own in order to become recognised. In the third place, the symbolizing activity yields, under the head of community, the sphere of Knowledge, the communication of which has for its condition Faith, confidence in the teacher. In the fourth place, the same activity, under the head of peculiarity, presents the proper and independent symbol-sphere of excitation and Feeling, in which communication is effected not by teaching but by revelation of what is felt. The Second Part of the Theory of the Highest Good, which Schleiermacher calls the Elementary Part (§§ 198–256), treats of ethical culture. First the formative (organizing) activity, then significative (symbolizing) activity, is treated; each, universally, first, and then under its opposed characteristics (of identity and individuality). In mutually-corresponding formulas that often suggest the trigonometrical formulas for sine and cosine it is shown that the formative activity, according as one's own sense and talent, or inorganic nature, or organic nature, is made the instrument of reason, we have Gymnastics, Mechanics or Agriculture, with which there is connected a fourth science, the Collection of Apparatus as instruments of knowledge, the formative activity here bordering upon the significative. As regards, now, this latter, there falls within the circle of moralized significative action the correctness of knowledge, both the transcendental and mathematical, which accompany all other
kinds, and the speculative and empirical, which are accompanied by the former. The avoidance of all one-sidedness, by combining certainty with the accompanying doubt, by turning away from what is one-sidedly a priori and a posteriori, prevents error, which has meaning only in relation to truth and consists only in precipitation. Moral culture embraces all this and avoids the one-sidednesses that arise from the fact that the formative and significative activities come into opposition, and the former is (economically) promoted without the latter, or the latter (cynically) without the former; knowledge is assumed to be only for culture's sake, as the one kind of one-sidedness assumes; or men content themselves with a minimum of instrumentalities in order to remain in contemplation, as the second kind of one-sidedness assumes. Likewise are thereby overcome those kinds of one-sidedness which arise when (athletically) development [Ausbildung] is sought at the expense of information [Anbildung], or the latter in opposition to the former (as in the seeking of unbounded wealth of knowledge). Neither productivity without possession, nor pleasure without activity, is right. What has so far been developed relates to the two activities wholly in their universal character. If, now, these activities be considered with reference to the common and the individual, intercourse develops into Division of Labour and Exchange of Products effected through money; and by means of these there is brought about a common usage, which does not endanger morality. Both are, as regards gymnastics, at the weakest; as regards production, at the strongest. Only the transcending of possession by means of exchange is moral; hence common charity is at most to be excused. If we call the complex of the most peculiar instrumentalities a House, ethical culture presents itself in this sphere as Domestic Authority and Hospitality, which will always differ in the different spheres, inasmuch as, in the gymnastic sphere, exclusiveness must be at the greatest, in that of apparatus, hospitality. The one-sided existence of the one without the other, as, for example, in slavery, is immoral, at most to be excused as a transition stage. Just so, as regards community of goods, knowledge is moral by virtue of the identity of Discovery and Communication, a distinction with which is joined that of Virtuosity and Common Property, the former corresponding to division of labour, the latter to exchange.
The culminating point of discovery is the ripeness of youth, that of communication the youth of age. The means of transfer is, in case of spatial separation, language; in case of temporal separation, tradition; confidence is related to these as credit is to money. As regards, finally, feeling, or immediate self-consciousness, since it contains, besides the knowledge of self as distinct, also the knowledge of self as bound to others, it is the feeling of dependence, or religion. A moral condition exists only when there is feeling not without representation, representation not without feeling. The means of representation is expression, which is a sign for the perceiving subject. Since this expression contains at the same time relation to the universe and is synthetic, phantasy co-operates, and Art is the language of religion, and the peculiar means of revelation in which enthusiasm has to unite itself with discretion, the spontaneity of genius with correctness. The fundamental inquiries of the First and Second Parts place us in a position to lay down in the Third, the Constructive Part, of the Theory of the Highest Good (§§ 247–251), the System of Goods. Since the positing of reason in a natural whole having the power to impart form and to use symbols, and not only constituting the middle point of its own sphere but also bound up with the community, gives the conception of a person, all goods are moral persons, *i.e.*, moral communities, and only the totality of those organic masses, *i.e.*, the person of humanity, the earth-spirit, of which every individual good is an image, is the highest good. The family, the original image of the highest good, which, since the thought of a first man is not tenable, constitutes the presupposition of the individual man, contains as germ the four kinds of moral communities in which the modes of action above considered are by nationality, which depends upon the family, formed into natural wholes. These are, first, the State, in which right in a plurality of connections that are limited by nationality becomes a good, and which has its subsistence in the distinction of ruler and subjects, which through the conception of civil freedom becomes relative, and in the constitution has its kind and manner. (Schleiermacher's views on this subject are given in extenso in his Theory of the State, which was printed in the year 1845, from an outline prepared, probably, in 1829, and from copied notes of lectures of the years 1817 and 1829, besides aphorisms of the years
1807 and 1808. Wks., Third Division, eighth volume.) The second form of moral community is the School as national community of knowledge, in which, corresponding to the opposition of ruler and subject, there is that of the learned and the public, which receives different forms in the School, the University, and the Academy (earlier conceived as a republic of the learned); which is treated at length in the brilliant work, *On Universities*. The third form of community, that of *Free Sociability*, is conditioned by the various ranks in society or grades of culture, is dependent upon the family, in which the opposition of host and guests is constitutive, and is conditioned by, and conditions, friendship, which must be esteemed by all schools that exclude the element of peculiarity. (This appears to be aimed at Hegel.) The last community, the Church, rests upon the various schematizations of feeling given by nature, consists in the organic combination of the (relatively) opposed clergy and laity, and realizes itself in art, in which the religious style is the highest. With these positions regarding the Church are connected Schleiermacher’s extended expositions of the *Christian Faith* and *Christian Ethics*, i.e., his Dogmatics and Morals, both of which he assigns to historical theology, because the one has to present the theory that obtained in an ecclesiastical community at a definite time, the other the prevailing morals corresponding to that. The first, Schleiermacher himself has developed in his book of world-wide fame, the second was edited by Jonas in 1843 according to the lecture-notes above referred to. (Wks., First Division, twelfth volume.) For the rest, the moral communities stand related to one another in the following way: the State transcends the ecclesiastical, social, and school communities; the Church the social, political, and school communities, etc.

9. The two other parts of the *Ethics*, i.e., the *Theory of Virtue* (§§ 292–317) and the *Theory of Duty* (§§ 318–346), have neither the completeness nor the nice elaboration of the Theory of the Highest Good. If the Theory of Goods had considered the totality of reason as opposed to that of nature, the Theory of Virtue considers reason in the individual man, hence the wise man as the personification of virtue. The relation of the latter to the highest good may be so formulated that every sphere of the highest good requires all virtues, and every virtue runs through all spheres of the highest good. If
we designate the individual's sharing in the highest good as happiness, virtue would have to be called worthiness to be happy. According as, in considering the personal unification of reason and nature (sense), regard is had more to what is contained in the former or the latter, the ideal content or the time-form, virtue is Disposition or Skill, which are, of course, never separated from one another but are distinguished by the fact that disposition awakes (erwacht) and skill grows (wächst). If this distinction be crossed with that of Knowledge and Representation, there result four virtues: disposition in knowledge and representation, i.e., Wisdom and Love, skill in both, Discretion and Perseverance. Every individual virtue is again viewed with reference to the crossing distinctions, and accordingly in wisdom there occur as dividing distinctions Contemplation and Intuition, Imagination and Speculation; in love, Likeness and Unlikeness, Freedom and Constraint; in discretion and perseverance, the Combinatory and the Disjunctive, the Universal and the Individual. Hereby result in all sixteen modifications, the names of which are in part arbitrarily chosen. As regards the Theory of Duties, the Critique of Previous Ethics, but particularly the academical dissertation on the conception of duty, contain much that supplements and rectifies the account in the lectures. Since duty was defined as the moral in reference to the law, it is concluded that in every act conformable with duty all virtues must be united, and hence the conception of duty is exactly as justifiable as the two other formal conceptions. The formula, "Act in every moment with thy whole moral power (with all virtues), and having in view the entire moral problem (all goods)," makes apparent the connection of this Part with the other two. The two following: "Act always for that end towards which thou feelest thyself vitally moved," and "Act for that end towards which thou art required from without," become, since they form an opposition, although a collision of rules of duty cannot be assumed, united in a third, "Do always that which can be most furthered by you"; according to which conformity to duty rests upon the subjective connection of the greatest advantage for the whole moral sphere. But since in this is contained, at the same time, that the moral problem can be perfectly solved only in society, there results from the twofold opposition of relation to society and to self, and to the universal and individual, a fourfold sphere of duty.
the universal relation to society gives the duty of right, the individual the duty of love; universal relation to self the duty of vocation, the individual, the duty of conscience. Each of these duties is developed in four formulas; the duty of right in the formula, Enter into association, but in such a manner that thy acquisition shall be conditioned by a reservation of thy individuality, that thy participation in social life and realization of self, that inner prompting and outer demand, shall coincide. Quite analogous are the three other duties. The presentation in the Ethics furnishes the practical proof for the opinion expressed in the Critique that ethics must be treated with regard to all three formal conceptions, and shows at the same time that, since all three observe entirely different grounds of division, the individual duties can correspond to the individual virtues and goods just as little as segments to the zones of a circle. Schleiermacher places the three modes of treatment in such relation to each other that they may be compared with the formula of a curve, the curve itself, and the instrument that describes it.

10. In the face of Schleiermacher's often-expressed assertion, that there is no knowledge of the Divine nature, there can be no talk of a Theology in the proper sense of the word. What he calls such should, properly, be called Pisteology; it consists, that is to say, in scientific reflections on pious emotions,—is the theory of piety, or has religion as its object. The best name would, therefore, be Philosophy of Religion, if Schleiermacher did not employ this term for a single portion of the problem of the theologian, i.e., for the critical comparison of the various religions. If with this knowledge on the subject of religion is combined the practical work of leading the Church, the theologian becomes a clergyman. Whoever were both in the highest degree might be termed an ecclesiastical Leader. What Schleiermacher says on religion in general in the Introduction to his Theory of Faith, which is here to be regarded as the chief source of information, is in entire agreement with what he has in part said, in part suggested, on that subject in the Dialectic and the Ethics. It is not nearly so much in conflict with what his early Discourses on Religion had developed, as some suppose. And yet his arguments have not quite reached complete agreement. As already in the Discourses, so throughout his whole life, Schleiermacher held that religion was neither knowledge nor action, but
feeling, *i.e.*, not an objective, but an immediate consciousness, or state of the same. In the *Ethics* the further qualification is added that it is the feeling of dependence; finally, in the *Theory of Faith*, that this feeling of dependence is absolute, *i.e.*, that it excludes all feeling of freedom or the feeling of self-determination. That upon which we feel ourselves so absolutely dependent is God, who is exalted above all distinctions, whereas in relation to the world, the totality of all distinctions, we feel ourselves in reciprocity, *i.e.*, free and independent. The consciousness of God is never presented in its purity; it always exists in combination, only, with the consciousness of the world. (Many differences between the *Theory of Faith* and the *Discourses* disappear, or at least diminish, when one reflects that the former speaks merely of pure [ideal] piety, the latter, on the other hand, have in view the piety that is exhibited in reality.) That fusion of the pure feeling of dependence with the sensible consciousness (consciousness of the world), as a result of which the former appears in the form of pleasure and of pain, has as its consequence the fact that in the reflections upon that feeling of dependence the anthropomorphic element is not wanting. To such reflections we are forced because, as the *Ethics* has shown, feeling must lead to society, and this is conditioned by linguistic expression. Many such religious societies have appeared in the course of history; and they stand related to each other, partly as stages (Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism), partly as classes (thus in Monotheism are included Judaism, Christianity, Islam). Since our consciousness of the world is divided into Physics and Ethics, the monotheistic religions standing at any given stage present an opposition, in that Islam has, by reason of the preponderance of the element of nature, an æsthetical character, whereas Christianity (and in a less degree also Judaism) has an ethical character. As regards, now, the latter, Schleiermacher places its essence in the fact that in the Christian religion everything has reference to the redemption brought about by Jesus of Nazareth, a peculiarity, which, at the best, can be construed in so far *a priori* as the philosophy of religion shows the possibility of a mode of belief in which an exculpating fact does away with impiety. According as the consciousness of connection with the Church is conditioned by that of unity with Christ or *vice versa*, the Christian consciousness is Evangelical or Catholic. As in all religions, so in the Christian religion,
all theories and dogmas have their origin in reflections upon pious emotions, are therefore descriptions of the pious state of mind. Hence there can be no question of a conflict, and, as little, of an agreement, between tenets of faith and of knowledge; and the connection between philosophy and dogmatics is limited to the circumstance that the former rules the dialectical use of language and systematic order generally, hence even in dogmatics. Hence the fact of dogmatics variously coloured according to the domination of philosophic systems. Dogmatic tenets are characterized not only by the fact that their primary form lies in their being descriptions of pious conditions of life, but also by the fact that they can be employed as expressions of conceptions of divine attributes, or as statements of the nature of the world, although it must never be forgotten here that the former do not touch metaphysics nor the latter natural science, nor at all put a higher objective theory in the place of speculative or empirical science. To give the further content of the Theory of Faith, the First Part of which treats of the pious self-consciousness as it takes form in every excitation of the mind, the Second Part, as it takes form in that excitation which is characterized by the opposition of sin and grace, is a matter for the history of dogmatics, which will have to recognise the epoch-making importance of Schleiermacher as a theologian. His philosophical importance is not so far-reaching, although even it must not be underestimated.


§ 316.

Transition to the System of Identity.

1. The necessity of the advance to a higher step must be exhibited in the original Science of Knowledge and not in its off-shoots, all the more because the system that forms this higher step precedes those off-shoots in time, and has had a demonstrable influence upon them. But they must nevertheless be treated first, since this influence does not extend so
far as to draw them entirely over to itself. If, for example, Schleiermacher who borrows so much (not merely in terminology) from Schelling, charges against him his pantheism, he does so not as one who has put pantheism behind him, but the unattainability of the absolute, to which he holds, causes him to appear as one who has not yet arrived at pantheism (exactly the same holds true of Fichte's altered, and of Schlegel's later, doctrine). The same point in which the Science of Knowledge transcends Kant's Criticism is also that in which it places itself in contradiction with what it would be and accomplish. The advance as regards Kant has been often formulated thus: Fichte put self-consciousness in the place of the Kantian consciousness; a form of statement that one may adopt if one understand by the latter the Ego (so-called in Fichte's terminology; in Kant's, reason) as passive with reference to the non-Ego, and by the former the Ego as entirely determining the non-Ego. Precisely on account of this conception does it become impossible to Fichte to fulfil the requirements which he himself lays down in the Science of Knowledge. One of these is that which was cited above (§ 315, 1). Where the real standing over against the Ego has the meaning of a limit to be broken through, there the ideal (Ego), only, can be the starting-point, and in any sort of union the starting-point must have a decided preponderance; hence ideal-realism at most, but not real-idealism, is here possible; and yet, according to Fichte, true philosophy should be both. But Fichte has laid down still another requirement in the Science of Knowledge which, if the former relates to its content, is of a more formal kind. Since the beginning and the end coincided, the Science of Knowledge was to have been a closed circle. The beginning was with Ego=Ego as principle, the end is at Ego=Ego as Idea. But since this latter is never reached, Fichte confesses that a difference must be made between the two, hence that it has happened with him, as with many a boy who, while attempting to draw a circle, has moved the points of the compasses nearer to one another and so, instead of a circle, has described a spiral. This defect also is a necessary consequence of the way in which Fichte has conceived his principle. Since there is placed over against the Ego its contradictory opposite, a real union is out of the question. Since, again, this opposite of the Ego is necessary that the Ego may be practical, it can never be annihilated, since otherwise tedium would result,
the goal having been attained. There remains, therefore, only the infinite approximation, *i.e.*, the spiral instead of a circle. Besides these two requirements which relate to the content and the form of the Science of Knowledge, Fichte had promised the fulfilment of a third, which may be called the historical problem of the Science of Knowledge. A deeper basis was to have been provided not merely for one part, as the Elementary Philosophy did, of what Kant had taught, but for Criticism as a whole. Now Fichte himself had repeatedly called attention to the fact that there are in Kant really three different beginnings, as also three different absolutes, and had always said with reference to this, that the conception of the absolute as given in the *Critique of Judgment* was the most perfect and the highest to which Kant had risen. Nevertheless Fichte ignores this work almost wholly, declares the Introduction to be the best part of the work, and really assents to the doctrines of this work only as regards the ethico-theological conclusion. And yet the incorporation of what was there taught would have obviated the material as well as the formal defect of the *Science of Knowledge*. For where not only the question, How does freedom become nature? but also the question, Where is the transition from nature to freedom to be found? is answered, there is given, along with ideal-realism, a complementary real-idealism. And again, where there is given to the real the preference of beginning with it in that deduction, there the investigation reaches a real conclusion, instead of striving ceaselessly towards such a conclusion. Obviously, in order to be able to do this, Fichte ought, as did Kant, to have seized two conceptions which remain foreign to him,—that of organism and that of a work of art. In the former (*vid. above § 313, 2*), he had seen only reciprocity, not immanent end; while the latter is to him scarcely anything more than an accessory, serving to the decoration of the house. And again, in order rightly to estimate the organism and fine art, the sensible, as well as being in general, would have to be thought not merely as in opposition to the Ego, not merely as object devoid of all force, the meaning of which lies in its being a mere limit,—merely a thing posited.

2. All the three requirements for the fulfilling of which the Science of Knowledge stood responsible, point to the fact that another meaning is assigned to the real than that of being
merely a thing posited, a mere object, or thing offering re-
sistance. Then, too, since correlates cannot be changed
one without the other, the ideal also cannot retain the
meaning of being exclusively that which posits. However
justifiable Fichte may be in protesting against the charge
that his Ego is only subject, he can make no objection to
the charge that, according to him, only it is subject, that
to the non-Ego all subjectivity (capacity as originator) is
lacking. But the non-Ego ceases to be, of course, if what
was hitherto mere object is conceived as a thing to which
the capacity for positing (subjectivity) belongs. Only for
what is exclusively a subject is the name Ego suitable; only
for that which excludes all subjectivity is that of non-Ego
suitable. Instead of the latter term, since by it is suggested
generative (originative, i.e. subjective) activity, may properly
be employed the name nature; and again, where the nega-
tive relation towards objectivity ceases, scarcely any other
name is eligible for that which has hitherto been called Ego
than that of reason or intelligence, since by both, when, for
example, one speaks of reason or intelligence in all tendencies
of nature, also what is objective is designated. Whatever
names may be chosen for the two sides, the essential thing will
be this, that upon both sides, what is subjective as well as
what is objective, hence what was above called subject-object,
must be found. On account of this relation, viz., that the
same moments are to be found on both sides, the most
suitable name is that of the System of Identity. This is so
plainly suggested by the Science of Knowledge that, when it
was stated, a reactionary effect upon those who held to that
could not fail to take place. It is possible that Schelling
has overrated the effect it had upon the originator of the
former, and that some of what he and others after him
called the influence of the System of Identity is to be ex-
plained by Fichte's earlier relation to Spinoza. But whoever
supposes that it does honour to Fichte to have learned
nothing from Schelling forgets that to learn nothing is never
honourable, and that here a borrowing is all the more readily
to be acknowledged since not only does Schelling confess
having been in the beginning of his career merely a co-worker
with Fichte, but it may be shown that his contests with the
Science of Knowledge have contributed essentially to his
later progress beyond the System of Identity. These two
men, therefore, who paid dearly for their attempt to be friends, exactly in the same manner and for the same reason that Hume and Rousseau earlier paid dearly for a similar attempt, stand thus related one to the other: Schelling gave the impulse to Fichte to give up his original stand-point, and Fichte to Schelling to give up his. Schelling, the old man, more correctly estimated the importance of Fichte's "Promethean deed" than Schelling, the young man, who saw in it only a "fall of man."

FOURTH DIVISION.

The System of Identity.

A.—SCHELLING AND THE SYSTEM OF IDENTITY.

§ 317.

SCHELLING'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

I. FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING (later raised to the nobility) was born on the 27th of January, 1775, at Leonberg in Württemberg, became, as early as his seventeenth year, magister in Tübingen and showed in his Thesis as well as in a dissertation on Myths, that he had industriously studied Herder. The study of the Critique of Pure Reason, with which he was immediately joined that of Reinhold, Schulze's Aenesidemus and Maimon, but particularly Fichte's earliest writings, so strongly impressed him that because of the above-mentioned writings (§ 314, 2) he could be counted as the truest adherent of the Science of Knowledge. In the year 1796, Schelling left Tübingen to study in Leipsic, besides philosophy, physics and mathematics particularly, but also philology. Here he put forth the work in which, without either of them having suspected it, he separates from Fichte: the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (First [only] Part, Leipsic, 1797), with which is connected as a supplement, The World-Soul (Hamburg; 1798). In these two works Schelling supposes himself, and Fichte confirms him in this view, to be entirely in agreement with the latter in holding that the Science of Knowledge is the fundamental philosophy, upon which all other disciplines are based. But when Fichte had linked
with this fundamental science his Theory of Right and of Morals, in which, more completely and deeply established, that was to be given which Kant had attempted in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, Schelling decides to issue as a counterpart to that a Philosophy of Nature which, providing a deeper basis for Kant’s Metaphysics of Nature, given partly in his *Metaphysical Foundations* and partly in his *Critique of (Teleological) Judgment*, should supplant it; hence a Physics based on the principles of the *Science of Knowledge* corresponding to the Ethics issued by Fichte. Obviously neither of the two men reflected that this was a self-contradiction, since as was shown above (§ 313, 2), the *Science of Knowledge* denied nature, and obliged natural science to go begging. Hence also is it Kant more than Fichte that Schelling allies himself with in the *Ideas* as well as in the *World-Soul*. In the former, it is particularly the thought maintained by Kant in his Dynamic (§ 299, 5), that the quantitative distinctions of matter are not to be deduced from the difference in the number of parts but from the different relation of the forces of repulsion and attraction, which Schelling greets as the dawn of the true natural science. What he finds fault with here is that in Kant there is the appearance of putting one hypothesis in the place of another, whereas a transcendental investigation of perception, as instituted by the *Science of Knowledge*, shows that perception must conceive all its objects as the unity of two opposing forces, as well as spatial and temporal, so that matter, therefore, has not those two forces for its properties, but is nothing else than these forces, the exact relation of which to space and time is especially emphasized. In addition to the task of establishing Kant’s dynamical view of matter, Schelling placed before himself in his *Ideas* still another: to show regarding the opposed theories which at that time confronted one another in almost every chapter of physics, that his frequently enunciated principle that opposites are everywhere united to form a third somewhat, which is the truth, was correct. Upon this principle all those phenomena must, naturally, have been welcome to him which, particularly since his time, are designated polaric, because they are, properly speaking, merely the embodiment of that very principle. Hence Schelling’s inclination to maintain that the law of polarity is the highest, and everywhere to recognise opposition in unity, and in turn unity in opposition, an inclination
which, it is very easy to understand, leads to triple articulation in every investigation. By the aid of this law he seeks to show that with Lavoisier's theory of combustion a modification of the phlogistic theory may be united, and thus he approximates to the attempts of Cavendish and Kirwan to set free phlogiston in hydrogen. In the theory of light, he seeks to establish, besides the theory of emanation, then almost the only prevailing theory, the undulatory theory likewise, represented almost solely by Euler. In the theory of electricity, he attempts to reconcile Franklin and Symmer by the assumption of only one kind of electricity, which, however, divided by us, seeks itself. Exactly similar is his method as regards Aepinicus and Hauy, in the theory of magnetism. What was to have been treated in the Second Part of the Ideas, viz. the theory of heat and life, forms the content of the work on the World-Soul, a word by which Schelling designates the common medium of the continuity of all natural causes, so that it nearly coincides with the universal reciprocity which Kant had asserted in the Third Analogy of Experience, as well as in the Mechanics connected therewith. In it also, are, of course, two opposed tendencies assumed; properly, it coincides with the law of polarity. As regards the theory of heat, it is to be remarked that Schelling expected that the laws of the capacity for heat, which were then first discovered, would, when united with those of the conduction of heat, some day become the central point of the theory of heat, and that he declares against the heat-stuff, and calls heat a modification of light, but does not go so far as likewise to assert the reverse. In the theory of organism and life, which holds the same position with reference to Kant's Critique of Judgment as the investigations thus far considered do to Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Schelling declares with equal decision against the iatrochemists of his time, who saw in life only a chemical process, and (what the empiricists of to-day, when they complain about the mischief which the Schellingian Philosophy of Nature has wrought, not only forget but precisely reverse) against the defenders of a special vital force. Rather does life consist in the fact that the realization of the chemical process is constantly hindered, for which the union of positive and negative conditions of life is required; the permanence of the vital is different from that of the material; it is, namely, that of the self-preserving form, in which the whole
conditions the parts, and everything is as well cause as effect. The process of crystallization is only a suggestion of life, not life itself. The life-process is not an effect, but a cause, of composition and form. Haller's theory of irritability is an anticipation of the fact that a stimulus coming from without (just that arresting stimulus) is required; Blumenbach, in his theory of a formative impulse, rightly perceives that form depends upon function.

2. Immediately after the work on the World-Soul had appeared, Schelling came to Jena as an academical instructor, and now allied himself personally with Fichte, particularly, however, with A. W. Schlegel, later also with his brother Friedrich. Fichte and Schelling lectured as colleagues only one semester; Fichte then went to Berlin. If they had remained together longer, the breach between them would have occurred even earlier than it did, for the lectures which Schelling delivered in the winter of the year 1798–99, from which the works, First Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), and System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) grew, prove that the Science of Knowledge had already ceased to be for Schelling more than a co-ordinate part of the philosophy of nature, that, therefore, the System of Identity was in its main features complete. The Zeitschrift für speculative Physik, which Schelling had edited since the year 1800, contains in the first volume the Universal Deduction of the Dynamical Process, in the second, the Exposition of the System as a Whole, which was always designated by him as the only authentic exposition, and which unfortunately remains incomplete. Besides the Essays in the Neue. Zeitschrift für speculative Physik (one volume, 1804), and the Kritische Journal für Philosophie (six numbers, 1802), edited with Hegel, he published during his stay at Jena the Bruno, or, On the Natural and Divine Principle of Things (Berlin, 1802), and the Lectures on Academical Study (Stuttg. and Tübingen, 1803). Called in the year 1804 to Würzburg, he published his work—occasioned by one of Eschenmayer's works—Philosophy and Religion (Tübingen, 1804), in which the first traces of having outgrown the System of Identity would appear to have shown themselves. The treatise, On the Relation of the Real and the Ideal in Nature (Hamburg, 1806), which was written as an appendix to the second edition of the World-Soul, as well as the very angry public disavowal of Fichte:
Statement of the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Altered Doctrine of Fichte (Tübingen, 1806), and finally the dissertations which Schelling furnished to the Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft (3 vols., 1806–8), which he edited in conjunction with Marcus, are the last writings of Schelling on natural science. With the Aphorisms by way of Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature; and the Aphorisms for the Philosophy of Nature, he appears to have taken leave of all studies relating to it, and likewise also to have given up his close following of Spinoza.

3. When Schelling published the essay last named he was already in Munich as a Member of the Academy, and soon after publishing the Festival Address, On the Relation of Plastic Art to Nature (Munich, 1807), as its General Secretary. While occupying this position he had printed, in the first (only) part of his Philosophical Works (Landshut, 1809), the celebrated Philosophical Investigations on the Nature of Human Freedom, in which the step indicated in the Philosophy and Religion is really taken. Jacobi's not quite unimpeachable expressions concerning the Festival Address included in this collection, in his work on Divine Things, as also Eschenmayer's Reflections upon the Dissertation concerning Freedom, caused Schelling to publish in answer to the first his merciless Memorial of the Work on Divine Things, etc. (Tübingen, 1812); in answer to the second, his very measured Answer to Eschenmayer in his Allgemeine Zeitschrift von Deutschen für Deutsche (First, and only, year, Nürnberg, 1813). When Schelling wrote the latter he had for years been busied with a greater work, which should have appeared under the title, The Ages of the World, the printing of which, though begun, was again and again inhibited by him, and, instead of it, an academical lecture, On the Divinities of Samothrace, designated as a supplement to the Ages of the World, appeared (Tübingen, 1815). The First Book of the Ages of the World, in the same form which it received in 1815, appeared after Schelling's death, in the Collected Works. In the year 1820 Schelling, because of long-continued ill-health, obtained the grant of the privilege of residing in Erlangen and giving lectures, and availed himself of this right until the year 1826. When the University of Landshut was transferred to Munich, Schelling received the professorship of philosophy in it, and began his series of lectures with those on the Ages of the
World, which were followed by the *Universal Philosophy, Historico-Critical Introduction to Philosophy, Philosophy of Mythology*, finally, the *Philosophy of Revelation*. The *Mythological Lectures*, the appearance of which was announced by the list of new publications for 1830, had reached the sixteenth sheet when the printing was inhibited by Schelling. (A copy that has been preserved, I myself possess.) In North Germany attention was first directed to Schelling’s activity in Munich after the death of Hegel, after Stahl and Sengler had given an account of his altered teaching, but particularly after Schelling himself had, in his *Critical Preface* to a translation of a work of Cousin, made by Hubert Becker, expressed himself so acrimoniously concerning Hegel (Tübingen, 1834). Having been called to Berlin in 1841, he availed himself of the right of Members of the Academy to give lectures in the University and began, on the 15th of November, the lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation before a very large audience, composed in part of students. The inaugural lecture he himself published. It is the last that he had printed. His vexation at the fact that when his old enemy Dr. Paulus caused to be struck off (Darmstadt, 1843) notes of his own of the *Philosophy of Revelation* which had been copied for this purpose, his (Schelling’s) complaint regarding the impression was disregarded, disgusted him with the lectures. On the other hand, he read many dissertations in the Academy, which, as it has transpired, are all fragments of his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology*.

4. While occupied in arranging his earlier works and elaborating those parts of his system to which the lectures of his last years had been devoted, Schelling, almost an octogenarian and yet wonderfully vigorous, was suddenly overtaken by death, on the 20th of August, 1854, at the baths of Ragatz. Never perhaps has any philosopher been so variously judged in his life as Schelling. By one, almost deified, by others (Paulus, Kopp, Salat and others) regarded almost as an incarnation of evil, he suggests in this regard the man who appeared to him, while he was working out his System of Identity, to be the world-hero of more than human dignity, viz., Bonaparte. This sympathy is just as little an accident as that Fichte sided with the Jacobins. The account of the System of Identity will show how this Spinozism of the nineteenth century entered into conflict with the subjec-
tivism that sprang from its mother, the Science of Knowledge, as he whom the Revolution had raised to such a height, did with the anarchy that sprang from it. This analogy proves the world-historic necessity of this system, as the defects of the Science of Knowledge, commented upon in § 316, had shown the necessity of the same in the history of philosophy. After Schelling’s death two of his sons united in editing his Complete Works. These appeared in the years 1856–1861, in fourteen volumes, from the house of Cotta, in such a form that in the first division (vols. 1–10) occurs, chronologically arranged, everything that had been printed before, what had remained unprinted being inserted in the proper place; and in the second division (vols. 11–14) are placed, in accordance with Schelling’s own wish, the Introduction to Mythology, the Philosophy of Mythology, the Philosophy of Revelation. Unfortunately, death has prevented one of the editors from completing the biography of his father that had been begun by him. So far as carried out, this has been printed, supplemented by a selection of letters written to and by Schelling.


§ 318.

Schelling’s Original System of Identity.

1. The System of Transcendental Idealism (Works, iii. pp. 327–634), perhaps the most finished of Schelling’s writings, as regards form, starts with the supposition, as a self-evident one, that philosophy has to do with the explanation of knowledge. But since knowledge consists in the agreement of subject and object, its problem at once falls into two: First, How comes the objective, the inner totality of which we call nature, to become known to the subject? Second, How does the inner totality of the subjective, intelligence, arrive at objects and at a Nature? The first problem has to be solved by the Philosophy of Nature, the second by the Transcendental Philosophy. To the Transcendental Philosophy the work just mentioned is devoted; and although it is too much to say, as the preface avows, that there is contained in this work nothing that the earliest writings of Fichte and
Schelling had not already taught, the relationship of this work with the Science of Knowledge is still very close. The problem is, to deduce as necessary, our assumption that things are; which is possible only if the act, which common consciousness always forgets in thinking of its creations, be itself made an object of thought. This, now, is obviously not within the power of every one, but there is required for it, as for being a poet, an inborn talent—inner perception; only by it are we enabled to win the principle of all knowledge that is not itself dependent upon any other. This principle is the Ego that is realized by the act of self-consciousness, and consists purely in it; which is not an object (for another), but becomes by its own activity, and makes itself its own object. This is not to be conceived as an individual, which accompanies ideas as an "I think" subjected to time, but as what is pure, which produces itself by intellectual intuition, and stands wholly out of time, because it first gives time reality. This act which, because there is for the Ego no other being than it itself, is an absolutely free act, must, by an arbitrary act without which there is no philosophizing, be made an object, which, since it also is impossible without intellectual intuition, makes this last necessary, as it were, in a higher potency. In the first part of the Transcendental Philosophy, the system of Theoretical Philosophy (pp. 388–531), Schelling begins with that first act, which constitutes absolute self-consciousness, and advances to the point at which experience is explained, i.e., at which is deduced why certain ideas are accompanied by the feeling that we are compelled to have them. As Fichte speaks of a pragmatical history, so Schelling also speaks here always of a history of self-consciousness, in which the series of self-limitations of the real and ideal activities to be distinguished in the absolute self-consciousness, give the particular acts of the same. If they were all deduced, every particular sensation would be deduced. Only the cardinal ones are here to be considered. By them the course is divided into three periods (Schelling ineptly calls them "epochs"), the first of which extends from original sensation to productive perception. Sensation, regarded as the finding its negative in self, or finding self limited without its co-operation, has its ground in a precedent act which, however, because sensation is the first consciousness, does not lie within consciousness. The progress from this stage to the
following and from this, again, forward, is, now, made in such a way that there is made to appear how by the infinite ideal activity's transcending the previous point of self-limitation, that which we had thus far recognised consciousness to be becomes conscious of itself ("what it had been for us it becomes for itself"), so that it gradually grows from a thing felt to a thing felt and a thing feeling; finally, to a thing perceiving itself as feeling. Here it is shown why that which is perceived must appear as spatial in three dimensions, *i.e.*, as matter. At this point the second period begins; which extends from productive perception to reflection. Here also the progress consists in the fact that it is shown how perception comes to be for itself what it had been for the philosopher contemplating it. In this period falls the entire manifoldness of the objective world, *i.e.*, the unconscious creations of the Ego. The most interesting point here is the deduction of time and space, connected with the distinction of outer and inner sense in consciousness, and the combination of time and space with the categories, first of substance and accident. This combination, in the execution of which Schelling appeals expressly to Kant's transcendental schematism, shows how attentively he had studied Beck's theories. In this operation the table of categories is very much reduced, inasmuch as the Categories of Relation are given as those from which all others are deduced; they themselves, however, or rather two of them, causality and reciprocity, are given with the first-mentioned, substantiality. Since reciprocity in spatial phenomena gives what is called organism, the universe is deduced in what precedes as total-organism, but thereby is also explained how the Ego which had thus far limited itself by objectivity, in general, attains, in a second limitation, to the perception of the universe from certain points of view, *i.e.*, to becoming a plurality of Egos that find their present condition a fate or destiny, although they are bound by their own foregoing deed. A third limitation, finally, as a result of which each of these Egos regards a part of the universe as its exclusive possession, is deduced in the third period, which extends from reflection to the absolute act of the will. It is clear that the question why I regard only a part of the universe as my organism, coincides with the question how I come to regard the rest of the universe as things outside of me (which means something wholly different from "in space"). The result
of this very extended investigation is that this takes place through an act of the will, a result corresponding completely, therefore, with Fichte's declaration that there can be no theoretical ground given for it, that this impulse is not to be theoretically deduced. Just as with Fichte, the transition is here made to the:

2. System of *Practical Philosophy* (pp. 532–611), in which there appears, particularly, the agreement with what Fichte had said in his Introductions to the *Theory of Right* and the *Theory of Morals*; but at the same time, also, the theories of Right, the State, and of History, are treated in the form of appendices. What Fichte had called the deduction of the "opposition" forms here the starting-point. That act of the will is to be explained. The difficulty contained in the fact that this is to be thought as free and yet as necessary is solved by saying, that that act is called forth by the action of intelligences outside of one's own Ego. By this co-operation of many intelligences there arises a common world, for which, therefore, there is no need of the unintelligible conception of a contriver. Through the existence and the influence of other intelligences (education), as also through one's own activity (one's talent), reacting against these, arises the third limitation, or individuality, which coincides with the need of seeing self as an organic individual. In this common world, *i.e.*, this world assumed by all, we have the theatre of our conscious action, *i.e.*, the sphere in which we know ourselves as causality. Possibility consists in the fact that our perception of this world itself is only our (unconscious) action; hence what we are accustomed to term action can be called merely a continued and modified perception. Since it is at bottom only one and the same action by which we posit a nature and which proves to us our causality, nothing that contradicts the laws of nature can ever be regarded as the product of free action, nor, again, can free action ever be regarded as not mediated by the body. Even impulse, which my volition shows itself, primarily, to be, must be regarded as a natural impulse. If, now, the contradiction that lies in the fact that freedom itself is thus to be possible according to the laws of nature, becomes known to the subject involved in the contradiction, *i.e.*, if there enter into his consciousness what the contemplating philosopher sees or what was for us, then arises the perceived contradiction between the moral law and natural impulse, in
consequence of which the absolute will appears as caprice. (This distinction between absolute and empirical [transcendental] freedom justifies Kant's distinction of intelligible and empirical character.) These investigations having led to the explanation of how the Ego comes to ascribe to itself objective occurrences, Schelling, as has just been remarked, adds, as appendices, further considerations of an ethical character. First is set forth as the highest good the pure will ruling in the external world, and then is shown that in order that the attainment of this goal shall not depend upon accident, an adjustment must be found which shall compel even self-seeking natural impulse to act contrary to itself. This is found in the law of right, an inexorable order of nature, the conversion of which into a moral order leads to the most fearful despotism. In the State, which is merely an institution of right, not the envy of the strong, but the power of the executive, should rule, possible oversteppings of which are prevented by the intercourse of nations, which carries itself out in history, that great drama, which has no composer (for then we were not, who play it), but is produced by us, who as co-operating authors and our own devisers of rôles represent Him, God, the Spirit of History. That this being is not to be conceived as substantial, personal, is self-evident. There have been two periods of history: the Past, in which God was known as Fate, or Providence, the tragical in which splendid empires fell; and the Present, in which, instead of fate, there enters in the Plan of Nature, and mechanical law curbs wanton caprice. In the third, the Future, God will be.

3. In the addition to the Theoretical and Practical Transcendental Philosophy, of the Outlines of a Philosophy of Art (pp. 612-629), as a Third Part, there is presented very distinctly what had not shown itself in the Transcendental Philosophy, viz., a deviation from the Science of Knowledge. By it is solved, at the same time, that historical problem which Fichte (vid. § 316) had been able only to state, not to solve. The opposition of the unconscious production by which we know of nature, and the conscious by which we know of freedom, would have demanded a solution even though Kant had not shown that the work of art is raised above the opposition of the product of nature and that of freedom. What unartistic Fichte failed to catch a suggestion from, must have been a fruitful hint to Schelling, who was aesthetically
cultivated and in close friendship with the circle of Schlegel. In the work of art brought forth by conscious-unconscious enthusiasm there appears as attained and as a fortunate gift, what praxis can only strive to attain. In this regard every work of art contains the adjustment of an infinite opposition, namely, beauty, this incomprehensible miracle in which idea becomes matter, freedom nature. But in the work of art is also attained the point towards which, as towards its goal, Transcendental Philosophy strives. To the question which it had to answer, how intelligence comes to nature—is here provided the answer, by art; in the work of fine art. But since artistic activity occupies here the highest place, just as practical (moral) activity does in the Science of Knowledge, it is clear why Schelling does not, as does Fichte, put forward the requirement to raise self to intellectual perception, in the form of an appeal to conscience, but represents it as attainable only by the select few, and always compares it to poetic endowment. Æsthetic perception is transcendental perception become objective; it is the true organ and instrument of philosophy, which constantly deposes anew what philosophy is not able externally to show: the unconscious in action and production, and its original identity with the conscious. For art, the view which the philosopher, in the manner of an artist, makes for himself of nature, is the original and natural one; to the artist as to the philosopher, it is a reflection of the world which is in him. But it is certain that with the Philosophy of Art the Transcendental Philosophy becomes a closed circle, inasmuch as it returns to the point which it had first proposed to reach. Intellectual perception forms the beginning-point of the system; æsthetical perception its terminal point. What the former is for the philosopher, the latter is for his object. The former is never present in consciousness, the latter may be present in every consciousness. Hence philosophy as philosophy is never universally valid. The General Observation upon the Whole System (pp. 629–664) recapitulates the course passed over and sets forth, in a synoptical manner, the most important steps in the continued involution of self-perception, again compares art and philosophy, and closes with the thought that, as originally philosophy and poetry were one in mythology, so perhaps a new mythology which, of course, not one man but the race would have to create, might again unite the two.
4. Even if Schelling's Transcendental Philosophy had not added to what Fichte had said in the Theoretical and Practical Science of Knowledge, the Third Part, on æsthetics, we could no longer speak of an agreement of the two after Schelling had, in the introductory words of the System of Transcendental Idealism, placed the Philosophy of Nature beside the Transcendental Philosophy as a co-ordinate part with it, and had thereby converted the Fundamental Philosophy into a collateral discipline. He had been far from doing that when he wrote the Ideas and the World-Soul; but he did so and was compelled to do so because he no longer, as in those two works, analytically sought for the ground postulated by reason for what is given in experience, but, on the contrary, set out to construe nature synthetically or, to employ his own daring expression, to create it. (Kant, who affirmed that matter was given, had felt at liberty only to say to make. It is otherwise with the philosophy that boasts of having freed itself from the given thing-in-itself.) This is first done in the First Sketch, etc., and the Introduction to it (Works, iii. pp. 1–268, 269–326). Here the difference between natural history and natural science, or speculative physics, is placed in the circumstance that the former treats nature as a product, the latter, on the other hand, as productive (as natura naturans), and just for that reason has for its organ not dismembering reflection, but the perception that grasps firmly the Whole. Since no production is conceivable without a product, and in the product production is extinct, nature (just as the Ego, above) must be conceived as containing in itself a self-limiting production, or as two opposed activities. By means of this opposition, now, it is possible that nature assert its infinitude, although it continually gives forth finite (illusory) creations, in which, however, because of the opposition lying in them the impulse of infinite development dwells. (Species thus preserve themselves through the sexual particularity of individuals.) As the vortex in the stream remains unchanged in spite of the constant flowing of the individual particles of water, so also does it in the stream of infinitely productive nature, where the points of arrest are qualities or even natural monads; hence the philosophy of nature may be called a qualitative Atomism. Later, there is employed, instead of these two expressions, the term Categories of Nature. Because of this opposition, nature
appears to be a conflict of the universalizing and the indivi-
dualizing principles,—a conflict that presents the most varied attempts to bring about absolute equilibrium. In these attempts we meet a dynamical succession of steps, which in the First Sketch is presented in a descending order, but in the Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process (Works, iv. pp. 1–70), and later, always in ascending order. The first arrange-
ment, which, entirely in opposition to the spirit of the system, gives to it almost the appearance of a theory of emanation, is of course chosen especially because it is in the organic world, particularly in the process of the species, most clearly visible how nature, by a battle against permanence, promotes per-
manence. Hence it came about that Schelling’s belief in the possibility of rescuing the higher dignity of the organic was of such a character that he assumed that life was extinct in the dead. Later it appeared that the difference was not so great whether one said, in the earlier manner, the higher loses itself in the lower or it raises itself out of it. An essential difference between the assertions of the First Sketch and later presentations relates to the three physiological func-
tions. Kielmeyer, who had been stimulated by Herder, had not only by his well-known address, but also by unprinted works that circulated in transcriptions in the Schellingian circle (I myself possess one in Steffens’s hand) operated just as powerfully upon Schelling as upon the later opponent of the Philosophy of Nature, Cuvier. With him sensibility was always put before irritability and reproduction. This order Schelling retains, and since the organic merely repeats in a higher potency what the inorganic (for a long time Schelling wrote inorgie [anorgische]) displays, he institutes a parallel between them and magnetism, electricity, and the chemical process, giving to magnetism the highest place. This, now, he withdrew later; and his intercourse with Steffens may well have contributed to this and other modifications. In the deduction of the Categories of Nature we have to do with three points: First, the construction of matter out of that original act of production. Here it is shown that the centrifugal activity gives the first dimension and the force of repulsion of Kant; the centripetal individualizing activity, on the other hand, Kant’s force of attraction and the second dimension; the union of these being the third dimension, matter or gravity, so that gravity is not attraction (alone), and
is not a property, but the real essence, of matter. The second point here is, the repetition of this same construction as self-construction of matter in the dynamical categories, magnetism (linear force), electricity (surface force), chemical process (reciprocal space-filling), which may be called gravity in the second potency, just as magnetism is a higher potency of linear activity, which, being the condition of all phenomena, never enters into phenomena. Besides these involutions of those three primitive categories, however, there must be a phenomenon of the involution and construction conditioning all the three, and this, which is, as it were, a tendency to being reflected and to thought,—is light. Whereas the construction of a first potency can at most deduce distinctions of weight and density, the construction of a second potency, or reconstruction, forms the basis for what Kant calls qualities: magnetism for the state of cohesion; electricity for sensibly felt qualities,—colour, etc.; the chemical process for chemical properties (which, for that reason, display themselves mostly in the condition of fluidity, i.e., of the not being defined alone by length and breadth). The chemical process contains magnetism and electricity in itself, but in its aspect of elements, the former, according to Steffens, in carbon and nitrogen, the latter in oxygen and hydrogen. All the three processes are held to be united in galvanism, which Schelling, since he declares for Galvani as against Volta, regards as the threshold of the third stage, at which magnetism involves into sensibility, electricity into irritability, the chemical process into reproduction, which latter shows itself, where difference in sex is in question, as sexual impulse, and where it is not, as artistic impulse. But the question which the Philosophy of Nature has to answer, How does nature come to intelligence? is here answered as follows: It comes to it in the organism, that is to say, in the highest organism, i.e., man, in which intelligence awakes. There needs no special reference to Kant's Critique of the Teleological Judgment in order to see how Schelling makes use of the result reached by that.

5. In the decided parallelism between the Transcendental, and the Natural Philosophy, which the express references in each to the corresponding steps of the other caused to stand out still more clearly, so that almost spontaneously there forces itself upon every one the schema of two currents moving in opposite directions, there was suggested so strongly
the thought of giving to the system, by the union of the two, a formal conclusion, that Schelling was obliged to attempt such a union. Everything seemed to urge it, he rightly says. That he gave this to the world "earlier than he himself would have done," in what is always designated by him as the only Authentic Exposition of his System (Wks., iv. pp. 105–212)—to this he was forced by the entirely opposite and false judgments upon his system: first, of those who called it philosophy of nature, to whom he would here again show that the philosophy of nature is only a part of the system; second, of those who, with Reinhold, identified his system with the Science of Knowledge, and to whom he would show not only that transcendental philosophy is only a part of philosophy, but that Fichte, in making it the whole of philosophy, did not get beyond the standpoint of reflection and a mere subjective idealism, whereas his own system is productive in its procedure, and is objective idealism. He calls it, therefore, the System of Absolute Identity, and explains its similarity to the form of the Spinozistic philosophizing by the relationship of the content of the two theories. He begins this Exposition with the definition of reason as the total indifference of subject and object (subject-object), a conception which we get if we abstract in thought from the thinker. The reason is the true in itself; hence to know things in themselves is to know them as they are in reason. It is the absolute, outside which is nothing. Since it is absolute identity, the law of identity is the law of all being. Since it is absolute being, all that is, is, in its essence or absolutely considered, absolute identity itself. Until the present time Spinoza alone has perceived that there can be no such thing as the absolute coming outside of itself, but that everything is the infinite, the absolute, the all itself. (The expression "God," upon which Schelling laid so much stress later, does not occur as a name for the absolute in this Authentic Exposition.) But if there is nothing besides the absolute, it follows that even the real and true knowledge of this as presented by philosophy can be only the self-knowledge of the absolute, so that in order to know it one must immerse one's self in this self-knowing, must be the absolute itself. But if there is self-knowledge only where subject and object make themselves one, the absolute must also enter into this opposition, and we have therefore identity (the subject-object) as subjective and
as objective, i.e., with the quantitative difference that here subjectivity, there objectivity, preponderates. Reason, as the former, is spirit; as the latter, nature; in both, which, considered from the standpoint of reason, are the same, the absolute is posited actu. Within each of these, the various relations of subjectivity and objectivity give the definite expressions or potencies of the absolute, of which those with preponderating objectivity belong to nature, those with preponderating subjectivity to spirit, the former being considered in the real, the latter in the ideal, part of philosophy. The whole system may, therefore, be well represented in a schema, by a large magnet in which the indifference point may be designated by \( A = A \), the poles at the two ends of it, on the other hand, by \( +A = B \) or \( A = B^+ \), between which lie, then, the correlate or opposite stages of preponderating subjectivity. The question whether this system is realism or idealism has no meaning; since it assumes only the unity of the real and ideal: indeed, every individual is for it only in so far as it is an expression of this unity. The Exposition, now—to conform to the schema employed by it—places itself at the pole of preponderating objectivity, hence at that of the potency of nature in which subjectivity is the less potent, and is, therefore, designated as the first \( (A^1) \). As this primum existens, matter is designated, in which the two moments as forces of expansion and attraction are united in the force of gravity, the latter having to be regarded as the ground upon which, as that which remains undiscovered, the existing matter rests. Because of the importance given to light in the following stage in the dynamical processes, this whole stage \( (A^2) \) is designated by its name. As in the Universal Deduction, so here magnetism is defined as the repetition of the linear function, and cohesion as its phenomenon. But there is added Steffens’s theory of a cohesion-series of bodies in which carbon and nitrogen form the poles, iron the indifference-point (vid. § 322, 5). The statements made earlier relating to electricity, according to which oxygen and hydrogen are poles, water their indifference-point, are united with that theory, a ridiculous meaning is given to both laws, and then a north and south, as well as an east and west, polarity are talked about. Water gives the resolution of the two latter, prevents the opposition of east and west from becoming fixed. (The same is true as regards the moon.) New in this part are the statements con-
cerning light and colours, in which Schelling allies himself with Goethe. New is it, further, that the chemical process, which is here treated after magnetism and electricity, since it is of higher order than they, is treated as identical with galvanism. The union of gravity, and light, in which the former exists as mere potency, is the organism ($A^3$), in which the form is preserved by the processes treated under $A^2$, but upon which, as was shown earlier, there supervenes a hindering factor. As $A^2$ rests upon $A^1$ as its basis, so the two form the basis of $A^3$. The organism exhibits absolute identity as existent; it is the sole end. Hence even inorganic nature is organized, namely, for organization, as distinct from, and opposed to which we have, after it has ceased to be, a worthless residuum as an inorganic mass. The earth does not produce animals and plants, but becomes them: what cannot be either of these we call inanimate. After some antithetical observations upon plants and animlas, which may be put into the same class with those already mentioned (of north and south, water and iron, etc.), the treatise breaks off and promises in the future an exposition "in which I may lead the reader from one stage of organic nature to another up to the highest expressions of activity in the same; from these to the construction of the absolute indifference, or to the point where absolute identity is posited under completely equal potencies; where I invite him from this point to the construction of the ideal series, and so, again, lead him, through the three potencies which, as regards the ideal factor, are positive, as now through the three, which, as regards the same factor, are negative—to the construction of the absolute centre of gravity, in which as the two highest expressions of indifference lie truth and beauty."

6. Properly speaking, it is somewhat strange that in the concluding words just cited only truth and beauty are mentioned, since, on the other hand, in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Art (Wks., v. pp. 353–736), which Schelling delivered at about the same time at which he wrote his Authentic Exposition, he gives a conspectus of the entire system, which fully agrees with the synoptical table given in the year 1806 in his Aphorisms by way of Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature (Wks., vii. pp. 140–197). According to this, however, God manifests himself as the All: to be specific, —on the one hand, in the three potencies of the relatively
real All,—gravity (matter), light (motion), organism (life),—
which together give the world-structure that culminates in
man; on the other hand, in the three potencies of the rela-
tively ideal All,—truth (science), goodness (religion), beauty
(art),—which together form history, with its apex, the State.
Both series, however, are embraced by philosophy, which is
not only science, but also virtue and beauty, and restores
absolute identity. That goodness is omitted in the conclud-
ing words of the Authentic Exposition must therefore be regarded
as merely an oversight. Had Schelling, whose First Sketch and
Transcendental Idealism, as well as the Lectures on Academi-
cal Study, which are presently to be discussed, had gradually
spread the expectation that he would have every one of his
lectures printed, and of whom, in fact, because of the many
new investigations constantly set on foot, it had begun to be
believed that he carried on his studies only before the public,
—had Schelling himself published the just-mentioned Lectures
on the Philosophy of Art, as well as the extended work,
System of the Whole of Philosophy and of the Philosophy of
Nature in Particular (Wks., vi. pp. 131–576), (which was
edited in the year 1806, in part from the Jena lecture-notes)
which were both first printed after his death from manuscript
remains, it would not have been repeated until to-day, with
apparent justice, that what Schelling had performed was only
fragmentary and that he always remained entangled in the
beginnings of his undertakings. The two works just named
 treat, with a greater degree of completeness, the closing
chapters,—the former that of the science of mind or of history,
the latter that of the philosophy of nature. In their influence,
of course, the works that have really remained fragments
have surpassed the complete works, which were known merely
to those who heard them; for the reason, it may be, that
great importance would be attached to the fact that among
those who heard them Hegel is thought to have been one.
The Philosophy of Art from which, for the rest, individual parts
had been early printed, e.g. the part that relates to Christianity,
in the Lectures on Academical Study, the Essay on Dante, in
the Critical Journal, etc., is based on Kant’s Critique of the
Æsthetical Judgment, as Schelling’s works on the philosophy
of nature had been based on Kant’s Metaphysics of Nature
and Critique of the Teleological Judgment. Schelling
repeatedly confesses that Kant had here laid the foundation;
which was, he thought, doubly remarkable, since his own view of works of art had entirely miscarried. Besides Kant, it is Winckelmann especially, "the unsurpassed and unsurpassable," on whom he leans; after him, Schiller, whose aesthetic dissertations are frequently cited; finally, the two Schlegels; as well Friedrich, whose original study of the history of art had led to results that border upon what Schiller had discovered by an examination of its nature, as August Wilhelm, whose Berlin lectures of the year 1801 had been known to Schiller before they were yet published. That the merits of both men are not made more conspicuous by him has, no doubt, personal grounds. Characteristic, in this connection, of this entire lecture, is the enthusiasm for antiquity. As compared with the Greeks, the Romans occupy an inferior position; besides these two peoples only the Italians are, properly speaking, taken into consideration; in other nations only Calderon, Shakespeare, and Goethe. Of these three, the second-named almost occupies the lowest place, although Schelling confesses to knowing only a single piece of Calderon's. The lectures are divided into a General Part (pp. 373-487), which construes art in general, its matter, finally its form, and a Special Part (pp. 488-736), which construes the particular forms of art. But to these discussions on the philosophy of art there are prefixed others of a more general sort, which are distinguished from the opening paragraphs of the Authentic Exposition by their greater completeness, but further by the fact that here, instead of the Absolute, God is always spoken of. The like holds true of the unpublished System of the Whole of Philosophy. Thus he can connect with the word reason the more definite meaning, the reflection of God, in which are comprised the potencies of the real and ideal All, and which is related to God as copy to type, or as indifference to identity. In both expositions, for the rest, he opposes a number of misunderstandings which his system had experienced. Particularly he cannot insist strongly enough that for philosophers, whose first and only presupposition is that it is one and the same thing that knows and is known, hence that there is no such thing as the finite; that the finite, hence also the quantitative distinctions of potencies, arises for us only by the fact that we turn away from the absolute, hence conceive the All to be just what it is not—i.e., if it is considered from the standpoint of
the absolute. But from the standpoint of reflection, on the contrary, it is. From both together, it is mere phenomenon. No one should allow himself to be terrified at this, the only true theory, by the charge of pantheism. Just so should no one regard the absolute as the unity of both, imitating, as it were, the opposition of the subjective and objective. Rather, must the indifference of the subjective and objective, the affirming and affirmed, in which the affirmed is always also the affirming, be conceived as the absolute prior. In the General Part of the Philosophy of Art is to be mentioned the statement that since things as they are in God, i.e. eternal archetypes or divine forms, constitute the matter of art, and Ideas conceived as real are gods, mythology is the proper matter of art. The opposition of ancient and modern, which otherwise, also, pervades art, here appears in such sort that the mythology of the ancients is made by the race (which produces it as a swarm of bees produces the honey-comb), that of the moderns by the individual. The investigations relating to the sublime and beautiful, the naïve and sentimental, and to style and manner, form the transition to the Particular Part and the System of Individual Arts. The distinction, construed in the General Philosophy, of the relatively real and ideal, forms the basis of the distinction of formative arts and poetry. The former has, as branches, music, painting, plastic art. In each of these, however, the three arts themselves, properly speaking, repeat their three moments, inasmuch as what is musical, pictorial, and plastic are repeated:—in rhythm, melody, and harmony, in music; in clare-obscure, drawing, and colouring, in painting; and in architecture, bas-relief, and sculpture, in plastic art. Just so are all three repeated in the art of poetry as the lyric, the epic, and the dramatic. As in epic poetry Dante's great poem forms a species by itself, so in the drama does Goethe's Faust. An exact discussion of individual works of art makes these lectures, concerning which it must always be remembered that they were written in the year 1802, in the highest degree charming. It can hardly be called an accident that Schelling passes over lyric poetry most rapidly.

7. In the Lectures on the Methods of Academical Study (Wks., v. pp. 207 ff.) Schelling develops his system as a whole, not in a mathematical form, always recalling Spinoza, but in the way of suggestive reflections. They begin by fixing the
conception of absolute science or first knowledge, upon which, as the immediate unity of the ideal and the real, all other knowledge rests. In this knowledge the universe, or God, appears exactly as it appears in nature, only as self-knowledge. In the second lecture, it is shown that science is not an affair of the individual but of the species, hence is a witnessing tradition for a more perfect past, of which institutions of learning have to show, by constantly going back to the first knowledge, that it does not have value merely through tradition and authority. In the third lecture, the preconditions of science,—what is learned and the means by which it is learned, memory,—are considered and extolled, not without glancing aside at modern pedagogies, which slights both. With the fourth lecture, begins the encyclopaedic survey of the sciences, commencing with the pure science of reason. Here the mathematics of the ancients is held up as a pattern before the modern, as being more full of ideas, whereas the latter elings merely to the symbols of ideas; and then philosophy is taken up, and in the fifth lecture its alleged danger for the State and religion is illustrated. Only where the common understanding, which even in science leads to ochlocracy, calls itself philosophy, as in France, i.e., where want of ideas gives itself this name, does it lead to mob-rule; for, with the common understanding, Spanish sheep-farming stands higher than the transformation of a world by the almost divine powers of a conqueror, and utility and plain morals, with their firstburghers instead of kings, higher than, to the through-and-through aristocratical philosophy, the Absolute and Ideas stand, which to it are exalted above individual things as the monarch and freemen are above serfs. Then, in the sixth lecture, is more closely considered the study of philosophy; and the fact-philosophy, the dogmatism of the understanding, the rule of a logic resting wholly upon an empirical basis, which has validity only for the finite, and finally, dualism, which forbids regarding psychology as a branch of physics, are given as the chief obstacles to true philosophy. The seventh lecture, which compares philosophy with the positive sciences, forms the transition to the faculties; the eighth contains the celebrated historical construction of Christianity, which defines Christianity, particularly in its opposition to the Grecian world as the culminating point of natural religion, as follows: the Christian religion has not
symbols, in gods, of the infinite but refers immediately to the infinite; does not base religion upon mythology but mythology upon religion; of course also, sees in nature a mystery (whereas to the heathens nature stood revealed), and hence needs miracles. The reconciliation of the infinite and finite is the real content of the doctrine of the trinity, and that Lessing has divined in the most speculative of all his writings. Theology, indeed, has, as the ninth lecture complains, mistaken the depth of that theory and conceived the eternal incarnation as having taken place but once, so that in this regard the inhabitants of India, with their many incarnations, show more understanding than their missionaries. Theology came into such a condition of stuntedness by the deification of the Bible, which cannot sustain even a superficial comparison with the religious books of India, and out of the sterile matter of which only the philosophical culture of the Church Fathers could draw so much that is speculative. The Bible has thus been the real obstacle to the perfection of the church; a dead letter has assumed the place of the earlier, at least living, authority, and now, after theology has been converted into philology, men busy themselves with explaining Jewish fables, which were invented under the guidance of the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. The true eternal Idea of Christianity is attested in philosophy and poetry more than in such theology. The eleventh lecture considers history and jurisprudence, and characterizes the various forms of historiography. The State is defined as the objective organism of freedom; the ancient State is preferred to the modern with its so-called civil freedom, with which only too much of slavery is mingled, because it appears more as a self-end. This does not forbid the accomplishment by it of collateral ends also, e.g., security. In the eleventh lecture natural science is treated, and it is shown how the immanent application of the absolute in the special forms gives the eternal Ideas of nature which the philosophy of nature has to exhibit. Physics and chemistry are treated in the twelfth lecture; medicine in the thirteenth. In the last-named lecture Brown is not unqualifiedly praised, but is recognised; disease is conceived as organism, pathology as the natural history of these organisms, and the hope is expressed that comparative anatomy will lead to a real history of productive nature. The conclusion of this interesting work, the complete contents
of which have been given here because Schelling has in this
work expressed himself upon subjects concerning which he
had never, up to this time, addressed the public, is formed, in
the fourteenth lecture, by the Philosophy of Art, which takes
much from the lectures characterized above on this subject.
Here the connection between art and the life of the State is
made more prominent than it was there. This connection
appears particularly in antiquity, which, with its festivals and
memorials, presents a great work of art.

8. The expression, "Ideas," for the Absolute manifesting
itself in special forms, which appears first in the Lectures, was
a consequence of Platonic studies, to which at this time
Schelling devoted himself. It was they that caused him also to
employ in the exposition of his Bruno, or On the Natural and
Divine Principle in Things (1802), the form of the scientific
dialogue, instead of mathematical construction, which in its turn
had altered itself from the antithetico-synthetic method of the
first works. It is remarkable that here the original opposition
is conceived as that of the infinite and finite, which are held to
have their identity in the eternal, which is not at all affected
with opposition, is in its ideal being real, in its thought being,
etc. This trinity, the manifestation of which is given in the
universe, in which the stars, for whose laws of motion dis-
covered by Kepler Hegel's dissertation is affirmed to have
provided the speculative ground, live as blessed gods, is re-
vealed, likewise, in speculative apprehension, in which it is, in
perception, subordinated to the finite, in thought, to the infinite,
in reason, to the eternal. Thought is treated with greatest
completeness, and it is shown, in this connection, that con-
ception, judgment and the syllogism are not to be empirically
assumed, but result from the including of the infinite, finite,
and eternal under the infinite as necessary thought-forms.
Obviously, as such, they do not suffice for the reason, because
the unjustified domination of logic in the sphere of reason
has had as a consequence the fact that the absolute has been
divided into the soul, the world and God in a manner corre-
sponding with the three syllogisms. The characteristics of
the four one-sided conceptions of the Absolute (materialism,
intellectualism, realism, idealism), which are compared with
the four quarters of the world, and in opposition to them the
delineation of true philosophy with its eternal God-becoming-
man, and man-becoming-God, closes the exposition. With
the Bruno is connected as a supplement, The Further Expositions from the System of Philosophy in the Neue Zeitschrift für speculativ Physik, which discusses at length the absolute mode of knowledge, and, with continual polemic against Fichte, who had not sufficiently risen above the empirical Ego, and hence, also, not to intellectual perception, extols this last. Nothing makes it obligatory to render this perception accessible to the weak: it consists in the placing of one’s self completely at one with the absolute, becoming the absolute, and thereby possessing a wholly immediate knowledge of the absolute. It is, therefore, far removed from that which Fichte discovers by the observation of his own inner action. Here, rather, one’s own action ceases. Hence also is Spinoza extolled, in opposition to Fichte, because he comes much nearer to apprehending the absolute as real unity, not as mere union, or synthesis. In the absolute everything is absolute, perfect, eternal; exists in it as Idea. Hence is it also a misapprehension to suppose that philosophy has to deduce the particular, to construe the animal, the plant, etc.; rather does it show that, and why, the universe must be thought in the form of the plant, in the form of the animal, etc. So little does philosophy construe the particular, that for it what is called particular has, rather, no existence. What is called the real world must, in the construction of the universe, be given up; so far is philosophy removed from construing the real. As regards terminology it is noteworthy that here, similarly as in Spinoza (vid. 272), the word God is not used to designate the entire absolute, but the one phenomenal form of it, so that the construing of the infinite into the finite gives nature, of the finite into the infinite, God. The copies of the two are, then, phenomenal nature and the Ideas; but nature and God are absoluteness of form and of essence in eternal interpenetration. The dissertations in the Neue Zeitschrift are, apart from the critical reflections on the world-structure, also interesting because they show how far modifications of his philosophy of nature in individual points permit of the retention of the standpoint as a whole. Where he has abandoned this itself—on this point Schelling has expressed himself in the supplementary paragraphs to the second edition of the Ideas (1803). With the Bruno connects itself, not as a supplement, but as a justification, the work: Philosophy and Religion (1804), occasioned by the
fact that Eschenmayer, in a work to be mentioned later (vid. § 319, 3) would allow the System of Identity, the most perfect exposition of which he saw in the Bruno, to be regarded as only a part of the knowledge of truth, and, further, missed in it the proof of why the particular potencies acquired reality, the potencies now having the appearance of mere accidentality. Schelling, now, attempts in this work chiefly to overthrow these two positions, and hence, in the first place, to show that the holy does not transcend the eternal, nor religion philosophy, nor God the absolute, which must of course so appear to those who know no other philosophy than the dogmatic or critical, of which the former (categorically) conceives the absolute as the neither-nor of oppositions, the latter (hypothetically) only as the combination of them. True philosophy (Spinoza and the System of Identity), on the other hand, which is in this regard analogous to the disjunctive syllogism, wholly denies this opposition, conceives the absolute as being ideal by its real-being and vice versa, hence also is an immediate apprehension, intellectual intuition, from which Fichte’s mediated apprehension is far removed. More important, because here are recognisable the first traces of the later doctrine of Schelling, is the treatment of the second problem set before himself by Schelling, the derivation of finite things from the absolute. Both dualism and emanationism are rejected, and it is laid down as the only possible view, that the things contained in the absolute only as a possibility come into existence by an act of self-realization not to be explained by means of that, but only by means of themselves; hence by a falling-away or estrangement from the absolute which is connected with the highest problems of practical philosophy. This act of freedom, upon the meaning of which no one has thrown a clearer light than Fichte, realizes what, regarded as a separation from the only true being, nothing is, and hence produces only what is null, which stands in the infinite series of finite causes and effects. To make, with Fichte, this nothing, converted into Egohood, the principle of philosophy, means to found philosophy upon the Fall of man, whereas true philosophy sees in that fall only the, no doubt, inevitable, falling-away, which in itself is nothing, and hence lapses into the null, the non-absolute. When Leibnitz conceived the sensible world as confused idea, he had indeed a certain presentiment of the truth; but he did