Library of Philosophy.

EDITED BY J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A.

ERDMANN'S
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
VOL. II.
THE LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Library of Philosophy is in the first instance a contribution to the History of Thought. While much has been done in England in tracing the course of evolution in nature, history, religion, and morality, comparatively little has been done in tracing the development of thought upon these and kindred subjects, and yet "the evolution of opinion is part of the whole evolution."

This Library will deal mainly with Modern Philosophy, partly because Ancient Philosophy has already had a fair share of attention in this country through the labours of Grote, Ferrier, and others, and more recently through translations from Zeller; partly because the Library does not profess to give a complete history of thought.

By the co-operation of different writers in carrying out this plan, it is hoped that a completeness and thoroughness of treatment otherwise unattainable will be secured. It is believed, also, that from writers mainly English and American fuller consideration of English Philosophy than it has hitherto received from the great German Histories of Philosophy may be looked for. In the departments of Ethics, Economics, and Politics, for instance, the contributions of English writers to the common stock of theoretic discussion have been especially valuable, and these subjects will accordingly have special prominence in this undertaking.

Another feature in the plan of the Library is its arrangement according to subjects rather than authors and dates, enabling the writers to follow out and exhibit in a way hitherto unattempted the results of the logical development of particular lines of thought.

The historical portion of the Library is divided into two sections, of which the first contains works upon the development of particular schools of Philosophy, while the second exhibits the history of theory in particular departments. There will also be a third series, which will contain original and independent contributions to Philosophy.

To these has been added, by way of Introduction to the whole Library, an English translation of Erdmann's "History of Philosophy," long since recognised in Germany as the best.

J. H. MUIRHEAD,
General Editor.
INTRODUCTION:—

The History of Philosophy. By Dr. J. E. Erdmann.


LIST OF WORKS IN PREPARATION.

FIRST SERIES:—

Early Idealism: Descartes to Leibnitz. By W. L. Courtney, M.A., Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrew's), Fellow of New College, Oxford.

German Idealists: Kant to Hegel. By Wm. Wallace, M.A., Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford.

Modern Realists: Herbert, Lotze, &c. By Andrew Seth, M.A., Professor of Logic and English Literature, University of St. Andrew's.

Sensationalists: Locke to Mill. By W. S. Hough, Ph.M., Assistant Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, University of Minnesota, U.S.A.

The Ethics of Idealism: Kant and Hegel. By Henry Jones, M.A., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, University College, Bangor.

The Utilitarians: Hume to Contemporary Writers. By W. K. Sorley, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Professor of Philosophy in University College, Cardiff.

Moral Sense Writers: Shaftesbury to Martineau. By William Knight, M.A., Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Andrew's, N.B.

Principle of Evolution in its Scientific and Philosophical Aspects: By John Watson, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Queen's College, Kingston, Canada.

SECOND SERIES:—


Philosophy and Economics in their Historical Relations. By J. Bonar, M.A., LL.D.


The Development of Rational Theology since Kant. By Professor Otto Pfleiderer, of Berlin.

THIRD SERIES:—

The Theory of Ethics. By Edward Caird, I.L.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.


ERDMANN'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

NOTICES OF THE PRESS.

"A SPLENDID monument of patient labour, critical acumen, and admirable methodical treatment. . . . It is not too much to predict that, for the library of the savant, for the academical student, whose business it is to be primed in the wisdom of the ages, and for the literary dilettante, who is nothing if not well up in 'things that everybody ought to know,' these volumes will at once become a necessity for purposes, at least, of reference, if not of actual study. . . . We possess nothing that can bear any comparison with it in point of completeness."—Pall Mall Gazette.

"It is not necessary to speak of the great merits of Erdmann's History of Philosophy. Its remarkable clearness and comprehensiveness are well known. . . . The translation is a good, faithful rendering, and in some parts even reaches a high literary level."—Professor JOHN WATSON, in The Week, of Canada.

"It is matter of real congratulation, in the dearth still of original English or American work over the whole field of historical philosophy, that by the side of the one important German compend of this generation, the other, so well fitted to serve as its complement, is now made accessible to the English-speaking student."—Mind.

"It has been long known, highly esteemed, and in its successive editions has sought to make itself more worthy of the success it has justly achieved. Erdmann's work is excellent. His history of mediaeval philosophy especially deserves attention and praise for its comparative fulness and its admirable scholarship. . . . It must prove a valuable and much-needed addition to our philosophical works."—Scotsman.

"The combination of qualities necessary to produce a work of the scope and grade of Erdmann's is rare. Industry, accuracy, and a fair degree of philosophic understanding may give us a work like Ueberweg's; but Erdmann's history, while in no way superseding Ueberweg's as a hand book for general use, yet occupies a different position. Erdmann wrote his book, not as a reference book, to give in brief compass a digest of the writings of various authors, but as a genuine history of philosophy, tracing in a genetic way the development of thought in its treatment of philosophic problems. Its purpose is to develop philosophic intelligence rather than to furnish information. When we add that, to the successful execution of this intention, Erdmann unites a minute and exhaustive knowledge of philosophic sources at first hand, equalled over the entire field of philosophy probably by no other one man, we are in a condition to form some idea of the value of the book. To the student who wishes, not simply a general idea of the course of philosophy, nor a summary of what this and that man has said, but a somewhat detailed knowledge of the evolution of thought, and of what this and the other writer have contributed to it, Erdmann is indispensable; there is no substitute."—Professor JOHN DEWEY, in The Andover Review.

"It is a work that is at once compact enough for the ordinary student, and full enough for the reader of literature. . . . At once systematic and interesting."—Journal of Education.

"The translation into English of Erdmann's History of Philosophy is an important event in itself, and in the fact that it is the first installment of an undertaking of great significance for the study of philosophy in this country. Apart, however, from its relation to the Library to which it is to serve as an introduction, the translation of Erdmann's History of Philosophy is something for which the English student ought to be thankful. . . . A History of past endeavours, achievements, and failures cannot but be of great use to the student. Such a History, able, competent, trustworthy, we have now in our hands, adequately and worthily rendered into our mother-tongue."—Spectator.
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

JOHANN EDUARD ERDMANN
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Halle

ENGLISH TRANSLATION
EDITED BY

WILLISTON S. HOUGH, PH.L.M
Assistant Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Minnesota

IN THREE VOLUMES.—VOL. II

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

SECOND EDITION

LONDON:
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO
NEW YORK: MACMILLAN & CO
1891
PREFACE TO VOLUME SECOND.

The part of the History of Philosophy of which the present volume treats I attempted to present in an extended work, the first division of which appeared thirty-three years ago, and was separated from the last division by a space of twenty years. I may be permitted to say something respecting the relation in which the present, probably my last published work, stands to that earlier, which was my first. That it is a very different one, part by part, every one will readily understand, who considers that the first division of the larger work was written when its author had reached his fourth climacteric year, the last division, when he had reached the seventh, and that now, when he is approaching the ninth, he must naturally find the first to be more remote and foreign than the last. In fact, although still firmly convinced to-day, as I was when I began my youthful work, that the history of modern philosophy begins with Descartes, that its first period, the philosophy of the seventeenth century, is pantheistic, its second, that of the eighteenth, anti-pantheistic or individualistic, that the latter, however, develops in two opposite directions, which terminate in the French sensationalist and the German rationalist Enlightenment,—I am nevertheless so dissatisfied with the way these thoughts are worked out in my earlier book, have vexed myself so often with the review of the same, that, although a father does not easily cast off his first-born child, and I hence have sought to save as much as possible of what was there said, I confessed to myself when the first twenty sheets of this volume were ready, that they would have been easier for me to prepare had I not myself treated of this period before,
and now, besides the study of the philosophers themselves, had only such expositions of their doctrines before me as had been given to the public since the appearance of my work. That among these I had in mind especially the expositions of Kuno Fischer, every attentive reader of my book will perceive. To avoid misconceptions, I note that I was able to use the second edition of Fischer's splendid work only on Cartesianism. When the Spinozism appeared in the altered exposition, my manuscript was already in the hands of the printer.

It was quite otherwise with regard to the third period. With the exposition of this period, which I gave in the last two-volume part of my larger work, and which also appeared under the special title, Entwicklung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant, I am still in entire fundamental agreement. In this case it was not so much a question of saying something quite different from what I had said before; it was only necessary to say it much more concisely. A résumé of my own book, which should compress into twenty sheets what originally filled nearly a hundred, I could the more readily permit myself to give, as that work—à confession very painful to my literary vanity—belongs to those silent and forgotten ones, which have not even called forth a review, much less can flatter themselves that they are well known. The abridgment, however, made it necessary to omit all citations, and this circumstance may explain the frequent reference to my larger work, where the citations are to be found.

The explanation that I am still in entire agreement with what was said in the Entwicklung der deutschen Speculation might really have excused me, if I had closed my exposition with § 330. My honoured friend and publisher would probably have been rendered a service, if the second volume had contained precisely as many leaves as the first. Nevertheless, I regarded myself as in duty bound to add an appendix of upwards of ten sheets, which, if the worth of a piece of work were estimated according to the labour it involved, would be decidedly the best in my book. But I now regard it as the
least rounded and complete part. In the entire absence, however, of predecessors, it was not possible for me to give more than I have given. Some years ago a brilliant writer, to whom I complained that no one had undertaken to write the history of this part of modern philosophy, said that he believed that he could do it, but that he was too lazy. He did not attempt it, and has now passed away. No other has undertaken it, and so I have made a feeble beginning. To the critic, who complains that I have not characterized, indeed not even named, this or that philosopher, or this or that book, I reply, not with the proud consciousness that I have done it well, but with perfect sincerity, because I wish, so long as I live, that it may be done, "Do it better."

Without altering the economy of this work, there could be added to this appendix, as a second, an exposition of French philosophy in the nineteenth century, and as a third, one of English. If these Outlines should ever find French or English translators, it would properly be their matter to supply these additions. Yet again, did its author retain enough of the sanguine hope of youth to persuade himself that his work would see new editions, and had he by that time acquired a sufficient knowledge of the latest French and English philosophy to write instructively respecting it, he would himself promise two such appendixes for the future. Since, however, the first condition will hardly be realized, and the second as yet is certainly wanting, he may be allowed for the present to send forth an appeal to German, French, and English scholars to communicate any information respecting the latest important phenomena in the philosophical worlds of those two peoples, and thus fill a void in our literature, which we feel only too keenly. The more he himself has come to know the difficulties which beset such a work, the greater will be the appreciation with which he, at least, will greet every contribution towards it.

J. E. ERDMANN.

1866.
Here also, as in the case of the first volume, the preface which accompanied this volume at its appearance is reprinted without alteration, and the present preface will speak only of the differences of the two editions. The designation of the present edition not only, like the second edition of the first volume, as "revised," but as much "enlarged," was rendered necessary by the fact that three-fourths of the additions made—six sheets of the earlier print—belong to the second volume. They will, I think, moderate, if not do away with, some of the criticisms received. The consideration which Hermes, Bolzano, Windischmann, Molitor, Beckers, Deutinger and Wilhelm Rosenkrantz have received will show that my confession has not prevented me from attentively observing the philosophical movements within the Catholic world. That I have attempted to do more justice to Beneke, Fortlage, F. A. Lange and Czolbe than heretofore, should appease those who complained that I pass hastily over everything which differs widely from my own standpoint. And again, may the completely opposite stricture, that, oddly enough, precisely those whose views I more nearly share are treated too briefly by me, be silenced, now that Von Fichte and Kuno Fischer are considered so much more fully than before. Further additions were made necessary by the fact that those who had once been taken up in my book could rightly demand that it should now be said what they had done since its first appearance. This is particularly true of one who I have just heard to-day has been taken from us, Leopold Schmid. It is also the case with George, Tredelenburg, Fechner, and Lotze. Finally, additions could not be omitted, where new names had made themselves known.

I know that what has been added will not satisfy all. I must beg critics, however, to pay more regard in the present instance than is generally done to the purpose, ability, and freedom of its author. Yes, to his purpose! For, when the "Appendix" promises expressly an exposition of "German Philosophy since Hegel," and a complaint is raised against the
author in France because he has totally ignored the French; or one arises from the theological quarter, because neither the conflict with the Ultramontanists nor that between the different critical schools is mentioned, both seem to me an encroachment upon the liberty, in virtue of which I myself alone determined my theme. In like manner, I of course grant every connoisseur the right to expel me as incompetent from the circle of expounders of the history of philosophy. If he allows me to remain within, however, then it is unjust to expect a giant’s labour from a dwarf. In justice he can only ask, “What, according to his powers, has the man accomplished? Has he spared trouble and labour to make it easy for himself?” And these questions will not cause me to blush. Finally, however, I should like to remind the reader who demands more, that what is free to the author of a new book, he frequently cannot do with a new edition. His book is no longer his; he shares the property with the publisher.

When the latter, as mine has done, makes no inconsiderable sacrifices in order to keep the work as accessible to his circle of readers as it has been hitherto, he has a right to demand that this should not be made too difficult for him. The position of the author, however, who together with these requirements is at the same time besieged with the requests of friends, to be sure not to leave this or that out of the new edition, is too much like steering between Scylla and Charybdis not to be uncomfortable. For more than a year I have had to think, day after day, how what I would like and was able to do could be harmonized with what I felt free to do. Now that the passage is made, and I am happy that I can go my way without stopped ears, it would be cruel to remind me by criticisms of that painful conflict. Spare me, then, reader, and follow for my benefit the words of a better than I, with which I close:

Vive, vale! Si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti; si non, his utere mecum!

Halle, 1869. 

J. E. ERDMANN.
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

If in the case of the worst, indeed of quite unheard-of crimes, the open confession of the accused is taken as a ground for mitigating the punishment, why in the case of a misdeed, which is surely bad enough, but against which, on account of its frequency, our sense has become blunted, may the culprit not also hope for this benefit of the law: in the case, namely, where one has had printed what is worthless? That this is his case, the author of the present work confesses, not indeed respecting his entire second volume—he is still too proud for that—but respecting the last eleven sheets of the same, precisely the part which has cost him the most trouble and labour. While my exposition of the history of modern philosophy down to the death of Hegel, and that part of the Appendix which treats of the dissolution of the Hegelian school, has to my eyes gained in completeness and proportion with each new edition, and now in view of what I have added to the earlier treatment on Spinoza, on Clarke at Zimmermann’s instigation, on Adam Smith, on Kant, on Gruppe and others, the third edition pleases me much better than the first and second, it has gone just the opposite way with what the last five sections contain. I myself was most nearly satisfied when eleven years ago I attempted for the first time to delineate contemporary philosophy for the reading public; already much less satisfied, when three years later the second edition was printed; to-day even the most angry critic cannot be more convinced than I am myself, that what I give does not meet the demands which one may make of such a delineation. This is not, however, inexplicable. Already in the first edition, I had admitted, in § 343, that I was not able to study thoroughly all the philosophical works that then appeared. And at that time whole movements which control the present, such, for example, as I recently heard called the brochure-philosophy, had not arisen. And to-day? Only the lack of predecessors and coadjutors remains. For although I at once acknowledge
with thanks that I have obtained fruitful suggestions from the
critical characterizations of special lines by Von Hartmann,
Vaihinger and others, I have nevertheless always had first
to weld these works, like single reviews, into a whole, in order
to see how those of different opinions judged of the writers
which I had considered. Only a single book that gives in its
title contemporaneous philosophy as its sole subject has fallen
in my way. I cannot say, however, that it has helped me
much, much less that its author seems to me to be he whom
my preface to the first edition has conjured up by its exorcism,
“Do it better”!

Under these circumstances, it will readily be believed that
when it was announced to me that the second edition was sold
out, the pleasure of a third was quite destroyed by the thought
of the “Appendix.” I said to myself that if my book was
to be complete in itself and evenly worked out, one of two
things must be done, neither of which it was free to me to
do. Either I could—and I thought of this seriously for
some time—combine the first part of the Appendix, the dis-
solution of the Hegelian School, under some such title as
the “Reception and Fate of the Hegelian System,” with
the exposition of this system, and thus incorporate it into
the book itself, which would then, since the second half of
the Appendix would be suppressed, appear without supple-
ment. I recollected, however, that I did not occupy in
reference to the public the free position of an author who
laid a new work before it; that to those of my readers to
whom precisely this part was most important, an injustice
would be done if they did not find in the new edition what
above all they wished to know, namely whether I to-day judged
of the phenomena which were wholly new eight years ago, as
I did then; how I viewed the latest, etc. Or I might attempt,
so far as my powers were adequate to the task, to describe
the events since Hegel with completeness. Then the Appen-
dix to my Outlines would become a third volume; and this was
forbidden me by a second obligation, that namely which rests
upon one who does not write a new book, but revises an old one—to consult the publisher’s interest. This straitened position, to which my preface to the second edition alluded, and which even then poisoned the pleasure of a new edition; has turned my pleasure at this third edition, as already said, to disgust. For I have not concealed from myself for a moment that the public has a right to demand more than I have here given. This explains the fact that I have confined myself to those writers who were already referred to in the earlier editions; when, however, these have since that time rewritten earlier works, or published new ones, I have of course given an account of the same. This is the case with Lange, Strauss, Czolbe, Von Fichte, Wilhelm Rosenkrantz, Von Hartmann, Ulrici, Fechner, Lotze, and others. New names I have either entirely passed over, or only mentioned in order to indicate the place which I assign to their bearers. The exception I have made in the case of Dühring is the result, not merely of the latest events, which have reminded many of what the Vaudois—then subject to Berne—said to Voltaire: “Vous avez écrit contre le bon Dieu; c’est fort mal, mais Il vous le pardonnera. Vous avez écrit contre Jésus Christ; c’est pis encore, mais Il vous le pardonnera. Mais n’écrivez pas contre Leurs Excellences, Elles ne vous le pardonneraient jamais.” That with such disproportionate treatment no good, indeed no tolerable, book can result, goes without saying. My work does not wish to pass for such. It professes to give nothing more than a collection of material, or rather, only a contribution towards such a collection, which might assist any one who undertook actually to characterize all the philosophical works of the last three or four decades. May the judges of what I have done not fail to bear this in mind, and accept it as an extenuating circumstance.

Bad Vichy,
27th Aug., 1877.

J. E. ERDMANN.
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MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 258.

In spite of its breach with the Middle Ages, and of its opposition to them, the modern world is still characteristically Christian. Christianity, indeed, no longer consists in being spiritually minded, i.e., in enmity to the world. Instead of this, it now requires that man, while living altogether in the world, should also live an inner and altogether spiritual life. The solution of this problem is found in the transformation of the world by Christianity, i.e., by the new spirit (of reconciliation, vid. § 118). This spiritualizing of the world implies at once a positive and a negative relation towards it, so that modern thinkers have fallen heir to the problems which Antiquity and the Middle Ages had to face. In the period of transition, pagan love of the world, or worldly-mindedness, appeared side by side with the hatred of the world, or unworldliness, that characterized the Middle Ages. This is not what is looked for now. Man is to overcome the world. He is no longer to be merely worldly-minded: he is to be that, and something more than that. This problem transcends the two earlier ones by combining them. Its solution lies in finding satisfaction in a world born of the Spirit.

§ 259.

peared 1865–69, in which the first two are thoroughly revised, and the
next two [Kant] but little altered. The fifth (1869) goes as far as
Fichte inclusive; the sixth, which treats of Schelling, gives his biography
in the first book (1872). [Later editions of Fischer's works have since
appeared. Munich, Basserann.—Ed.].—Chr. A. Thilo: Kurze prag-
matische Geschichteder neueren Philosophie. Cöthen, 1874.

In accordance with the character of the different epochs, modern philosophy has to rise above the philosophical wisdom
of the ancients and the theological wisdom of the Middle
Ages. No theories will meet the requirements of modern times,
nor deserve the name of philosophy (vid. § 4), except such as
recognise both the here, or real, of antiquity, and the hereafter,
or ideal, of the Middle Ages, and attempt to reconcile the two.
Any system which left one of these sides out of account, or
which did not admit that there was a point where the two
coincided, would cease to be philosophical. And the differ-
eence between systems depends upon the different manner in
which these two sides are conceived of (as extension and
thought, as nature and spirit, as real and rational, etc.), and in
a special degree upon the different methods of reconciling
them. In the latter lies the main feature, and, therefore, the
real principle of any system of modern philosophy. In the
period of transition from the Middle Ages, there appeared
side by side the philosophers who forgot God, and the mystics
who despised the world. They showed where the point was
to be founded from which both natural and supernatural knowl-
edge are seen to be subordinate and partial aspects of a
whole. For the Microcosmos of the former, and the Micro-
theos or, “God in miniature,” of Böhme, is man, whose
function is to introduce thoughts of God into the world,
to lead it to God. When philosophy becomes knowl-
geledge of man, it does more than merely transcend the
one-sidedness of knowledge of the Cosmos, and of knowl-
geledge of God; it now for the first time corresponds to
our idea of it (vid. §§ 2 and 3). Henceforth the path that
philosophy follows is not to reach self by starting from the
world or from God, but to start from self and find one's way
back to a world and to God.

§ 260.

If the mind is to find satisfaction in a world of its own con-
struction, it must begin by destroying that which it finds in
existence, in order to make room for the new and to get material in the ruins of the old. The modern era accordingly begins with a denial of the existing order of things, and a protest against it. This protest, in the various spheres in which it makes itself felt, is limited by that without which the sphere itself would be impossible; but in no sphere is it the ultimate end, everywhere it is only a means towards reconstruction. That organization followed immediately upon this protest, is therefore not an inconsistency, but just the true and logical result.

§ 261.

Accordingly in the Church, where it was first definitely expressed, this protest did not extend to the validity of Holy Scripture. Rather, the revelation there given, as the germ of Church doctrine, was acknowledged to be unassailable. The protest was directed solely against what had been added to it. Such a course cannot be called incomplete. Nor is there anything inconsistent in the fact that so soon after the protest had found expression, an orthodoxy was developed resting upon creeds, and maintaining all the decisions of the Ecumenical Councils. For, henceforth, they are binding, not because they are decisions of Councils, but because they are according to Scripture. The individual repeats within himself the process by which the κατάγωγον passed into the δόγμα (vid. § 131). Thus he really admits only what he has himself made (out of the message of salvation), and therefore what he maintains is not the old dogma, but a freshly formed one. Within these limits, demanded by the nature of the case, the protest was directed against everything that was characteristic of the Roman Catholic Church in its existing condition. In the first place, then, it was directed against everything in which the Church had secularized itself, or by which it had become Jewish or pagan (vid. § 179). With the Jewish hierarchy and salvation by works, were contrasted the priesthood of all believers, and justification by faith alone. The levity and the carnal mind, which admitted the children of the world into the Church, and taught men to deify things of sense, were opposed by the seriousness that demanded a Church consisting solely of priests, and by the ideal conception, according to which salvation is present, not in the actual sensible object, but in its being consumed (i.e.,
annihilated), so that it becomes not bread and wine, but flesh and blood (in him who enjoys it). Similarly, it was directed in the second place, against everything in which the now dreaded Church had opposed itself to the rational and justifiable interests of the world (vid. supra, § 227). The fact that Luther married and set up a household, was the most daring protest against monastic vows; and it was one of his greatest acts of reformation. For he did not, like so many modern heroes of the faith, become a Reformer in order that he might marry. It was rather the other way.

§ 262.

If we turn now to the State, we find that the pressure of the Church from above, and the independence of the great vassals beneath, had prevented it from attaining sovereign power. The revolt against the authority of the Church and the subjugation of the vassals,—both the work, for the most part, of the same princes,—mark the breach with the existing state of affairs, the protest directed against it. The purely negative character of this task makes the men that perform it wear an aspect that is almost diabolical. In place of the time-honoured powers there is all at once set up another, and that a power which is a direct product of the human mind. This is politics, which, just because it is a thing of the mind, appears to be more powerful than what have hitherto been regarded as realities—the Church, privileges of birth, chartered rights, and which has therefore justly earned the name of the modern fate. In form, this new power is an idea, a work of the mind; what it really signifies, is the sovereignty of the State. For the guiding principles of the great exponents of politics,—the great English queen and the still greater French minister,—are, in foreign affairs, the balance of power, and at home, absolute monarchy, before which everything, even the monarch himself, must bow.

§ 263.

Lastly, we come to the relation between Church and State. In classical times religion had been looked upon as entirely national, and entirely an affair of the State. In the Middle Ages the condition of things was completely reversed, and a situation arose which is very aptly described by the term “Church-State.” This latter was in turn found inadequate;
and the demand for an absolute separation of the two spheres was the protest against what had hitherto been in vogue. This purely negative attitude sufficed only for a short time. In theory and in practice the entirely novel idea of a national Church and a national episcopate asserted its supremacy over men's minds. Here, too, just as in purely ecclesiastical and purely civil life, the (negative) protest against the existing state of affairs received its (positive) completion in the impulse to organize. If the principle of protest be called Protestantism, and if the application of the word be extended beyond the sphere of religion, the modern spirit which breaks with the past, may be called Protestantism. But since this negative activity everywhere has as a complement, the positive impulse towards reconstruction, the first period of the modern era may fitly be called the period of organization.
FIRST

PERIOD OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: PANTHEISM.

§ 264.

INTRODUCTION.

Men's minds were so much occupied with the work, that they were not at once conscious of the sense in which, and the principle on which, organization was proceeding. It was not until the seventeenth century that philosophy formulated what had been a motive of action as early as the sixteenth. When dogma was being once more established, no question was asked, save what the sacred spirit predominant in the community said ("nostri docent"); where the individual appealed to the powerful (individual) spirit within him, Luther would have none of it. Further, in politics nothing was heard of save the good of the State, or the general weal; to such an extent was this the case, that the well-being of every individual, even of the king and his minister, was sacrificed to the well-being of the whole. Finally, the constitution of the Church, in the spirit of the strictest territorialism, delegated rights only to the national Church, and none to individual communities or individual persons; people were not allowed even to wear hats according to their own taste. For all these reasons the only general maxim to which the philosophy of the seventeenth century could give expression, was to pay no heed to the individual. In other words, it was bound to exhibit that tendency which is called pantheistic because most of those who took account only of the whole or the all, have called this whole God. If that word is to be avoided, and if such new names as Totalism, Pantism, or Universism are not to be employed, it may be expressed otherwise by saying that in this period systems of
Substance were of necessity set up in which truth and value was assigned only to that from which the individual springs as from its substance. The maxim just referred to, dominated the philosophy of antiquity, and accordingly, though we cannot call the first period of modern philosophy a complete return to this, we may say that it is a repetition of it in a higher form. Nor need we be surprised that it culminates in a man who, brought up in pre-Christian beliefs, has so many points in common on the speculative side of his thought with the pre-Christian theories of Parmenides and the anti-Christian views of Averroës and Giordano Bruno, and on its practical side with Hobbes, who deified the world.

§ 265.

In respect of what has so far been stated as characteristic of modern systems, no difference will be found between the first of the series and the others. Like all systems of the modern era, it will contain the two sides that require to be reconciled, and the point that has been already indicated as the principal one. And further, like all systems of the first period, the earliest of them will exhibit a tendency towards pantheism. On the other hand, it will be distinguished from all the rest. For, as the first and therefore the farthest from the end, it will keep the two sides as far apart as possible, or, to put it differently, will be more distinctly dualistic than any of them. If, however, in this respect it falls behind the more advanced position of the others, there is a fourth point in regard to which it will prove itself superior. For, as the "epoch-making" system, it will have to give expression to the protest that marks the breach with the past. And in this case the protest does not find, as it did in the particular spheres mentioned above, limits which it cannot assail; it will appear as a protest against everything hitherto regarded as valid. We shall see that all the features enumerated in this section are found only in one system—that which Descartes propounded; and this is a clear proof that with that system any account of the history of modern philosophy must necessarily begin.
FIRST DIVISION.

Descartes and his School.


§ 266.

Descartes' Life and Writings.

René Descartes was born on March 31st, 1596, at La Haye in the province of Touraine. To distinguish himself from the older members of the family, he took the surname of Perron, from an estate which he afterwards inherited. In Latin he appears as Renatus Cartesius, but he himself always objected strongly to the Latinizing of his family name. From his eighth to his eighteenth year he was educated at the Jesuit College of La Flèche, recently founded by Henry IV. The study of poetry, mathematics, and philosophy resulted in his falling into the scepticism that was so common among the cultured men of his day; and during a considerable period, he entirely eschewed scientific pursuits. For a while he gave himself up altogether to aristocratic accomplishments and amusements, especially gaming. Even then, however, his theoretical cast of mind asserted itself. Not only did he fence, but he also composed a treatise on the art of fencing. This dissipation, which belongs to the period of his first stay in Paris, lasted only a short time. Then Descartes suddenly vanished from the circle of his acquaintances, and for two years led the life of a recluse in the very heart of Paris. The conviction that he would attain to a knowledge of the true nature of man, not in solitude, but amid the stir of the world, led him to volunteer for military service. At first he entered the army of the Netherlands. While the troops were in winter quarters at Breda, he made the acquaintance of the mathematician Beeckmann through the solution of a mathematical problem; and for him he wrote at this time (1618) his *Compendium musicæ*. Leaving Holland, he entered the Bavarian and then the Imperial service, and took part in several campaigns during the Thirty Years' War. From his school-days
he had been accustomed to treat geometrical problems algebraically and vice versa; and the good results which had flowed from this, suggested to him the idea that a combination of the logical method with the two former might prove helpful to all branches of knowledge. This method he afterwards called the deductive, meaning by that, something very different from the syllogistic process which adds nothing to our knowledge. The first glimpse of it, and, therefore, of the first principles of the fundamental science or mathesis universalis, of which he speaks later, was the great discovery of November 10th, 1619, which he made at Neuburg in Germany. This was the decisive point in his career. Henceforward the unalterable purpose of his life was to treat, first the other sciences and then philosophy according to this new method, which is at once analytic and synthetic, inasmuch as effects are explained by causes, causes demonstrated by effects. He now gave up military life, and returned for a time to Paris. After setting his affairs in order and selling his estates, he spent several years more in travel, visiting, among other places, the shrine of Our Lady of Loretto, to which he had vowed to make a pilgrimage, if he saw light amid his doubts. Then he left his native country and retired to Holland. During his residence there, he lived in thirteen different places, including Franeker, Amsterdam, Utrecht, and Leyden. His correspondence with France was carried on through Père Mersenne, the friend of his school-days at La Flèche, and the only man in the country who knew his place of abode. From his letters we can see that immediately after his settlement abroad, he began to busy himself with a work which bears the title of Le Monde, and in which the theory of light was to play an important part. The year 1633 was mentioned to his friend as the probable date of its completion. The condemnation of Galileo by the Pope alarmed the author, whose whole "philosophy," i.e. physical science, depended upon the motion of the earth. At first he talked of destroying the work, and, though he afterwards gave up this idea, he would never consent to its publication. Instead of it there appeared in quarto, at Leyden in 1638, the Essais Philosophiques, which were finished in June, 1637. Here, in the Discours de la Méthode, he gives a sketch of the long-sought-for science universelle, or mathesis universalis, through which, as he writes in April, 1637, to a friend of Mersenne (Epist. ed. Elzev. i., 110),
with the help of experience, one would be in a position to decide everything. To this treatise are appended three others, which he himself calls examples of its application. Of these, he tells us, the *Dioptric*—a part of his *Monde*—deals with mathematical physics, the *Meteors* with pure physics, and the *Geometry* with pure mathematics. All these four treatises have had a most important effect on the development of science; the first and the last have been epoch-making. Although the work appeared anonymously, every one knew who the author was, more especially as he was mentioned by name in the very flattering Privilege from the King. Accordingly the Latin translation, which was executed in 1643 by Etienne de Courcelles, and which does not contain the *Geometry*, bears the title: *Renati Cartesii specimina philosophica*. In 1641 there followed: *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, written in Latin, and really his most important work. Before being printed, this was communicated to several men of learning, and their objections, together with the replies of Descartes, were printed and laid before the public along with the original work. There were six sets of objections; the seventh, those of Père Bourdin, did not appear until the second edition. This great work was first translated into French in 1647 by the Duke of Luynes, then by Clereslier, and lastly by Fède. It was followed in the year 1644 by the *Principia philosophiae*, also written in Latin, and translated into French by the Abbé Picot in 1647. Of the four parts of these *Principia*, the first, as Descartes himself says, repeats in a more exact form the thoughts of the *Meditations*. Lastly, in 1646: *Traité des Passions de l'Ame* was written out for the Princess Elizabeth of the Palatinate, with whom Descartes was very intimate at the Hague; but it was not till 1649 that it was published, at the urgent request of a friend. Immediately after the author's death, a Latin version was brought out by Elzevir. Summoned by Queen Christine of Sweden to her court, Descartes was with difficulty persuaded to comply with the request. The climate, the life, and especially the constraint, which was such a contrast to the perfect independence he had hitherto enjoyed, did not suit him. He fell ill, and died on the 11th of February, 1650. After his death, two works were published from the papers he had left behind him: *De l'Homme* and: *Traité de la Formation du Fœtus* (Paris, 1664, 4to). The former of these treatises is merely a part of
Le Monde, ou Traité de la Lumière, edited in 1664 by an unauthorized hand, and much more correctly by Clerelier in 1667. In this we have, at least in outline, the work with which Descartes began his literary activity. Before it appeared, Clerelier had edited the Letters of Descartes in three volumes (1657–67), a Latin translation of which was soon afterwards published by Elzevir at Amsterdam. The same publisher also brought out in 1701: Renati Descartes Opera posthuma mathematica et physica, which included Regulae ad directionem ingenii, a work belonging probably to an earlier period. Of these Rules, originally intended to consist of three books, there exist only the first and second, the latter of which is incomplete. In all probability they were composed in French. On the other hand, the Inquisitio veritatis, a dialogue, likewise unfinished, seems to have been written in Latin. All the writings mentioned are contained in the Latin quarto edition, published in nine volumes by Elzevir in 1713, as well as in the French octavo edition in eleven volumes, which Cousin had published by Levraut, at Paris (1824–26). The latter has the merit of giving the Letters in chronological order. As these letters, as well as the works of Descartes, were written partly in French and partly in Latin, those who wish to read his writings in the original, must use both editions. In 1859 Count Foucher de Careil began to publish from manuscripts of Leibnitz: Œuvres inédites de Descartes, containing youthful writings which were supposed to have been lost. [Completed in 1860, Paris.—Ed.]

§ 267.

Descartes' Doctrines.

1. The sceptical doctrines of Montaigne and Charron had fallen into the intellectual life of France like a fruitful seed. In religiously disposed minds, such as that of Mersenne, the result was a sceptically-tinged toleration towards all philosophical views, which was quite compatible with a decided attitude on theological questions. Most men, however, had developed a much more thorough-going scepticism, which made Mersenne lament over the general and wide-spread atheism. If we suppose that Descartes experienced similar attacks of scepticism, which disturbed him in what gave him
most delight,—research and knowledge,—his attempt to rid himself of doubt by refuting it, becomes intelligible. Both the Discourse on Method and the Meditations, as well as the beginning of the first part of the Principia, contain this train of reasoning in almost identical language.—The senses often deceive us, and accordingly we cannot trust them. Further, we cannot depend unconditionally even upon reason, inasmuch as it is at least conceivable that it is of such a nature that its right use leads to error. Seeing that the only two sources of knowledge send forth such troubled waters, there is no course open to us, but to question everything that has hitherto been accepted as certain. It is evident that in the demand de omnibus dubitandum, of which Descartes expressly says, that it is not to be looked upon as being, in the interests of scepticism, the end, but only as the means of attaining the end, there is contained that protest against everything hitherto accepted, which in § 265 was emphasized as the fourth point that would be found in this epoch-making system. The fulfilment of that postulate levels the ground on which the new building is to be erected. But this is not all, for it appears that the "methodical doubt," as Cartesians called this absolute questioning, provides also the material for the new structure. For, however far I may carry the doubt, one fact remains irrefragable, nay, even becomes more certain the more I doubt, namely, that I, who doubt, exist (Medit. ii.). But, by the Ego which remains so irrefragably certain, must of course be understood, only the Ego that doubts, and so far as it doubts, or,—since doubt is only a species and form of thought,—the Ego that thinks. Cogito, ergo sum, then, is the one proposition which cannot be questioned, if we question everything. This proposition is not to be looked upon as a conclusion that might be drawn from the more general proposition, "Whatever thinks, exists." Rather, this general proposition could only be deduced from the certainty that in my Ego thinking and existing coincide, because my existence consists in thought only. That proposition, then, which for this very reason might equally well be stated as: Sum cogitans, sum dubitans, ego res cogitans sum, and so on, is not a deduction but a certainty intuitively perceived. Only because it is this, can it be employed, as we shall see shortly, as a basis for further deductions. For Descartes maintains, employing the very words of Aristotle (vid. supra, § 86, 4), that there are
certain ἀπλά which are beyond demonstration and definition, which are apprehended by absolutely clear intuition, and from which deductions are drawn (Règles pour la Direction de l'Esprit. Règle 12. Ed. Cousin, xi. p. 274). In contrast to the declaration of Sanchez: "The more I think; the more doubtful I become," Descartes says: "The more I doubt, the more I think, and the more certain I am of my existence." But it must never be forgotten, that I am only certain of my existence as a thinking being, not of my bodily existence. I am conscious of myself, as one whose existence consists solely in thinking (Disc. de la Méthode, ed. Cousin, i., p. 158), and accordingly the best way to apprehend one's own nature, i.e., that with the cessation of which one's own existence comes to an end, consists in doubting of the external world, for an intensification of this doubt intensifies the existence of the doubter. By the thought of which doubt is a form, Descartes understands, as he repeatedly declares, nothing but consciousness. That which is endowed with this, or the thinking subject, he call mens, animus, intellectus, ratio, and so on, expressions which we can hardly translate by any other word than "mind" (Princ. i., 8, 9, Medit. ii., p. 11, edit. iii., Elzev.). If the mind is thus certain of its own existence, the principle of all knowledge has been attained, the desired foundation has been discovered on which philosophy is to rest (Letter to Clerselier, ed. Elzev. i., 118, Méthod., ed. Cousin, i., p. 158). Everything which stands or falls with this certainty, which is as certain as that I myself exist, I must and therefore may regard as true. The proposition that nothing can be produced out of nothing, is so often treated by Descartes as being of this character, that Spinoza certainly did not misrepresent him when, in his account of the Cartesian philosophy, he declared that with the denial of this proposition the cogito ergo sum, too, falls to the ground. To say that the effect cannot contain more than the cause, is, the Schoolmen had already taught, merely a special application of this axiom; anything more would have to be produced out of nothing. Subsequently, as we shall see, use is made of this proposition, which is as incapable of being doubted as the proposition "I am."

2. Ego sum cogitans. Now, if we reflect upon what is contained in the individual processes of thought or consciousness, i.e., in the ideas, it becomes clear that an idea, being a copy, and therefore an effect of something, cannot possibly repre-
sent more than is contained in that something of which it is a copy. The *ideatum*, or original of the idea, must contain at least as much as is contained in the idea itself, possibly more; in the former case it contains *formaliter*, in the latter *eminenter*, what is contained in the idea *objective*, which in old mediaeval phraseology meant representatively (*Medit.* iii. p. 18, 19. *Rationes more geom. disp.* Def. 3 *Axiom.* 3–5). Instead of *objective*, some Cartesians say *repressative*, and others again *intentionaliter*. Some ideas, for example that of a doubting being, it is plain that I could have, even if I existed quite alone; they would be copies of myself, I myself should be their *ideatum*. But there is one idea which would in such a case be impossible, namely that of an infinite being. I cannot obtain this from myself, for I am finite. Nor can I, as some think, form it by abstraction from my own finitude, for all abstraction is negation; and consequently, though I may arrive by abstraction at the thought of a negative infinite, an *indefinitum* which is free from limitations of a sort, *e.g.* infinite space, I can never attain to the perfectly positive conception of the *infinitum*, or that which is free from all limitations, and of which the finite must rather be called the negative, as presupposing the idea of the infinite (*Princ.* i. 27. *Medit.* iii., p. 20, 21. *Respons. ad prim. object.*, p. 59). The mere existence of the idea of the infinite in us is a proof that there actually is an infinite being, or God, outside of us, who is at once the original and the author of that idea; inasmuch as He has implanted it in us, it is produced in us by His power (*Princ.* i., § 18. *Medit.* iii., p. 24). Just as from the existence of the idea of God in me I must conclude that God is, so too from my own existence I must conclude that there is a cause not merely of my having been created in the past, but also of my being created every moment (*Rat. mor. geom. disp. pr. ii., c. dem. Respons. ad prim. obj.*, p. 57). Such a cause would be necessary even if I had existed from all eternity, for without it I should not have endured. To be maintained in existence is to be continually created. Besides these proofs *a posteriori*, there is another. Quite apart from the question as to what we start from, and how we arrive at the idea of the infinite, we are bound to conclude from this very idea, that God is. For just as the idea of triangle contains the idea of three-sidedness, which we must for this very reason predicate of the triangle, so in the idea of the infinite
there lies that of necessary existence. There can no more be a height without depth, than a God who is non-existent (Princ. i., 14, 15, 16, and elsewhere). These proofs of the existence of God were of importance not merely as links in the argument, but also because the prevailing scepticism had undermined the belief in God in many quarters. They formed one of the chief points of attack. They are criticized in almost all the objections printed along with the Meditations; in every case the line of attack varies with the point of view of the assailant. Gassendi, who had denied that any knowledge of the infinite was possible, questions the fact that we have a definite idea of it. Descartes' answer to this is, that just as one who is not familiar with geometry, has nevertheless the idea of the triangle as a whole, so we, although we have no exhaustive knowledge of the infinite, yet apprehend not merely a part of it, but the infinite in its entirety (Resp. quint., p. 66). The point, however, in regard to which he had most frequently to defend himself, was his attempt to deduce the existence of God from what is contained in the idea of God. This seemed to be merely the ontological argument of Anselm; and one of his critics objected that it had already been refuted by Thomas Aquinas. Descartes replies (Resp. prim., p. 60), that there is a very great difference between a conclusion drawn from the meaning of a word, and his own argument. The proof that Thomas found fault with, is of the former character. His own depends upon two facts. In the first place, when we think of God, we must think of Him not merely as existing, which we do with everything while we are thinking of it, but as necessarily existing. In the second place, this thought of ours is not an arbitrary figment of the mind, but a necessary, because an innate or God-given, thought. As Descartes here and elsewhere always places his deduction from what is contained in the idea of God side by side with that drawn from its necessary presence in us, it almost seems as if he intended the reader to combine the two, and say that the existence of God is certain, because God Himself testifies to Himself within us and demonstrates His existence. Others again (Object. secundae), employing almost the same language that Cudworth and Leibnitz did later (vid. § 278, 3, and 288, 7), find fault with what they say is a newly-discovered gap in the reasoning; viz., it must first of all be proved that the conception of an infinite being is possible, and does not
contain a contradiction. Descartes allows this (Responsum secundum), but shows that such a proof need occasion no difficulties. This is precisely what Leibnitz subsequently did.

3. As certainly as I exist, so certainly does God exist, the Infinite Being, who is free from all limitations. Accordingly He is free from all limitations of His power; God is the absolute cause of Himself as well as of everything else, inasmuch as all things have their being from God. If we hesitate to call God the *causa efficiens* of Himself, we may call Him the *causa formalis* of Himself. At all events we are not to take in a merely negative sense the statement that He is *a se* or *causa sui.* God is the positive cause, at least of His being uncaused (Responsum primum, p. 57 ff.). This, however, implies that God is free from every imperfection, and is possessed of every perfection, for an absolutely almighty being can, and therefore will, clothe himself with all perfections. None of these is of such importance for us as the absolute truthfulness, in virtue of which God is incapable of willing to deceive us (Principia, § 29). But God could not be acquitted of the intention of misleading us, if the reason which He has given us, tells us what is incorrect. The Divine truthfulness, then, guarantees to us that whatever we apprehend plainly and clearly by reason, is true. Now, since the initial doubt rested on the possibility of reason deceiving us, at this point, but not till this point, this doubt must be given up, and we have now a perfectly certain canon established: Whatever is apprehended plainly and clearly, is true (Principia, § 60. Meditations, III, p. 35). This result, too, which he had attained by refuting for himself the original doubt, Descartes had to defend against objections. There were two points in particular, against which the assailants directed their attacks. In the first place, it was said, too much was proved here, for the reasoning would justify the conclusion that we could never make a mistake. Descartes replied, that error does not consist in the imperfect apprehension of anything, but in approving and affirming what we apprehend imperfectly. This affirmation, as an act of will, lies within our own power. (Compare the old saying, *Nemo credit nisi volens.*) If, then, we come to any conclusion in regard to what we have not apprehended clearly, or what transcends our limited power of apprehension, the mistake which we make is our own fault, not the fault of Him who gave us a limited power of apprehending and an unlimited
power of willing. Every error is self-deception (Princ, i., §§ 34, 35, 38). The second criticism was, that Descartes was really reasoning in a circle. He began by saying: Everything that is as evident as that I exist, is true. In virtue of this he concluded that God exists. But from the existence of God he concluded that everything that is made evident to us through the reason, is true. Descartes justifies his position by drawing distinctions. He begins by pointing out the difference between the first kind of thought, which is quite unreflecting and depends upon what is immediately evident, and that which rests upon reflection, and can give the reason why it is to be depended upon (Resp. iv., p. 134. Resp. vi., p. 155. Resp. ii., p. 74); then he draws attention to the fact that it is quite possible to make the "I am" the principium cognoscendi of God, and again to make God the principium essendi of the Ego and of its certainty of its own existence, and to call the "I am" an innate idea (Medit. iii., p. 24).

4. After the original doubt has been disposed of, and the rule of evidence discovered, Descartes, as we might expect, advances more rapidly. But he always starts from the thinking Ego, which is firmly established as irrefragable. If we review all the acts or ideas which exist in the Ego, we find, in the first place, some which are more particular determinations, i.e., limitations of other ideas, without which they could not become objects of thought. Thus the conception of triangularity presupposes the idea of figure, and that of pain cannot be thought of without the help of the idea of feeling, and so on. Those thoughts which cannot be conceived of without the help of others (per alius concipiuntur), Descartes calls "modes"; so that triangular is a mode of figure, pain of feeling, and so on (Nota ad progr. quodd. in Ren. des C. Medit., ed. Elzev., 1650, p. 183). If we inquire further, we find that figure and feeling are in turn modes, determinations of other ideas, and that all ideas are ultimately to be traced back to a small number which are primary and, as such, per se concipiuntur. These Descartes calls "attributa," because, as he says, going back to the derivation, they are given by nature to things (a natura tributa sunt), as the main qualities which go to make up their essence and nature (essentiam naturamque constituunt). (Nota ad progr., p. 179. PÇp. i., § 53. Cf. Lettre à Vattier, 17 Nov., 1642.) Among such highest or primary ideas Descartes speaks only of
those of extension and thought, each of which is intelligible without the other, and even without any other idea at all. Only these two are mentioned by him, although he admits that in God, in whom there are of course no modes, which would be limitations, multa sunt attributa (Note l. c.). Although extension and thought differ from figure and triangle or from feeling and pain, as primary from secondary and tertiary, still we find an analogy between the two former in this respect—they are both predicates, and in virtue of their (adjectival) character require to be supplemented by a (substantival) substratum on which to rest. These independent objects endowed with attributes Descartes calls substances; and accordingly defines a substance as that which can exist and be conceived of without the help of anything else—that which is absolutely independent, for, as he himself expressly says, a substantia incompleta is a contradiction in terms (Respons. quartae, p. 122). He admits at the same time, that if the definition be taken strictly, there is only one substance, namely God (Princ. i., p. 51). In a wider sense, however, we can apply the term substance to created things, if they can be conceived of without the help of anything else at all, and can exist without the help of anything else that has itself been created, in other words, if they are independent of each other,—not, of course, of God,—and can be conceived of and exist without one another and without anything else. This does not hold good of modes and attributes, for the former are always attached to attributes, the latter to substances. We find then within us, besides the idea of substance in the proper sense, the ideas of (created) substances. They are of two kinds, depending on the two attributes already mentioned,—extended substances and thinking substances. The latter are called minds (mentes), and their sum is the natura intellectualis; the former are the corpora, and taken together they form the physical world. The existence of both is vouched for by the truthfulness of God, since reason compels us to assume originals (ideata) of these ideas, and we cannot assume, what would be essentially inconceivable, that God calls forth the ideas of such substances within us immediately. Just because they are substances, they are mutually exclusive, for in this the nature of substances consists (Resp. quart., p. 124); but still more because their attributes are opposite (Note progr., p. 178). Thought is
purely internal, it is consciousness, and belongs solely to the Ego. Extension, on the other hand, is external and has no analogy with what belongs to the Ego. There can, therefore, be no possible community between them, the two worlds are absolutely separated; what belongs to the one, is for that very reason excluded from the other. This extreme dualism was indicated in § 265 as a feature which would be found in the first system of modern philosophy. One consequence of it is, that the two parts of this system, physics and mental philosophy, fall completely asunder. They are not even so far related that one presupposes the other, and accordingly it does not matter with which our account begins.

5. To such an extent has Descartes devoted the principal part of his activity to Physics, that he very often calls it, especially in his letters, his philosophy. Its aim is to give an account of all that can be discovered of nature through thought. It is clear, however, that we must set aside what the evidence of our senses would lead us to regard as the quality of bodies; for these sensible qualities are only states of the subject that feels them, and have as little resemblance to the body that produces the sensation, as words have to the thoughts which they are employed to communicate (Le Monde, ed. Cousin v., p. 216). “All sensible qualities of things lie within ourselves, i.e. in the soul,” was a proposition repeated by all Cartesians. Further, we must set aside everything which does not so much belong to the body itself as come to it through its connection with something else, for example, number, time, and the like, which are relations, and therefore modi cogitandi. What strikes us, on reflection, as the real nature of bodies, is their extension in length, breadth, and thickness. Space and matter accordingly coincide, an empty space is a contradiction in terms; and by a body is to be understood simply what is understood by it in stereometry. Every internal impulse which would bring the extended matter nearer the thinking mind, every force which would be anything else than extension, weight for example, must be distinguished from body (Princ. ii., § 4. Meditat. iv., p. 40)—This assertion, that a body is nothing but the space it occupies, had also to be defended by Descartes against attacks. These proceeded both from physicists, who objected that on this hypothesis condensation and rarefaction would be impossible, and from Catholic theologians, who
grounded their scruples on transubstantiation. To the former he replied that a sponge, when filled with water, was not thereby increased in extension, and that every rarefaction, like the alteration in the sponge, consisted in a widening of the pores (Princ. ii., § 6, 7). As regards the second objection, Descartes attempted to show, in his answer to Arnauld, (Respons. quart.) that the qualities of bodies could remain the same, even where the bodies were changed. For proof of this he relied on the fact that our sensations are called forth by the surface of bodies, i.e. by their border, which belongs neither to them nor to the surrounding air. Many were satisfied with this; but when he afterwards attempted, in letters to the Jesuit Mesland, to make the change itself intelligible by analogies with physiological processes, and the correspondence was published against Descartes’ will, a fresh outcry arose. These occurrences gave occasion to a number of inquiries which were collected under the title of a philosophia eucharistica, and they serve to explain why, among the propositions rejected by Jesuitical and other theologians, there always occurs the dictum that the nature of bodies consists in extension. (Compare on this point Bayle’s Recueil de quelques pièces curieuses, Amst., 1664, and Bouillier in the work referred to.)—As the physical and the mathematical point of view thus coincide, we can understand how Descartes claims for his physics the distinction of being as plain as geometry (Letter to Plempius of 17 Nov. 1637). A further consequence is, that the Cartesian physics completely excludes the conception of an end, a conception that is foreign to mathematics, and the absence of which from the teaching of Pythagoras had been noted by Aristotle. Descartes does not indeed deny that God pursues ends in the physical world, but he considers it presumptuous to desire to know them. It becomes not merely presumption but pride, if we assume that man is the end of the world. Everything which follows from the conception of extension must naturally be affirmed of bodies and of their combination; what is contrary to it must be denied. Neither atoms, nor limits, accordingly exist in the physical world (Princ. ii., 20, 21). The capacities for being formed and for being moved are, like divisibility, bound up in the conception of extension. That these possibilities may be realized, the intervention of another cause is necessary, and this is the Being that is also the ultimate ground of extension,
that is, God. He produces this effect by dint of motion, \textit{i.e.} the transference of a body into other surroundings. Thus all the varieties, even of division and form, have their ultimate ground in motion, and nothing is necessary for the creation of the world save extension and motion (\textit{Princ. ii., 23}). All real or formal differences of bodies, then, are merely various motions of themselves or of their parts. If we draw a distinction between the expressions, universe (\textit{universitas}), and world (\textit{mundus}), and make the latter mean the system of different bodies, it becomes possible to do as some Cartesians did, and maintain at one and the same time the infinity of the universe and the limitation of the physical world, beyond which exists motionless and therefore obscure matter. So Geulinx, \textit{Disp. phys. isag. cont.} Descartes is therefore quite right in affirming, as he does in his letters, that with him mechanics is not a part of physics, but that his whole physical philosophy is mechanical and, as a consequence, mathematical (Letter to Beausé, of April 30th, 1639). As the cause of motion, God, is unchangeable, the effect too must be of this character; and the first of all the laws of nature, indeed the united result of them all, is this: The sum of motion is always the same (\textit{Princ. ii., § 36, and elsewhere}). From this there follow, as deduced or secondary laws,—(1) That every body continues in the state in which it is; (2) That a body which is moved, maintains the direction in which it was set in motion, and moves in a straight line so far as it is not affected by extraneous causes; (3) That if a body which has been set in motion strikes another body, a transference of the motion takes place (\textit{Princ. v., 37, 39, 40}). (Where Descartes begins to lay down particular rules for the transmitting of motion, he frequently comes into conflict with experience.) In his \textit{Monde}, he gives an imaginary picture of the creation of the universe. An entirely new world is to be created with the help of nothing but matter, and motion conforming to the laws laid down. In the beginning, God divided matter into innumerable parts of various (moderate) sizes and various forms. None of them, however, were round or gave indication of a centre, \textit{i.e.} something within them. Once for all He imparted to these a quantity of motion in the most various directions, and then left them to themselves, or rather continues to preserve unchangeable, \textit{i.e.} to maintain, what He has once done. The natural consequence is, that through the collision
of bodies, and through the chaotic medley of directions in which they are moving, one portion of those particles of matter will consolidate into larger masses; another portion, by having the corners rubbed off, will become extremely small globules, of which there are perhaps millions in every grain of sand; while yet a third portion will produce a much finer dust, that matière infiniment subtile, which is often called the substance of ether. The parts of the last-mentioned are inseparable and can assume every possible form, so that we have here to deal with something which is continuous. This materia subtilissima may be called the element of fire. Descartes usually calls it the first element, and makes the sun and the fixed stars consist of it. The first-mentioned kind of matter, on the contrary, he calls the third element or element of earth; out of it are formed, among other things, the planets. The bodies which consist of this, are fluid or solid according as their particles are easily moved and displaced, or the reverse. Between the two comes the second element, which consists of small globules, and which may be called the element of air. Of this the heavens are composed. The phenomena of light are produced by the vibratory motion of its particles, which is communicated in straight lines with infinite swiftness. Their rotary motion is the cause of colour, while warmth and heat are due to the motion of the first element (Monde, Chap. 5, and elsewhere). The various motions intersect one another and, as a consequence, deviations from the straight line take place. Further, since all motion goes on in a plenum, when a body changes its position, the surrounding bodies press into its place, so that ultimately circular movements arise. These are the famous vortices, which explain not only the revolution of the planets round the sun, but also the falling of bodies to a centre. It is neither an actio in distans of the centre, nor yet an inward impulse that brings them thither, for, in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth, Descartes expressly maintains that no movement can be produced without shock and contact; but the fine matter that envelopes bodies pushes them forward, just as objects that have found their way into a whirlpool are pushed towards the centre (Princ. iii., 46, ff.). The more he goes into detail, the more frequently is he obliged to adopt auxiliary hypotheses; for example, that in the case of the magnet the small particles that exercise the pressure are of corkscrew shape.
and so on. Still, Descartes’ account of creation remains the most successful attempt to give a full statement of how everything admits of a purely mechanical explanation. Even organic bodies he holds to be mere machines; when they cease to act, the stoppage is called death. The real principle of life and, if this may be called soul, the soul of the animal, is the blood, in the circulation of which life consists. Harvey’s discovery of the capillary canals is gratefully acknowledged by Descartes; but he finds fault with Harvey for assigning as the cause of circulation the contraction of the walls of the heart, for this itself requires to be explained. It is rather the warmth that has its seat in the heart, and by which the blood is forced into the lungs in the form of vapour. From thence, cooled and therefore liquid again, it returns into the heart, to spread out once more into the arteries, to pass from these through the capillary canals into the veins, and to be brought back to the heart through the vena cavae. The blood is conducted by a very direct road, and therefore in a very warm condition, to the brain, which not merely cools it but, acting like a filter, separates from it the most volatile particles of the third element and changes them into “animal spirits” (spiritus animales), very volatile substances, of which the nerves are the repositories. The movement produced in the ends of the nerves by external impressions is communicated, like the vibration of a string, to the part of the brain in which all the nerves do not indeed meet, but through which all vital spirits certainly pass, and which, since all impressions are concentrated here as at the point of a cone, may be called their conarion. It lies in the pineal gland, which, especially in man, as we shall see by-and-by, has another function besides that of separating the phlegm, the one usually ascribed to it. In addition to being the point towards which sensations from without tend, it is also the point from which the operations of the body on the external world proceed. From thence the movement of the vital spirits is communicated to the parts of the nerves that set the muscles in motion; and this is the reason why an animal runs away when it sees a wolf, or cries out when it is struck. This is a process which is not in any way distinct from that by which the note of an organ gives forth a sound when struck; an animal is just as much a machine, as an organ is. (For a long time it was fashionable among zealous Cartesians to torture animals in a frivolous
spirit, in order to show that their theory was seriously meant.) The human body, to the more detailed account of which the work *De l'Homme* is devoted, is also a machine. It would, like the bodies of ordinary animals, be nothing more than this, were it not united with a spirit, a point that will be discussed later on.

6. Distinct from but parallel to physics, is the *philosophy of mind*. Descartes often calls it metaphysics, although this word is frequently employed by him to denote the *science universelle*. While the former, like mathematics, cannot be elaborated without the help of imagination, the organ of the metaphysician is thought pure and simple. This gives it a much greater degree of certainty than physics, inasmuch as it deals with what is the most certain and most evident of all things (*Princ.*, i. § 11, *Respons. prim.*, p. 55, and elsewhere). But, on the other hand, it is a very abstract science, and Descartes writes to the Princess Elizabeth on June 18th, 1643, that while he devoted several hours daily to his mathematical studies, only several hours a year were given to metaphysics, and he was satisfied with having established the principles. Just as the nature of bodies consisted in extension, so the attribute of mind is thought. This is true of all mind, and therefore of the mind of God; for God's mind differs from the finite mind, as an infinitely large number differs from two or three; if we imagine the *natura intellectualis* set free from limitations, we have the idea of God, and the idea of God as limited, gives the idea of a human soul (*Letter of 1638*, ed. Cousin, viii. p. 58). For this very reason we could deduce the existence of God from the existence of our own mind; but it could no more be deduced from the existence of the physical world, than sounds could be deduced from colours (*Respons. secund.*, p. 72). Of course this distinction must never be lost sight of, that God, as the Infinite, knows no limitations, and that therefore He has no modes, but only attributes; He does not feel, but certainly thinks (*Princ.*, i. § 56). Just as body, because extension is its attribute, is not conceivable and cannot exist without extension, so mind always thinks or, in other words, is always conscious (*Respons. quint.*, p. 60; *Respons. tert.*, p. 95). As light always lights, and warmth always warms, mind always thinks (*Epistola*, ed. Elz., i. 105). Accordingly Descartes does not hesitate to admit, in a letter, that the child is conscious before birth.
That we cannot remember what our thoughts in sleep have been is no objection, because memory is a purely physical condition. Descartes calls the individual acts of thought ideas; it is obvious, then, that all thought, even the Divine thought, consists of ideas (Ration. mor. geom. disp. Defin. ii. Respons. tert., p. 98). In man they are divided, in respect of clearness, into adequate and inadequate, or perfect and imperfect (Letter of 1642, i. 105, Elz.); in respect of origin, into self-made (fictæ), borrowed (adventitiae), and innate (innatae) (Medit., iii. p. 17); and lastly, in respect of their purport, into more passive acts of perception, ideas in the narrower sense, and more active ones, acts of will. The latter are never found without the former, for we are conscious of all our acts of will, i.e., we have an idea of them, or perceive them (De passion., i., art. 19); on the other hand, there are acts of pure perception, where no will is exerted. To this latter class, however, judgment does not belong, as some suppose it to do; rather, every judgment involves an assertion or a denial, that is, an act of will. Like the position which, in antiquity, the Stoics partially, and the Sceptics unconditionally, took up towards συγκαταθεσις (§ 97, 2), like the often-repeated mediæval dictum: Nemo credit nisi volens, Descartes' doctrine is, that our assent may be withheld at pleasure, and may be given at pleasure. This indicates how error is possible, and further how it may be avoided. In the mere conception of the chimera, for example, there is no error involved, but there certainly is in the affirmation or assertion that it exists. If we would give our assent only to that which we know clearly, we should never make mistakes. That God endowed us with a limited intelligence, and at the same time with free will, in virtue of which we can assent to what is imperfectly or inadequately known, does not make Him (vid. supr. 3) the positive cause of our mistakes. God Himself is of course infallible, because He has no inadequate ideas. We, however, if we would guard against error, must always inquire whether an idea is not made by ourselves, and made in such a way that, in forming it, we have omitted something, without which it cannot exist. For if we give our assent to such an imperfect idea, for example a mountain without a corresponding depression, we make a mistake. Of those ideas which are not produced by ourselves, but are adventitious, we may certainly affirm that there is something
external to us which corresponds to them as their ideatum; but that this has exactly the qualities which are reflected by our idea of it, cannot be affirmed until a distinction is drawn between modus rerum and modus cogitandi, what belongs to things and what to the sensible subject. Colour, for instance, like time, does not exist in the objects, but is a condition of the subject, a modus cogitandi (Letter to Vatier, of 17 Nov. 1643, ed. Elz. i., Ep. 116, ibid. Ep. 105). There is no fear of error in regard to innate ideas. They are so bound up with the nature of thought as to be inseparable from it, so that we may say they are the innate power of thought itself. The idea of God, or of ourselves, may accordingly be assented to, as being at once adequate, clear, distinctly known, and innate. Just as there is a difference between the infinite and the limited mind in regard to the understanding, the intellectus, which is not a facultas electiva (To Buitendijk, 1643, Epp. ed. Elz. ii. 10), so is there in regard to the exercise of the will. God has perfect freedom of will. He does not affirm a thing because it is so; on the contrary, it is so because He affirms it. Similarly a thing is good simply because He wills it. Everything, even the eternal verities, is dependent upon God’s good pleasure, and therefore His will cannot be conditioned by His intelligence (Object. sext., p. 160. To Mersenne, 20th May, 1630. Epp. ed. Elz. i. 111). It is otherwise with man. With him, to believe to be good, is identical with to will (Letter to a Jesuit, 1644, ed. Elz. i. Ep. 116). In regard to God, then, Descartes is a Scotist; in regard to man, he is a Thomist. He does not suffer him, however, to lose his indifferentia arbitrii. For we may recollect that we have known something to be good, and therefore desired it; and this recollection may become the motive of an act of will. Thus man, by accustoming himself to act in accordance with what was previously known to be right, may become able to oppose what appears to him at the moment as a good. Nor does this imply any loss of freedom, but rather the gain of a higher freedom than the aequilibrium arbitrii (Resp. sext., pp. 160, 161). Descartes conceives of the Divine will as perfect freedom from necessity; but it must not therefore be supposed that he believes freedom from determination to be the highest quality of the human will. Rather, he expressly says (Medit. iv.) that indifference is the lowest stage of will, and that the man who
always knew clearly and plainly what was true and good, would never hesitate what to choose. Such a one would be perfectly free, but he would not be indifferent. The highest freedom, and the highest perfection altogether, he considers to be infallibility become habitual.

7. The Cartesian philosophy of mind is substantially enriched, but at the same time modified, by the transition to Anthropology, that is, the study of the connection which experience shows to exist between the finite mind and an organic body. However hard it is for Descartes to admit the existence of such a connection, since it was the nature of substances to be mutually exclusive, and thought and extension stand to each other much as fire to ice or black to white (To Mersenne, 8th Jan., 1641); however often he maintains that there is no proof of this connection in reason, but only in sense and experience,—he cannot deny that in man a thinking substance, a mens or anima (for with him the two are identical), exists in connection with a body, and that the two form a unity, though it be only a unity compositionis (Resp. Sext., p. 156). The connection between a mind and a body, cannot have its reason in their nature, since this was one of opposition; it must therefore be a supernatural fact, willed by God (Pcip., i. 51). Although in this connection the soul is united to the whole body, yet the union takes place through the medium of a definite organ. This is the conarion, the small cone (gland pinnae) suspended at the point where the vital spirits meet and cross each others' paths. Apart altogether from its position, it is the most suitable organ to serve as the special seat of the soul, because it is not one of those which exist in pairs; and it is important that the soul should feel as a single sensation what is presented to it by the two eyes (Les Passions, i. 30). But in spite of this connection between them, the soul cannot really set the body in motion, inasmuch as the production of even the smallest additional quantity of motion would be inconsistent with the first law of nature. Through its influence on the conarion, however, it may give another direction to the vital spirits which are already in motion, may guide them (Resp. quart., p. 126), so that its work may be compared to that of the rider, who directs what is really the movement of the horse. In like manner, the affection of the senses and other bodily organs does not really produce any new ideas in the soul; but the movements of the vital spirits,
and the traces which previous movements have left in the brain, like folds in paper, become for the soul occasion and opportunity for calling forth ideas which resemble them (*Note ad progr. quodd.*, p. 185). Moreover, as is proved by dreams, and by the fact that pain is sometimes felt in amputated limbs, this occasion is to be traced, not to the affection of the organ of sense, but simply to the movement of the vital spirits, which can also be produced in other ways (Letter to Fromond, Nov., 1637). Further, no ideas are called forth, save those which concern what is sensible. For neither images on the brain (sensations), nor traces of these (recollections), have anything to do with what is intellectual (*Note ad progr.*, p. 188). This connection with the body renders it possible, if the soul has an idea, for the vital spirits, by means of the pineal gland, to force their way to the heart through all the pores within the brain and the rest of the body; the oftener it happens, the easier those pores are opened. In this way the sensations are prolonged and strengthened. The result is the condition of affection or passion, in which the ideas are powerful, but are confused owing to the connection with the body—a connection which is not clear to the reason (*Les Passions*, i. 37, 28). Nothing, accordingly, is so destructive of clearness of mind as the passions. Just as ideas were naturally divided into theoretical and practical, perceptions and acts of will, so too the passions may be classified on a similar principle. Among the primary affections, which Descartes assumes to be six in number, a specially theoretical character belongs to wonder (*admiration*), in the case of which the movements of the vital spirits are supposed not to pass beyond the brain (*Les Passions*, ii. 96). In the case of the other five,—love, hate, desire, sorrow, and joy,—the movement forces its way to the heart, is felt there, and is accompanied by a tendency to motions; they are practical (*Les Passions*, ii. 88–101). All the rest, such as hope, fear, and the like, may be deduced from these. As the soul has the power of calling forth ideas, and of giving, by the help of these, a particular direction to the animal spirits, it is able indirectly to subdue the passions, to neutralize the fear of death by the hope of victory. This is a struggle, not between a higher and a lower soul, but between the soul and the vital spirits (*Ibid.*, i. 45, 47). By self-observation and patience, even the weakest soul may succeed in gaining a mastery over the passions, just as we can
tame the largest dog (Ibid., 56). If this be done, the passions themselves become a means of pleasure, and instruments for the attainment of the ends we ought to desire; for the good which the reason recognises has a more powerful influence upon us, if it presents itself at the same time as beautiful, an effect that is produced through the medium of the senses (Les Passions, iii. 211. 12; ii. 85). In the mastery over the passions, and the consequent desire for what we know to be right, all moral action consists, a point which is brought out especially in his letters to the Princess Elizabeth and the Queen of Sweden. Its highest reward is the peace of conscience that results from the desire to live a virtuous life.

8. This account of the connection of body and mind, and the moral demands directed not merely to the latter but to the whole man, is very defective, and is further marked by such glaring contradictions, that an attempt to get rid of them was made ere long within the Cartesian school itself. The universal law of nature, that absolutely no fresh motion can arise in the physical world, was subverted even by the minimum of motion which Descartes admits, when he says that the soul sets the conarion in motion. And further, the secondary law, that a body continues moving in the same direction, proves that the soul, by giving a fresh direction to the vital spirits, introduces into the body a new and a stronger motion than that of the spiritus animales had been. The contradiction is so manifest that when a clear-sighted disciple attempted to get rid of it by a method which Descartes himself had indicated, all the prominent Cartesians readily accepted his views; indeed, we may even confidently assert that Descartes himself would have done so. People accordingly have been quite justified in always regarding Occasionism as the true Cartesian doctrine. The man who first propounded it, was Arnold Geulincx, or, as it is otherwise spelled, Geulincs, Geulinck, Geulinx. He lived from 1625 to 1669; and the theory which has made his name immortal, was propounded in his lectures, probably at Louvain, certainly afterwards at Leyden. It is not found in his Saturnalia seu quastiones quotidiales, Leyden, 1660, nor in the Logica fundamentis suis restituta, Leyden, 1662, but it is developed in detail in his Πνευματικος σεβοταν, sive Ethica, Amst., 1665. I have never been able to get the original edition of this, and know only the one published after his death by Philaretus
(i.e. Bontekoe), which was supplemented from the author’s MSS., and printed again in 1709 by Flender. I am thus unable to decide whether it is to Geulinex or to Bontekoe that we should ascribe the comparison made in a note, between the body and the soul and two clocks going together. This is usually regarded as an illustration invented by Leibnitz, but H. Ritter has already pointed out that Leibnitz has no right to the credit of having been the first to make it. None of the rest of the works of Geulinex were printed till after his death. Among these are the \textit{Physica vera}, which appeared in 1680 at Leyden, as an appendix to Bontekoe’s posthumous works, and the \textit{Annotata praecurrentia} and \textit{Annotata majora in principia Renati Descartes}, which were published at Dortrech by his admirers in 1690 and 1691. These consist of notes dictated to his hearers; and to them are added by way of supplement a number of academical treatises, which were defended by his pupils under his presidency. Last of all, and also in 1691, there was published the \textit{Metaphysica vera et ad mentem peripateticam}, Amst., 16mo, a work which, after a long search in places at a distance, I found quite close at hand in the library at Jena. Here he contrasts the true metaphysic with that of the Peripatetic school.—According to Geulinex, the mutual interaction of body and soul is rendered impossible not merely by their nature as substances and the opposition of their attributes, but by the fact that nothing acts which does not know what it is doing; and one does not know how the movement of his hand comes to pass, nor does the sun know how the impression of light is produced. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that if I will to move my hand, it really does move, and that if the sun shines on my eye, I have an idea of light. In both cases we have to do with something which is inconceivable or even impossible, and which is yet actual, that is, with a marvel. This consists in the omnipotent God employing the opportunity or occasion to move my hand when I exercise my will, and to give me an idea of light when the sun shines. (It is the “occasion, or opportunity,” of Descartes, applied, however, not to the soul but to God.) Accordingly, in the view of Geulinex, neither the will nor the impression made on the eye is properly a cause, but merely an occasion, an opportunity (\textit{occasio, causa occasionalis}), a view which for this very reason has been called the system of occasional causes, or \textit{Occasionalism}. In view of
this inability to produce any change whatever in the external world, it is quite natural that Guelinx should lay down the practical precept: Where I can do nothing, I should will nothing, but submit. The result of this is a system of ethics which, as might be expected in the case of a convert to Calvinism, is remarkable for the most decided contempt of works, and for complete resignation to the will of the Almighty. Humility, which combines the two,—consciousness of our own helplessness, and submission to the Higher Power,—is accordingly declared by Guelinx to be the highest virtue. This agrees well with a statement in the second part of the Meta-

physics, to the effect that we are modes of the Divine Mind, and that if we imagine the modes removed, we have God. As has been already indicated, this very statement is found almost word for word in a letter of Descartes' (i. 103, ed. Elz.), and prevents us from drawing a hard and fast line between Occasionalism and Cartesianism. On the other hand, in the Physics of Guelinx there occurs a statement which, as it had been already denied by Descartes, must be regarded as an addition to his doctrines. As our Ego is properly not a mens, but merely aliquid mentis, that is, participates in God as the only mens, so there is properly only one corpus, extended matter; and the so-called bodies participate in it, each being properly merely aliquid corporis. Consequently there are not, as with Descartes, two kinds of substances, but really only two substances; his mentes et corpora are replaced here by Mens (Deus) et corpus (materia). If one takes the view that will be adopted in this work, and regards Spinoza as the logical outcome of Cartesianism, it is interesting to note how Descartes, Guelinx, and Malebranche respectively occupy the stages that lead to the position of Spinoza, and especially how Guelinx stands midway between the opposing attitudes of Descartes and Malebranche (vid. § 269, 3, 270). According to Descartes, God is infinite thought, in which minds participate, but not infinite extension, of which bodies are modes. Conversely, Malebranche makes bodies modifications of infinite (i.e. Divine) extension, while he regards minds as having a substantial existence, and not as merely participating. According to Guelinx, both minds and spirits are modifications; and he would have been in complete agreement with Spinoza, had not his dualism led him to believe in two substances, instead of in one.
§ 268.

Reception of Cartesianism.

1. The progressive mind must always be prepared for the criticism of those who lag behind; and accordingly Descartes had to be ready to meet a host of attacks. He and his school adopted the dictum of Bruno and Bacon (*vid. § 249, 5*), that it is really we who are the ancients, and looked down somewhat contemptuously on antiquity; nor did he estimate the Middle Ages more highly, for he talks of Scholasticism as merely an exercise for the youthful mind; where he mentions the method of Bacon, he regards it as a preliminary one, and Hobbes is treated by him as a man who was completely ignorant of physics, and whose knowledge of political science, if somewhat more extensive, was thoroughly unsound. This position of superiority was of necessity assumed by the thinker who began the series of efforts which, by assigning a true position to both the theology of mediaeval thought and the naturalism of antiquity, have produced effects not merely differing from, but transcending the results of the two earlier periods. Foreseeing that there would be no lack of objections, he deliberately invited these before the issue of his principal work, in order that he might publish his replies at the same time. It is a remarkable coincidence, that in these seven sets of objections almost all the points of view are represented, which Descartes abandons as being inadequate. In the first place, as regards Antiquity, the most prominent contemporary of Descartes among the champions of ancient systems (*vid. supra § 236–239*) was Gassendi. The fifth set of objections are from him; and, as a matter of course, they exhibit a strong preference for the empirical point of view. In the account of the Middle Ages, a distinction was drawn between the patristic period, the scholastic period, and the period of transition; and Augustine was indicated as marking the zenith of the first of these (§ 144). Thomas Aquinas of the second (§ 203). The doctrines of all three periods were summoned into the field against Cartesianism. The philosophy of Augustine, to which Arnauld gives expression (in the third set of objections), protests, however, in the friendliest terms, for this too had shown some leaning towards pantheism, and Arnauld is almost persuaded to be a Cartesian. The protest of Thomism, on the contrary, is expressed much more bitterly. This makes itself heard in the seventh set of
objections, those of the Jesuit Bourdin, who, however, in his eagerness to crush the common foe, condescends to borrow weapons of attack even from Scotus, and thus appears as the representative of the whole scholastic period. Just as Descartes was here reproached with becoming a pagan, because he did not follow scholasticism closely enough, so exactly the opposite charge was made in the second and sixth sets of objections, which Mersenne had collected. Descartes is here regarded as an adherent of the ontological argument, that shibboleth of the scholastic mode of thought, and is treated from a point of view that has already been described (§ 267, 1) as a sceptically-tinged toleration towards all philosophical opinions. From the days of Montaigne this had been the attitude of mind adopted by educated Frenchmen. The philosophy of Hobbes (§ 256) has been represented as transcending this merely worldly wisdom, and as forming one of the culminating points of the period of transition, in contrast to mysticism which forms the other. Its author gives expression to his views in the third set of objections, where he of course finds fault with whatever runs counter to his naturalism. But Descartes was attacked also from the other culminating point, mysticism; not indeed in the objections which he himself collected and published, but in the letters which Henry More exchanged with him. Although this thinker, chiefly under the influence of Jacob Boehme, declared against Cartesianism, in doing so he expressed opinions which prove that he really occupied a more advanced position and belonged to the succeeding period (vid. infra, § 278, 2). Lastly, in the period of transition we mentioned those who, like Melanchthon for example, represented the Protestant spirit in the sphere of religion, although in philosophy they were thoroughly mediæval. This school of thinkers, too, sent its champion in the person of Voet. Most people know him only from his controversy with Descartes, and accordingly judge him as unfairly as any one would do who was ready to form an idea of the character of Luther and Melanchthon from their relation to Schwenckfeld, or conversely. More violent attacks, carried on with weapons other than those of science, were subsequently made upon Descartes, but not until his philosophy had found an echo in wider circles.

2. As may be imagined, it was in Holland that this first
came to pass. The University of Utrecht especially has earned the distinction of being the first place where, to quote Descartes' own phrase, "our philosophy" was taught. Its earliest advocate was Cyprian Renery, who had become acquainted with Descartes and with his doctrines in Deventer. As a professor at Utrecht, he helped to spread his master's views, and further was instrumental in bringing about the appointment of Henricus Regius (le Roi) as Professor of Medicine there. After the death of Renery, in 1639, the latter came to be regarded as the chief apostle of the new doctrine. His enthusiasm attracted the younger generation, but succeeded in calling forth the reaction of Voet, and through numerous paradoxes brought all sorts of annoyances on Descartes, who ultimately separated himself formally from his disciple. (This circumstance led me, in my work already referred to, into the error of ascribing to this Utrecht professor a book which at that time I did not know: *Cartesius verus Spinozism architectus*, written by a different Regius.) What had happened at Utrecht, happened at Leyden. There Professors Heerebord and Raey were the first representatives of Cartesian doctrines. Their teaching gave rise to the reaction of Revius and others, and consequently to certain University regulations, concerning which Descartes believed himself bound to make complaint. But in spite of them Cartesianism continued to flourish in this University, as is proved by the names of Wittich, Heidanus, Geulinex, and Volder. In Amsterdam Cartesianism was represented by the physician, Ludwig Meyer, whose book: *Philosophia Sacra Scripturae interpres*, attracted great attention, and who has since become still more famous as the friend of Spinoza and the editor of his works (*vid. § 272).* The new philosophy soon made its way into Gröningen through Meresius and Gousset, but especially through the German Tobias Andrä (1604–1674). Franeker could boast of Alexander Roellius, and also of Ruard Andala (1665–1727), who in his: *Cartesius verus Spinozismi eversor*, Franeker, 1717, 4to, defended Cartesianism against more extreme developments. At the two latter Universities, Balthasar Bekker was educated. Born in 1634, he distinguished himself first by a defence of Cartesianism (*De philosophia Cartesiana admo-

* It has recently been discovered that, not Meyer, but Schuller was the Editor of the *Opera Posthuma*, v. § 272, i, note.—Ed.
nito cannida et sincera. Franck., 1668), then by his attacks on superstition in his work on comets, and in a very special degree in his Betoverde Weereld (The World Bewitched). In this work, which first appeared in Dutch in 1691, and was afterwards translated into many languages, he argues from the impossibility of mind exercising an influence on corporeal matter, to the absurdity of all belief in witchcraft and demons. The world is a world of nature, not of magic. He was a Doctor of Divinity and a clergyman at Amsterdam, and had to undergo much persecution on account of this work. Expelled from the Church, he joined the communion of French Reformers, and died in the year 1698. The number of works that this book called forth is very great. At Breda, Pollat and Schuler taught the philosophy of Descartes. In short, Cartesianism predominated more or less in the professorial teaching of all the Dutch Universities, and an immense number of writings were published in its defence. The Cartesians were opposed by the orthodox theologians, who were at the same time engaged in controversy with the dissenting theologians (Arminians and Cocceians). This circumstance, as might have been expected, drew together the two parties who were attacked by a common enemy; and the result was, that eventually hardly any distinction was made between a Cartesian and an enemy of the Church. They had to submit to being called Jesuits or Cocceians, according to the term which seemed more opprobrious to their adversary for the time being; and even ecclesiastical councils, like that of Dort, sat in judgment on the new philosophy.

3. Descartes' doctrines did not establish themselves in his native country until somewhat later than in Holland; but when they did so, they took a deeper hold. Only in this case it was not in the Universities, for these were closed against them, but in other institutions, that their fate was decided. The first movement was among the clerical Orders. There was none of these to which Descartes was so well disposed as to the Order of the Jesuits, and there was none whose good opinion he valued more highly. Although the provincial superior of the Order, Dinet, had been his friend since his days at La Flèche, and although Pères Vatet and Mesland were even his decided adherents, still the Order declared against him. The immediate occasion of this was a second explanation of transubstantiation, which has been already referred to;
the real reason was perhaps that the Jansenists, and especially their stronghold Port-Royal, decided for Cartesianism. (The Port-Royal Logic [L'Art de Penser], composed by Arnauld and Nicole in 1662, with the assistance of a work of Pascal, has been universally regarded as the Cartesian text-book.) The Cartesian were now reproached, as the Jansenists had been, with being Calvinists—a charge that stands in strange contrast with that of being Jesuits, preferred against them by the Dutch Calvinists. What happened on similar occasions, happened here. The foe of the foe was regarded and treated as a friend. Gassendi had opposed the teaching of Descartes, and he was accordingly taken into favour by the Jesuits. His doctrines were not put under a ban at the Universities, nor were his works placed on the Index librorum prohibitorum. Both of these indignities were inflicted on Cartesianism at the instigation of the Jesuits, who brought the head of the Church into a position similar to that in which Papal bulls were issued to protect Averroism against those who discovered its anti-Christian character (vid. supra, § 238). The patronage extended to the followers of Gassendi by the Jesuits, and further by the Universities, gave a new impulse to their teaching. Even the Parliament of Paris was almost misled by the Jesuits into committing itself to a position hostile to Descartes. His relation to some of the clerical Congregations existing at that time, was much more friendly than to the Order of the Jesuits. Especially was this the case in regard to the Congregation of the Oratory, whose founder, Cardinal Berulle, had been one of the earliest to regard Descartes with favour. His personal friends Gibieuf and La Barde belonged to it, and it was soon to produce Malebranche. Other Congregations followed this example. Added to this was the good-will which such prominent ecclesiastics as Cardinal Retz, Fénélon, and Bossuet showed to Cartesianism. Another circumstance that had an important influence in spreading the new ideas, was, that in some of the free academies, of which Paris had at that time a great number, academic prelections were held for the members, and public discourses for whoever cared to hear; and there the doctrines of Cartesianism were expounded. Among these, great attention was aroused by the lectures of Rohault, especially upon physics, and still more by those of his pupil and successor, Pierre Silvain Regis (1632–1707), who taught Cartesianism first in Toulouse and Montpellier, and afterwards in Paris,
and who was long looked upon as the first representative of the philosophy in its pure form. His *Cours entier de Philosophie* treats of logic in one book, of metaphysics in three, of physics in eight, and of ethics in three. As early as 1691 a second edition of it appeared (Amsterd., Huguetan, iii. vols. 4to). But what contributed more than anything else to the spread of the doctrine, was the interest which was taken in it by members of the most various classes of society. The advocate, Claude de Clerelier, who came to know Descartes shortly before his departure for Sweden, was so devoted to him that he afterwards appears as the principal translator of his Latin writings, and is also associated with the physician Louis de la Forge in the publication of the *Posthuma* of Descartes. Gentlemen of rank, like the Prince of Condé and the Duke of Luynes, would not let themselves be outdone by the scholars. The letters of Madame de Sévigné show the interest which intellectual women took in these doctrines; and the interest taken in them by those who were not intellectual appears from the comedies of Molière, who was a follower of Gassendi and therefore an opponent of the Cartesians. The *Egoists*, too, who appealed to Cartesian principles, are worthy of mention. This word, which up to the middle of last century had not the obnoxious moral meaning which is associated with it now, denotes here an adherent of the view that nothing exists save the Ego. The number of these "Solipsists" (as they were called later, although in the eighteenth century, with Baumgarten for example, "Solipsism" means exactly what is called egoism nowadays) seems to have been considerable. This we infer from Buffier, who attempted to refute their views. But, as early as the time of Reid (*vid. § 292, 4*), it was very difficult to get hold of any of their writings. The *Mémoires of Trevoux* (1713) mention a follower of Malebranche who held such opinions. It is perfectly evident that an extreme subjective idealism must take as its starting-point the certainty of one's own existence, as established by Descartes, and, on the other hand, that this starting-point may lead to such a result.

4. From Holland, Cartesianism spread to Germany. The Westphalian Johann Clauberg, born in 1622, and educated at Gröningen under Andraæ and at Leyden under Raey, was on most friendly terms with the Cartesians in France. He taught first in Herborn and afterwards in Duisburg, where he
died on Jan. 31st, 1665, after doing his best in his *Defensio Cartesiana* to defend his master against Revisus at Leyden and Lentulus at Herborn. While in his logic he is a forerunner of the *Art de Penser* and in his physics of Occasionism, he approaches very near Malebranche and Spinoza in his treatise on the knowledge of God. In his eulogy on the German language, again, he reminds one of Leibnitz, and in suggesting for metaphysics the names "ontosophy" or "ontology," he gave a hint of which Wolff (*vid. § 290, 4*) afterwards took advantage. Clauberg’s collected works were published by Schalbruch, Amsterd., 1691, 4to. The Marburg statutes of 1653 contain a warning against Cartesianism, a proof that it had already found its way thither; in theology it was represented by Reinhold Pauli, in medicine by Waldschmied, and in philosophy by Horch. In 1673 Professor Kahler managed to introduce it into Giessen by means of a book, the title of which sounded like an attack against it. Cartesianism spread to Berlin through Chauvain (born 1640), who was actively engaged there as a preacher of the French Reformed Church, as professor at the French College, and lastly as editor of the *Nouveau Journal des Savants*. At Frankfort-on-the-Oder, Johann Placentius, a mathematician, wrote: *Renatus Cartesius triumphans*. At Bremen, Daniel Lipstorphius composed his: *Specimina philosophiae Cartesiana*; and there too Eberhard Schwebing refuted Huet’s treatise against Descartes. In the Royal Institute at Halle, Sperlette based his teaching upon writings of Cartesians; from Altorf, where the new views were represented by Petermann (1649-1703) and Sturm, they passed to Leipsic with the former. There they were afterwards advocated also by Michael Rhegenius and Gabriel Wagner. In 1677 T. Wagner says of Tübingen in his *Examen atheismi speculativi*, that no University suffers from a more dreadful visitation of Cartesianism. The records of Jena in 1697 contain a similar statement.

5. What Holland had done for Germany, France did for Switzerland, England, and Italy. Cartesianism was introduced into the first-named country by Rob. Chouet, who had been educated at Nîmes, and who was a professor at Saumur and afterwards at Geneva. But it did not flourish long there, for Geneva very early declared for the empiricism of Locke, which everywhere drove Descartes from the field. Descartes’ doctrines were transferred to England, chiefly through Ant.
Legrand, a Franciscan born in the beginning of the seventeenth century. He devoted his *Institutiones philosophiae*, a book that has been often reprinted, to the propagation of a doctrine which in his *Apology* (1679) he boldly defended against the theological zeal of Samuel Parker, bishop of Oxford. Samuel Clarke afterwards passed completely over to the other camp; but when he resolved to translate Rohault's *Physica*, he appears to have been more favourably inclined to Cartesianism than he was when he wrote the notes to it (*vid.* § 281, 2). Those English thinkers who afterwards adhered to Cartesianism instead of following Locke, adopted it rather as modified by Malebranche than in its original form. Among these was John Norris (1667-1711). Lastly, as regards Italy, Cartesianism found here too a footing in spite of papal censure. Especially was this the case in Naples, where it was represented by Thomaso Cornelio, born in 1614, Bornelli, born in 1608, Gregorio Caloprese, and Paolo Mattia Doria, who had come thither from Genoa. Its most characteristic advocate, however, was Michael Angelo Fardella (1650-1711), who was educated at Paris and wrought for the new philosophy in Modena, Venice, Padua, and lastly in Naples. In addition to being assailed here as everywhere else by the empiricism of the eighteenth century, Cartesianism in Naples had also to defend itself against the attacks of Giovanni Battista Vico, who was held in such honour there. The point which specially excited his hostility, was the contempt that the Cartesianists affected for history and all positive knowledge. Huët had made a similar complaint, to the effect that the Cartesianists wished to bring barbarism back again. One of the last and most zealous Cartesianists of Italy was Cardinal Gerdil (1718-1802), who played the same rôle there that Fontenelle and Mairan played in France. The two latter, however, who occupied in succession the post of secretary of the French Academy, represent the development of Cartesianism,—Fontenelle following Leibnitz and Mairan Spinoza,—while Gerdil, adhering to Malebranche, held it more nearly in its original form.

§ 269.

**Transition.**

1. The starting-point of Cartesianism necessarily leads to an extreme dualism, in which any action of mind on body or
of body on mind is an impossibility. Necessarily; for if mind essentially consists in a negative relation to the external world (in mere Being-by-itself, in doubting, and so on), it naturally follows that its opposite is the negative of mind (hence, mere Being-outside-itself, extension). The introduction of the idea of God puts an end to this dualism. The original doubt is refuted. The external world reveals itself to the mind, and it becomes possible and certain that the mind by the direction of movements can make its way into the external world. The fact that Descartes makes the doubting Ego and the Deity the fundamental principles of his philosophy, agrees very well with what was indicated above (§ 259) as the peculiar characteristic of a system of modern philosophy. The former, the starting-point, is the *principium cognoscendi*; the latter, the terminus, is the *principium essendi*. Both really show, as was demanded in the § above referred to, the relation that subsists between the two sides that are to be reconciled. They do this in entirely opposite ways, inasmuch as the former declares that the two sides are mutually exclusive, while the latter maintains that it is not so. In spite of this, however, the latter conclusion necessarily follows from the former. The result of the doubt was, to show that the two sides were mutually exclusive. Now, since, according to Descartes, the nature of substance consists in this exclusiveness, it naturally follows that those two, as excluding each other, are thought of as substances. But if both are thought of as substances, they have, as Descartes himself says, this very element in common. The meeting-point lies in their existence as substances; and as soon as the notion of substance is strictly taken, their exclusiveness must give way to their community. But it is not strictly taken until the conception of the Deity is introduced; indeed, "properly speaking," He is the only substance. Before the Deity, then, the negative relation of the two sides vanishes; the external world opens up to the thinking Ego, and is no longer closed against the realization of its ends.

2. Another result, however, also follows. If it is the nature of substances to be mutually exclusive, things which are no longer mutually exclusive can no longer be thought of as substances. Starting from the position which assigned substantial existence to individual minds and bodies, we are bound to conclude that they have none at all. This contra-
diction between premises and conclusion is unavoidable if we adopt the Cartesian point of view. If it were fully and clearly realized, it would demand and find a solution. It was not until a later age that it became necessary to express this contradiction in the pointed form of the dilemma: "Either I am, and then God is not, or God is, and I am not." But before an individual philosopher (Schelling, *vid.* § 314, 2) could thus distinctly formulate the problem for solution, the spirit of philosophy must first have learned by experience that wholly antagonistic views of the world really existed. Spinoza, in the spirit of the seventeenth century, kept firm hold of the conclusion of Cartesianism, that is, of the second part of Schelling's dilemma; while, in accordance with the tendency of the eighteenth, the thinkers of the "Enlightenment" made the Ego the central point of their systems, and decided for the former of the two alternatives. As the "epoch-making" philosopher, Descartes combined both views, although he left the contradiction unsolved, just because he did not see it clearly. Spinozism, accordingly, appears as the natural development of Cartesianism; and yet it was to Descartes that its opponents in the eighteenth century, almost without exception, professed adherence. Similarly it would not be difficult to show that both the realism and the nominalism of the Middle Ages might justly claim descent from Erigena.

3. Although it is only a clear consciousness of this contradiction that can lead to its solution, a vague feeling of its presence may suggest a way of avoiding it. The difference between the two is, that in the former the claims of both the opposing sides are fully recognised, while in the latter only one of them is firmly maintained. This means of escape lay too near the position which Descartes had reached, not to be seized upon. To arrive at a conclusion which is opposed to the point from which one started, means, however, virtually to give the latter up. If this be done not merely virtually but actually, a position is reached which involves no contradiction. As soon as we take strictly the dictum that there is, properly speaking, only one substance, we deny a substantial existence both to thinking subjects and to extended objects. Descartes himself, in virtue of a feeling of this sort, is always on the point of taking the step to pantheism. What we are bound to censure him for, is the want of thoroughness which makes him retract deductions drawn from his theories, or
weaken them by distinctions, and the want of fairness he shows in treating one of the two opposite elements differently from the other. His school is characterized by the same faults. As regards the first, viz. his want of thoroughness, while admitting that, properly speaking, God alone is substance, he qualifies this by saying that there are things of which substance may be predicated, though not univocally with God. These are "created" substances, and inasmuch as what is created is re-created every moment, this means with him substances which do not subsist for a single moment. As regards his want of fairness, he makes a distinction between the world of mind and the world of matter, that is quite inconsistent with his dualism. For he says of the former: "If we imagine the limits removed, we have infinite thought, that is, God." (From this is deduced by simple conversion the proposition, also laid down by himself and by Geulinex: "If we impose limits on infinite thought, we have individual minds.") But yet he does not venture to assert, what is equally justifiable: "If we imagine the limits removed from the world of matter, we have infinite extension, that is, God." Nor can it be said that no conclusion is to be drawn from his silence on this point. He maintains that it is only of minds, not of bodies, that our knowledge can be clear, and independent of the help of the imagination. This shows that he cannot admit that our knowledge of matter stands in the same relation to our knowledge of what is most evident of all, God, as our knowledge of mind does, i.e., that it is of such a kind that the knowledge of the finite can be deduced from the knowledge of the infinite. So, too, it was only from the existence of mind, that we could reason back to the existence of God. Thus it is minds alone that Descartes comes near to regarding as modes of infinite thought; he does not attribute this modal character to bodies. The very thing which he, a physicist, did not venture to maintain in regard to matter, one of his followers, who was a clergyman and a theologian, maintained of matter, and denied of mind.
SECOND DIVISION.

Malebranche.

§ 270.

1. Nicolas Malebranche was born in Paris on August 6th, 1638. In 1660 he entered the congregation of the Oratory, founded by Cardinal Berulle, and was there converted to Cartesianism, which had already commended itself to the founder of the Congregation. His chief work: De la Recherche de la Vérité, appeared in 1674. It was in two volumes; later editions, of which six were published in his own life-time, are arranged in four. This was followed by: Conversations Chrétiennes, 1677, occasioned by theological attacks, and undertaken at the request of the Duke of Chevreuil. In a letter to Leibnitz, however, he disclaims the authorship of these, and ascribes them to the Abbé Catelan, and the Méditations Métaphysiques to the Abbé de Lanion. His differences with the Cartesian Quesnel, who otherwise had a very great respect for him, drew Arnauld into the controversy. With the latter Malebranche fell out completely, as the result of the publication of his Traité de la Nature et de la Grâce, 1680. The Méditations Chrétiennes et Métaphysiques, 1683, roused much opposition, especially since in them the "Word," or universal reason, as mediator between the disputants, came forward to defend Malebranche's doctrines. The Traité de Morale appeared in 1684, the Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion in 1688, the Traité de l'Amour de Dieu in 1697, the Entretiens d'un Philosophe Chrétien avec un Philosophe Chinois in 1708, and the Réflexions sur la Prémotion Physique in 1715. As almost all his writings were exposed to a host of attacks, he also composed many controversial treatises. These are contained partly in the later editions of his works, partly in a four-volume collection which he prepared in 1709. In 1715 he fell ill in consequence, it is supposed, of a metaphysical discussion with Berkeley, and died on the 15th of October in that year. A collected edition of his works appeared at Paris: Œuvres Complètes, etc., xi. vols., 12mo, 1712.

2. In giving an account of Malebranche's philosophy, we shall be quite justified in confining ourselves to his chief work, the Search for Truth. The contents of his other
writings, with the exception of: *Entret. sur la Mtt. et sur la Religion*, are almost exclusively of theological interest; and where he varies from his chief work he often appears to have become inconsistent, through dread of Jansenist and other heresies. Although many of these inconsistencies, such as his polemic against Quesnel and Arnauld, gained him the momentary applause of the Jesuits, still men who followed him closely, like the Benedictine Dom François Lami, saw that he was repudiating truths upon which his own doctrines rested. The end which Malebranche set before himself in his chief work, was first to discover the sources of all our errors (Books 1–5), and then to show how these can be avoided (Book 6). Like Descartes, he recognises an opposition between knowledge and will,—an opposition to which he finds a parallel in the capacity of extended things for being formed and for being moved,—and assigns to the latter the assent without which error would be impossible. Still following Descartes, he next distinguishes sense, imagination, and understanding in the theoretical part of conduct, and inclinations and passions in the practical part. Understanding and inclination he supposes to belong to mind as such, and the three others only to mind when united with a body. Keeping to the above order, and devoting a book to each, he now inquires in how far these five may become occasions of error.

3. The twenty chapters of the *first book*, which treat of the senses, start from the proposition that these have been given to us in order to help to preserve the body. It is in accordance with this purpose that they give us information, not so much in regard to the nature of things, as in regard to the relation of things to us. A distinction must be observed between three things which most people confuse:—the motion and configuration of the body that affects us, the concussion which the organ of sense, the nerves, and their vital spirits experience, and lastly the sensation, which does not lie in the object, nor in the body, but in our soul. If this be duly observed, it will be easy to make a proper use of the senses, for example when we feel a burn, to remove the burnt place from the fire, but to distrust them where they wish to mislead us into passing judgment on the nature of things. This nature of things is not revealed to us through the senses, but through thought, which tells us that the nature of things consists in extension, while most people believe it to consist
in the qualities warm, yellow, soft, and so on, which really exist only in our own soul. Those who understand by matter, as most do, merely the sum of these qualities, are fully justified in questioning whether any matter exists outside of ourselves. The _second book_ treats of the imagination; its twenty-two chapters are divided into three parts (eight, eight, and six). The ideas (phantasms) of the imaginative faculty are, like sensations, merely conditions of the soul. They are distinguished from sensations, inasmuch as the concussions of the vital spirits which occasion them, are not called forth by the organs of sense being affected, but arise, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the central parts of the body. What Malebranche says further on this point, is in part extremely interesting, but is marked by nothing characteristic.

4. In this latter respect the _third book_ forms a contrast to what precedes it. It is divided into fifteen chapters, of which four belong to the first and eleven to the second part, and treats of the understanding or pure spirit, as opposed to spirit in union with the body. The nature of spirit consists in thought, which is inseparable from spirit as extension is from body. It always thinks, and never thinks more in one instant than in another. Thought and consciousness here coincide so completely, that sometimes, instead of spirit or soul, he speaks of "this Ego" (_ce moi_). By the help of thought the spirit can get rid of everything else—of feeling and imagination, which are modifications of thought, and even of will, which is its accompaniment; only thought itself remains. The first object of thought is God, the Infinite Being or, what is the same thing, Being in general, Existence without any limitation, which for this very reason is not an individual being. This infinite being, which it would be an absurdity to think of as non-existent, is the first and absolute Intelligible. To form a correct conception of it, it will not do to regard one side of it only, as they do who call God a spirit. This is correct so far as He is not a body. But just as little is He a spirit in the sense in which man is. We must beware of making God in the image of man. In God are all perfections, including that in which bodies participate and of which they are modifications—extension, the infinity of which is a proof that it cannot be predicated of merely finite things. In its entirety and infinity it is called by Malebranche intelligible extension. God, as uniting in Himself all perfections, is His own object
and His own end; in the former respect, He manifests Himself as wisdom, in the latter as love to Himself. Both are inseparable from His nature; and accordingly God knows and loves Himself to all eternity, necessarily and unchangeably. Since everything which exists, exists solely through participation in being in general, everything is contained intelligibly (that is, as an idea) in the wisdom of God, or His knowledge of Himself; and the intelligible existence or idea of a thing is nothing else than a participation in, or modification of, one of the Divine perfections. The ideas of things, that is, the nature of things as God beholds it within Himself, exhibit accordingly a regular succession, in which, for example, the idea of body contains less perfection than that of spirit. Just as God sees within Himself the ideas or entities; so He sees all their relations to one another, that is, all truths. Both of these, as they unite to form the Divine wisdom, are of course as independent of God’s good pleasure, as His own existence is; they are necessary and eternal. To do as Descartes did, and make them something quite arbitrary, means to declare that all science is impossible (cf. Éclaircissem. x.). The ideas of things are also an object of human thought, where it is real knowledge. People very often confuse ideas with impressions, or with mental images which have been called forth by these, and which do not in any way resemble the eternal prototypes of things. Or again, since it is by our own will that we make ideas present to ourselves, it is sometimes supposed that they are produced by us. The state of the case rather is, that our will is merely the occasion for their presence. Properly speaking, they do not exist in us, but we exist in that which the ideas unite to compose, the wisdom of God or Himself, which, or who, contains the spirits of men, just as space contains bodies. The ideas of things accordingly, are always present to us; we simply do not notice their presence, because we direct our attention to what passes away. If we turn away, and refuse to be distracted by the objects of sense, we again become conscious of the ideas. To know things means, then, to see their ideas, that is, themselves in God, who sees them eternally within Himself, and allows us to participate in this seeing of His, or enlightens us. Besides the infinite Being, of whom we have an idea that is not perfect, indeed, but clear and distinct, the physical world is an object of our knowledge. If we do not confusedly
ascribe to bodies what belongs not to them but to ourselves, we cannot regard them as anything but various limitations of infinite extension. To look upon them in this light, means to know them in their ideas, or, what is the same thing, to see them in God, since all our ideas are only limitations of the idea of God. Accordingly, there is a scientific and purely rational knowledge of bodies; and Malebranche has no doubt that physics will one day rest upon the same evidence that geometry does. This is the most suitable place to insert the propositions in which Malebranche gives an account of his Physics. These are contained in the second part of the sixth book. In regard to what constitutes their nature, extension, bodies are of course all alike. They become different from one another through the interference of motion, in which alone consists even the distinction between the living and the dead. Since motion does not lie in the nature of matter, it is imparted to it by God, and lasts just so long as God continues to impart it, or wills it. But because God Himself is one and unchangeable, unchangeableness and simplicity are necessarily predicated of the laws of nature, i.e. of motion. That God everywhere employs the simplest means, is with Malebranche an established axiom, to which he continually returns; especially is this the case in his theories of evil and of providence. God could not have lessened the number of evils, except in a very complicated way. Herein consists Malebranche's optimism or faith in Divine justice, which explains his delight at Leibnitz's theological views (vid. § 288, 7), a delight which found expression in his letters to Leibnitz, published by Cousin. Similarly, he believes that providence must be limited to what is general, i.e., to that for which the simplest methods suffice. Both theories drew down upon him many attacks. Since motion is imparted to bodies from without, he urges that one body does not communicate its motion to another, but that God takes it from the one and gives it to the other. This was also the reason why in his physical philosophy, which is quite as mechanical as that of Descartes, and in which he carries the theory of vortices still further by applying it to the particles of the first element, he differed in an essential point from his master. In a work written thirty years later than the Recherche, he attributes the errors in the laws of motion which Descartes laid down, and the untenability of his fundamental proposition, that the sum
of motion always remains the same, to the fact that he conceived of rest as a positive power, and not as a mere privation. This implies the censure, that a peculiar power is assigned to bodies, and the exclusive causality of God denied. The latter is emphasized by Malebranche, as it had been by Descartes, in the formula of Augustine, that preservation is continual creation. In the fact that he is in agreement both with the great father of the Church and with the epoch-making philosopher, he finds an ever-fresh proof of that agreement between philosophy and religion which he tries to establish in many of his writings. At the point where, as already indicated (vid. § 144, 4), Augustinism approaches pantheism, Malebranche feels it necessary, when he afterwards becomes acquainted with Spinoza, to state explicitly the difference between their doctrines. According to him, he says in the Entretiens, the universum is in God; according to Spinoza, God is in universo.

5. The result of the superior rank which Malebranche assigns to spirits as compared with bodies is, that his mental philosophy does not, like that of Descartes, form an exact parallel to his physics. God, he says, and perhaps we ourselves in a future life, can conceive of spirits in God or through ideas, that is, as modifications of infinite thought. Then we shall have a perfectly clear and distinct knowledge of them. At present this is not the case. We know of our own existence only through an inward, and a very confused feeling; so that the Cartesians maintain just the opposite of the truth, when they say that spirits are better known to us than bodies. It is not so with our own spirit, much less then with those of others, the existence and character of which we can only infer by conjecture. It was probably his consciousness of the worth of the redeemed Christian soul, that made him afterwards condemn Spinoza so utterly. For in the pantheism of the latter, spirits become modifications of infinite thought, exactly as with Malebranche bodies became limitations of extension. And yet, as Mairan points out to him in the interesting letters published by Cousin, Malebranche, not only in his “intelligible matter,” but elsewhere too, approaches very near to what so roused his wrath in the writings of that “miserable.” Especially is this the case in the fourth book. Here he treats in thirteen chapters of the practical side of pure spirit, or its natural motions, the inclinations. Just as
our knowledge consists in our participation in the ideas or eternal truths, so too the exercise of our will consists in our being carried along by the love with which God loves. This love has only God Himself for its object, since God loves things only so far as He loves Himself; and so all our will is really love to God. There is no exercise of will at all, which would not involve love to the bien en général, to happiness. But as God is the good in general, just as He was existence in general, and as happiness lies in Him alone, even the most perverse exercise of will is always love to God, mistaken love though it may be. Whence these mistakes arise, how they can attach themselves to love for the good in general, to love for our own well-being, and lastly to love for others—all this is explained in great detail in this book. We do not need to enter particularly into the explanation; here too the injunction continually recurs, to approve only of what is quite clearly known.

6. The fifth book treats, in twelve chapters, of the passions. He passes on to this subject with the remark that the spirit, besides its connection with God, by which it participates in God's knowledge and in His love to Himself, stands to the body in a relation which is no less essential and necessary. We have not a clear and rational knowledge of this connection, as we have of that with God; we know of it only through an instinct de sentiment. Still it subsists; nor is it to be regarded as a consequence of the Fall, although it must be admitted that the inclination to submit entirely to the dominion of the senses, has become greater since then. It was God that united the spirit with the body, but the spirit is itself responsible for its state of subjection. God has not, as many suppose, ordered this connection in such a way that, in consequence of it, the body exerts influence on the soul and the soul on the body, for that would be an utter impossibility. He has rather so ordered it, that on the occasion of our exercising our will, He moves our arm. He has pledged Himself to do this, and He raises our arm, even if our will be contrary to His commands. Semel jussit semper paret. (Malebranche's arguments for Occasionalism are often almost word for word in agreement with those of Geulincx; because he contributed so much to the diffusion of this theory, he is still regarded in many quarters as the author of it.) We saw that through this connection with the body, a distinction arises between
pure ideas and those which are mingled with the products of sense and imagination. Corresponding to this, there is a distinction between the purely mental or spiritual inclinations, and the raising of these to passions through the movement of the vital spirits. Not merely in this definition, but also in the arrangement of the passions, Malebranche is in complete agreement with Descartes. Wonder, in which, according to both, the concussion of the vital spirits does not reach the outer parts of the body, is called by Malebranche an imperfect passion, the others are called real passions. All are traced back to love and aversion as the passions mères, in fact, properly speaking, to love alone, since aversion is inconceivable without love. With express reference to what had been said of the senses, the purpose of the passions is declared to be to serve the economy of the body. They free the soul from the care of the body, and give it time to occupy itself with higher things. In this, as in the former case, the soul falls into errors, through giving its assent without clear knowledge, and through making no distinction between what is familiar (familiers) and what is thoroughly known (clair). Malebranche, accordingly, as little as Descartes, admits the existence of innocent error. But, as might be expected from the religious tendency of his teaching, he insists much more strongly upon the conclusion that freedom from error is identical with deliverance from sin, in other words, is enlightenment. There could be no difficulty in accepting such a conclusion, since God was "the place of all spirits."

7. In the sixth book, which falls into two parts of five and nine chapters respectively, he treats of the method of seeking for truth. Here he again insists that the only real cause is God, that we know only because He enlightens us, and feel only because He modifies our thought; he then goes on to point out that all depends upon one thing—we must give our assent only to that to which we cannot refuse it without being reproached by our reason. Inattention and narrowness of mind are therefore the greatest enemies of truth. Rules are given, how both ought to be met; and it is repeatedly pointed out how these have been followed by Descartes and neglected by Aristotle. In this book, too, the thought several times re-appears, that since there is only one end for God, namely Himself, our destiny can only be to know Him and to love Him. Knowledge of the truth, such as is attained in mathe-
matics and metaphysics, and the wish to act virtuously, are accordingly means to lead us to the highest end, to union with God. That this end may be reached by all, even by the spiritually gross and coarse, for whom the senses are the highest authority, God has condescended to make Himself comprehensible even to the senses. For fools, He has Himself become to some extent foolish, in order that He may make them wise (Book v. 5).

8. Although the views of Malebranche were not received with the same extraordinary enthusiasm as Occasionalism had been, yet a considerable number of Cartesians adopted them. The first that deserve mention are Thomassin (1619–95), Bern. Lami (1645–1715), and lastly Levassor, who translated some of his works into English. The last-named, however, by abjuring Catholicism, provided Malebranche’s enemies with material for calumny. Along with these came the Benedictine Dom François Lami (1636–1711), and even a Jesuit, Père André (1675–1764). Both of these, however, declare against him at the point where he shows a semi-Pelagian tendency. Outside of France, the English thinker, John Norris, deserves special mention. Nor was there any lack of opponents, even apart from those who disagreed with him on theological grounds. Those who had opposed Cartesianism in its earlier form, had now of course to argue against Malebranche also. Prominent among these was Foucher, canon of Dijon (1644–1696), whose scepticism reminds us of Montaigne. Less important is the Jesuit Detertre, whose sudden revolt from Malebranche is somewhat suspicious. Still less important is Faydit (died 1709), notorious as the “Zoilus” of Malebranche. But he was also attacked from the Cartesian point of view, especially by Regis, against whom he defended himself in a printed letter. Hardly was Malebranche dead, when the sensationalism that took its rise with Locke, began to be supreme in France. The struggle against it was kept up by Malebranche’s disciples Lelevel, René Fédé, Lanion (who used the nom de plume of Wander), Claude Lefort de Morinière, and Miron. But it was the vain struggle of reaction against a new and a justifiable principle.

§ 271.

The system of Malebranche is supplementary to the whole
of Cartesianism, including Occasionalism. Descartes had hinted, and Goulincx had expressly declared, that minds were only modifications of God. Here we have the consistently developed doctrine of bodies as modifications of infinite (i.e. Divine) extension. The two former refuse to admit of matter what Malebranche refuses to admit of mind. This difference is explained by the fact that according to Descartes, it is only of spirits, according to Malebranche, only of bodies, that it is possible to have a perfectly evident, pure, and rational knowledge, free from the disturbing influence of sense and imagination. There was a subjective ground for this. To the mathematician and physicist, the material world appeared the most substantial; to the pious theologian, the world of spirits. Further, Malebranche was not enthralled so completely as Descartes by the dualism which the substantial existence of minds and of bodies demanded. He admits that one class is more than the other, and is thus not on the same level with it, but above it. Physical and mental philosophy are no longer co-ordinate parts of the whole system. Accordingly the one-sidedness with which he meets and supplements that of Descartes, is much more emphatic; he is much more one-sided than his master. But he is so only because he was more bold in deducing the pantheistic results consequent upon Descartes’ adoption of Augustine’s theory of perpetual creation, i.e. of God as the sole cause. The philosopher who forms the culminating point of this period, the thinker who brought Cartesianism to its fullest development, deduced these results in their completeness; and in doing so he avoided leaning to one side or the other after the manner of his predecessors. For this reason Malebranche had to be discussed before him, although the more advanced results were deduced, but not published, earlier.

THIRD DIVISION.

Spinoza.

§ 272.

Colerus: *La vie de B. de Spinoza.* The Hague, 1706. (A translation from the Dutch. The original appeared in 1705. Owing to a confusion with Fr. Holma’s Dutch translation of the article in Bayle’s Dictionary, Colerus’ book has been assigned by many to the year 1698.) *La vie de Spinoza par un de ses disciples.* Amst., 1719. 2nd ed., Hamb., 1735. This is merely the rarer part of the work by the physician Lucas: *La vie
et l’esprit de Mons. Benoît de Spinoza. The other portion has been published several times under various titles, as Liber de tribus impostoribus, as Spinosa II., and so on.

1. Baruch de Spinoza was born, according to the ordinary account, which Böhmer doubts, at Amsterdam on Nov. 24th, 1632. The signature Despinoza also occurs in his letters; and the name is sometimes written de Espinoza, while in all three forms an s is frequently substituted for the z. He belonged to a well-to-do household of “Portuguese” Jews; for this term was applied even to Spanish Jews, like the Spinoza family. His gifts were early recognised, and he was accordingly entrusted to the care of the Rabbi Moses Morteira, a thinker who sought, in a way that reminds us of the Schoolmen, to bring about a reconciliation between philosophy and Judaism, and who in this semi-Rationalism was a follower of Maimonides. The pupil remained faithful to his master only in his anti-mystic (anti-cabalistic) tendencies. On other points he separated himself from him at an early period, because his rationalism was not sufficiently thorough-going. He was especially opposed to placing Aristotelian interpretations on the text of Scripture, and accordingly Ibn Ezra appeared to him a preferable authority to Maimonides. Spinoza got his first lessons in Latin from a German. Afterwards, in order to acquire classical culture, he entered a kind of school, presided over by the physician Franz van den Ende, notorious on account of his heterodoxy. At the same time he was instructed in the natural sciences by the physician Ludwig Meyer, and in this study he was perhaps assisted by Oldenburg. The circumstance that Meyer was a zealous Cartesian renders it probable that Spinoza now began to study the works of Descartes, and also the writings of the Cartesians. We know for certain that he read Heerebord’s books. Apart from the fact that the natural bent of his mind made him less liable than Descartes to limit himself to physics, he must have been repelled by the way in which the theories of the latter were adapted to the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Added to this was the impression made upon him by the so-called (§ 190) Jewish Aristotelians. (Cf. Joël: Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza’s. Bresl., 1871.) Lastly, the early acquaintance which Sigwart surmises, and Avenarius asserts, that he had with Giordano Bruno, is a fact that deserves to be noted. Still the impression that Cartesianism made on Spinoza was
very powerful. It considerably modified his views in other respects than mere form. The gradual estrangement from the synagogue which all this produced, finally led, in 1656, to his expulsion by an anathema of August 6, the Spanish text of which has been preserved. A protest against it, written in Spanish, contained, according to some, the outlines of the doctrine which Spinoza afterwards developed in his *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. It cannot have contained more than the outlines; for had Spinoza thus early placed Moses and Christ in the same relation as he does in the *Tract. theol. polit.*, he would hardly have protested against his exclusion. (Joël has shown how much besides in this work had been said before Spinoza's day by Maimonides and other Jewish scholars.) Neither at this time nor afterwards did he, so far as is known, formally become a convert to Christianity, although he often attended Christian sermons. He even took part in a petition concerning the appointment of a preacher, and he lies buried in a church. Baruch, or, as he now called himself, Benedictus, remained at first in or near Amsterdam. It is probable that as early as this there began the formation of that circle, chiefly of Jews, to whom Spinoza afterwards communicated his works in duplicate as they gradually progressed, and to whom he so often speaks of "our philosophy." To this circle belonged Ludwig Meyer, Simon de Vries, G. H. Schuller, and afterwards Tschirnhausen, in short, quite a number of prominent men. He had besides a great deal of intercourse with Arminians condemned by the Synod of Dort. One of them received him into his house. His relations with these "Collegiants," or "Rhynsburgers," date from an early period. Perhaps this contributed to his expulsion from the city in 1660 by the magistrate, at the instigation of the Reformed clergy, who joined hands with the synagogue. After this he himself lived for a long time in Rhynsburg, where he maintained himself by polishing lenses, but was chiefly occupied with his studies. A letter to Oldenburg shows what his opinion of Cartesianism was as early as 1661. His own views can be gathered from his *Tractatus brevis de Deo*, etc., written for his friends in Amsterdam. Van Vlooten has published this in a Dutch translation, and in an unfortunately not very successful re-translation into Latin, in his: *Ad Bened. de Spinoza Opera quae supersunt omnia Supplementum*, Amst., 1862. The first part of the appendix to this *Tractatus*, and
still more the beginning of the *Ethics*, as far as the 9th proposition, agree substantially with the small treatise which Spinoza sent to Oldenburg in the above-mentioned year. (Cf. Ed. Böhmer: *B. de Spin. Tract. de Deo et homine*, etc. Hal. 1852, 4to, and particularly Chr. Sigwart: *Spinoza’s neu entdecker Tractat.*, etc., Gotha, 1866, and Trendelenburg in his: *Historische Beitr. zur Phil.*, iii., pp. 277–398.) In this *Tractatus*, he does not yet quite adopt the position afterwards taken up in his chief work. Thus, he still admits the existence of a real connection between soul and body—a connection which he afterwards denies, and is bound to deny, in accordance with his theory of the attributes of substance. It follows from this, that the latter theory must at first have been held in a different form. His doctrines were communicated only to those whom he believed to be discreet and strong-minded. Accordingly, when a young man, probably the one who lived at the time in the same house with him, Alb. Burgh, asked him to instruct him in philosophy, he dictated to him the chief points of the Cartesian philosophy. These jottings were amplified at the request of L. Meyer, and published by the latter in 1663 as: *Rev. des Cartes Principia philosophiae more geometrico demonstrata per Benedictum de Spinoza, accesserunt ejusdem Cogitata metaphysica*. Even the *Cogitata* did not contain Spinoza’s own views. In order to prevent this work producing the impression that the suspected individual was a Cartesian, the real Cartesians began from this time to persecute him in every way. In 1664 he removed to Vorburg, always busied with the development of his system. In 1665 he was working at the third part of it, and was able to lay eighty propositions before one of the Amsterdam circle, J. B. (Bresser,?). The copies which his friends took of what he sent them, were, of course, word for word; but Spinoza’s correspondence shows that many misleading clerical errors had crept even into these. On the other hand, he himself, when he communicated in writing single propositions from his system, seems to have exercised great freedom in regard to individual expressions. Continual alterations were made in matters of detail. (Thus, as Vlooten’s *Supplem.* now shows, the reference in Simon de Vries’ letter of Feb. 24th, 1663, was originally to *Schol. tert. prop. 8*, which does not correspond to the *Ethics* in its present form, and not to *Schol. prop. 10, lib. i.*, to which it was corrected before publication. Thus
it is no longer possible to argue, as was formerly done with apparent good reason, that the first book of the Ethics, and much less that the whole work, was completed in 1663.) These alterations explain why references to previous statements are so often inaccurate. But the plan of the whole had been decided upon, and perhaps the five parts of the Ethics finished, when he yielded to the entreaties of his friends, and in 1670 took up his abode at the Hague. Here he lived with the painter Van der Speyk, who drew his portrait, and who is also said to have instructed him successfully in his art. The change of residence occurred in the same year as the (anonymous) publication of his Tractatus theologicopoliticus. It purports to be printed at Hamburg and published by Heinr. Künraht, this being a device to disguise Christoph Konrad, of Amsterdam. This frequently reprinted work caused a great outcry, especially among theologians. About the same time his patron De Witt, who had always urged him to print, met his death. These occurrences made Spinoza, who had a great regard for his own peace of mind, and also for the conscientious feelings of others, entirely give up his plan of publishing anything else. For the same reasons he also declined in 1672 the professorship at Heidelberg, which was offered him. Only once, in 1675, he seems to have made up his mind to publish the Ethics, manuscript copies of which were in the hands of not a few people. The talk which this announcement created, made him give up the idea. Consumptive symptoms showed themselves more and more decidedly, and he set about preparing for death. He arranged that the Ethics should be printed, but that merely his initials, and not his full name, should be prefixed to it; posterity has disregarded his wish that his system should not be called after him. Other writings he burned, including a translation of the Pentateuch. His life, which had been in every respect an exemplary one, came to a close on February 21st, 1677. (This date, like that given for his birth, is the usually accepted one.) In the same year there appeared in a quarto volume: B.D.S. Opera posthuma, mdcclxxvii.* This

* It has been newly discovered (Vid. Ludwig Stein: Neue Aufschlüsse über d. Herausg. v. Op. posth. Spin. in Archiv für Gesch. d. Philos. Bd. i., Heft 4) that not Meyer and Jelles, but Georg Hermann Schuller was the real editor of the Opera posthuma. Stein also contends that the Prefatio was composed by Meyer, not merely Latinized by him from Jelles' Dutch.—Ed.
contains the five books of *Ethica*, the unfinished *Tractatus politicus*, the likewise unfinished *De intellectus emendatione tractatus*, which was written before the *Ethics*, but after the *Tract. brev.*, *Epistole et Responsiones*, and the unfinished *Compendium grammatices linguae hebraeae*. The first complete edition of Spinoza's works is that of Dr. Paulus: *Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quae supersunt omnia*. 2 vols. Jena, 1802–3. Gfrorer's unfortunately unfinished collection: *Corpus philosophorum optime notae*, Stuttgart, 1830, contains all his writings, including even the Hebrew Grammar. Lastly, in 1843, C. H. Bruder published a stereotyped edition in three small volumes (Leipz. Tauchnitz). Unfortunately it is not much more correct than that of Paulus. Uniform with this appeared the *Supplementum* mentioned above. Besides the *Tractatus brevis de Deo*, etc., it contains a short mathematical treatise on the rainbow, which was supposed by many to have been among the manuscripts destroyed. As a matter of fact it has been in existence in print since 1687, although this early edition is extremely rare. In addition to these, the *Supplementum* has some additional notices of his life from a Dutch MS., and also some *Letters* hitherto unprinted. Böhmer (Fichte's *Zeitschr.*, vol. 42) and Trendelenburg have shown how bad the Latin translation of the *Tractatus* is. The German one by Chr. Sigwart, Tübing., 1870, has its value much enhanced by the addition of explanations and parallel passages. Of translations of Spinoza's philosophical works, the French one by Saisset is far preferable to the German one by Auerbach. Of the innumerable monographs on Spinoza, F. H. Jacobi: *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Mendelssohn*, 1787, still deserves to be mentioned, as it laid the foundation of a thorough study of Spinoza in Germany. The literature of the subject is pretty exhaustively catalogued in Antonius van der Linde: *Spinoza*, Göttingen, 1862. To the list there given should be added the article by Böhmer already referred to, which was written later. It is called *Spinozana* ii., and is in the 42nd vol. of Fichte's *Zeitschrift*. This contains a very thorough explanation of one of the most difficult points, forming a sequel to *Spinozana* i., *Ibid.*, vol. 36, and being itself continued under the same title in vol. 57.

2. The fact that Spinoza employs the geometrical method both in his account of the principles of Cartesianism and in his own chief work, may be regarded as an acknowledge-
ment, that it was through Descartes that he was led to the thoroughly mathematical view of things, which is characteristic of him, and which must never be lost sight of, unless the difficulty of understanding his doctrines is to be much increased. Philosophical and mathematical certainty are with him synonymous (Tract. theol. polit., c. 14, 36). For no other reason than because it is a necessary consequence of the mathematical way of looking at things, the geometrical form of proofs is of great significance, even where the proofs themselves are insipid and marred by inaccuracies. Every point of view not recognised in mathematics is expressly rejected by Spinoza as inadmissible. Foremost among these is the teleological. In order to preserve this, Aristotle had declared a mathematical view of physics to be inadequate (cf. § 88, 1). Spinoza, on the other hand, will not admit the conception of an end even in Ethics. He is never weary of scoffing at those who demand a God that works towards ends, who commit the ὁπέρ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς of explaining things by their ends, or who introduce the confused idea of obligation into human conduct. He expressly extols mathematics because non circa fines versatur (Eth. i., Append.), and recommends it as a model. Everything, even the various aspects of human activity, is to be regarded exactly as if it were a question of lines, planes, and solids (Eth. i., pr. 33, Schol. 2. iii., pref.). Just as mathematics knows nothing of the idea of an end, so the idea of causality is utterly foreign to it. There we hear nothing of the actual production of effects, which cannot be conceived of without transference, but merely of conditions. Instead of causes, mathematics has reasons; instead of effects, consequences. This is exactly Spinoza’s attitude. The expression causa, and even causa efficiens, occurs in his writings (Eth i., prop. 16, Coroll.). But his often repeated polemic against the causa being conceived of as transiens; the explanatory remark, when efficere was predicated of anything, that it means ex ejus definitione (so Eth. i., pr. 16, dem.), or even ex eo sequitur (i., prop. 7, dem., and elsewhere); the continually recurring reference to the illustration of the triangle, from the nature or definition of which this thing or the other follows—all these show clearly that he knows nothing of actual causal connection, but merely of being conditioned by a logically prior or auxiliary conception. Accordingly he connects causa and ratio by seu (i., pr. 11;
dem. alii.). Just as space neither contemplates nor causes figures, but certainly conditions them, since figure cannot be conceived of without space, so Spinoza recognises no other conception of the conditioned than that it presupposes something else: conceptum alterius rei involvit (Eth. i., ax. 4). In accordance with this principle, wherever the conception of one thing presupposes (præsupponit, involvit) that of another, he forthwith defines the former as conditioned by the latter, as its effectus (cf. Eth. ii., pr. 5, dem.). Closely connected with this polemic against all transitio, is the similar one against all real succession, against time, which he looks upon as merely a confused idea. Averroës, whose opinions may have been familiar to Spinoza through the commentaries on his work by Maimonides, and through Gersonides, had made (vid. § 187, 2.) the philosopher take his stand in the heart of eternity, where before and after completely disappear, and where all that is possible is regarded as already actual. Spinoza follows him almost literally in demanding that the philosopher should view everything sub specie aeternitatis (ii., pr. 44, Cor. 2), i.e. in perfect freedom from the limits of time (i., def. 8). This naturally implies, that he views everything simul (de int. em. xiv.), i.e., without a real, and in merely a logical succession.

3. Accordingly, the starting-point of his philosophy is not the creator of the world, not even the fundamental cause of all things, but the logical presupposition of all that exists,—that in virtue of which alone everything else can become an object of thought, and which itself does not require for its conception the antecedent conception of anything else. This is the only meaning of his causa sui (i., def. 1). The phrase has no reference, as it had with Descartes, to an actual process of self-creation. In the Tract. brev., Spinoza had scoffed at such an idea, and therefore at the causa sui; in the Tract. de int. emend. he is willing to accept this (vulgo) current expression, provided it be taken to mean simply what is in se, that is, not in alio. In this sense, and in this sense alone, it is adopted in the Ethics. The best translation of causa sui in Spinoza is: the unconditioned. This he finds in the one Substance wherein all things consist. This Substance alone exists, it combines in itself omne esse; and therefore it would be an absurdity to conceive it as non-existent (i., def. 3, de int. emend. ix.). Although he calls this Substance God, it must
not be forgotten that he expressly declares that he attaches a
very different meaning to this word from that attached to it
by his Christian contemporaries; further, that he uses Deus and
Natura quite indifferently; and finally, that he joins by hoc est
the sentences: "God is one," and: "The Substance wherein
all things consist, is one" (Ep. 21, Eth. iv., Praef. i., pr. 14,
Coroll. 1). (Those who attach a religious significance to the
word God, ought accordingly, in reading Spinoza, always to
substitute Natura for Deus.) The unity of Substance is not
to be conceived of as numerical, for number presupposes a
higher genus, but as absolute oneness (Ep. 50). Since there
is no real existence, except Substance, and since anything
defined, or limited, or determined, or finite (all four words
mean just the same in Spinoza), only exists because it is
limited by another thing of the same nature, e.g., a figure by
other figures (cf. Eth. i., def. 2), it follows that Substance is
infinite. In regard to this word, Spinoza insists, as Descartes
had done before him, that in spite of the negative prefix,
infinity is a positive conception. For all determination is
negation, inasmuch as it draws a line between the thing de-
termined and everything else, e.g. a figure (Ep. 50). Further,
it states a non-esse, a defectus (Ep. 41). Accordingly, that
which, like Substance, is simply an affirmation of existence
(Eth. i., pr. 8, Schol.), must naturally be conceived of without
this negation, and therefore as infinite in the positive sense of
the word (ibid., i., pr. 8, Schol.). Since "without limitations"
means the same thing as "infinite," we may also use "perfect"
instead of either. It is so used in the Tract. brev. (p. 22),
where non esse accordingly appears as omnium imperfectionum
maxima (p. 56). That which is absolutely undetermined, is
determined neither in regard to its existence nor in regard to
its results. That is, where it produces an effect, it does so
without being compelled. What he here opposes to com-
pulsion, Spinoza calls necessity quite as often as freedom
(ibid. i., def. 7), and says, in accordance with this principle,
"God acts (agit) without compulsion, and He is a free cause"
(ibid., p. 17). If we reflect that Spinoza is never weary of
denying that God acts with freedom of will, and that he uses
ex eo sequitur for agit as frequently as we saw that he did for
efficit, it becomes clear that libere here merely means "of
Himself," or, "without compulsion," and agere about as much
as "making" or "causing" does with us, when we say:
"The nature of the triangle makes or causes its angles to be, etc." On the whole, then, Spinoza always maintains that the same necessity which requires the existence of God, demands that everything should result from Him (iv., praefat.), i.e., maintains that His being and His activity coincide.

4. The correlative to the absolutely unconditioned, or Substance, is the merely conditioned. To this, Spinoza often (e.g. Ep. 4) applies the Aristotelian name of accidens, but usually the Cartesian one of modus. He also calls it modificatio, or affectio. He explains mode to mean that which is in something else, so that it can only be conceived by the help of this something (i., def. 5), or requires this something as a preliminary or pre-existing conception (i., pr. 8, Schol.). Infinite space is the pre-existing condition of a definite figure, and can be thought of without the help of the figure; but the converse is not true. Similarly, thought cannot rid itself of Substance, but may rid itself of mode in which Substance certo et determinato modo expressa est; it is possible to conceive as non-existent what exists definitely, impossible to do so with existence itself (i., pr. 24, Ep. 28). For this reason eternity, i.e. existence as a result of the definition, belongs only to Substance, not to modes. Similarly, Substance is the unity that excludes all plurality, while there are many modes, etc. In short, the predicates attached to Substance and to modes are of such opposite kinds, that Spinoza himself compares the difference between the two to that between straight and crooked. They are diametrically opposed to each other, as correlatives must be. And further, as is also characteristic of correlatives, they suggest one another, a relation which Spinoza expresses by calling Substance the causa (not transiens, however, but immansens) of the modifications, of which it is said to be at once the cause and the sum-total. In spite of the fact that it has been criticized as childish, my comparison of this relation to that between the ocean and the ever-vanishing waves, seems to me quite as justifiable as the one made by Spinoza himself in the Tract. brev., where it is likened to that between the understanding and the ideas of which the latter is the sum, or as the other in the Ethics, according to which Substance is related to the modes, in the same way that a line is related to the points which exist in it (as possible). Now, if Spinoza in many passages maintains that nothing really exists except Substance and its changing forms
or modifications, the question arises—What place is there in his system for individual things, the res particularis, of which he very often speaks? Spinoza himself associates the most various meanings with the word res. But if one understands, as we would do here, by individual objects or things, beings which exist and persist independently, then properly speaking Spinozism does not admit that there are things at all. We only come to things by giving independence to the modes which are essentially dependent, by disregarding what constitutes their nature—the fact that they are merely in something else. In this abstract way of looking at them, we alter them just as, in one of the similes employed, frost would change the waves into lumps of ice, or, in the other, a needle cutting the line would change it into points. Spinoza gives the name of imagination to this partial and fragmentary way of regarding things (vid. infra, sub. 11); and we must accordingly say that imagination alone makes (independent) things out of (dependent) modes. The mere sum-total of individual things is called the world (of sense) in ordinary phraseology, and by Kant too, who opposes it to Nature. If we adopt this view, Jacobi and Hegel are right in maintaining, especially in contrast with those who reproached Spinoza with having deified the world, that he had rather denied its existence altogether. If we accept with a slight modification the illustration which Spinoza himself employed, and liken Substance and its modes to a plane surface and the figures which can be drawn within it, the process characteristic of imagination may be compared with the division of the plane surface into an infinite number of minute squares, each of which would represent what we, in Spinoza's language, call a res particularis or even individuum. If it be asked what is the condition (causa proxima) of the existence of such a square, it is certainly not the infinitely extended plane in which it is, but the other squares which enclose it. This makes perfectly intelligible Spinoza's assertions that no finite thing results from God, or has Him for its (immediate) cause, but that each in turn is conditioned by finite things, and these again by finite things, so that the finite results only from the finite (i., prop. 28). And further, that every individual thing, insomuch as it is conditioned by another, is under restraint, and is accordingly not free or necessary, that it contains an element of chance which cannot be deduced from its definition or a priori, but can only be
realized by the help of experience, i.e. imagination (ii., pr. 31, Coroll. Ep. 28). The illustration just employed makes it very easy for us to understand the position of Spinoza, when he defends himself so vigorously against the accusation that he makes Substance consist of a combination of things, and yet elsewhere calls things parts of nature (Epp. 40, 29, 15). To make Substance a combination of things would be to him just as absurd as (i.e., not less so, but not more so, than) to say that the line is a combination of points. In our own illustration, every square can be called a part of the plane surface, and yet no one could say that the plane was formed by a combination of the squares. For, in the first place, they were not there prior to it; and further, in order to have the plane surface, we must remove in thought the sides of the squares, that is, the squares as such. Things as such, then, are products of a limited apprehension; things are in fact modifications which give definite expression to the true existence (God, Nature) (i., pr. 25, Corol.). But so soon as their true aspect is realized, they cease to exist independently, they are no longer things in the ordinary sense of the word. In their place appear limited participations in the one true existence. Each of these participations must naturally contain two important elements; and the fact that Spinoza sometimes lays stress on one of these and sometimes on the other, often makes it harder to understand him. In the first place, as an expression of the true existence, it belongs to the infinite multiplicity (i.e., the totality) that results from God (i., pr. 16, 17, Schol.), or is contained in God (ii., pr. 8), in such a way that it cannot be conceived without Him. In other words, it belongs to that which is (immediately) caused (conditioned) by God (v., pr. 29, Schol.). This side of the individual thing is its essence or nature (essentia sive natura, iv., def. 8, pr. 56, dem.), often called by metonymy its idea (definitio i., pr. 16, dem.). This is eternal, just as being in general is eternal, Cogit. met. 1, 2, Eth. i., pr. 21. It is called an eternal truth (Ep. 28). Accordingly, with Spinoza “to view under the form of eternity,” and “to apprehend anything from its essence,” are synonymous (v., pr., 29, 30). Since being or existence was the absolutely positive which excludes all negation, it is impossible that the essence of a thing should contain what involves its non-existence. Transitoriness would involve this, and accordingly the essence of everything be-
comes identical with the maintenance or assertion of its own existence (iii., pr. 4, dem., pr. 6, 7). Besides this positive element which constitutes the true reality (entitas sive realitas iv., pref.) of things, there is in the second place that which completes the essentia by making it actualis or praesens existentia, or actu existere (v., pr. 29, dem. ii., pr. 9). This comes \textit{to} it from other things, with which it is united to form a \textit{communis ordo naturae}, or \textit{connexio causarum} (ii., pr. 30, dem. pr. 7, Schol.). This negative element,—which, just because it is negative, is not deduced from the being of the thing, but is accepted empirically as a fact,—makes what is (essentially) eternal into something temporal or enduring. Each thing has, accordingly, a double existence, and likewise a double position in the complex world of existence: on the one hand, that which is determined by its essence, on the other, that which is determined by its being conditioned by something else. In virtue of the former, it is necessary \textit{per se}; in virtue of the latter, necessary \textit{per alium}. The latter Spinoza called \textit{contingens} (i., pr. 33), and accordingly identified, as did his subsequent opponent Wolff (vid. § 290, 4), with the \textit{hypothetice necessarium}. The two kinds of existence, the timeless and the temporal, would correspond in our illustration to the existence of each individual square as a plane, and as a four-sided figure. Spinoza compared them to the possibility of making, by the help of two intersecting chords within the circumference of a circle, an infinite number of right angles of the same size, and the actual existence of two such right angles made by drawing two chords (ii., pr. 8, Schol.). This comparison explains the position subsequently taken up by the school of Leibnitz and Wolff, in which existence was placed on the same level as possibility, and \textit{existentia} was called \textit{complementum possibilitatis} (vid. § 290, 4).

Cf. Theodor Camerer: \textit{die Lehre Spinoza's}. Stuttg. 1877.

5. Midway between Substance as the \textit{infinitum} and things as \textit{finita}, there stands the sum of all modes, which is reached last in the ascent from things, and first in the descent from the infinite. Spinoza's phrases: infinite modification, or infinite mode, and so on, characterize very aptly this intermediate position. In connection with it, however, we are not to think of anything like an actual development, but simply of a higher and lower in a logical and mathematical sense.
Thus, if, to push our illustration further, we start from the most limited, the primitive square, this gives us what Spinoza calls *individuum primi ordinis*; if we imagine several of those combined into one, we have *individua secundi ordinis*, and so on until we reach that which embraces all of them. This remains the same amid all changes of its subordinate constituents, and is *tota natura* (ii., *Lemma 7, Schol.)*. Instead of this expression, the phrase: *facies totius universi* is employed in a letter to Tschirnhaus; and Spinoza at the same time says, that it is this he means when he speaks of an infinite, eternal modification of God, which results directly from God. In the ascending process above described the simple square is recognised as resulting directly from those which surround it, and these in their turn from those which surround them. And so, when the question ultimately arises,—“What is the presupposition necessary for all the squares taken together, that from which they result directly as from their *causa proxima*?” we can hardly give any other reply, than that it is the plane surface undivided. Quite in accordance with this, Spinoza says in his *Tract. brev.*, that God is *causa proxima* only of infinite modification (*Supplem.*, p. 59). This latter he separates from individual things by an infinite number of intermediate stages; and he says repeatedly in the *Ethics*, that it alone results directly from God, that what it comprehends results from Him only indirectly. Inasmuch, however, as infinity can now be predicated both of the absolutely unconditioned and of this immediately conditioned, and further, since the word *natura* was employed to denote both, the necessity arises for avoiding misunderstandings by strict distinctions. Spinoza remains faithful to the conception he has once set up, according to which the infinite is the positive, which excludes all limit (as being negation). But he allows a distinction between that which absolutely excludes all limitation, and that which merely excludes numerical determination. The former is the absolute *infinitum*, Substance; the latter is what he means wherever he speaks of the infinite in the plural, and employs *infinita* as a synonym for *omnia* (e.g. i., *pr. 16*). Although he himself frequently says, that we should apply the term *infinitum* only to the absolutely infinite, and should call the innumerable, *indefinitum*, and although he contrasts the former as *infinitum rationis* with the latter as *infinitum imaginationis*, still he is not always consistent. Consequently, the distinction
is often lost sight of between the conceptions which we have so far been explaining, and which, to connect them with Spinoza’s own words, form the descending stages: (1) All or infinite (Omnesse, absolute infinitum, in the Tract. brev. also Omne); (2) Everything, or infinites, or infinitely many (Omnia infinita); and lastly, (3) Each, or individual thing (Quocumque, res particularis, finitum, singularis). If this distinction be maintained, there is no contradiction involved in Spinoza’s saying, that no finite thing results from God, and that everything results from God (i., pr. 16, dem.). Nor is it any more a contradiction to say, that all finite being is necessary, and that every finite thing is contingent. With the expression “nature,” Spinoza deals more strictly than with “infinite” as a predicate. He accordingly adopts the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata, a distinction which appears as early as the Commentaries of Averroës (De caelo, 1, 1), and which was current among the Schoolmen. Consistently, however, with his point of view, the idea of creation which former thinkers had looked upon as the bond between the two (e.g., Vincent of Beauvais: Speculum majus, 15, 4), is here supplanted by that of condition. Both in the Tract. brev. (Suppl. p. 80) and in the Ethics (i., pr. 29, Schol.), he says that the natura naturans is that which is in itself and requires nothing else, i.e., God. In regard to the natura naturata, on the other hand, the two accounts are quite at variance. According to the Tract. brev., a distinction must be drawn between the natura naturata generalis, i.e., the modes which follow immediately from God, and the natura naturata particularis, i.e., the particular things conditioned by these modes. In the Ethics this distinction is no longer recognised. There, conditioned nature is defined as that quod ex necessitate Dei naturæ sequitur, hoc est omnes modos quatenus considerantur ut res quæ in Deo sunt et quæ sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt (i., pr. 29, Schol.), that is, exactly as the natura naturata generalis was conceived of in the Tract. brev. If, then, we keep the expression, world, for the sum of things (the former natura naturata particularis), the natura naturata which stands midway between it and God, would correspond very much to what we might call the world as a whole, or order of the world. This is distinguished from the unconditioned, as the system of all conditions, within which every individual object would be a conditioned thing.

6. The distinction between nature, viewed either as all or
as everything, and individual things, may be called a quantitative one; and accordingly a geometrical figure sufficed to make it clear. Qualitative distinctions are introduced into the system by the help of a third fundamental conception. This is the conception of attribute, the definition of which Spinoza himself inserts between that of substance and that of mode—an order from which we have departed here. Where he is maintaining that nothing, except Substance and its modes, exists rea\textit{litier}, he repeatedly adds to this word \textit{i.e. extra intellectum}.* And yet, besides these, he speaks of attributes. The only explanation possible seems to be, that the attributes are \textit{in intellectu}. That such is really the doctrine of Spinoza, many are disposed to deny; but they can only do so by utterly ignoring the chief passages in support of this view. These passages must accordingly be brought forward prominently here. Spinoza never forgot the statement he made in his \textit{Cogit. metaphys. (i., 3)}, to the effect that Substance, as such, does not affect us at all, and that it therefore requires to be interpreted by an attribute, from which (as Descartes before him had taught) "\textit{nonnulli ratione distinguitur.}" Accordingly he always speaks of the attributes of Substance in such a way as to bring into prominence the idea of existence for the understanding that knows. This is the case even in the definition of attribute (\textit{i., def. 4}). While Descartes had said that attribute constitutes (\textit{constituit}) the essence of substance, Spinoza says that attribute "is that which intellect perceives concerning substance, as constituting the essence thereof." (That \textit{constituens} is neuter here is proved beyond a doubt by \textit{i., pr. 7, Schol.}) In this, an indication of something which is not perceived, is recognised even by those who hold a different view from the one maintained in these pages. In the same direction point all the varieties of expression: that attribute \textit{exprimit, explicat} the essence of Substance, or, that the essence \textit{per attributum intelligitur}, sub attributo con-

* Kuno Fischer: \textit{Gesch. d. n. Phil. 2nd ed. i., 2}, p. 275 and 317 asserts that I have no right to appeal upon this point to \textit{Eih. i. pr. 4, dem.}, since there Spinoza adds to the word \textit{Substantia—sive quod idem est attributa.} The quotation in my \textit{Vermischte Aufsätze} did not refer to the end of the \textit{dem.}, of which Fischer is thinking, but to the first sentence of it, where this addition is no more to be found than it is in \textit{Ep. 4}, which I also brought forward as a proof. [Fischer replies to this in the 3rd ed., p. 359.—Ed.]
sideratur, and so on, all of which involve the idea of revelation or phenomenon, i.e. of a relation to a perceiving subject. Most decisive of all is what Spinoza writes to Simon de Vries, or rather in his person to the whole circle, in whose name de Vries had questioned him. After defining Substance as he does in the *Ethics*, he continues: "By attribute I understand exactly the same thing, except that it is called attribute *respectu intellectus substantiae certam talem naturam tribuentis*." (Here then it is the perceiving intellect, with Descartes [cf. § 267, 4] it was nature, which is said to be that which *substantiae naturam tribuit*.) He then goes on to meet the objection that two names are applied to one and the same thing, by pointing out that what we call smooth, may be called white, if it be looked at in a different aspect. The other example which he brings forward in the same place, that the third patriarch had two names, one of which denoted his relation to his brother, reminds us of what he had said in regard to the name of God in the *Tract. theol. polit.* xiii. 11, 12. Only the name Jehovah indicates *Dei absolutam essentiam sine relatione ad res creatas;* El Sadaí, on the contrary, and all the others, *attributa sunt quae Deo competunt quatenus cum relatione ad res creatas consideratur vel per ipsas manifestatur.* Accordingly, although (*Eth. i. pr. 32, dem.*) the *substantia absolute infinita* is expressly distinguished from Substance *quatenus attributum habet*, still we must surely ultimately conclude that the attributes do not introduce essential differences into Substance, but merely state what it is for the understanding that contemplates it, i.e., the ways in which it appears, or,—what is the same thing differently expressed,—in which it is conceived of by the understanding that contemplates it. I have compared them to the coloured spectacles through which a white surface (i.e. one which contains all colours or no colours) is viewed, and I am least of all moved to abandon this illustration by the raillery of the critic who maintains that the understanding does not put the attributes there but merely distinguishes them. For this seems to me to be merely the substitution for the spectacles of a prism, which breaks up the white into blue and yellow, i.e., the substitution of *bonnet blanc* for *blanc bonnet*. The view here advanced has been attacked with more serious weapons, but with even less success, by those who say that it makes Spinoza into a disciple of Kant. As if Kant had
invented the distinction between "in itself" and "for us," between essence and phenomenon! As if, since men began to think, it had not been made by every one who has attempted to get behind things or to investigate their essence! But not only has this distinction been made. It has been the subject of reflection ever since Democritus distinguished between what is ἐστὶν, and what is νόμος, or Aristotle contrasted φύσις with πρὸς ἴμας. The same question appears in the Middle Ages in all inquiries about esse in re and esse in intellectu, about distinctio secundum rem and secundum rationem, about denominatio extrinseca and ens rationis. Lastly, as regards Spinoza himself, one could never say that such a distinction was unknown to him and did not appear till the succeeding century, unless one were willing to forget all the passages where he contrasts denominationes extrinsecas, relationes and circumstantias with essentia, modi cogitandi with modi rerum, distinctiones reales with distinguï solo conceptu. There is, however, a vast difference between Kant and Spinoza. The former never loses sight of this distinction, and has pushed his reflections upon it so far as to reach the result that all predicates which are attached to phenomena, must be denied of things in themselves. In Spinoza, the relation between the two is quite different. He touches upon the relation between things as actually existing and as objects of thought, only where he cannot avoid it, especially therefore where he has to reply to objections. That the two may stand in opposition to each other, never occurs to him. Like all before Kant, he looks upon it as a matter of course that cogitari debet and est are the same. And so too with non esse and nequire cogitari. The question: "Why are the two one?" he thrusts aside almost scornfully, as where he touches upon the criterion of truth, or again where the adequacy of the idea, though at first it does not denote its agreement with the idcum, still involves the certainty of this agreement. For this very reason I can see no objection to my view in the fact that Spinoza says substantia sive,—or even id est,—eius attributa. It is exactly parallel to non est i.e. cogitari nequit, or conversely. Spinoza's theory of the attributes of Substance would accordingly assume the following shape: The understanding can conceive of anything only by attaching predicates to it. If that which is conceived is something limited or finite, then the predicates to be attached to it may contain negations; as, e.g., when
mind, because it cannot distinguish bodies strictly, omnia corpora sub attributo entis, rei, etc. comprehendit (ii., pr. 40, Schol. 1). It is otherwise with Substance, existence in itself, to which, as the absolutely affirmative, only such predicates may be attached as express something absolutely positive, that is, perfection or infinity. It is true that so soon as there are several of these, so soon as one is not what the other is, their infinity is not the infinity of Substance, which was absolutely free from negation, but a third kind, which now appears, the infinitum in suo genere (i., def. 6 explic.). By this is to be understood that which allows nothing of the same kind as itself to escape it. Thus extension, which includes all extended things, remains infinite (in its own kind), or infinitam certam essentiam exprimit (i., pr. 10, Schol.), even although thought lies outside of it. Now all such perfectly positive predicates expressing this infinity must be attached to existence, which includes everything. An infinite understanding will therefore view it under innumerable attributes; for such an understanding, Substance consists of all, i.e. of innumerable attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite being (i., def. 6). It is otherwise with the human understanding. It too is unable to conceive of Substance without attributes, that is, without attributing to it predicates. Substance accordingly sepulitis affectionibus cogitari potest, but not sepulitis attributis; it consists therefore of attributes, and that, as we have just shown, for the human and for the infinite understanding alike. Thus, as soon as the understanding, whether finite or infinite, appears, what exists outside of the understanding as Substance, pure being, is changed into attributes, or consists of them (i., pr. 30, dem.). (I consider this passage one of the most important for confirming my view, although it has been brought forward very recently to refute it, in the excellent essay of Camerer, referred to above, § 272, 4.) But of what attributes? Just as Spinoza is serious in his scorn for those who consider that the globulus which we inhabit is the whole world (Tr. br. de Deo), so he is serious, when, in his letters to Tschirnhausen, he admits the possibility that another finite understanding may not know the attribute of extension, just as our understanding is unable to conceive of an infinite number of attributes of Substance, although it knows that there are such. He may at one time have cherished the hope that the human understanding would
succeed in discovering new attributes of God. But in his latter days he was convinced that, because man is a mode of thought and extension, he knows only the attribute of thought and that of extension, and can accordingly conceive of God only under these two attributes, but must conceive of Him under both. In spite of this limitation, he claims for the human understanding an adequate knowledge of God, since, as Descartes had already shown, it is possible to have a perfectly adequate knowledge of the triangle, even before one knows all the propositions which follow from the definition. It is not in Substance, then, but in the limitation of the human understanding, that we are to look for the reason why we must be content with regarding it as thinking and as extended. As a matter of fact, however, it does not really involve a great sacrifice to renounce all claim to a knowledge of the others. For thought, which Spinoza conceives of just as Descartes had done,—as the making objective or the representation of what exists formaliter,—mirrors in itself the content of all attributes. Thus it forms, to express it mechanically, the half of all that all the attributes together contain, or contains just as much as all the others put together;—an exceptional position which Spinoza recognises when he contrasts thought, as he frequently does, not with the "others," but with "the" attributes (ii., pr. 8, Cor.; pr. 6, Coroll.).

Thought, which is thus correlative and equivalent to all the other attributes, is known to the human understanding and to every finite understanding, even to that which could not apprehend extension. But this is not all. It appears to have been the feeling that subject and object, Ego and non-Ego, were mutually opposed, which made Spinoza say so decidedly in his Tract. brev. p. 192, that even although it were not bodies that occasioned our ideas or mental affections, still what called them forth would be something quite different from the human mind. This "omnino differre" assigns to every object of thought a nature opposite to that of thought. Since, however, thought was something internal, being-by-itself, this is something external, being-outside-itself (Vid. p. 40, supra); so that every attribute which is opposed to thought threatens to become ultimately identical with extension. Perhaps Spinoza felt this when he gave up the search for other attributes. Perhaps too it was this feeling which, when Tschirnhausen drew his attention through Schuller to
the fact that thought will contain more than each of the other attributes, made Spinoza pass over the point in silence, and afterwards led him in the further course of his investigations to proceed as if it were impossible to regard existence otherwise than under these two attributes. We have now further to inquire how all, how everything, and how individual objects present themselves to the mind of the observer under these attributes.*

* It was through Hegel that I was first led to adopt the view stated here. In my: Versuch einer wissenschaft. Darst. der Gesch. d. n. Philos. i., 2 (Leipz., Riga and Dorpat, 1836), § 8, and more thoroughly in my: Vermischte Aufsätze (Leipz., 1846), I have expounded it as the only one which to my mind is consistent with maintaining the "monism," or pantheism, of Spinoza. My belief has been confirmed by the fact that a different view of the attributes, as is proved by the example of Thomas, and more recently of Böhmer, goes hand-in-hand with the idea that Spinoza is a "pluralist," or, if one will have it so, a polytheist. But my opponents are not drawn solely from those who hold such an opinion, but also from those who regard the oneness of Substance as part of Spinoza's teaching. In fact, my view has been attacked by almost all who mention it. Although these attacks have shown me that it has weak points, still I have met with no theory which I should be prepared to accept instead of it. To begin with what the most formidable opponent of what he calls the "formalist" view advances,—although Kuno Fischer's reproduction of the system of Spinoza is brilliant, and in many respects admirable, still I cannot agree with his assertion that the attributes are forces. For we join issue on the first point of all, inasmuch as I deny that the Substance of Spinoza is a causa efficiens (vid. supra, sub 2), while Fischer really founds his whole account upon the supposition that it is. [Vid. Fischer's reply, op. cit., 3rd ed., p. 369. Also: Note to p. 355.—Ed.] Trendelenburg I can no longer reckon among my opponents. For if he calls the attributes "various definitions of one and the same thing," or various "expressions," I confess that I can discover no difference between those statements and my own. P. Schmidt, in his interesting essay on Schleiermacher, which will be referred to at the end of § 315, differs from both Fischer and Trendelenburg, but is a decided opponent of my view. According to him, thought and extension are the summa genera of existence. So far, I can quite agree with him. For by denying the determination (finitude, according to Spinoza) of the individual objects of perception, it is possible to rise from these until ultimately the two classes of thinking and extended existence are reached. Beyond these lies nothing but the omnem esse, which embraces them, and which is identical with Spinoza's Substance, or Nature, or God. This, however, so far from anticipating one of the possible answers, does not even raise the question: "Whence comes that by which existence manifests itself as these two genera, or by which the two are distinguished, thinking existence being non-extended, and extended existence, non-thinking?" To this Hegel replies, and I follow him: "It cannot be deduced from Substance, and it must accordingly be introduced into it. This is the work of the understanding, which finds in itself not merely one, but two positive predicates (positive to correspond to existence), and no more than these
7. First, as regards Substance as such, the *natura naturans*, it is, according to its two attributes, of two kinds—extended Substance, and thinking Substance (*res extensa*, *res cogitans*, ii. pr. 1 and 2). In both cases, however, we must imagine every limitation removed. God is therefore neither body nor will, for the former is a limitation of extension, while the latter is a determined and limited form of thought. Infinite or substantial extension, infinite size, attributes (i.e., properly, the other attributes) of God, *natura Dei*, or even simply *natura*, are the terms applied to the Infinite as extended. On the

two." That Spinoza reaches his attributes in this way, is for me much the most important point. In the face of that it seems comparatively unimportant, how far he himself was conscious of the relation in which his two attributes really stood. Even if I could not bring forward a single quotation to prove that Spinoza was conscious of this, I should venture to say that the attributes are predicates, which the understanding must attach to Substance, not because the latter, but because the former, has this peculiar constitution. (I might say so, just as I may say that every person who tries to squint must alter the pupils of his eyes, although only a very few of those who squint know that this is the case.) I can, however, appeal to the letter to Simon de Vries, which I could not set aside so easily as K. Fischer does, even if it were written merely for the person to whom it is addressed, much less when it is seen to be an *epistola catholica* to Spinoza's school. If the members of the Amsterdam "Collegium," to which Spinoza was really writing, read his answer, it must have at once become plain to them, that in the theory of attributes, the point raised was what had been called for centuries, in philosophical phraseology, a *distinctio rationis*, as opposed to a *distinctio realis*. Descartes, too, employs this phraseology; and K. Fischer, in his translation of the First Book of the *Princ. Phil.*, has been less happy in his choice of the expression, "rational" distinction, than Picot, who says (*Œuvr. de Desc. ed. Cousin, vol. iii., p. 104*): *qui se fait par la pensée*. Descartes (*Princ. Phil. i., 62*), just after having said that the distinction between a substance and its attributes is a *distinctio rationis*, justifies the position that in certain circumstances this can be united with the *distinctio modalis*, on the ground that both form a contrast to the *distinctio realis*. Any one who bears this in mind in reading Spinoza's letter, as that circle of Spinozists at Amsterdam probably did, may,—if he shares the view I have set forth here, of Spinoza's theory of attributes,—regard this theory as almost directly suggested by Descartes. (Many, however, who do not agree with me, will perhaps think that Fischer should have called my view, not "formalist," but, "modalist," on the analogy of the Sabellian doctrine of the Trinity.) It appears to me still to be the one in which I can find the best explanation of the contrast between Spinoza's mutually opposed attributes of one Substance, and Descartes' two kinds of mutually opposed Substance. Nor am I shaken in my convictions by the statements of the *Tract. brev.*, which distinguishes these two predicates from all others. I see in those statements the bridge that connects Spinoza's original theory with Descartes and (the later) Spinozism.
other hand, infinite or substantial thought, infinite power of thinking, frequently too *idea Dei*, often simply *Deus*, are the names employed to denote the thinking Absolute. Consequently, while at first *Deus* and *natura* were connected by *sive*, it now runs: *quod formaliter est in natura, objective est in Deo*, but never conversely. The two words, taken in this narrower sense, stand in the same relation as *res* and *cognitio rei*, and the parallelism which Descartes had merely asserted to exist between formal and objective existence, here requires no further proof, because formality or actuality (what is now known as real existence) and objectivity (what is now called existence as idea) are both predicates of the same being. Since to become an object of thought, or to exist as an idea, means with Spinoza, just as with Descartes, to come into consciousness, unconscious thinking is of course a contradiction in terms, and God, because He thinks, knows that He thinks. Spinoza lays great stress on this point. He warns us against supposing that an idea is a "mute" (*i.e.* unperceived) copy, and demands that it should be regarded as a (conscious) act of thought (ii., *pr. 43*, Schol.). Accordingly the *idea tam ejus (sc. Dei) essentia quam omnium qua ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur* (ii., *pr. 3*), which constitutes the Divine thought, is not an unconscious process; and those who understand by consciousness no more than consciousness of sensation, may say that Spinoza here teaches the doctrine of a conscious God. Those who demand more from (even human) consciousness, may question this. God, or Substance in general, was the condition (*causa prima*) of all that exists, and therefore His extension will be the condition of all corporeal existence.—this reminds one of Malebranche,—and similarly God, as a thinking being, will be the condition of all the various processes of thought. The circle has its ultimate ground in extension, just as the idea of the circle has its in thought. Accordingly, to attempt to deduce the existence of an extended thing, *e.g.* of the circle, from the fact that God had willed it, *i.e.* thought it, would—quite apart from the error of making one individual thing be conditioned by anything except another individual thing (*vid. supra, sub 4, i., pr. 28*)—involve the further mistake of trying to explain the mode of the one attribute by a limitation of the other. The two are entirely independent, each is to be conceived of *per se*, for otherwise they would be modes.
Everything, then, that follows *formaliter* (*i.e.* as something real) from the attributes of God, or from His nature (*i.e.* His extension), follows as an object of thought from His thought, or His idea (*ii.* *pr.* 6 and 7, and *Cor.*).

8. Leaving aside for the present, as we did before, the *natura naturata* (*generalis*), and turning to the world of individual things, we find that these are either *corpora*, *res corporeae*, sometimes simply *res*, or are *idea*, according as they are regarded under one attribute or the other. As surely as the small squares we introduced maintain their position relatively to one another, whether they are looked at through a yellow or through a blue glass, so surely is *ordo rerum* *idem ac ordo idearum*, and a body and its idea or its *cognitio* are *una eademque res* (*ii.* *pr.* 7, and *Schol.*), which becomes at one time part of the Divine thought, at another, part of the Divine extension. The proposition brought forward above, to the effect that one individual thing results only from another individual thing, receives here a more exact determination. Anything of the nature of body can be conditioned (caused) only by something else of the nature of body, and a process of thought only by a process of thought (*ii.* *pr.* 9, *dem.*),—a separation of the two worlds which excludes all idealistic explanations in physical philosophy, all materialistic explanations in mental philosophy. Occasionalism could not go further than Spinoza in this separation. Not only does he scoff at those who imagine that their will moves their hands, but he makes both the rise of ideas in the human soul and their departure from it, *e.g.* at death, quite independent of the body, so that the mind dies from within (*iii.* *pr.* 11, *Schol.*). At the same time we must not overlook the fact, to which, following the example of the elder Sigwart, I drew attention in my *Verm. Aufs.*, p. 160, that he treats materialistic explanations of mental processes with more respect than their opposite. Indeed, sometimes (*ii.* *pr.* 19, *dem.*) it happens with him that the *ideata* are opposed to the ideas, not as *res* but as *causa*, which contrasts strangely with what he writes to Schuller on 18th Nov. 1675. Although, on account of this separation, both body and mind are to be conceived of as *automata*, the latter as *automaton spirituale* (*De int. emend.* xi. 85), still on account of the parallelism, in fact on account of the unity of the two orders, the few propositions on the theory of body which Spinoza has interspersed in the Second Book as lemmas,
are also very important for the theory of mind. Accordingly they are just in their right place under the heading *De natura et origine mentis*. Since all bodies alike exist in extension, and further since extension does not vanish if we imagine an individual body removed, the essence of this body cannot consist in extension (*Cf.* ii., def. 2), but in that which modifies extension by being added to it. With Descartes this had been motion, which was added to extension by God. Spinoza puts this *Deus ex machina* aside, by making motion follow from extension. Further, by admitting an opposition within motion itself, an opposition which he designates by the words *motus et quies* (not to be regarded as absence of motion), he reaches in the *Tract. brev.* the position of making the essence of each body consist in a definite proportion of motion and rest. Such a proportion is found even in the *corpus simplicissimum*, by which we are merely to understand one of the above-mentioned *individua primi ordinis*. This is accordingly distinguished from others of the same kind only by swiftness and slowness, not, so far, by direction, etc. of motion. This same *individuum*, under the attribute of thought, or in the Divine thought, is a simple thought or process of thought, an idea. If we imagine an *individuum secundi ordinis*, this would, under the attribute of extension, be a *corpus compositum*, which might contain a number of different complicated movements, accelerated, curvilinear, etc. To this corresponds a complex of ideas, or an *anima*, so that there is no composite body which would not possess a soul. There are various degrees in which this is true, for the more complex and capable of the most various impressions it is, the more perfect is the body, and the richer in ideas or more perfect is its soul (*ii., pr. 13, Schol.*). Lastly, if the body is put together in the way in which the human body is, its soul is called a mind (*mens*). This mind is not something simple, but is made up of ideas, just as its body is made up of individual bodies (*ii., pr. 15, dem.*). Nor can we say of it that its essence consists in thought, but rather that it consists in the idea of this its body, or the knowledge of all the various bodily conditions (*ii., pr. 13*). We must not, however, forget that there is no other knowledge of the body and its existence than that which concerns its being moved and affected (*ii., pr. 19*). The so-called connection of body and soul, then, consists in its being one and the same thing, which is regarded at one time under the one
attribute, at another under the other (iii., pr. 2, Schol.). The fact that every individual object, and therefore man, must, as being a mode of Substance, be regarded under the same attributes as Substance itself, leads Tschirnhausen (Ep. 67) to bring forward one of the most forcible objections against the plurality of the attributes: If man is a mode of Substance which has an infinite number of attributes, how comes it that the human mind has the idea only of two of these? Spinoza attempts to answer this in a letter of which only a fragment has survived (Ep. 68). The answer he gives could only be satisfactory, if, instead of saying that the knowledge of these attributes falls into an infinite number of other mentes, he had said that it falls into other intellectus infiniti (cf. infra, sub 9); for it is absolutely impossible to understand how what constitutes my essence should be known by another mens, i.e. another part of the one intellectus infinitus of which I and that mens are parts. Mind, then, is simply the idea or cognitio corporis. But since an idea is only a product of the activity of thought, which was identical with consciousness, the idea corporis is a conscious act of thought of the mind. Accordingly the idea corporis is so closely connected with the knowledge of it, that as mind is idea corporis, so it is idea of this idea, and therefore idea mentis. (Kuno Fischer, whose correction of my former view I gratefully accept, has explained this point very clearly. The most important passages are De int. emend. vi. 34 ff. and Eth. ii., pr. 20–22.)

9. The ascent from individuals of the first to those of higher orders led, as we have seen (sub 5), to the tota natura, which, however, was not that which excludes all plurality, but the natura naturata which embraces everything that necessarily follows from Substance. This too must be conceived of under the two attributes. Under the one it will contain not a definite proportion of rest and motion, but all rest and all motion; and it will accordingly be motus et quies in general. Under the other, just as one mind embraced many idea, so it will embrace all idea, and therefore also all collections of ideas or mentes (v., pr. 40, Schol.). This sum of all ideas (and minds) is the intellectus infinitus, which, as we may quite easily see from the foregoing, belongs not to the natura naturans, but, just like motus et quies, to the natura naturata (i., pr. 31, Ep. 27). As the natura naturata was the last to be reached in
the ascent from the finite, and the first to be reached in the
descent from the infinite, we can easily understand why the
intellectus infinitus and motus et quies, which follow directly
from God, were called at first not works but everlasting sons
of God (Tract. brev., p. 82).—expressions which do not occur
in the Ethics. The intellectus infinitus, then, possesses or
contains objective, the essence of all things (ibid., Append. p.
246). It is the idea or cognitio omnium, just as our mind is
the cognitio of all that goes to make up our body, and just as
“substantial thought,” or substance under the attribute of
thought, was the cognitio of omne esse. Exactly as individual
bodies participate in motus et quies, and are conditioned by
them, so every mens is of course a part of the intellectus
infinitus. The difference between this and the cogitatio
infinita may be defined by saying that the former does and
the latter does not consist of ideas (Ep. 26). What is con-
tained in the latter is the idea only of the one existence.
The cogitatio infinita is therefore not idea omnium, but
certainly idea Dei. For the rest, Spinoza’s intellectus infinitus
reminds us strongly of the intellectus universalis of Averroës,
vid. § 187, 2.

10. Since, according to Spinoza, man is a part of nature,
i.e. a thing among things, Anthropology naturally forms a
part of his physical philosophy, and is with him much more
nearly akin to Zoology than it is with Descartes (cf. iii., pr.
57, Schol.). The third part of the Ethics, which treats of
man apart from everything else, and purely as a natural being,
begins by determining the conceptions of activity and of
passivity. Activity means an adequate and sufficient, pas-
sivity on the contrary, merely a partial explanation of one’s
own condition (iii., def. 2). Man accordingly, whose bodily
state is conditioned by the bodies which surround him, and
who through sensation becomes conscious not merely of his
own existence but also of the existence of other beings, is at
once active and passive. In other words, he is checked, af-
fected from without, in his activity; but he keeps striving to
assert his existence in the face of this hindrance, for this is
essentially involved in the nature of everything (iii., pr. 3,
Schol., pr. 6, 7, 9). If the consciousness of being thus affected
is called affection, the consciousness of the effort mentioned
(appetitus) will be cupiditas, the first affection. With this are
associated joy and sorrow, according as satisfaction or
hindrance gets the upper hand. Next come fear and hope, which are modifications of these fundamental affections. Since they all involve passivity, the absolute Being, as the absolute explanation, and therefore the absolutely Active, can know nothing of them. Like the being to which they belong, these passions (passiones) are both bodily and mental. Along with them the conceptions of good and evil are forthwith settled. These, since they denote merely satisfaction and its opposite, describe a relation to the individual that desires. The expression, "this is good for me," has therefore a perfectly rational sense; while the expression, "this is good (absolutely)," has no meaning whatever (iii., pr. 39, Schol.). By bringing into connection with joy or sorrow the idea of the object that causes them, we get love or hate (iii., pr. 13). Spinoza now shows how, from the combination of those hitherto mentioned, the most various passions result, partly of a depressing and partly of an elevating character. Since the depressed condition of mind is always laid down as the one that is to be avoided (iii., pr. 28), we get Spinoza's statics and mechanics of the passions; from which is deduced the result that every one acts as his nature demands, i.e., seeks his own profit, and that the affections of men can only be overcome by stronger affections. These two propositions give us the premises of Spinoza's Political Philosophy, which is stated in outline in a scholium of the Ethics, and in more detail in the Tractatus politicus. Spinoza's aim is merely to give a physiological account of the State; from his point of view this becomes a mechanical and physical theory. He does not profess to give laws for a Utopia, but merely a description of how man is bound to pass from a state of nature to some form of political society. Since every being naturally tends to assert and to enlarge its own existence, or to seek its own advantage, it has a right to do this; and might and right generally coincide. Not merely has the pike a right to eat the small fish, but man has the right to live according to his nature, and therefore the fool has a right to live foolishly, the wise man to live rationally. Nothing, accordingly, would be unjust in the state of nature, except what no one wishes to do, and what no one can do. If men come into contact with one another,—as they are bound to do, since ultimately nothing can be so useful to man as his fellow-men,—those who are rational, i.e. those who go in pursuit only of knowledge, can never
come into conflict with one another. On the other hand, those who follow their affections are bound to get into entanglements about the end they have in view, and accordingly men are by nature enemies. In this mutual warfare all are powerless, and in an absurd position, since all assertion of their power or of their right brings with it the loss of these two things which they attempt to assert. They are bound to extricate themselves from this situation, and they do so by transferring to the community, which thereby becomes a State, the *summum imperium*, i.e., the power of terrifying and persuading by hope and fear, and thus of bridling the weaker affections. In this way men become citizens in relation to the State, and subjects in relation to its laws. The union of men to form a State is conceived of as something purely external, for Spinoza entirely disregards the idea of nationality (God, he says on one occasion, creates not nations but individuals). Similarly, he never refers to the natural unity of the family. Where he uses the word, he understands it to mean artificial bonds of citizenship within the State. By entering into political union, one's own natural power is certainly lessened; but since it is a means of purchasing security, the profit is greater than the loss. Spinoza exalts his own political philosophy in contrast with that of Hobbes, because it allows of the continuance of natural rights. Men are still determined to action by fear, hope, and the like; only, in the State the object of fear and hope is the same for all. While in the state of nature nothing was unjust except what was impossible, in a political society injustice is simply what the State forbids, justice, what it allows. As with the individual, so with the State, right is limited by might. In regard to other States, treaties are binding only so long as it considers them advantageous, and so on. In regard to its own citizens, its power is limited by the absurdity of which it would be guilty, if it tried to give commands which it could not enforce, and thus made itself contemptible. This would be the case, for example, if it attempted to persecute people for their religious or scientific convictions. But convictions are quite different from the external signs which mark their presence. To determine the form of worship is, according to Spinoza, just as according to Hobbes, the business of the State. Since the attitude of the citizens to the State is a *noli me tangere*, he constructs his State without any regard to it. The political machine
should be organized in such a way that it will go just the same, whether the individuals have an affection for the community or not. Whether peoples flourish or go to ruin, depends simply upon the character of the arrangements. In his view, there is no other way for a people to fall into decline. Men were always and are everywhere the same; and therefore, if things go badly, the political arrangements alone can be responsible. Great importance is accordingly attached to the omnipotence of the State; and the Government is always conceived of as the State in the proper sense of the word. Although the governing body (or the ruler, for in a monarchy rex est civitas) can never really be wrong as against its subjects, still it should never forget that its power stops at the point where threats and promises cease to have any effect; and, above all, that the most dangerous enemies of every State are its own citizens. That State, therefore, is the safest, in which the government is conducted on the most rational principles, and in which the greatest amount of freedom is granted to the individual citizens. Of the three forms which government may take, Spinoza has treated only of monarchy and aristocracy; his account breaks off at democracy. He often states the principle that every attempt to overthrow the existing constitution must end in destruction. It would be strangely at variance with this, if he, who lived in a republic, had represented monarchy as the only constitution that afforded security and peace. On the other hand, those who are so anxious to make Spinoza a democrat, forget that in his Politics he does not retract the principle already laid down (Eth. iv., 54, Schol.)—Terret vulgus nisi metuat, but merely extends the conception vulgus to the great majority of mankind. At the very most, three, he believes, among the hundred chosen optimi would be under the guidance of reason. The optimi are the State in an aristocracy, as the king was in a monarchy. Spinoza admits that a monarchical constitution would offer sufficient freedom, where the prince aimed at the good of the mass of his subjects; and he further acknowledges it to be an intelligible fact that monarchy has developed out of aristocracy, and this out of democracy, which is the primitive form of the State. Still, he believes that he could count most surely on the durability of an aristocratic republic, consisting of several orders of citizens.

11. Spinoza’s political philosophy gave an account of civil
freedom, i.e. of that extension of power of which the mass of mankind is capable. His Moral Philosophy, on the other hand, has for its purpose to show how the few who do not require the State and for whom accordingly civil liberty is insufficient, raise themselves to the highest form of liberty, spiritual freedom, which is a private virtue (Tract. polit. i., 6). A philosopher who denies the conception of an end, and therefore all notion of obligation, and who compares the freedom of the will to a stone that has been thrown and that imagines itself to be moving of its own accord, cannot, it is clear, establish an ethical system that would take the form of a positive command. Like everything else, the human will is treated on the analogy of mathematical physics. He begins with a warning not to accept the idea of a will (voluntas) as distinct from the various acts of will (volitiones); for a fiction of this sort has, he says, about as much value as the lapideitas which the Schoolmen distinguished from the lapides (ii., pr. 48. Schol.). He had learned from Descartes to identify will with assent; and this, combined with the fact that we must assent to what we clearly recognise (e.g. the three-sidedness of the triangle), leads him to the result that every clear idea is a volitio, and that therefore the sum-total of all such ideas and the sum-total of all volitiones, i.e., intellectus et voluntas, idem sunt (ii., pr. 49. Coroll. et Schol.). Spinoza's nature was purely speculative to an extent that is probably unique; and therefore, just as he could not conceive of any one's being displeased because a sphere is round, so he could not see how one should refuse to give his assent to what he has come to understand, i.e., recognise as necessary. Thus the relation that subsists between the individual who understands and the thing that is understood, is that between one who is free and something which he has himself approved of or willed. Increase of understanding, therefore, brings increase of (spiritual) freedom, for it adds to the amount of that of which I am master. On the other hand, the more I understand, the more am I bound to accept of what does not depend upon my approval, and, therefore, the more constrained I am. This contrast between constraint (servitus), treated of by Spinoza in the Fourth Book of his chief work, and spiritual strength and spiritual freedom, discussed in the Fifth, is the cardinal point of his Ethics, which thus becomes really a Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, to adopt the title of one
of his earlier writings. In order to explain the origin of this constraint, it is necessary to return to that fragmentary existence, the world of sense, and to the individuals of various orders. The figure we have already employed, of a plane surface divided into squares, will help us again. Hitherto we have been considering such combinations of more simple individual objects into more complex ones, as may be compared with divided surfaces that are bounded simply by straight lines and right angles. If, on the other hand, we imagine the divided surface to be curvilinear, a number of the squares would be mutilated, and would come only partly within the range of the figure; i.e., it is possible that in the case of complex individuals many of the component elements are only partially and not entirely regulated by the whole. Now, if such an individual object be a body, i.e., be regarded as extended, the motions of its component parts are not thoroughly controlled by its own. It is subject to perturbations. These, however, are peculiar to such bodies, for they of course occur neither in a corpus simplicissimum nor in the individuum summum ordinis, which contains all bodies and therefore all motions. What holds good of the complex body, naturally holds good also of the complex of ideas, or the mind, which expresses this body objective. A portion of the ideas of which it consists, will come completely under its control, and will therefore be deducible from its definition. With regard to these it will be active, according to the meaning of this term as already laid down. It will stand in quite a different relation to those ideas which do not come entirely within it, but exist partly in it and partly in other portions of the intellectus infinitus (i.e. in other mentes). (This is the case when two people apprehend one and the same object, each from a different side. Just the opposite happens in regard to what belongs to all and is true of each part as well as of the whole (ii., pr. 38). From this it follows, that only in the former case is a difference of views possible.) Those fragmentary (mutilate) ideas which we have merely ex parte (ii., pr. 10 Cor.), Spinoza calls inadequate, and contrasts with adequate ideas of which the mind has entire possession. Accordingly, just as in Descartes, these two expressions denote, not a relation to the ideata, but merely the relation of the ideas to the mind that has them. Further, adequacy and certainty (certum esse) are clearly identical. What I know
completely, I know certainly and without doubt; inadequate (half-known) ideas, on the other hand, are uncertain (ii., pr. 43, Schol.). Although the inadequate idea is only part of an adequate idea, still in another respect it contains more than that of which it is a part. For it is marred by its relation to the mind into which it enters; and it is accordingly not merely mutilata, but also confusa (ii., pr. 35). In contrast with the complete and pure ideas, the inadequate ideas may be called imagines of things (ii., pr. 17, Schol.). Every individual idea by itself is, of course, adequate; and similarly the intellectus infinitus contains all ideas in their entirety; in it they are therefore adequate. Only in a mind which stands midway between the two and is part of a larger mind, will there exist side by side with the ideas which fall completely within its control, of which it is therefore master, or in regard to which it is active, other ideas, which it possesses and controls only partially, in regard to which it is therefore passive or constrained. The sum-total of the former (the real idea) Spinoza calls intellectus, that of the latter (the imagines) he calls imaginatio. Nor is it difficult to see why there can be an intellectus infinitus, but not an imaginatio infinita. The understanding, or the better part of the human mind, as Spinoza often calls it, contains the ideas which are clear, definite, and so certain that no doubt at all can arise in regard to them, not even as to whether they correspond to their ideatum. In the case of an adequate idea, it is as unnecessary to seek for a test in regard to this latter point (which is accordingly a secondary quality of adequate ideas), as it would be to illuminate light (De int. emend. vii.). To have an adequate idea, means to know that it is true; and the knowledge of the understanding is therefore free from all taint of doubt. It is quite otherwise with inadequate ideas and with their sum-total, imagination. This contains half-knowledge, knowledge that is uncertain and doubtful. The motions in which the affections of our body consist, belong only partly to it and partly to the bodies by which it is affected. They are not to be explained by our body alone. Similarly, the mind, so far as it has the ideas of these affections, stands in a passive or suffering relation, since the idea of each of these always involves the idea of other existences. In our sense-perceptions we neither perceive our affections pure and simple, nor perceive in its entirety that which affects us.