proaching the end of the course fixed by its stars. The freedom of the will is just as compatible with the might of the heavenly bodies as with strong temptations to evil. This part of the work closes with a detailed description of the then known world, in which connection Roger makes especial use of the reports brought home by the Franciscan William, who had been sent as an ambassador to the grandson of the Dschingis Khan. The section contains also medical counsel in respect to constellation and geographical situation.

6. In the fifth part (pp. 256–444) *Perspectiva* (optics) is treated as an especially important science. The subject of vision in general is first taken up, and then direct, refracted, and reflected light. The discussion is preceded by anthropological investigations in regard to the *anima sensitiva*. There belong to the latter, in addition to the five senses, the *sensus communis*, by means of which every sensation is first made our own, the *vis imaginativa*, which fixes the sensations, the *vis aestimativa*, which shows itself among brutes as the power of scent, and finally the *vis memorativa*. The last two faculties reside in the back part, the first two in the front of the brain. In the centre of the brain is enthroned the *vis cogitativa* or *logistiva*, with which the *anima rationalis* is joined, but that only in man. An accurate anatomical description of the eye is then given, and it is shown how dim, double, and cross sight is to be avoided. Ptolemy, Alhazen, and Avicenna are especially employed in this connection. Roger opposes those who teach that light takes no time to travel. It is only the great rapidity which causes the appearance of instantaneousness. We are to distinguish in our seeing between that which is pure sensation, and that which is perceived *per scientiam et syllogismum*. Judgment is mingled with every act of sight, even of the brute. By the help of geometrical constructions it is shown how we have the power of throwing rays of light and pictures wherever we wish, by means of flat, concave, and convex mirrors.

7. The *Tractatus de multiplicatione specierum* (pp. 353–444) forms an appendix to the preceding investigations. Roger uses the name *species* (*simulacrum, idolum, phantasma, intentio, impressio, umbra philosophorum*, etc.) to denote that by means of which a thing reveals itself, something therefore of like nature with it, which does not emanate from it, but is rather produced by it, and from which then another
is produced, so that it is thus successively propagated. Thus light, heat, colour, etc., manifest themselves in their species. This however is not the case with sound, for that which is propagated is plainly something different from the original vibration of a body. Not only accidents but also substances, and the latter not merely through their form but as a whole, are able to reveal themselves, that is, to propagate their species, which will then be something substantial. This revelation however is not a pouring into or an impression upon the passive recipiens, but a stimulation to co-production, so that the species is produced by both, as for instance the light of the sun produces that of the moon, which could not be seen everywhere if it shone only by reflected light. But since at every point the species thus produced give rise to new ones, an increase and a crossing of the various primary and secondary images result, which explains why the corner of a room, for instance, is light, although the sunlight which shines through the window does not fall directly upon it. All these species move through inorganic media in straight lines. In the nerves they move also in crooked lines. It is possible with concave mirrors, especially if they are not spherical but rather elliptical in form, to concentrate the rays of the sun at any desired point, and thus to work miracles in war, for instance against unbelievers. A friend, he says in the Opus tert., was quite on the track of this mirror, but he was Latinorum sapientissimus. These species are not spiritual. They are corporeal, although incomplete and not perceptible to the senses. The great opticians Ptolemy and Alhazen are to be understood only in this way, and they teach in this connection sine falsitate qualibet. Of course the further the species are from the proper agens, the weaker they are; and on the other hand, the nearer the one acted upon stands to the one acting, that is, the shorter the working pyramid whose summit is formed by the recipiens, the more powerful the effect must be.

8. The sixth part (pp. 445–477) treats of the scientia experimentalis. According to Aristotle, the ultimate principles of none of the sciences can themselves be proved, and they must therefore be discovered by experiment. The peculiar superiority of the scientia experimentalis may, therefore, be regarded as lying in the fact that in it principles and conclusion are found in the same way. As an example of the
way in which the nature of anything is discovered by experiment. He shows how the fact that each one sees his own rainbow leads to the conclusion that it owes its origin to reflected light, and is not itself an actually existing thing, but only an appearance. By means of experiments, the way in which most things are discovered before the grounds are known, that equilibrium of the elements, among other things, is to be sought for, which, if it existed in man, would make death impossible; if in metals, would restore the purest gold, since silver and all other metals are only crude gold. That equilibrium has not yet been found; but many very important things have been discovered by experiment, as for instance an inextinguishable fire similar to that of the Greeks, that substance which contains saltpetre and which produces a thunderous explosion when ignited in a small tube, and also the attraction between a magnet and iron, or between the two halves of a split hazel rod. Since he has seen this, he says in the Secret. operib. nat., nothing appears to him beyond belief. In the same work he says also that wagons and ships could be built which would propel themselves with the swiftness of an arrow, without horses and without sails. In the same work, and also in the Opus maj., he says that, since the apparent size of an object depends upon the focus of the rays which come together in the eye, it is possible so to arrange concave and convex lenses that the giant will appear like a dwarf, and the dwarf like a giant. It is certain that Roger Bacon knew a great deal which was known by scarcely any one else among his contemporaries. At the same time it is not to be overlooked that when he scoffs at the ignorant who know no Greek, he himself confounds δ̄α and δ̄ο in tracing etymologies, and that, where he boasts most of his mathematics, he condescendingly pities Aristotle because he did not know the squaring of the circle. It sounds rather strange, too, when he offers to teach a person to read and understand Hebrew or Greek in three days, and when he considers a week long enough for learning arithmetic and geometry (Opus tert.).

9. His moral philosophy, which forms the seventh part of the Opus majus, and to which Bacon often refers in his Op. tert., has unfortunately not been published by Jebb. It appears from the Op. tert. that it was considered under six different points of view: theological, political, purely ethical, apologetic, parenetic, and legal. We may gather from the
Op. tert. that in the fifth section, which treated of eloquence, whose theory he refers in part to logic, in part to practical philosophy, he must have judged the preaching of that day very severely. He commends the Frater Bertholdus Alemannus, as a preacher who accomplishes more than the two mendicant Orders together. It is impossible to avoid thinking, that if Roger, instead of becoming a Franciscan monk, had made the attempt to teach as secularis in the Paris University, his lot would have been more favourable, and he would have worked with better results and with greater contentment.

§ 213.

The fact that the Aristotelianism which was introduced into scholasticism estranged the Church from the latter, as shown by the example of Roger Bacon, might be looked upon as a proof that the introduction of a foreign element was the only thing which caused the break. But if Aristotelianism be left quite out of account, it may be shown from the very conception of scholasticism, that sooner or later the same result must follow. Scholastic philosophy had received the Church dogmas from the Fathers (cf. § 151). Their content was looked upon as unchangeably fixed. All scholasticism had to do was, in its first period, to conform them to the understanding, in its second period, to bring them into line with the demands of philosophy. Since the content of the dogmas was not at all brought into question, the Church suffered scholasticism to go on with its task, and even encouraged it in it. She did not realize, that the subject with which a philosophy chiefly and exclusively busies itself must become its principal, indeed its sole object, while everything which it puts outside of its sphere of investigation, as indisputably established, must cease to exist so far as the philosophy itself is concerned. A philosophy which does not have to concern itself with the content of dogma, but devotes itself all the more to rational and scientific demonstration, must make the discovery, when it comes to think about itself, that the substance of the doctrine is its smallest concern, while reason and science are its greatest, that is, it must break with dogma. Up to the present time scholasticism, entirely absorbed in its task, had not begun to reflect upon itself. Its commencing to do this must, since philosophy is self-consciousness (cf. § 29),
be looked upon as more philosophical, and therefore as an advance, even if the hitherto existing form be thereby done away with. This advance is made by Duns Scotus, who differs from Thomas, not chiefly in the doctrinal points in regard to which he disagrees with him, but in the object of his labours. Thomas takes the doctrines which are to be proved, while Duns Scotus takes the proofs for these doctrines, as the peculiar subject of study. In the criticism of the proofs the latter often forgets to come to a decision in regard to the doctrines themselves. That which scholasticism had hitherto actually done became for him the chief object, and this is the reason why he must appear very abstruse to those who compare him with Thomas on the assumption that they pursued one and the same end. It was the same with him as with Fichte at the end of the eighteenth century. The teachings of the Science of Knowledge appeared abstruse when compared with the works which treated of the known, while Fichte was speaking of a knowledge of the same. In both cases the men who wrote abstrusely had the clearer heads.

§ 214.

John Duns Scotus.

1. If the disputed question, as to whether Duns Scotus was an Englishman, a Scotchman, or an Irishman were to be decided by asking which land was the most devoted to the extension of his fame, he belongs unquestionably to Ireland. Not Duns in Scotland, not Dunston in England, but Dun in the North of Ireland, saw, then, the birth of the man whose name, Scotus, according to some, is a designation of his Irish origin, according to others, a family name. He was born in the year 1274, or, according to others, in 1266. He entered the Franciscan Order at an early age, and studied in Oxford, where he learned more from books than from oral instruction, and while still very young became Magister in all the sciences. He wrote in Oxford his notes upon the works of Aristotle, as well as his commentary upon the Sentences, called Opus Oxoniense, also Anglicanum or Ordinarium. In the year 1304 he went to Paris, and there, by his victorious defence of the conceptio immaculata b. Virginis, won the name of Doctor subtilis, and from that time on eclipsed all other teachers, including the Provincial of his Order. His commentary upon
the Sentences was revised here, many of the later distinctions before the earlier, for instance those of the fourth book before those of the second. This was not, however, the case with all. The unpublished material found after his death was collected and issued under the title Quaestiones reportatae, or Repertiata Parisiensia, or Opus Parisiense, Parisiicum, or Parisiicum. It is naturally far inferior to the Opus Oxoniense in its form, but surpasses it in definiteness and clearness. In the year 1308, Duns was sent to Cologne to adorn the school there. He survived only a short time his triumphal entry, which was more splendid than that of a prince, and died suddenly in November of the same year.

2. The edition of his works in twelve folio volumes, which appeared in Lyons in 1639, is ordinarily named after Lucas Wadding, the learned annalist of the Franciscan Order, who really performed great service in connection with its publication, and added a biography of Duns Scotus. The edition bears the title R. P. F. Joannis Duns Scoti, doctoris subtilis, ordinis minorum, opera omnia qua hucusque reperiri potuerunt, collecta, recognita, notis scholii et commentariis illustrata a PP. Hiberviis Collegii Romani S. Isidori Professoribus. This edition contains only "qua ad rem speculativam s. dissertationes scholasticas spectant." The "positiva s. S. Sex. commentarii" are promised in another collection, which was to contain the commentaries upon Genesis, upon the Gospels, and upon the Pauline epistles, as well as the sermons. The Lyons edition is wanting in most German libraries. The majority of the copies are said to have gone to England. The first volume contains the Logicalia, including the Grammatica speculativa (pp. 39–76), whose genuineness has been wrongly disputed, then expository Quaestiones in universalis Porphyrii (pp. 77–123), In librum Pradicamentorum (pp. 124–185), two different redactions of In libros perihermeneias (pp. 186–223), In libros clesologicorum (pp. 224–272), In libros analyticorum (pp. 273–430). In an appendix is given a lengthy exposition of the work upon Porphyry, by the Archbishop of Thuram. The second volume contains In octo libros physicorum Aristotelis, which are shown by Wadding to be unauthentic. The Quaestiones supra libros Aristotelis de anima (pp. 477–582), which the Franciscan Hugo Cavellus attempted to continue in the spirit of Duns Scotus, are genuine. The third volume contains Tractatus de rerum principio (pp. 1–208), de primo
principio (209–259), Theormata (pp. 260–340), Collationes s.
disputationes subtilissimae (341–420), Collationes quatuor nuper
addita (421–430), Tractatus de cognitio Dei (uncompleted)
(pp. 431–440), de formalitatis (441 ff.). Questiones miscel-
Jânea and Meteorologicorum libb. iv., conclude the volume.
The fourth contains the Expositio in duodecim libros Aristotelis
Metaphysicorum, prefaced with a detailed proof of its
genuineness by the editor, which is in contradiction with a
brief appendix, in which, after the statement that no one had
expounded the thirteenth and fourteenth books, "nec ipsos
aliquando vidi," it is added that the author has constantly
followed Duns Scotus, "cujus verba frequentem reperies." The
Expositio is followed by the Conclusiones metaphysicae and
the Questiones in Metaphysicum. The next six volumes
(vols. 5–10) contain the Oxford commentary, the first three
each one book, while the fourth book fills three volumes.
The expositions of Lychetus, Ponzius, Cavellus, Hiqueaus and
others which accompany this book cause its unusual extent.
The eleventh volume contains the Reportata Parisiensia, the
twelth the Quaestion quodlibetales, which Duns, according to
custom, had answered on the occasion of his receiving for the
second time (in Paris) the degree of doctor, and had later
worked over, and perhaps, as was also customary, had supple-
mented with additions. The Oxford commentary and the
Quodlibetales have often been printed, for instance in Nurem-
burg, by Koburger, in 1481. The same is true of the
Reportata Parisiensia, which appeared in the year 1518 in an
edition which speaks of them as nunciam antea impressa.
The publisher is Joannes Solo, cogn. major, the editor Jehan
Gräion. Another edition, Colon., 1635, bears the title
Questiones reportatae per Hugonem Cavellum noviter recogni-
te, etc. The text in the complete edition differs greatly
from that of these earlier ones. The editor not only divides
the Quaestion into sections (Scholia), corresponding to the
Opus Oxoniense, as Cavellus does, but also takes the liberty of
amplifying expressions which seem too brief, and of substi-
tuting for such as appear too barbaric what, in his opinion,
are improvements, so that he really becomes often a para-
phrase. A more important fact is, that he had before him
more complete manuscripts. For instance, in the Paris and
Cologne editions the third question of Lib. iv., dist. 43, is
wanting, only its contents being given. In the complete
edition it is treated at great length. The four sections of this discussion follow essentially the same line as the *Opus Oxoniense*, but differ from it sufficiently to show that the editor gives, with variations in style, what Duns had said in his Paris lectures. The citations which follow, all refer to the Lyons complete edition.

3. Almost the greater part of Duns’ discussions consists in a polemic critique of Albert, of Thomas, still more of Henry of Ghent, and further of Aëgidius Colonna, Bonaventura, Roger Bacon, Richard of Middletown, and others. It is thus natural to compare him with his predecessors. A difference between his Aristotelianism and that of the Dominicans lies in the fact that he is better acquainted with Aristotle than they were, not, to be sure, without owing much to their labours. He not only argues from passages which they seem to have overlooked, but also often understands better what they too quote: for instance, where Aristotle (*vid. supra*, § 88, 6) speaks of the *extrinsecus adventire* of the *anima intellectiva* (*vid. Report. Paris*. IV. dist. 23, quæst. 2). The investigations also, in regard to individuality, which were undertaken at the same time, show that Duns pays more attention than the others to Aristotle’s distinction between τὸ τί ἐστι and τὸ ὁτι. He shows how familiar the synonymous investigations of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* are to him, and how thoroughly acquainted he is with the teachings of the *Topics*, by the easy way in which he refers to both. But this clearer perception of the real meaning of Aristotle must necessarily reveal the contradiction between his teaching and the teaching of the Bible and of the Church Fathers, and for that reason threaten the peace between philosophy and theology. This danger is somewhat lessened by the fact that Duns maintains rather the form to which the doctrines of each had developed, than the original doctrines themselves. His theology is far less Biblical than ecclesiastical. Our belief in the Bible, he says, and in the fact that the Apostles, fallible men as they were, were infallible when they wrote, rests solely upon the judgment of the Church (*Report. Paris.*, III., d. 23). In the same way he appeals to later ecclesiastical definitions when he rejects Augustine’s propositions as erroneous (*Op. Oxon.*, III., d. 6, qu. 3). Accordingly he allows himself to supplement the Bible and earlier doctrines of the Church. The Biblical statement that eternal life consists in the knowledge of God,
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does not hinder him from maintaining that it consists rather in love, for, as he contends, the Bible does not say in knowledge without love (Report., Paris., IV. d. 49, qu. 2). In opposition to Anselm he claims the right of introducing new termini into theology (Op. Oxon., I., d. 28, qu. 2). On the other hand, he is not so free in regard to the papal decrees; they are for him decisive. It is characteristic also that he differs far oftener from Augustine than from Lombard. He holds that the Holy Spirit has not let the Church stand still, and therefore, while admitting that the conceptio immaculata Virginis, and many ecclesiastical customs, such as the celibacy of the clergy, etc., are not taught in the Bible, he nevertheless upholds them strongly (Report. Paris., III., d. 3). As theology, in his opinion, is not the word of Scripture but that which has grown from it, in the same way philosophy has not remained at a stand-still since the time of Aristotle. It is true that he puts the master so high as sometimes to say that a certain thing cannot be demonstrated, for then either Aristotle or his commentator, the maximus philosophus Averroës, would have proved it (Report. Paris., IV., d. 43, qu. 2). In the Opus Oxon., in connection with the same passage, he expresses himself quite differently about the maledictus Averrois). On the other hand, he often shows much more freedom in his relations to Aristotle. He says that the latter had taken many things from his predecessors as probable, which we now understand better (Ibid., II. d. 1, qu. 3). Wherever Aristotle and his expounders contradict each other we must adopt the more rational position (Quodl., qu. 7), etc. His familiarity with the additions which the Byzantine philosophers and their Latin editors had made to the Aristotelian logic, makes him certain that here Aristotelianism has really advanced. The Summulae, as well as Shyreswood's revision, are used very often and quoted as opportunity arises. The belief that the Spirit which leads the Church, as well as the Spirit which begets philosophy, constantly moves forward, made it possible to investigate more freely than before the original sources of theology and philosophy, and to retain the hope that, in spite of all the variety of those sources, that which springs from them can be finally united.

4. To this is to be added the fact, that the full agreement of Church doctrine and philosophy is no longer a matter of so great moment to Duns as it was to Thomas, and hence is by
no means so complete. When he criticizes those who confound theology and philosophy, and give neither to theologians nor to philosophers their dues, he is thinking, amongst others, of Thomas (Op. Oxon., II., d. 3, qu. 7). He carries the distinction of the two almost to complete separation. He says that the order of things which the philosopher accepts as natural is for the theologian a result of the fall (Quodl., qu. 14); that the philosopher understands by blessedness the blessedness of this world, the theologian that of the world beyond (Report. Paris., IV., d. 43, qu. 2); that philosophers and theologians think in quite a different way of the potentia activa (Op. Oxon., IV., dist. 43, qu. 3 fin.). Indeed, he goes further than this, and even says that a proposition may be true for the philosopher but false for the theologian (Report. Paris., IV., d. 43, qu. 3. Schol., 4, p. 848). We often find in his works a contrast also between Catholic and Philosophi. Duns avoids the necessity of choosing between philosophy and theology, which seems to be a result of such a contrast, by attributing to the former, as Albert had done, but much more distinctly than he, a purely theoretical character, while he emphasizes the decidedly practical nature of theology, whose proper content is Christ. He carries this so far as to say that God's theology, that is, the way in which God conceives the subject of theology, is practical and not speculative (Disp. subt. 30), and that he often doubts whether theology, since it is unable to prove its chief propositions, can actually be called a science (Theorem. 14; Op. Oxon. and Report. Paris., II., d. 24). If it is held to be such, however, because the theological propositions have as their content not merely a knowledge of principles, which is an evidentia ex terminis, but a knowledge deduced from them (Report. Paris., Prol., qu. 1), it must at least be maintained that theology is a science different from all others, resting upon principles peculiar to itself, and of a character more practical than speculative (Op. Oxon., Prol., qu. 4. 5).

5. If, in accordance with these hints, we consider separately Duns' purely philosophical investigations, and commence with his dialectics, the first question that presents itself is, How is his doctrine of the universals related to that of his predecessors? He is a decided opponent of those who see in the universals mere fictiones intellectus. If their opinion were correct, science would be transformed into mere logic, since all
science has to do with the universal. Those who hold this opinion are treated rather scornfully by him as loquentes, garruli, etc. When he says that cumbet universali corresponsent in re aliquis gradus entitatis in quo conveniunt contenta sub ipso, he is a conceptualist, as Abelard and Gilbert were (vid. supra, § 163, 3). Duns shows, however, in the same way that Avicenna, and after him Albert and Thomas had done, by maintaining alongside of the conceptualistic formula in rebus, the realistic ante res, and the nominalistic post res (cf. § 114, 1; § 200, 2), that the strife between the nominalists and the realists is a thing of the past (cf. Op. Oxon., I., d. 3, qu. 4). He agrees word for word with the Schoolmen mentioned, when he teaches that the general exists first as the original type, after which things are formed, that it exists secondly in them as the quiditas which gives the nature of the thing, and thirdly that it is discovered by our understanding, which abstracts it from the things (hence post res), as that which is common to them. Since Duns often limits the word universale to this third signification, and emphasizes the fact that the universale as such (potentially) lies in the understanding (In sup. Pophyr., p. 90), many have wrongly regarded him as a nominalist, quite forgetting that he says immediately afterward, that the universalitas is in re and no figmentum. Since he named the universals formae, his view, in accordance with the principle of nomenclature stated above (§ 158), has been called the formal. In regard to the origin of general conceptions in the thinking soul, Duns is much more exact than Albert and Thomas. As they had done, he bases them here on the species, which he calls intelligibiles in agreement with Thomas, instead of spiritualia as Albert had named them; and he distinguishes them from the species sensibiles, the impressions of individual things. They are neither mere effects of the genera which exist in the things,—as is taught by the Platonists and by Thomas also, who makes knowledge quite passive,—nor are they simple figments of the intellect; but the impression received from them, as mere occasio or concausa, causes the understanding to form those species intelligibiles to which the general in rebus corresponds. Since only these species are expressed in words, the latter designate the things only indirectly, and are direct symbols of the species alone. The difference between Thomas and Duns Scotus becomes much more apparent in the question, How and in what are the
general and individual distinguished? They are both real (in natura), or, what is the same thing, reality has a like relation to both (natur-a est indifferens) (Op. Oxon., II., d. 3, qu. 1). The difference must therefore lie in something else. According to Thomas (§ 203, 5), it was the materia signata which individualized. The result of this opinion was the position rejected by the Church, that angels could not be individuals of a species, and hence Duns concludes that the opinion itself is heretical (De anima, qu. 22). On philosophical grounds also, it is to be rejected. For since, according to Thomas, matter is a limit and a defect, it follows from his theory that it is really an imperfection for a thing to be hoc or haec. In opposition to this Duns asserts that that which makes a thing hoc or haec, is something positive (ultima realitas, Op. Oxon., II., d. 3, qu. 6), and that the individual is more perfect, and is the true end of nature (Report. Paris., I., d. 36, qu. 4). Individuality is designated by Duns by various names. In the Expositio ad duod. libri Met. Ar., which may perhaps be regarded as unauthentic on account of its postscript referred to above, and also in the Report. Paris. (II., d. 12, qu. 6), occurs the expression haecceitas (in very old editions, eccceitas), which was subsequently often made use of by the Scotists. It is employed in such a way as to denote sometimes the individual and specific being itself, sometimes that which makes the individual specific. Other expressions used by Duns are unitas signata ut haec, hoc signatum haec singularitate, individuitas, natura atoma, etc. (Op. Oxon., II., d. 3, qu. 4). The constantly recurring objection brought against Thomas is, that according to him that which more closely defines a quid, and makes of it a hoc (contrahit), is a negative, while it should really be conceived as something positive, something which makes more perfect (Op. Oxon., II., d. 3, qu. 6, and other passages). In opposition to this (pantheizing) disparagement of individual beings, we are not to go so far, however, according to Duns, as certain (atomizing) deifiers of the individual go. The assertion of Brother Adam, that material things are individuals ex se or per se, appears to him blasphemous and nominalistic (Ibid., qu. 1): blasphemous, because in God alone is the quiditas per se haec (Report. Paris., II., d. 3, qu. 1), nominalistic, because it is thereby denied that anything actual outside of their individuality exists in things. According to Duns the correct view is, that the individual existence of
things, which are not, like God, purus actus, is something simultaneously composed (Report. Paris., II., d. 12, qu. 8). With this distinction, in the way in which the essentia divina and the substantia materialis are one and hæc, is connected the fact that, since the former is common to the three Persons, there is in God a commune, which is nevertheless realiter individuum (Op. Oxon., II., d. 3, qu. 1), while in man incomunicabilitas is a necessary property of singularitas (Quodl., qu. 19). In the Opus Oxon. (III., d. 1) Duns distinguishes between the communicabile ut quod, which can be predicated only of the singulare illimitatum, that is of God, and the ut quo, so that every created individual nature is incomunicabile ut quod; while on the other hand he does not deny it a communicabilitas ut quo. On account of this distinction Duns often shows the tendency to limit the word individuum to the sphere where there is also dividuum (Report. Paris., I., d. 23), and hence not to call the Divine nature individuum, as in the case just cited. But whatever it may be called, individuality constitutes always the precondition of personality. Individuari prius est quam personari (Report. Paris., III., d. 1, qu. 8) is true of Divine as well as of human being.

6. To pass on to the metaphysical investigations, Duns makes the ens their first object as well as the first object of our reflective understanding in general. Since it is the predicate of everything, of God, of substance, of accidents, etc., and that too univocè; and since in metaphysics we must take our start from being, in order to prove the existence of God, the ens is really the conception which has the priority of all others (De anima, qu. 21; Report. Paris., I., d. 3, qu. 1). Since ens is the opposite of non-ens, but non-ens or nihil is for the most part that which is contradictory to itself (Quodl., qu. 3), the proposition of identity is true of every being, and every being, even the Divine, is subject to it. The incompossibilitas contrariorum is absolute necessity. Although ens is the highest conception, it cannot properly be called the highest genus, but, as that which embraces all, has only a position analogous to that of the genus (De rer. princ., qu. 3). The ens stands in fact above the genus of predicables and predicaments; it is transcendent just as its predicates of unity, of truth, etc., are transcendent because they are true of the ens before it descendit in decem genera (Theorem. 14, Report. Paris., I. d. 19; Quodl. qu. 5) The ens as such is therefore neither the first genus,
nor the highest substance, nor accident; as that which embraces everything, it stands not in, but above these relations. The lowest position within the sphere of being is occupied by matter. This therefore is not to be thought of as mere limit, for in that case it would be non-ens; it is in fact a something positive. Even without form it is an actual something (Report. Paris., II., d. 12). It is an absolutum quid, and is not to be thought of as a mere correlate, as is maintained by those who say that it cannot be conceived without form (Op. Oxon., II., d. 12, qu. 2). With this may be easily reconciled the fact that it is the possibility of new effects, and that there is a condition of it which has been preceded by no effect, where it is thus indeed actu but nullius actus, the principle of passivity (De rer. princ., qu. 11), the purely determinable. It is this as materia primo-prima, which, as receptivity for every form, contains only the form of the primum agens in the creation of things. The materia secundo-prima would then be that which is formed in propagation (informatur), the materia tertio-prima that which underlies other transformations, etc. (De rer. princ., qu. 7, 8). The materia primo-prima is thus common to all things; not even souls and angels are without it. When a soul therefore is called the form of its body, it must not be forgotten that it, this informans, is itself a substance, and therefore materia informata, a union of matter and form (Ibid.). In this lies the possibility that a soul may exist separated from the body. It follows however from the same fact, that since an angel can never be united with a body as its form, the materia primo-prima in angels must be joined with its form in a different way from that of man, must be otherwise informed, and thus a specific difference exists between angels and disembodied souls (Op. Oxon., II., d. 1. qu. 5). When we find these fine distinctions drawn in respect to matter, we are led to look for similar ones in regard to its correlate, form. Duns does in fact draw such distinctions, and employs them especially when he combats the second watch-word of the Thomists, the unitas formae. He asserts, namely, a pluralitas formarum in man, with which the fact is easily reconcilable that the last added, highest (ultima) form has all the lower ones under itself, in such a way that it may be called one element in man, while the rest of them, together with matter, constitute the other element (Op. Oxon., IV., d. 11, qu. 3). As Albert had previously distinguished the materiale (hyleale) from materia proper (hyle), Duns in the present
instance distinguishes *formalitas* from *forma*; and thus, since his *formalitates* present a succession of degrees, it comes to pass that the *formalitates* and the question as to the *intensio et remissio formarum* are made for a time the favourite point of strife. Since the *formalitas* as well as the *forma* gives the what and therefore the name of the *informatum*, Duns often treats *formalitas* and *quiditas* as synonymous. As matter occupies the lowest, God assumes the highest position among the *entia*. He is the nature to which perfection belongs, and therefore reaches beyond everything which is not Himself (*De prim. omn. rer. princ.,* 4). The existence of this endless Being, since He has no cause, cannot be deduced from one, that is, cannot be proved *propter quid* or *a priori*. At the same time one has no right to look upon His existence as *ex terminis* certain and therefore needing no proof, as Anselm had done in his ontological argument. There is a *demonstratio quia*, or an *a posteriori* proof of His existence drawn from His works (*Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 1, 2). By this means we arrive at the existence of a first cause and of a highest end, *quo majus cogitari nequit*. The cosmological, teleological, and ontological arguments are thus combined by Duns in a peculiar way. No supernatural illumination is necessary for this knowledge of God: it is possible *in puris naturalibus*, and is scientific because deduced or proved (*Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 3, qu. 4). The argument however leads only to a highest cause. That it is the only one, that it is almighty and needs no material cannot be proved (*Op. Oxon.* and *Report. Paris.*, I., d. 42; *Quodl.*, qu. 7). The nature of God also may be reached by a like process of reasoning. All things contain at least the *vestigium*, the more perfect the *imago Dei*, that is, the former resemble a part of the Divine, these the Divine itself, and so we are able by examining ourselves (*via eminenticie*) to rise to a knowledge of the Divine nature (*Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 3, qu. 5). Psychology therefore forms the bridge between ontology and theology.

7 The chief point of difference between the psychology of Thomas and that of Duns lies in their view of the relation between thinking and willing. Both, although found *unitive* in the soul, are nevertheless actually (*formaliter*) distinct from one another and from the soul (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 16). Thomas had so conceived of their relation that the will must follow thought, and must choose that which the reason represents to it as good. This is combated by Duns. He not only ascribes
to the will the power of determining itself quite independently of the reason (Op. Oxon., II., d. 25), and under certain circumstances deciding in opposition to it, but he also points out that very often thinking follows willing, as for instance when I try to perceive, when I will to think, etc. Over against the objections of his opponents, he assumes a first and a second act of thinking, between which the act of willing falls. But even the first does not determine the will, for voluntas superior est intellectu (Rep. Paris., d. 42, qu. 4). For Duns the will coincides completely with the liberum arbitrium. What it does is contingent et evitabile, while the intellect is subject to necessity (Op. Oxon., ii., d. 25). Duns is a most decided indeterminist. The intellect according to him only furnishes the material, while the will shows itself free, that is, able to choose either of two opposites (Ibid., I., d. 39). Indeed this doctrine of freedom reacts upon his theory of knowledge. The beginning of all knowledge can be called an act of receiving in so far as every act of perception has, as its basis et seminarium, sensation, which is possible only as a result of an impression and image (species) of the object. At the same time, aside from the fact that this is so only as a result of the fall, the act of receiving is not, as Thomas holds, a mere passivity. The object and the perceiving subject work together. The former is not the sole cause, but only the associate cause, the occasion, of the image which arises in our mind (Op. Oxon., I., d. 3, qu. 4, 7, 8; Disput. subt., 8). The self-activity of the mind is still more prominent in the subsequent steps through which the process of perception passes. Since the images remain in the mind after the act of appropriation, for the most part (again on account of the fall) as phantasmata (De anima, qu. 17), but also in part as species which represent the intelligible, and since both can be called up by the memory, the latter is plainly a transforming, indeed, as is proved in the production of words, actually a producing power (Report. Paris., IV., d. 45, q. 2). Self-activity is shown still more in the intellectus agens, that power of the soul which is related to sensible images as light to colours, to the intellectus possibilis as light to the eye, to actual perception as light to the act of seeing (De rer. princ., qu. 14), and which makes actual knowledge out of fancies. To these acts is finally added, however, a pure act of will, the act namely of concurrence, which necessarily follows only in the few cases in which a thing is ex terminis certain, otherwise, if not entirely at
pleasure, yet not without the consent of our will (Disp. subt., 9). This concurrence, where a thing is not certain and the concurrence therefore not necessary, is belief (fides), and hence it follows that a great deal of knowledge is based upon fides, indeed that the greater part of knowledge is a completion of belief and therefore more than the latter (Report. Paris., Prol., qu. 2). This superiority of knowledge does not exclude the superiority of belief in other respects (Op. Oxon., III., d. 23). A distinction, in fact, is to be drawn between the fides acquisita, which even the unbaptized may have in respect to the doctrines of the Church, if he does not distrust those who testify to him of their truth, and the fides infusa by means of which we become partakers of grace. While the former, as concurrence without compulsion, is an act of the will, there must be recognised in the latter the element of passivity, which Thomas wrongly ascribes to all belief and therefore to all knowledge (Op. Oxon., I., d. 3, qu. 7). If this fides infusa were ever accompanied by the fides acquisita, a condition would result of which, as it appears, man is not capable in this world (Quodl., qu. 14).

8. From these psychological doctrines conclusions are drawn in regard to the Divine nature, which can also be known ex puris naturalibus, but likewise only a posteriori (Theorem. 14, Report. Paris., I., d. 2, qu. 7). Our knowledge therefore of the Divine nature is not intuitive but deductive (Ibid., Prol., qu. 2). The two modes are so distinguished that the latter abstrahit ab esse fuisse et fore, while the former presupposes the presence of the object with which it ends. As in us there is a difference between intellectus (and its central point, memoria) and voluntas, in God also understanding and will must be distinguished. The former works naturaliter, the latter libere. The former is the ground and the content of all that is necessary, the latter causes all that is accidental, and causes it contingenter (Report. Paris., II., d. 1, qu. 3). The ultimate ground of all contingency is this power of the accidental in God (Ibid., I., d. 40). With these two definitions of Duns the doctrine of the Trinity is closely connected, since the Son, as verbum, has His ground in the memoria perfecta, while the Holy Spirit has His in the Spiratio of the first two Persons mediated by the will (Report. Paris., I., d. 11; Op. Oxon., I., d. 10). He therefore does not hesitate to ascribe to the natural man the ability to apprehend the Trinity (Quodl., VOL. I. 497
qu. 14). These relations within the Godhead (rationalia), by virtue of which there are three Persons, are the first results which spring from the Divine nature, and are therefore to be deduced from the known essentiales (Ibid., qu. 1). It is different with all God's relations ad extra. Since every being outside of God owes its origin to His will, which contingenter causat (Op. Oxon., I. d., 39), it can by no means be proved that anything outside of God must exist. God wills necessarily only His own nature; everything else is secundario volitum (Report. Paris., I., d. 17). There is no incompossibilitas contrariorum in the fact that God might have created other things than those He did create, or that He might do other than He does (Report. Paris., I., d. 43, qu. 2). We can therefore only say that in the course of the customary order which may be pleasing to God, this or that will certainly take place (Ibid., IV., d. 49, qu. 11). Duns is forced to the assumption of such a customary order by the distinction between creation, that is the passage of nothing into being, and preservation, the passage of being into being. He calls them two different relations of God to things (Quodl., qu. 12), or rather of things to God (Op. Oxon., I. d., 30, qu. 2). God's willing the things is preceded by the idea of them in the Divine understanding, which thinks them as separate things. These ideas, however, by no means determine God, least of all in such a way that He chooses a thing because it is the best. Rather is it the best only because He chooses it (Op. Oxon., III., d. 19, and other passages). The Incarnation and the sending of the Spirit are, like the Creation, works solely of Divine pleasure. If God had wished, He could have become a stone instead of a man. Although it is certain that the Incarnation would have taken place even if there had been no Fall, it nevertheless cannot be proved. Nor can it be proved that the Redemption had to take place by the death of Christ. It has pleased God that the death of the guiltless should be the ransom (Op. Oxon., III., d. 7, qu. 1, d. 30, IV., d. 15). (With these assertions are later connected the strifes with the Thomists on the merit of Christ, on adoption, acceptilation, etc.). All of these doctrines require the gratia infusa, if we are to be certain of them; they are articles of faith, which admit no scientific proof (Ibid., d. 24). The same is true of the practical part of revelation. That which God commands is good, and it is good only because He prescribes it. If He had commanded
murder or any other crime, it would be no crime, it would not be sin (Ibid., d. 37). There is thus no idea here of the per-seitas of the good (vid. § 203, 6).

9. When the indeterminateness of the will is so emphasized there must arise an opposition, much sharper than before, against the Aristotelian elevation of theory above everything, and against Augustine’s Anti-Pelagianism, that is, against the two chief doctrines of scholasticism as it had been. Accordingly, we hear Duns saying, the philosopher, it is true, puts blessedness in knowledge, but he concerns himself only with this world, while the really Christian opinion is the theological one, according to which blessedness consists in love, therefore in willing. For this very reason it appears to him almost too quietistic, when blessedness is conceived as delectatio (Report. Paris., IV., d. 49, qu. 1, 2, 6). How he reconciles the words of the Bible with his view has been already shown. It is true that the will alone cannot attain blessedness, it needs to be supported by the infusion of the theological virtue charitas (Ibid., qu. 40). But this infusion does not take place without our co-operation. Christ is the door and opens the way to salvation. It is not however the door, but the act of walking which brings us in (Op. Oxon., III., d. 9). Holding such synergism, it is quite natural that Duns should ascribe to the faith, which appropriates salvation, merit which will be rewarded. Only in the dispensation of mercy does God alone decide; in the execution of righteousness the deed of man co-operatēs (Report. Paris. IV., d. 46). Indeed it cannot be said to be absolutely impossible that man should attain blessedness by his own morality, for there is no real contradiction in this, but under the established order of things it does not take place (Ibid., d. 49, qu. 11). It is clear that Duns here goes very far in the direction of Pelagianism.

10. As the followers of Thomas were chiefly from the Dominicans, those of Duns, the Scotists, are almost exclusively from the Franciscan Order. Among his personal pupils the first place is occupied by a Franciscus, who is called from his birth-place Mayro, or de Mayronis. Some place him almost on an equality with his master. His ability in deductive reasoning is evidenced by his honorary title Magister abstractionum, and for his skill in disputation speaks the fact that he became the inventor of that actus Sorbonicus, or "Sorbonica," in connection with which a disputation was held for a whole
day without interruption and without presiding officers. His Commentary upon the Sentences appeared in Venice, 1520, together with other works. The commentary upon the first book had been previously printed in Treviso. Franz Mayro died in Piacenza in 1327. The Aragonian Andreas, with the cognomen Doctor Mellifluus, John Dumbleton of Oxford, Gerard Odo, eighteenth general of the Franciscan Order, John Bassolis, the Doctor Ornatissimus, Nicolas of Lyra, Peter of Aquila, the Oxonian Walter Burleigh, the Doctor planus et perspicuus, who died in 1157, John Jandunus (Gandavensis), the greatest Averroist of his age, are cited as Scotists with especial frequency. Later the strife against nominalism, and still more the danger which threatened the Scotists as well as the Thomists from the new tendencies in philosophy, caused them to forget their conflicts with each other and to make attempts at a compromise. From the beginning, however, the two parties, especially where the rivalry between the Orders fell out of sight, were not so widely separated but that, in one or another of the contested points, the Thomists approached Duns, and the Scotists the doctrines of Thomas. Especially in the sphere of Logic there resulted a number of intermediate forms, which are given in the third volume of Prantl’s work, already so often referred to.

§ 215.

When Duns combats not only Thomas, but also just as often the latter’s opponent, Henry of Ghent; when he contends not only against the two renowned Dominicans, but also against the glittering stars of his own Order, Alexander and Bonaventura; when he is further just as severe in his polemics in cases where he agrees in doctrine with his opponents, as in the opposite cases,—all this is due to the fact mentioned above (§ 213), that the object of his study is not the thing to be proved but the act of proving itself. He stands, therefore, in a position essentially different from that of Albert and Thomas. If this fact is overlooked he will be ranked far below the two latter; below Thomas, because in most cases where he differs with him he goes back to Albert; below both of them because the chasm which he makes between theology and philosophy is far greater than it was with them. But, on the other hand, when his position is more correctly
estimated, it will be seen that, in reflecting upon their action, he goes beyond them; and therefore it is not true, as in the case of Albert, that for him theology and philosophy do not yet agree, but that they no longer agree. The harmony between them rests upon the fact that the proofs of science stood at the service of doctrine. When they are made the principal thing they are raised above a position of servitude, and therefore cease to act as the handmaidens of doctrine. In spite of the fact, therefore, that Duns is the truest son of the Romish Church, he has brought scholastic philosophy to a point where it is obliged to announce to Rome the termination of its period of service. This attitude of scholasticism of course appears as a victory of earlier nominalism to those who represent the interests of ecclesiasticism alone. The assertion that only the individual actually exists, united with the statement that philosophy does not confirm the doctrines of the Romish Church, was enough to make their author looked upon as a pure Roscellinus, and to cause the latter's watch-word, universalia sunt nomina et flatusoris, to be ascribed to the moderns.

It was quite out of order that the name nominalist, which in its original meaning was rightly, indeed necessarily, disclaimed by Occam, should in strictly scientific discussion be applied first to him, and then to all whom we prefer to call individualists. This has however taken place; and to refuse to employ the customary nomenclature would be to give up all idea of being understood. Accordingly we shall speak here always of the victory, not of Occamism, but of nominalism; but we wish to point out at the start, as H. Ritter has done, that the nominalism of the fourteenth century is something entirely different from that which had previously borne that name. The later nominalism, in so far as it is different from the earlier, rests upon that into which scholastic Aristotelianism had grown. The two principal propositions which Duns opposed to Thomism, became the chief pillars of fourteenth century nominalism. Occam so unites the two propositions, that individual being is the true and perfect being, and that God acts with absolutely unrestrained arbitrariness, that they mutually support each other, as well as his whole system of philosophy and theology. The time for nominalism being come, it is the men mentally best endowed who now show a tendency to it, a state of affairs exactly opposite to that which existed in Anselm's time. Thomism is farther from nomi-
nalism, and therefore Durand of St. Pourçain (died 1333), in becoming a nominalist, changes from a disciple to an opponent of Thomas. In his work upon the Sentences (Lyons, 1569), and in another De statu animarum, he gives utterance to the proposition, that to be individual means in general to be. Scotism leads more clearly to nominalism, and therefore Peter Aureolus was looked upon as a follower of Duns even after he had declared himself to be a complete nominalist. He was first a teacher in Paris, and finally Archbishop of Aix, and died, according to the common view, in 1321, according to Prantl, not before 1345. The report that it was Occam's instruction that made a nominalist of Durand is unfounded. Another report makes Aureolus the teacher of Occam, but this is no better supported than the former. He and Occam were perhaps fellow-students. In any case the cardinal points upon which Occam's doctrines rest are to be found in the works both of Durand and of Aureolus, as well as of other contemporaries.

§ 216.

William of Occam.

1. William, called, from his birthplace in Surrey, Occam or Ockam, after studying at Merton College, Oxford, and holding for a time a position as pastor, is said to have entered the Franciscan Order and to have become a hearer of Duns, and later to have taught philosophy and theology in Paris. His innovations in both branches procured him the title of Tenebrabilis aceptor, and the acuteness which he displayed in connection with them, that of Doctor invincibilis. At this time he wrote Super quatuor libros Sententiarum (Lyons, 1495, fol.), in which only the first book of the Sentences is expounded in all its distinctions, also the Quotlibeta septem (Strasb., 1491, which contains also the Tractatus de sacramento altaris), the Centilogium theologicum (Lyons, 1495), the commentaries upon Porphyry and upon the first two works of the Organon, which was issued in Bologna (1497) by Marcus of Benevento, under the title Expositio aurea super artem veterem, finally the Disputatio inter clericum et miliem, in which he attacks the pretensions of Boniface VIII. and the temporal power of the popes in general. The last work was written according to Goldast in the year 1305, but this is
probably too late a date. It has often been published, for instance in Paris in 1598, and also in Goldast's Monarchia, vol. i., p. 13 ff. Occam also expounded some of the physical works of Aristotle, as appears from his Logic; but no such commentaries are known. After these works, he composed at the request of a brother of his Order, Adam, the Tractatus logices in tres partes divisus (Paris, 1488), which is cited also as Summa totius logicae and Summa logices ad Adamum. In this work the doctrines of logic are exhibited more briefly than in the expository essays, and yet at the same time more completely, because the ars nova and moderna are noticed, that is, the Aristotelian writings which had become known later, as well as those which had come into circulation through Byzantine agency. After this, Occam appears to have devoted himself entirely to questions of Church politics. In agreement with the stricter division of his Order (the Spirituales), he had always deduced from the humility of Christ and of the Apostles the conclusion that the pope ought not to possess temporal power. To this was added later the conviction that as the pope must be subject to princes in worldly affairs he ought to be subject to the Church in spiritual matters. In this opinion he was confirmed more and more by the party spirit shown by the incumbent of the papal chair against the Spirituales. The Dialogus in tres partes distinctus (Paris, 1476), together with its appendices, the Opus nonaginta dierum (Lyons, 1495), and the Compendium errorum Joannis Pape X; XII. (Lyons, 1495), as well as the Quesiones octo de potestate summi pontificis (Lyons, 1496), contain his views upon this subject. In his Tractatus de jurisdictione imperatoris in causis matrimonialibus, if it was really written by him, he goes still further. This Tractatus was composed in 1342, and is given by Goldast, p. 31. Imprisonment in Avignon was the result of his polemics. He escaped in the year 1328, and took refuge with Ludwig of Bavaria in Munich, as his brother monks John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua (the author of the Defensor pacis) had done before him. He died there in the year 1347, or according to others some years later in Carinolæ in the kingdom of Naples.

2. No Schoolman since Abelard had devoted himself to the study of logic with such fondness as William. He calls it the omnium artium aptissimum instrumentum, and ascribes to its neglect the rise of most errors in theology. It is
therefore well to begin with this subject. He concerns himself always with forms, and employs the expressions which had been familiar to all logicians since the Summule had been used as a text book. They cannot therefore be passed over in silence, as has hitherto been done (cf. § 204, 3). It is scarcely necessary to remark, however, that when investigations and expressions are here brought up for the first time, it is not the intention to imply that William was the first to teach all this. This idea has been completely refuted by Prantl in the third part of his work. The Tractatus logices serves as a guide; in addition, the Quotlibeta and the notes upon the Sentences, especially upon the second distinction of the first book, in connection with which it had become the traditional practice to treat the subject of the universals. As a theoretical question this latter does not belong properly to logic, which, according to William, is, like grammar and the mechanical arts, a practical discipline, an art (so Expositio aurea, Proem.). Nevertheless in order to avoid logical errors, the metaphysical sphere, where this question properly belongs, must be glanced at. For the realm of logic proper the proposition, Logica non tractat de rebus quae non sunt signa (Quotl., v. 5), is decisive. This limitation is carried so far that Occam asserts that the questions: How these signs arise, Whether they are acts of the soul or something else, etc., do not properly belong in logic, since they concern reality (the reality of the signs) (Expos. aur., Proem.). Nevertheless he often discusses them, and always decides that species intelligibiles should not be inserted between the things and the activity of the spirit, as is done by the Scotists. On the contrary, it is the actus intelligendi itself by which the thing is revealed to us, that is, this actus is itself a sign of the thing. By a sign (as used in the sentence Logica non tractat, etc., quoted above), William means that which stands for something else. Significare or importare aliquid, stare, and especially supponere pro aliquo are the expressions by which this representation is designated. In the first place, a distinction is to be drawn between natural signs, that is, such as have arisen involuntarily, and those that have been fixed by the will (ad placitum instituta). To the former belong our thoughts about things, which arise as spontaneously as a sigh, the sign of pain, or as smoke, the sign of fire. Thoughts are conditions of the soul, and therefore passiones or intentiones animae,
and conceptus, intellectus, intellectiones rerum are used as synonymous expressions. William constantly insists that these occurrences in the soul are no more images, properly so called (species), of the things, than the sigh is of pain or smoke of fire (cf. Expos. aurea de specie). When he nevertheless calls them similitudines rerum he justifies himself by the consideration that they assume the same place in the esse objectivum, that is, in the cognosci, or in the realm of that which is thought, as is occupied by the things designated by them in the esse subjectivum, that is, in being which is independent of our thinking (Ad. I. Sentt. 2, 8; Tract. log., I. 12). From these signs of the presence of things, involuntarily called up in us by them, are to be distinguished the signs which have been made ad plactum (κατὰ συνθήκην in Aristotle, vid. supra, § 86, 8) to point out or designate something. These are words, voces or nomina, which are properly signs of signs, since in them an intentio animae is expressed (Tract. log., i. 11). Since words are not only spoken but also written, there are three varieties of signa or significantia to be distinguished: concepta s. mentalia, prolata s. vocalia, finally scripta. If, in speaking and in writing, the communication of thoughts were the only object, grammatical and logical forms would necessarily be identical. That this is not the case is, according to William, due to the fact that many grammatical forms exist only for the sake of ornament. The fact that synonyms are not always of the same gender, is to him a proof that no logical analogue corresponds to the grammatical genus. The distinction between singular and plural, on the other hand, is not only vocal but also mental (Quotl., v. 8, and in other passages). Since the former disagreement is only exceptional, the divisions of logic have force also in grammar. In the first place, namely; are to be considered the simplest elements of every complex of thoughts or of words, the termini, then the simplest combinations of them, the propositiones, and finally the establishment of them, so that the third part bears the title De argumentatione.

3. The first part of William's logic, which treats of the termini, is the most important, and is decisive for his view. In connection with the distinction between the broader and, narrower application of the word terminus, is considered the distinction between the cathegremata and syncaethegremata (to retain his barbaric orthography), so important in the eyes
of the mediaeval logicians, that is, the distinction between the words which in themselves fix a concept and those which do it only when supplemented. Passing this by, we shall first determine the distinction between a \textit{terminus prima} and a \textit{terminus secundae intentionis}. By the former is to be understood the \textit{actus intelligendi}, which implies a \textit{res}, by the latter that which implies a \textit{signum} (\textit{Tract. log.}, i. 11; \textit{Quotl.}, iv. 19). Simple as this distinction appears to be, and clear as it is that, by reflecting upon the formation of my conceptions, I can only obtain a \textit{conceptus secundae intentionis}, we must nevertheless avoid limiting too closely the sphere of the \textit{prima intention}. Not only is that which exists outside of the mind (\textit{extra animam, extra intellectum}, or even \textit{extra alone}) a \textit{res}, but mental processes, passions, etc., whose being does not coincide with the \textit{cognosci}, are also \textit{res}; they have a subjective, that is, not a mere predicative, being, and thus give, when they are thought, \textit{conceptus prima intentionis} (cf. \textit{Log.}, i. 40, ad. i. \textit{Sentt.}, 2, 8). To the distinction between the first and the second intention, in connection with conceptions, corresponds the first and the second \textit{impositio}, in connection with names, and the words "stone" and "pronoun" serve to mark this distinction (\textit{Tract. log.}, i. 11). Still more important than this is the distinction between the various \textit{suppositiones} or representations of the object. The \textit{suppositio} (that is \textit{pro aliis positio}, \textit{Tract. log.}, i. 63) is various, not only when it is silently thought, but also when it is spoken. In the two propositions \textit{homo est animal} and \textit{homo est substantivum}, the word \textit{homo} stands in the first case for a thing, in the second case only for the word itself. The same thing occurs in connection with every thought, and therefore every \textit{terminus} can predicate in three ways, \textit{personaliter i.e. pro re, simpliciter i.e. pro intentione animae}, and \textit{materialiter i.e. pro voce}. The sentences \textit{homo currit, homo est species, homo est vox dissyllaba} serve as examples of these three ways of predication, which William discusses very frequently (\textit{Tr. log.}, i. 64; \textit{ad i. Sentt.} 2, 4, and in other places), because a great many paralogisms can be solved only when the particular \textit{suppositio} in the premises is pointed out. In the \textit{Expositio aurea} the phrase \textit{supponere pro se} is commonly used instead of \textit{simpliciter supponere}.

4. The distinctions just given are employed in connection with the investigation in regard to the universals. By the universals are to be understood first of all the five predicables
of Porphyry, which are looked upon as corresponding with the five questions which William deduces from the single *quid est hoc* (*Tract. log.*, i. 18), and of which the first two, genus and species, are especially considered. He maintains that they are *termini secundae intentionis* (*Ibid.* i. 14, cf. *Expos. aur.*, cap. *de genere*) and that therefore they correspond with nothing real *extra animam*, but express (predicate) solely that which is *in mente* (*ad* i. *Sentt.*, 2, 8). Everthing which exists, whether a *res extra animam*, or a process in the mind, for instance a *qualitas* which exists subjectively in it, is an *individuam* or *singulare*. The question therefore arises, How does it happen that a *terminus*, as for instance *homo*, is used as *universale*, that is, is predicated of a number? (*Tract. log.*, i. 15). The *moderni*, that is, the realists (it is interesting to compare the earlier use of *moderni*, *vid.* § 159), have invented the theory of a *commune* to which they ascribe the power; which belongs only to the Divine nature, of being one, and yet in many *supposita*, and which (not the individual *hominis*) is designated by the word *homo*, is *personaliter* predicated. Even Scotus, who far outshines all the rest of the *moderni*, when taken with precision agrees with them, since his modified view that the *commune* is not *realiter*, but *formaliter* distinct from the individual things, does not improve their untenable opinion (ad i. *Sentt.*, 2, 6). In beginning with the general, and then seeking for the ground of individuality, they have perverted the whole thing. The individual is in and of itself individual and is alone actual. That which is to be explained is rather the general (*Ibid.*). Of the many absurdities to which, according to William, this (realistic) view leads, we mention only one: every individual being would then be an aggregate of an endless number of actual beings, namely of those *communia* which are predicated of it. Again, Aristotle, the greatest authority in philosophy, and his commentator Averroës, as well as John of Damascus in his Logic, can be understood only when this opinion of the modern Platonists is rejected. The true view, which is also that of Aristotle, is that the universals exist only *in mente*, and that therefore in the proposition *homo est visibilis* the *terminus homo* does not stand for such a fiction as a general man, but for actual individual men who are alone able to laugh (*ad* i. *Sentt.*, 2, 4). But even among those who agree that the universals have reality only in our mind, different opinions may rule as to the
manner of this existence. William gives some of these without deciding in regard to them. At the same time he enunciates a principle which in various forms is to be found a hundred times in his works: where one is sufficient, it is useless to assume many. According to one view, the universals are mere objects of thought, mere fictions which exist only in virtue of their being thought, and therefore have mere esse objectivum. According to others they are images of individual things, confused on account of the less definite impressions of the things themselves. Still others regard them as existing independently (subjective) in the mind, as certain somethings (qualitates) which are to be distinguished from the mind's own activity. Finally, the universals may be looked upon as actus intelligendi, an opinion which recommends itself by its simplicity (Tract. log., i. 12 and other passages; cf. Expos. aur. lib. peryarmenias, Proem.). Neither here nor elsewhere does William use the expression which had given rise to the party names, Vocale, Nominales (vid. supra, § 158). Nor can he from his point of view admit that the universals are mere voces or nomina, for he regards them as signs which have arisen naturally, and not signs which have been voluntarily formed. He would therefore have been literally right if he had repudiated the name nominalist, but he could have urged nothing against the name Terminista, which has actually been applied to him.

5. As the assumption of actual communia seemed to William an unnecessary multiplicatio entium, in the same way he regards a number of other names as equally unjustifiable personifications. Not only does he ridicule those who add to ubi an ubitas, to quando a quandeitas (Tract. log., i. 59, 60), but he denies that there is a quantitas which is anything else than the res quanta, or a relation which is other than the related things (Ibid., 44 ff., cf., Expos. aur. de praeicament., c. 9). He makes use of the first assertion in connection with the question as to the quantity (extension) of the body of Christ; of the second when he shows that the conception of creation is not a third one in addition to those of God and of the creature. Since the case is the same with quality, qualitas could be translated above (sub 4) as if it were quale or quid. As a whole, the result in respect to the predicaments (categories) is the same as in connection with the predicables: they do not express anything real, but rather modes of our
thinking. In his *Expos. aur. de praedicament*, c. 7, William had already asserted that Aristotle in his categories does not divide things, but words. He therefore constantly refers afterwards to their connection with verbal expression, and traces back the distinction between the first and the second substance to the *nomen proprium* and *commune*. He also lays weight upon the fact that the fifth and sixth categories are adverbs, that the seventh coincides with the active, the eighth with the passive voice, etc., and continually repeats; that Aristotle’s view leads to the same result. The reduction of the Aristotelian categories to *substantia*, *qualitas*, and *respectus* (*Sentt.*, I., d. 8, qu. 2) does not appear to him a deviation from the master, whom he ranks supreme. He could not therefore look with indifference upon the fact that the Platonizing *moderni* continually appealed to one of Aristotle’s own propositions. The assertion of the latter that science has to do only with the general, must lead to the renunciation of all real knowledge, if nominalism be true. William replies, that even the most decided realist must admit that our knowledge consists of (mental) propositions. It is clear, however, that propositions consist, not of things *extra animam*, but of *termini*. Every rational person must then admit that there is no knowledge except such as falls within our mind and is in so far mental (*ad* i. *Sentt.*, 2, 4. et al. *loc.*). Nevertheless we are justified in characterizing some knowledge as real, and in distinguishing it from that which is rational. For instance, if the *termini*, which form a sentence, predicate *personaliter*, that is are the representatives of *res*, the sentence expresses real knowledge, as for example *homo currit*, *homo est risibilis*, where it makes no difference whether *homo* stands for a single man, as in the first case, or for all individual men, as in the second (*Tract. log.*, i. 63). On the other hand, if the *termini* of a proposition do not stand for things but for *termini*, if they are therefore *secunde intentionis* and predicate *simpliciter*, as in the sentence *genus praedicatur de speciebus*, the knowledge thus expressed is rational, as for instance, all logical knowledge. Since, then, in the propositions which express real knowledge, *termini* almost always occur, which stand not for a single thing but for many, that is, general *termini*, Aristotle is quite right in saying that knowledge has to do with the general, namely, with general *termini*, not with general *res*.

6. It may be mentioned as peculiar, that in the second part
of his logic, *de propositionibus*, William regards the modal judgments as the results of combination, just as Aristotle had done (*vid. supra*, § 86, 1). Since, however, according to him, a judgment, in addition to the predicate *possibile*, etc., can have also the predicates *scibile*, *dubitabile*, *credibile*, etc., he wishes to assume a greater variety of modal judgments than is common. The third part of his logic, *de argumentatione*, the fullest of all, is divided into four sections which treat of conclusion, definitions and proofs, reasons and deductions, finally, false conclusions. He maintains Aristotle's original three figures in opposition to the later four, and defends him against the charge of incompleteness. In each figure he gives the sixteen possible combinations of two premises, eliminates the useless ones, and designates the remaining four of the first figure by the words *Barbara*, etc., of the second figure by *Cesare*, etc. For the six combinations of the third figure no similarly formed words are used. He then shows that the *modi* of the so-called fourth figure *Baralipon*, etc., arise from those of the first figure by subalternation and conversion of the conclusion, and calls them, as the earliest Peripatetics had done, indirect *modi* of the first figure. He then shows, however, that in the second and third figures similar ones can be formed by a similar process. He enumerates them, but invents for them no such *voces memoriales*. In connection with deductions those cases are treated with especial fulness in which simple and modal judgments are united as premises. A paraphrase of the second Analytics of Aristotle then follows, into which are worked, however, the conceptions current in the existing logic of the schools. Finally he takes up fallacies. Three more fallacies are to be added to the thirteen enumerated by Aristotle. It is sometimes surprising, when he discusses the subject in detail, to hear him say that he expresses himself briefly, and that a fuller treatment will be found in his commentaries on the Organon.

7. This terministic view is held to agree, not only with Aristotle, but also with theology, much more closely than the modern Platonizing opinion; above all, because the assumption of such actual generalities, preceding individual things, makes the latter proceed from the former as the material, and thus does away with the creation from nothing, and hence with God's unlimited omnipotence (*Tract. log.*, i. 15, *ad* i. *Sentt.*, 38, 1 and in other places). This omnipotence how-
ever, with God's voluntariness which is always combined with it, is for William, almost more than for Duns, the most important dogma; and he maintains, in verbal agreement with his predecessors, that things were not created because they are good, but that they are good because God willed them. The only limit to Divine power is the logical contradiction. Although he sometimes (e.g. ad i., Sentit., 1, 4) shows a tendency not to stop even with this, when Scripture and ecclesiastical decisions seem to demand it; he nevertheless maintains on the whole that God can do everything which involves no logical contradiction (Centilog. concl., 5 et al.), and that He therefore could have assumed the nature of an ass or of an ox, as well as of a man (Ibid., concl., 6). The assumption of ideal models seems to him to deprive God of freedom. He admits that ideas of things are in God's mind, but he wishes to have understood by this only their being thought, the esse objectivum of the individual things, the things as God thinks them. An independent (subjective) existence does not belong to them (ad i., Sentit., 35, 5). William, still more than his predecessor Duns, emphasizes God's arbitrary pleasure, and thus withdraws from knowledge and leaves to belief a great deal which rests upon necessity. By far the greater part of the hundred conclusions, of which his Centilogium consists, show either that all proofs for the principal dogmas, the existence of God, His unity, His infinity, etc., are uncertain, or that the most important doctrines, such as the Trinity, Creation, Incarnation, the sacramental presence of the body of Christ, lead to results which contradict the recognised axioms of reason: namely, that nothing can at the same time exist and not exist, that nothing can exist before itself, that a conclusion drawn from sound premises must be correct, that a part is smaller than the whole, that two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time, etc. We are the less justified in seeing irony in this, as Retberg and von Baur do, or scepticism, as is done by others, since in that case it would at least remain a question whether the irony were not levelled at the reason. It may seem strange to the Protestant that William, who is led by his own tendency, and by consistency, to explain the sacramental presence of the body of Christ by means of His all-permeating ubiquity, should nevertheless hold to transsubstantiation. He may further be surprised to hear William so often repeat, that whatever he may say in disagreement with the teaching of the
Church is to be regarded, not as an assertion on his part, but only as something which he has formulated for the sake of mental practice, or as a mere review. Still more, he even says that he is ready, not for the sake of pleasing any obscure authority, but at the bidding of the Romish Church, to defend what he has just combated (cf. *ad I. Sentit., 2, 1; de Sacr. alt., c. 36, and in other places). This may all seem strange to the Protestant, but to assert that no one could be in earnest in making such statements is to brand as rascals the most honest men of the most various ages, who have made like declarations. That a thing may be true for the theologian, but false for the philosopher, an opinion expressed by Duns only in passing (*vid. supra, § 214, 4*), William is firmly convinced, and he is nevertheless, while holding this dualism, an upright Aristotelian and a believing Catholic.

8. The question, to be sure, arises, whether theology still has a right to be called science. William's theory of knowledge and of science is found in part in the questions contained in the prologue to the *Sentences*, where all the commentators of Lombard treat the subject, in part in the second section of the third part of his *Tract. log.* He adopts Duns' distinction between intuitive and deductive knowledge, and defines it at one time as lying in the fact that the former has to do with the existence or non-existence of the thing known, while the latter has to do with its "what," and hence is just as possible of the non-existent (*Quotl., v. 5*), again as due to the fact that the former concerns only that which is present, the latter also that which is absent. Our apprehension of sensible objects is therefore intuitive knowledge. But this does not mean that intuitive knowledge is limited to the objects of our senses. It embraces also the intellectual: for instance, we observe our own sadness. Thus in this case also the *species*, inserted by Thomas and others between our conditions and the observation of them, disappears. Intuitive knowledge is very often represented as forming the basis for deductive knowledge, so that all knowledge rests finally upon external and internal experience. For this very reason, however, man cannot properly know God in this life. At least he cannot gain a knowledge of Him in the natural way; that God can reveal Himself, that is, make Himself an object of intuitive knowledge, is not to be denied. It is true, that not only the basis of knowledge, the intuition of God, is lacking in theology, but
also the form of knowledge, the proof. Deity has no cause and hence cannot be proved propter quid or per prius, that is, the effect from the cause, as when an eclipse of the moon is deduced from the passage of the earth between the sun and the moon. The proof quia or per posterius (by which the intervention of the earth is deduced from the occurrence of the eclipse) is also inapplicable to God, because it rests upon a number of presumptions, the impossibility of endless progress, etc. (ad I. Sentt., 2, 3; Tract. log., iii. 2, 19, etc.). Finally, the statement that God’s existence is ex terminis certain, as made in the ontological argument, is regarded by William as unfounded; and the argument itself is criticized by him in a way very similar to that pursued later by Kant. Since, then, God is the chief, if not the only, object of theology (ad ProL. Sentt., qu. 9), we cannot properly speak of the latter as a science in the strictest sense of the term.

9. In consequence of this, Occam’s theology contains rather negative propositions than positive assertions, and the process of deduction is often replaced by the statement that a thing is accepted on authority, that it is only theologiæ loquendo correct, etc. His chief service is, that he prepared the way for the banishment of a great deal of trash from theology. In accordance with his favourite saying, Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate, he rejects a number of distinctions which had hitherto been drawn; for instance, between the nature and the attributes of God. God Himself, he says, is His wisdom, and vice versâ (ad. I. Sentt., 1, 1 and 2). He praises the “Ancients” who spoke of the name of God, where we speak of His attributes (Quotl., 3, qu. 2). He declares against all the multiplication by means of which paternitas is distinguished from pater, filìio from filius (Quotl., i. 3, iv. 15). He will have nothing to do with the statement that the Son has His cause in the understanding, the Holy Spirit in the will of the Father. Both proceed from the nature of God, and understanding and will are the same (ad I. Sentt., 7, 2). Nor is anything added to the nature of God by His unity (Ibid., 23, 1). The same tendency to simplification is shown by William in connection with his consideration of the creature, especially of man. He denies the plurality of the powers of the soul, maintains the unity of understanding and will, as well as that of the vegetative and sensitive soul (Quotl., ii. 11). Only when phenomena arise which are
opposed to each other are we to conclude a like opposition, and hence twofoldness, in the causes. The strife of the senses with the reason is a confirmation of the real difference, which may also be assumed on other grounds, between the sensitive and intellectual soul. Although the latter is in this life in the body, it is nevertheless not circumscriptive so, that is, in such a way that it dwells in the whole body, each of its parts inhabiting a part of the body, but diffinitive, that is, the whole of it in every part, as the body of Christ in the Host (Quotl., i. 10, 15, iv. 26, etc.). The sensitive soul, on the contrary, is extended, and united with the body as its form (Quotl., ii. 10). Since the two are really different, we cannot ascribe to the one what belongs to the other: for instance, merit belongs only to the internal act of the higher soul; the external work which is carried out by the lower one is morally indifferent (Quotl., I. 20). The objection that the punishment of hell-fire cannot touch the higher soul, is answered by the statement that it is real pain for the latter to be in the fire against its will (Ibid., 19).

§ 217.

1. The command given in 1339 to the Paris University not to use Occam's text-books, which was followed in the next year by the formal rejection of nominalism, proves that Occam must have had a numerous following even in his life-time. Nor was this confined to his own Order. The Dominicans, beginning with Armand of Beauvoir (De bello viso), who died, according to Prantl, in 1334, according to others in 1349, and Robert Holkot (died 1349), and the Augustinians, beginning with Thomas of Strasburg (died 1357) and his successor Gregory of Rimini, go over in crowds to nominalism; and the Thomists and Scotists, who unite themselves against the common enemy, although they count such men as the Doctor planus et perspicacuus (vid. supra, § 214) and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Bradwardine, can nevertheless only prove by the fruitlessness of their struggle that the time for nominalism is come, and that therefore he who declares for it best understands his age, that is, is the most philosophical. The last attempt which was made to put it down by force was in the year 1473, when an edict of Louis XI. bound all the teachers of the Paris University by an oath to realism. The
pretended obedience was not long required, for in 1481 nominalism was again made free.

2. John Buridanus, born in Bethune in Artois, is one of the most celebrated Nominalists of the fourteenth century. He was professor in the faculty of Arts at Paris, and in the year 1327 Rector, and is said to have been instrumental in founding the University of Vienna in 1365. His work *Supra summulas*, which was very famous at the time, and which is often cited under the title *Pons asini*, the writer is unacquainted with. It was probably intended to simplify the study of logic. Buridan’s commentaries on Aristotle, on the other hand, are very common. That upon the *De anima* was published at Paris in 1616 in folio, the *Questiones in Politic. Arist.* at Oxford in 1640 in quarto, the *In questiones super decem libros Ethicorum Arist.* at Paris in 1513, and the commentary on the *Metaphys. Arist.* at Paris in 1518, both in folio. It is only the nominalistic separation of philosophy and theology which puts him in a position to philosophize on the freedom of the will in the manner in which he does in the first question of the third book, and yet at the same time to assert it.

3. Buridan is worthily supported by his younger contemporary and friend Marsiliius of Inghen. He was born in the Moselle district, and in the year 1362 began teaching in Paris, where he gained quite a reputation, and afterward under the Palsgrave Robert became one of the founders of the University of Heidelberg, where he died in 1392. I have not seen what he wrote on some of the physical works of Aristotle (on the *Physics* and the *De gen. et corr.*). His *Questiones supra IV. Libb. Sentt.* (Strasbourg: Flach, 1501, folio) were written in Heidelberg, but expound the distinctions only of the first book, a proof of the prominence of the speculative interest. Every doubt as to the nominalism of Marsilius must vanish when we hear him say in his prologue *non sunt res universales in essendo*, and when we find him developing the idea that the similarity of things leads us to deduce from them the general, not voluntarily but involuntarily (*naturaliter*). He agrees with Occam likewise in the opinion that theology is not a science in the strict sense of the term (Fol. xvii. b), in his constantly recurring polemics against unnecessary distinctions, for instance, of the nature and attributes of God, and finally in his emphasis upon God’s unlimited arbitrariness. He also conceives the relation of intuitive and abstract (*per dis-
knowledge as Occam does, and with him makes the intuitive the ground of every other kind. The fact that he cites Occam rarely, Durand much oftener, and that he quotes Thomas of Strasbourg and Rob. Holkot alongside of Thomas and Ægidius, seems to show that he was won to nominalism less by the Franciscans than by others. Jellineck has discovered a Hebrew translation of his Dialectica, for a long time regarded as lost, which proves a progress toward nominalistic tendencies among the Jews also.

4. The bloom of scholastic philosophy was looked upon as so completely dependent upon that of the University of Paris, that voices were raised which demanded the sanction of the law for that which was practically already established, viz. that the judgment of that University should be decisive in every scientific question. Realizing this, we must not underrate the importance of the fact that Buridan and Marsilius assisted in founding new scientific centres which showed from the beginning more of a national character than Paris. Decentralization is incompatible, not only with Roman Catholicism, but also with the philosophy which stands in the service of the latter (and that is what the position of scholasticism had been). When this took place it ceased to be the case that the publication of articuli Parissenses put an end to all strife. Scholastic philosophy was at last better represented in Tübingen than in Paris. Gabriel Biel (died 1495), who is commonly called the last of the Schoolmen, taught their doctrines in the former University as they are found developed in his Collectorium (printed in 1512 in folio and often afterward), in his commentary on the IV. libb. Sentt., and in other works. It is incorrect to call him the last of the Schoolmen, even when German Universities alone are thought of, for scholasticism was taught in them long after his time. It is still more incorrect when France and especially Spain are taken into consideration. In the former land Salabert’s Philosophia Nominalium vindicata could appear as late as 1651. The last section of Stöckl’s work (mentioned in § 149), and still better Werner’s monograph (mentioned below), contain detailed accounts of the men who, especially by hushing up the internal strifes, sought to impart a new life to scholasticism and to secure it against the attacks of new opinions.

§ 218.

The nominalism which grew out of Thomism, still more that which Occam had drawn from Scotism, in bringing the two elements of scholasticism, philosophy and Christian doctrine, into opposition, left but the one course open, to pursue each independently of the other, and thus to unfold the ideal content of belief without any reference to science, or, on the other hand, to represent science as philosophy limited to reality. When minds, which are able to do more than merely repeat Durand and Occam, struggle against this result, there remains to them only to unite doctrine and science in a way different from that in which they had been united. If with this novelty in form were combined an advance in the content, that is, if the consequence just mentioned were drawn, they would secure a following as the beginners of a new period. But since they scarcely go as far as those who brought so near the result feared by them, the position, in any case isolated, of a reactionary doctrine is only made more marked by the formal innovation. Even extraordinary endowment procures at most only personal esteem, not enduring scientific influence, in a school. The fact that the later anti-scholastic philosophy looks upon these men, who are separated from the rest of the Schoolmen at least in their method of philosophizing, as more akin to itself does not affect what has been said. The first to be considered are Pierre d’Ailly and Jean Charlier of Gerson, successively Chancellors of the University of Paris. Although they were thoroughly initiated into the distinctions of scholasticism, yet they do not make use of these, but rather of edifying discourses and paralastic observations as the instrument by means of which they bring their belief into accord with their nominalistically coloured Aristotelianism. They agree in regarding faith, which results from the preaching of the Gospel, as of more worth than all scholastic investigations, and are therefore in a position to be influenced by and at the same time to move those who, having broken entirely with scholasticism, are to be counted as belonging to the next period. They nevertheless differ from each other in the fact that, in the belief of the former, ecclesiasticism occupies the more prominent place, in that of the latter, subjective piety. With this might be connected the fact that the former praises Thomas Aquinas almost more than the Victorines, while
the latter honours above all others Bonaventura as his teacher and predecessor.

§ 219.

Pierre d'Ailly.

1. Pierre d'Ailly, Latinized Petrus de Alliaco, was born in Compiègne in the year 1350, and received his philosophical training in Paris. In 1372 he entered the college of Navarre as a theologian, and in 1375 began to lecture upon the Sentences. In 1380 he was made Doctor, in the following year became president of his college, in 1389 Chancellor of the University as well as Almoner and Confessor of the King, afterwards Bishop of Puy and finally of Cambrai, in which positions he laboured constantly to heal the schism in the Church by endeavouring to induce both Popes to abdicate. In the year 1411 he was made a cardinal, and was the real soul of the Council of Kostnitz. He died as Cardinal Legate in Germany, Oct. 9, 1425. He wrote a great many works. His Tractatus et sermones and Quæstt. sup. I. III. et IV. libb. Sententt. appeared in Strasbourg in the year 1490. Among the former are the Speculum considerationis, the Compendium contemplationis, the Verbum abbreviatum super libro psalmorum, his Observations upon the Song of Songs, upon the Penitential Psalms, upon the Lord's Prayer, upon the Ave Maria, etc., the Tractatus de anima, Sermons upon the Advent, and upon many saints. To the questions are appended Recommendatio sacrae Scripturæ, Principium in cursum biblicæ, the Quæstio utrum ecclesia Petri sit ecclesia Christi? which is treated in his Vesperii, as well as the Quæstio resumpta upon the same subject. The latter essays are found also in the appendices of the first and second volumes of du Pin's edition of Gerson's works (vid. § 220), which contains in addition some shorter previously unprinted writings of d'Ailly whose titles had already been given in part by Bulæus. Here is found the treatise upon the Necessity and the Difficulty of Reforming the Church, also the tracts upon the False Prophets. These last are followed in their contents by the treatise Concordantia astronomie cum theologia (Augsburg, 1490), which was written in 1416, and moderates the teachings of Roger Bacon.

2. The questions upon the Sentences contain in the beginning pure Occamistic teaching; and again especially in connec-
tion with the third distinction of the second book, where it is declared in question six that God has ideas only of individual beings, since these alone are extra producibilia, while the universalia, on the other hand, are only in anima as the common predicates of things. If we add to this the assertion, that all truths are propositions (qu. 1), that what we know is always a proposition, and not that for which the proposition stands (qu. 3), the theological watch-words of nominalism, That theology is not properly science, That God is not distinct from His attributes, etc., will not cause surprise. The much-discussed proposition also, that we have a knowledge of material things only under the presupposition that God will not change the laws of nature, is one which another nominalist might have formulated in the same way. Although d'Ailly is thus far like the other nominalists, he is surpassed by them in the completeness of their commentaries. He passes over the second book entirely, devotes only a single question to the third, and so on. In another point, however, he shows quite a peculiar and marked difference from them. The Principia of the various books, that is, the ordinary introductory lectures, are far more interesting than the commentaries. They contain rather praise of the service rendered by their author, than an outline of the contents of the different books. They might almost be called homilies upon the Scripture text, Quænam doctrina haec nova? in which the homiletic artist proceeds in ingenious antitheses seasoned with alliterations and rhyme, such as the ceremonious wit of celebrated preachers has always invented. Their author seems to be contented only when he can show (in cursus biblicus) how the questiones subtiles et studiosæ in scola theoretica philosophorum, the questiones difficiles et curiosæ in scola phantastica mathematicorum, the questiones civiles et contentiosæ in scola politica jurisprudentiorum, and finally the utiles et virtuosæ in scola catholica theologorum, are solved.

3. Not only in these works does he remind us of the Victorines (vid. supra, § 171 ff.), but also still more in the writings in which he seems to be only a compiler of that which they and kindred spirits after them had taught. This is especially the case in the closely connected Speculum considerationis and Compendium contemplationis. In the former the security of monastic life is contrasted with the dangers of worldly life; the system of the seven principal virtues and their offshoots is developed, and the foretaste of blessedness pointed out in them; and finally
the relation of the contemplative and active life is displayed under the traditional image of Rachel and Leah. The main point is to begin with self-examination. The contemplative soul passes from that which is in us to that which is about us, in order to rest finally in that which is above us. The six steps of contemplation mentioned by Richard of St. Victor (*vid. supra*, § 172, 3) are cited, as well as those given by others, and the aids to it and the tokens of it are pointed out. The *Compendium contemplationis* contains in its first part general remarks upon the contemplative life quite in the style of Thomas Aquinas. In the second part the *spiritualis genealogia*, *i.e.* the various elements of contemplation, are given in connection with the family of Jacob. In the third (*de spiritualibus sensibus*) spiritual sight, hearing, taste, etc., are discussed. At the close, d'Ailly mentions those from whom he has especially drawn, but adds that others also, particularly those who have preached in the language of the people, have been made use of.

4. It is not impossible, since his character was rather pliable, that d'Ailly's appointment as cardinal modified somewhat his views upon the papacy. This opinion, expressed by his pupil Nicolas of Clément, has been adopted by others. At any rate he fell later into a strife with the Paris University, whose favourite child he had formerly been, when the subject of the withholding of the taxes due to Pope Benedict XII. came up. Nevertheless it would be doing him an injustice to assert a contradiction in his teachings at different times. He seems throughout his life to have believed in the primacy of the Roman bishops, which he discussed in his lecture *De ecclesia Petri* which is contained in his *Vesperi*. According to this there belongs to Peter no higher consecration, no greater *potestas ordinis*, than to the other Apostles, for the words of Jesus "upon this rock," etc., refer to Christ Himself. The words "feed my sheep," however, give him a greater *potestas regiminis*, therefore an administrative superiority. This was personal, and the administrative centre of the Church moved with Peter's diocese from Jerusalem to Antioch, and thence to Rome. In the same way it is not now bound to Rome. If the latter should become a Sodom the *Summus episcopus* would have his seat elsewhere. As regards the temporal power of the Pope, he contrasts with the position of the strict Franciscans (*spirituales*), who condemned it abso-
lutely, that of Herod, who saw in Christ a worldly prince and trembled. D’Ailly himself does not object to the fact that the Pope as a result of circumstances, for instance, the gift of Constantine, has become also a worldly potentate. As regards the subordination of the Pope to a general council, the decree of the Council of Kostnitz is hardly at variance with d’Ailly’s earlier opinions, and that, in the formulation of the decree, he should have asserted such a subordination for this case alone seems scarcely probable. It is true that he departs from that which the Roman Catholic Church had proclaimed in its greatest representatives, Gregory VII. and Innocent III., those incarnations of its triumph. Nothing else is to be expected from a man who, although initiated into all the subtleties of scholasticism, yet does not, like Duns and others, draw the truth with the help of Aristotle from the dogmatic handbook adopted by the Church and from the decrees of canonical law alone, but who has learned also from popular mystical preachers, and who always zealously maintains that the study of canonical law leads away from the perusal of the Bible, the real foundation of the Church.

§ 220.

JOHN GERSON.


1. Jean Charlier is better known under the name GERSON, as the village in the neighbourhood of Rheims was called in which he was born on the 14th of December, 1363. In his fourteenth year he went to Paris and entered the Arts department of the College of Navarra, where d’Ailly and Henry of Oyta initiated him into logic. The former was also his teacher in theology, and became so fond of him that he recommended him as his own successor, both as professor and chancellor, a recommendation which was followed by Gerson’s appointment. In the year 1397 he became dean in Bruges, and left the office of chancellor to be administered by a substitute. His study of Bonaventura, which he then began to pursue with much greater industry, as well as his intercourse with Beghards, Fraticelli, and Brothers of the Free Spirit, more and more ripened his mysticism, which was in full agreement with the doctrines of the Church. His work upon false and true
visions belongs to this time. He continued his praises of mysticism after he had returned to Paris, in 1401, and took up again the calling of professor and chancellor, and later that of pastor of St. Jean en Grève. He lectured on theoretical mysticism in 1404, and wrote a treatise on practical mysticism, in Genoa, in 1407. His pain at the papal schism caused him to seek constantly for a remedy, and, although he did not take part in the council of Pisa, his work, *De auferibilitate Papa*, was nevertheless intended to justify the steps taken by the council against both Popes. He worked in the same spirit as ambassador of his king and University at the council of Kostnitz, as is proved by the work *De potestate ecclesiastica*, which was written there. Another work, which goes much further, *De modis uniendi et reformandi ecclesiam*, is said, by the best authorities upon the subject, not to be from his hand. In any case, he was less influenced by consideration for the papacy than d'Ailly was. This deprived him of favour and protection at the papal court, and the utterances which he gave voice to both in Paris and later in Kostnitz, against the murder of tyrants (i.e. against the murder of the Duke of Orleans by the Duke of Burgundy), made a prominent position in France impossible for him. He was therefore compelled to live for a time outside of France, and after 1419 at least away from Paris. In Lyons, where he died on the 12th of July, 1429, he wrote a number of treatises, for instance, *De perfectione cordis, De elucidatione theologica mystica, De susceptione humanitatis Christi*, etc. His works were among the earliest printed. The first edition appeared in Cologne in 1483, in four folio volumes, the most complete one in Antwerp in 1706, in five folio volumes edited by du Pin.

2. As in the case of d'Ailly, whom he is never tired of calling his honoured teacher, his philosophical standpoint is that of Occam, which he always designates as Aristotelian. His nature was so averse to controversy that the bitter attacks which the "Formalizantes" and "Metapsicantes," as he calls them, that is the Scotists, made upon the followers of Occam, ridiculed by them as "rudes et terminista nec reales in metaphysica," necessarily caused him great pain. He therefore endeavoured to heal the schism between them. Of the works devoted to this purpose there are to be especially mentioned: *Centilogium de conceptibus, De modis significandi*, and its second part *De concordantia metaphysicæ cum logica* (vol. iv. pp. 793 ff.)
816 ff.). They deserve the name of attempts at mediation only in so far as they oppose those Nominalists who go beyond Occam in constituting only such termini as materialiter supponunt (cf. supra, § 216, 3). As regards Occam's own teaching, Gerson merely repeats that all knowledge consists only of termini, but that, since these denote either things outside of us or processes in us, there is a difference between real and logical (sermocinalis) knowledge, and therefore between metaphysics and logic. He combats further, just as Occam does, the assumption of universals existing outside of the thinking mind, since this is in conflict with the principles of Aristotle, and limits the omnipotence of God (p. 805). He puts, as Occam does, in place of the eternal genera in temporal thought, the ideas of individual things, and asserts accordingly that God thinks everything as an individual thing, since only the individual has reality extra animam (p. 825). His only peculiarity is that he tries to prove that the opposite realistic doctrine is anti-Catholic and has always been condemned by the Church. He sees quite rightly, that realism consistently carried out leads to the denial of reality to everything except God. In every condemnation of Pantheistic doctrines therefore, e.g. that of Amalrich (vid. supra, § 176), he sees the condemnation of the system which leads to such consequences. He appeals above all, however, to the conclusions of the Council of Kostnitz, which had condemned in the Bohemian heretics the same erroneous doctrine of the reality of the universals (p. 827). But Gerson is an Occamist not only in his doctrine of the universals, but also in his complete separation of philosophy and theology. He criticizes Albert because he had devoted more time and labour to philosophy than was befitting a Christian teacher (Trilog. astrol. theologiz., vol. i. p. 201), and therefore prefers to him Alexander of Hales (i. p. 117). This is easily understood when we consider his fondness for Hugo of St. Victor, and his opinion that the traditional custom of expounding Lombard is not right. He says himself, in a letter to d'Ailly, that much is declared true and right by reason which, according to an enlightened theology, is false (vol. iii. p. 432).

3. In Gerson's opinion no theologian ranks above Bonaventura. In his thoughts upon mystic theology he repeats what the latter says in his Itinerarium (vid. supra, § 197, 4), and what Hugo says in his mystical writings, and draws a distinc-
tion between symbolic, real, and mystic theology, the first two belonging more to the cognitio, the last to the affectus. He connects them with the three eyes of human perception, sensus, ratio, intelligentia, which Hugo, and before him Erigena, had distinguished. Since mystic theology is a knowledge and experience of God, it is related to philosophy, which also takes its departure from experience. For that reason we should trust also the experiences of others, as the mystic theology of Dionysius the Areopagite has its origin in that which Paul had communicated to him concerning his inner experiences. A great deal, it is true, is incommunicable. The proper seat of mystic theology is the apex mentis, the synderesis. Since this is the heaven of the soul, the being carried up into the third heaven means the suspension of the lower functions of the soul, and not only seeing but also feeling and tasting God. Raptus and amor ecstaticus are therefore often used synonymously. Mystic theology, being grounded in the synderesis, has a practical character, is often identified with religio and charitas, and raised far above the two other kinds of theology. The latter have no value without the former, but the former has without the latter. Mystic theology is also independent of all learning and therefore is found even in the simple. Its training school is not study, but prayer. The union with God, brought about by the agency of love, may be called a transformation into God, if we do not thereby understand that man ceases in God, which is nonsense. According to Gerson, Ruysbroek, in his Glory of the Spiritual Marriage, appears at least to share this heretical error of Alarich. It is most correct to say that in the moments of mystic love the spirit is separated from the soul and united with God. It cannot be said that in the moments in which we taste God all consciousness is excluded; it is, however, true that all reflection is shut out and that we immediately feel God. The chief works upon mystic theology, from which all the preceding sentences are drawn, are Considerationes de theologia mystica speculativa, De theologia mystica practica, Tractatus de elucidatione scholastica mystica theologiae, all of which are contained in the second part of the third volume of du Pin's edition.

4. As to Gerson's ecclesiastical position, the common opinion, that he belongs to the reformers before the Reformation, has given rise to many errors. We shall give up the idea that he was not a true son of the Roman Catholic
Church, if we only read his *Lectio contra vanam curiositatem*, and find how he expresses himself there against the reading of translations of the Bible on the part of the uneducated (i. p. 85), or when we hear his utterances in another work (*De exam. doctrin., Opera*, vol. i.) in regard to the celibacy of the priesthood and the Lord’s supper in both kinds, or again when we hear him assert that not even a general council may venture to do away with the monarchical constitution of the Church, etc. He is the enemy of all innovation, even when this concerns only a dogmatic *terminus*. He is never tired of quoting Augustine’s saying, that we should hold fast to traditional expressions, and he is continually holding up to the Universities of England and of Prague that of Paris as a model in this respect. It is quite consistent with this dread of innovation, that he should hold that a council cannot indeed do away with the papacy, but may unseat a Pope. The opposite doctrine, that the Pope is superior to the council, he calls *pestifera et perversissima*, because this is the doctrine which is new. It has been accepted from the beginning that the Pope and his aristocratic advisers, the college of cardinals, may err in regard to doctrine, but a general council not (*De potest. eccles., Works*, vols. i. and ii.). Although he agrees essentially with d’Ailly, he is yet much more decided than his teacher and friend, who is himself a member of the college of cardinals, and in duty bound to the Pope. In Gerson speaks the University man and the pastor. These he was passionately, but only these. In neither capacity could he have a fondness for the mendicant orders which had pushed themselves into professorial chairs and into the confessional. A certain lack of respect for them often appears in his writings.

§ 221.

The correlate to d’Ailly and Gerson is furnished by a man who feels the pressure of the second half of the dilemma presented by nominalistic scholasticism (*vid. § 218*), namely, to limit philosophy to the world as its sole object. He however wishes no more than they did to break with scholasticism, that is, with theology; in their case it meant with philosophy. Nothing is left to him but to base philosophy entirely upon the observation of the world, but at the same time to use the latter as a bridge to the theology of the Church. Gerson
declared for nominalism because the opposite doctrine was un-Christian. Here it is shown that that which the church teaches is indispensable to the system of the world. In the former case the Church had to confirm philosophy, in the latter cosmology testifies to that which the Church teaches. It was a true discernment which led Gerson to call his theology mystical, and Raymond of Sabunde to call his natural. We have seen (§ 194) that it was not without significance that scholasticism at its height was represented by members of the mendicant orders. The fact that d’Ailly and Gerson are University men and secular clergymen, and that they stand in no warm relation to the mendicant orders, as well as the fact that Raymond is a physician, must be looked upon as a sign that philosophy has begun to cast off its strictly clerical character.

§ 222.

RAYMOND OF SABUNDE.


1. RAYMOND OF SABUNDE (Sebunde and Sabeyda also occur) is said to have been born in Barcelona. He was a Doctor of Philosophy and of Medicine, and at the same time professor of theology in Toulouse, and published there in the year 1436 (if not earlier) his Theologia naturalis s. liber creaturarum. It has been often printed, according to Bayle in Strasbourg in 1496, then in Paris in 1509, and again, among other places, in Frankfort in 1635. The edition of Solisbaci, 1852, omits the prologue. An extract from this work made by Raymond himself constitutes the six Dialogi de natura hominis, which are said to occur also under the title Viola animae. Among the editions of these dialogues is that of Lyons, 1568, in which is contained an interpolated seventh dialogue. Even Montaigne knew nothing more in regard to Raymond’s life, although at the command of his father he translated his work.

2. The oft-repeated assertion (made also by Ritter) that Raymond was a realist, is disproved not only by his express statement that things lose their modum particularum et singularem et individualum and receive a modum communem et universalem which they extra animam non habent (Theol. nat.,
Tit. 217), but also by the emphasis which he lays upon the liberum arbitrium, as the sovereignty of the will over the intellect, in God as well as in man. That he differs so often with Occam is not due to the fact that Scotus, much less Thomas, is more to his liking, but that he cannot be satisfied with that separation of science and faith which appears so sharply defined in Occam's Centilogium. Since he mentions no authors in his work, it is difficult to say in how far he was acquainted with his predecessors. In respect to one only no doubt is possible, for he sometimes almost transcribes Anselm, whose ontological argument and Christology are adopted by him more nearly in their original form than by any other Schoolman (Tit. 250–265). This is easily explained. The theology established with the help of Aristotelianism had led to nominalism, whose correctness appeared indisputable, but also to the assertion that the dogmas teach the opposite of Aristotelianism. Whoever therefore wished to philosophize, but at the same time did not wish to give up the agreement of philosophy and dogma, was obliged to place himself upon the standpoint, not of Aristotelianism, but of the natural understanding, and with this first to examine the world, and then see whether and in how far Catholic doctrine agrees with the latter. But this was the very end which scholasticism had pursued in its earlier period (vid. supra, § 194). The guides therefore are to be sought in that period, and not in the time of scholasticism's greatest glory, when it was ruled by Aristotle. Raymond's clear understanding necessarily impels him to choose the keen Anselm rather than the deep Erigena, and his decided orthodoxy leads him to prefer the former, even though he was a realist, to Roscellinus, or even to Abelard.

3. In the prologue (strangely put upon the "Index" by the Council of Trent) to Raymond's Natural Theology, the science of the world, including man, is made the really fundamental science, and is characterized as the perusal of one of the books which is given us, the liber nature, in which every creature is a letter, whose combination constitutes the sense of that which is written. This book is supplemented by the revealed word of God, which is necessary on account of sin, and which is not, like the former, accessible to the laity, nor secure against falsifications. Although therefore this second book, on account of its supernatural character, is holier and higher than the former, our study must nevertheless begin with the reading of
the book of nature, because in it is to be found a science which presupposes no other, because it can be conceived by the simplest man, if he has only purified his heart from sin, and because it is really a warrant of the truth and certainty of that which is contained in the other book. A man is absolutely sure only of that which he himself witnesses (Tit. 1), and therefore self-certainty and self-knowledge are that upon which all other certainty must finally base itself. Man however, since he is the highest of the four orders of beings—the four which the Stoics [§ 97, 3], following a hint of Aristotle, Philo [§ 114, 4], and after them the Neo-Platonists and others, had distinguished), and unites in himself the esse, vivere, sentire and intelligere, cannot know himself unless he considers first the orders below him; and thus, in order to make him familiar with himself, he must be led to investigate the previous steps of which he is the end and aim. At the end of this process, which constitutes only the first day’s journey (dieta), he finds that he belongs to nature as that for whose sake everything else is there, and in whom is brought into unity all that exists in the other orders in a multiplicity of species (Tit. 2, 3). Here begins a second day’s journey. As the many species of the lower steps point to the one species man, which is raised above them all by the liberum arbitrium, which has velle and intelligere as its pre-conditions, men point again to a unity in which not only no specific but also no individual differences exist, which is wholly one, and in which therefore not only are esse and vivere, but which is itself esse, etc., and which can consequently be thought only as a being. This unity, this nature, which is before all and which cannot be non-existent, is God (Tit. 4–12). From the fact, however, that God excludes all non-being, follows not only His existence, but also very important conclusions in regard to His nature. Everything which is found in the creature, especially man, as an actual being, must be postulated, free from every limit (i.e. non-being), of God, whose being is the general being of all things (Tit. 14). We thus clearly conclude that God has created the world, and that out of nothing, and the ascensus, by which we learn from the world that God exists, is combined with the descendens, by which we deduce the world only from God, and thus perceive that it is created out of nothing (Tit. 16). How the most important dogmas are deduced in detail is of less interest, since Raymond often makes light
work of it. The essential point is, that he establishes it as the chief, indeed as the only, rule, that in every case the best that is conceivable must be attributed to God, and that this rule oritur ex nobis (Tit. 63, 64), so that the chief doctrines of the Church as to the nature of God are to be deduced, in accordance with that rule, not from the Scriptures nor from other authorities, but from self-observation. He does not fail to remind his readers from time to time that this knowledge of God drawn from ourselves is the most certain and the clearest (Tit. 82).

4. The two propositions reached at the close of this diæta, that man is the goal and the object of the rest of creation, but that God is the goal and the end of all things—these propositions have as their consequence the principle that man's profit and God's glory are the highest aim of conduct, are our chief duty. Belief can never contradict the natural duty of preserving and advancing our being, since it is itself only complementum naturae (Tit. 80). That duty in fact rather supports our belief; and we must believe that God sent His Son into the world, etc., because it promotes our welfare (Tit. 70, 74). If we do not limit that which is beneficial to man merely to the bodily, if we especially remember that the perception of things secures gaudium et doctrinam, i.e. the highest profit (Tit. 98), and that the knowledge of them leads to a knowledge of God, we shall neither deny that all things exist for the benefit of man, nor assume a conflict between this benefit and the glory of God. Man, as the mean between creatures and God, unites the two extremes (Tit. 119) in performing for God the service which the rest of creation performs for him (Tit. 114), and thus answers and thanks God in behalf of all creatures (Tit. 100). This thanksgiving consists in love towards God, which coincides with the knowledge of God. God wishes to be known, and thus grow in the creature (Tit. 154, 190). But since God is not in need of service and cannot grow in Himself, worship is given for the creature's good, and it is the latter that really grows (into God) (Tit. 116, 190). The more, therefore, man seeks the glory of God, the more does he promote his own salvation, and vice versâ. The more certain, too, does he become of the existence of one who will reward merit, and of a place where this will be done (Tit. 91). Love to God, however, implies love to our neighbours, the images of God. Natural love for
them precedes that true love for God, so that we have here too the same *ascensus* and *descensus*: we first love our neighbour for our own, and then for God's sake (Tit. 120, 121).

5. But if we inquire whether love for God and love for ourselves always coincide, experience teaches us that we put love for God beneath false self-love and the desire for false honour, and thereby become punishable, and as a consequence gain the certainty of a strict judge, as well as of a place of suffering. Experience likewise teaches us that strife and enmity rule everywhere, instead of love toward our neighbours (Tit. 140, 157, 91, etc.). This cannot be the original condition, for the canon given above demands that the first men, who on account of the unity of the human species must have been a single pair, proceeded pure from the hand of God, if not perfect (*bene, non optime*, Tit. 232, 274). The only conceivable way in which that condition could have been lost is disobedience toward God. This is easily explained without the assumption that the first men were led to it by one who was stronger than they, but who could fall more easily. Among creatures the *liberum arbitrium*, and therefore the *vertibilitas*, is greater in purely spiritual natures than in those upon whom all sorts of bonds are laid by their corporeality. The tempter, therefore, must have been an incorporeal, purely spiritual, but created being, that is, an angel (Tit. 239–242). If there were no angels, moreover, there would be a break in the succession of creatures, and analogy demands that as there are three orders below man there should be three above him (the familiar hierarchies) (Tit. 218). The fact that the glory of God, for which there is no equivalent, was impaired by the fall, and that man therefore can be redeemed only through the suffering of a God-man, is developed (Tit. 250–265), as mentioned above, in complete verbal agreement with Anselm’s *Cur Deus homo* (*vid. supra*, § 156, 8). Raymond’s only peculiarity is, that he asks the question, How we can be sure that this God-man, in any case necessary, has appeared in the historical personality, Jesus of Nazareth? Jesus' own testimony is decisive; for if it were false we should be obliged to regard Him either as a liar or as a maniac. And again the fate of the Jews is an argument; for if He lied they slew Him justly, and should then have been rewarded (Tit. 206). In order that this testimony and all that confirms it should be known, an authentic account was necessary, which should be above all
doubt, and this is given us in the second book, in which God offers us, not His factum, but His verbum: the Scripture of the Old and New Testaments. This is not in conflict with the liber naturæ. The latter is rather the via, janua et introductorium of the former, because it teaches us that the God, by whom the second book, the Bible, claims to be given, exists (Tit. 2:10, 211). Moreover the entire contents of the Bible, as well as the way in which it teaches, e.g. its total lack of argumentation, etc., testify to every unprejudiced reader of its Divine origin (Tit. 2:12 ff.). On account of the redemption, by means of which man is created a second time out of nothing, not this time out of the nihil negativum but out of the nihil privatum,—on account of the redemption he has a three-fold origin: bodily, from his parents; psychic, from God; and redemptive (bene esse) from Christ, and He lives therefore in a threefold relation of brotherhood toward all men (Tit. 2:75, 276, 278). For the last and highest relation, the churchly, the means of support are the seven sacraments. A consideration of these, together with a discussion of eschatology, closes the work. In connection with the sacraments, it is proved, not from authority but from the nature of the case, that it is most fitting for the internal purification to be brought about by a water-bath, the nourishment of the spirit by food and drink, etc., and in the same way it is proved that the necessary and natural end of the two opposite ways in which the good and the bad walk, the two dwellings, also locally separated, must be in the highest heaven and in the middle of the earth (Tit. 91 et al.). As the natural force of gravity draws the arm downward, and only that which is above its nature can raise it upward, in the same way the natural tendency of the sinning soul, without supernatural help, is toward nothing and its dwelling (Tit. 2:77).

§ 223.

The contrast between Gerson, whose mystical tendency leads him often to a mere repetition of Bonaventura's teaching, and Raymond, who follows no one so closely as the keen Anselm, devoid of all mysticism, is done away in a man in connection with whom it is hard to decide whether his depth of mind or the keenness of his understanding, whether his inner piety or his interest in the world, are more to be ad-
mired. That man is Nicolas of Cusa. With remarkable many-sidedness he combined the most various tendencies which had previously appeared in scholasticism. That this should carry him back to Erigena, who had united them all in himself, is natural; but the starting-point appears in the present case expanded to a circle which embraces all that the subsequent stages had produced. The question which played so great a part in the first period of scholasticism appears settled here, for he acquits the Realists from the charge of pantheism, their opponents from that of a godless deification of the world, and represents the intermediate conceptualistic tendency. Platonism, and its opposite, atomism, which brought that period into strife, are here united in a way which reminds us sometimes of William of Conches (vid. § 162). Nicolas, however, like the Schoolmen of the second period, draws continually from the Mohammedan Peripatetics, and from Aristotle himself. He ventures to praise the first who had done this, David of Dinant (vid. § 192), and like him and his successors, the great Peripatetics of the thirteenth century, makes Avicenna or Jewish teachers authorities for his assertions. Finally, however, his love for mathematical and cosmological studies reveals so strong a resemblance between his mind and that of Roger Bacon, his emphasis of individuality shows so great a likeness between him and William of Occam, and he agrees in so many points almost verbally with Gerson and Raymond, that we can scarcely avoid assuming that he borrowed from all the principal representatives of scholasticism in its period of decline. The rays which emanated from Erigena, that epoch-making sun of scholasticism, are gathered as in a focus in Nicolas, who brings scholasticism to a close.

§ 224.

NICOLAS OF CUSA.


1. NICOLAUS CHRYPPFFS (i.e. Krebs) was born in the year 1401, in Cues near Trier, and is called from his birth-place
Cusanus. He received his first school training at Deventer in the Society of the Brethren of the Common Life, founded by Geert de Groot. Later he himself entered their ranks. Thomas à Kempis (vid. infra, § 231, 4), was educated in this school and left it to enter his cloister. It was therefore natural that Nicolas should early have become acquainted with the latter’s celebrated Imitation of Christ. He next went to Padua where he studied law, and in the year 1424 became doctor of canonical law. At the same time he had trained himself thoroughly in mathematics. In the year 1428, he gave up the business of attorney, in which he had been engaged in Mainz, and adopted the clerical calling. From the year 1431 he was a deacon in Coblenz, where he preached frequently, and afterward he filled an ecclesiastical office in Lütich. He was called to the council of Basel in 1433, where he finished his work De concordantia catholica which he had begun some time before. In this work he is led by his distinction between the Roman Church and the Church Catholic, to opinions upon Pope and councils which he later modified, perhaps frightened at the consequences which others had drawn from them. In opposition to heretics he emphasizes constantly the primacy of the Pope, as he does in his epistle to the Bohemians on the form of the sacrament. The work De reparatione calendarii, which was written in the year 1436, shows the astronomical learning of its author, who proposes, in order to bring the computus in accord with nature and with the decisions of the Church, to leap, in the year 1439, from the 24th of May to the first of June, and to omit a day in every 304 years. He was made the representative of papal rights, and was entrusted by Pope Eugene IV. with important commissions in France, in Constantinople, and at the Reichstag of Frankfort. In the midst of these missions, however, he was very active in scientific labours. The plan of his first work, De docta ignorantia, which was written in 1440, was conceived upon the journey from Constantinople. In the same year followed the work De conjecturis; not much later De filiatione Dei and De genesi. On the 28th of December, 1448, he was appointed cardinal by Pope Nicolas V., an honour hitherto unheard-of for a German. In the year 1450, he became Bishop of Brixen, but did not enter upon the duties of his office until he had finished some extended missionary journeys in Germany and the Netherlands. His dealings with the Archduke Sigismund,
of Austria, who, as Count of Tyrol, was his vassal, embittered his life and brought him into a violent imprisonment. After some years absence from his diocese, he died in Todi, on the 11th of August, 1464. The first edition of his works, most of which were written while he was cardinal, consists of a single volume, in small folio, printed probably in 1476. The edition of Ascensius (Paris, 1514), which is cited here, consists of three folio volumes, and is more complete than the former. The first volume contains: *De docta ignorantia libb. III.*, the *Apolo gia docta ignorantia* (ostensibly the work of his pupil, Bernard of Waging), *De conjecturis libb. II.*, *De filiatione Dei, De geneesi, I diotæ libb. IV.*, *De visione Dei s. de icone, De pace fidei, Cr i brationum Alchoran libb. III.*, *De ludo globi libb. II.*, *Compendium, Dialogus de possest, De beryllo, De dato patris luminem, De quaerendo Deum, De venatione Sapientiae, De apice theor àe*. The second volume contains: *De Deo abscondito, Dialogus de annunciatione, De aequalitate, Excitationum libb. X.*, *Conjectura de novissimis diebus, Septem epistolae, Reparatio calendarii, Correctio tabularum alphonsi, De transmutationibus geometricis, De arithmetificis complementis, De mathematicis complementis, Complementum theologicum, De mathematica perfectione*. The third volume contains: *De catholica concordantia libb. III.* Besides these editions there is the one of Henric-Peters (Basel, 1565), which is also in three parts, but follows another order and contains some works omitted in the Parisian. Many things are still unprinted.

2. In agreement with Erigena, whom he often speaks of with praise under the name of Scotigena (cf. § 154, 1), Nicolas distinguishes sense, understanding, and reason in man (*sensus, ratio, and intellectus. Vid. De doct. ign.*, iii. 6). Although sense is the lowest, all knowledge nevertheless begins with it, since the senses give us the first positive elements of all knowledge, which the abstracting, and therefore denying understanding then further works over (*De conject., i. 10*). The Peripatetics are quite right in asserting that there is nothing in the understanding which has not first been in sense (*Idiotæ, iii. 2*), and that the understanding needs the images or *phantasmata*, which are the result of observation. It is, however, not to be forgotten that the Platonists also are right when they claim that the understanding draws its knowledge from itself. Without external objects and without light, it is impossible to see; but it is just as impossible
without the power of sight (Idiot., iii. 4). Observation by the senses acquaints us with the actual, that is, with that which is hic and in hic rebus (i.e. haecceitas of Duns), and therefore more than a mere thing of thought (Ibid., c. 11). This superiority of the senses, however, is diminished by the fact that their observations are very confused, and this because of their completely positive character, no distinction being drawn within them. The drawing of distinctions is the work of the understanding, whose activity thus has a positive and a negative character, since it affirms and denies, and therefore has as its fundamental law the contrast between affirmation and negation, that is, the incompatibility of opposites (De conjec.t. i. 11. ii. 2). A distinction can further be drawn within the understanding between the lower representation, imaginatio, which is more closely related to the senses, and the higher, ratio proper, which is nearer the reason (Ibid., c. 11). The senses have to do with the material but actual, the understanding with the forms, with genera, species, etc., in short with the universals, which really exist only in the things, and in themselves or abstracted from the things have merely mental existence (Doct. ign., ii. 6, iii 1). Of all the forms which the understanding employs in order to attain knowledge, numbers occupy the first place. Mathematics, that pride of the understanding, rests therefore upon the fundamental proposition of the incompatibility of opposites, just like the earlier, especially the Aristotelian philosophy (De beryllo, c. 25; De conjec.t., i. 3, et al.). Nevertheless the easiest transition to the sphere of the reason is to be made from mathematics; and numbers, those symbolical models of things (De conjec.t., i. 4), as the Pythagoreans have correctly observed, or also other mathematical conceptions, give the most convenient means of passing from the rational or intelligible to the intellectual, or from the disciplina to the intelligentia (Idiot., iii. 8, et al.). If we think, namely, of the contrast between straight and crooked, as of that between the string and the bow, or of the contrast between line and angle, as of that between the hypotenuse and the right angle of a triangle; and if we imagine the bow or the angle growing constantly greater, the distance between string and bow and between hypotenuse and angle will become correspondingly less, and since according to philosophy there is no endless progress, bow and string, angle and line finally coincide. This would give, therefore,
a coincidentia contradictioriorum which the Peripatetics would not recognise, but which points to the highest sphere, that of reason (Apol. doct. ignor., fol. 35, and other passages). That which the understanding separates the reason combines (De conjec., i. 11). If by knowledge we understand, as is usual, cognition by the analyzing understanding, i.e., by the discursus, comprehension by the reason is a not-knowing, hence is ignorantia. He, however, who raises himself to this point knows that it is not intellectual knowledge, and therefore it is a conscious ignorance, a docta ignorantia, by which words Nicolas designates his stand-point not only in his first but also in his later works. Other expressions for this going beyond the knowledge of the understanding are visio sine comprehensione (De apice theor.), comprehensio incomprehensibilis, speculatio, intuitio, mystica theologia (De vis. Dei), tertius coelus (Doct. ign., iii. 11), sapientia, i.e., sapida scientia (Apol. Doc. ign., De ludo globi, et al.), fides formata (Doct. ign.), etc.

Rational knowledge is equally related to the senses and to the understanding, since the former contain only affirmations, the second affirmations and denials, while rational knowledge, as had been formerly taught by the Areopagite, contains only negative propositions (De conjec., i. 10; Doct. ign., i. 26). Since this rational knowledge denies all contradictories, there is thus something which puts it into a position to recognise truth in all opinions, because the most opposite views here coincide (De filiat. Dei). In accord with this elevation above onesidedness, Nicolas not only endeavours to reconcile the Greek with the Roman Church, but also makes the attempt, in his Cribrat. Alchor., to separate error from truth in the religious teaching of the Mohammedans.

3. The Deity is the first object of this mystical intuition, not only in rank but also in time, since without Him knowledge would be impossible. God is the content of all being; since He contains all, and unfolds all from Himself (Doct. ign., ii. 3), He exists in all in a limited, concrete manner (“contracte.” Ibid., c. 9). Since God is above all contradictions, He is not opposed to non-being; He is and is not; indeed He is more closely related to the nihil than to the aliquid (De genesi, Doct. ign., i. 17). He must be the greatest of all, for He embraces all, and the smallest, since He is in all (De ludo globi, ii.; Init. doct. ign., i. 2). He dwells on the other side of the coincidence of opposites (De vis. Dei, 9), and for that reason
no contrast of "can be" and "is" exists in Him; He may be
called the Can-is (Possest), who only cannot not be (Dial. de
possese). Or, since in Him esse has not been added to posse,
He may be called pure ability, posse ipsum, to which the
posse esse, posse vivere, etc., are related as a posse cum
addito, therefore as a limited ability. This pure ability, which
lies at the basis of and precedes all other ability, as light does
visibility, is God (De apic theor.). He must be thought
of as triune, since all things are of, through, and to God; as
tri-causal, since He is the moving, formal, and final cause of all
things, and presents the distinction of unitas, aequalitas, and
nexus, as He who as Father is omnipresent, as Son all power-
ful, as Holy Spirit all-effective (De ludo globi, i.; De dat. patr.
lum., 5). In addition to this posse ipsum, the posse esse of things
must be thought before them, and this limited possibility of
things is their material, which, since it pre-supposes that ab-
solute possibility which is not a posse esse but a posse facere, is
not the absolute but the limited ground of things. An absolute
possibility for them outside of God does not exist (Doct. ign.,
i. 8). Since matter is only the posse esse of things, it is
nothing real (actu), it is in itself considered nothing, and
therefore it can be said that things originate when God
unfolds Himself into the nothing (Ibid., ii. 3). The entirely
different relation in which these two pre-conditions of things,
God and matter, stand towards them, God being that which
gives them their real being, matter that which gives them
limitation, has often been expressed by Nicolas in the
exact terminology of Erigena, things being designated as
theophanies. He appears much more original, however, when
he summons to his aid in this connection also the doctrine of
numbers. Since God is the content of all being He may be
designated as the absolute unity. Since every number is really
one (the number seven one seven, ten one ten) and since this
oneness is not affected by the difference in the numbers (the
ten is no less one ten than the seven one seven), in the same
way God is the absolute unity without any otherness (alter-
tas), which really does not exist for Him. In things unity
appears burdened with the alteritas, and this is the cause of all
limitations, of all evil, etc., all of which is nothing real (Doct.
ign., i. 24; De ludo globi, i.). For the same reason that God
stands above all plurality He stands also above all finiteness.
His infinitude, however, is not only negative absence of an
end or of limits, as is the case with the limitless universe, but His infinitude is actual and absolute, because He is Himself the end (De vis. Dei, 13; Doct. ign., ii. 1).

4. From God as the content (complicatio) of all true being the transition is to be made to the universe as the explicatio Dei. At this point Nicolas expresses himself with decision against all views which have since been called pantheistic. Not only against the doctrine that all things are God (Doct. ign., ii. 2), but also against emanation of every kind, whether it be thought of as an immediate emanation, or as effected by intermediate beings, by a world-soul, by nature, etc. He demands, on the contrary, although he himself admits that the "law" remains hidden from the understanding, that the world, this image of God, which may for that reason, be called the finite God, shall be thought of as created (Doct. ign., ii. 2). The world is therefore related to God, the absolutely greatest and the absolute unity, as the concretely (contracte) greatest and one, which is for that very reason not without plurality. God, as the absolute being of things, is in an absolute way that which the things are, that is, that which is true being in them. The universe also is what the things are, but in a limited, concrete way. While, therefore, God, the absolute being, is in the sun not otherwise than in the moon, the universe is in the sun, as sun, or in a condition adapted to the sun, in the moon in a condition adapted to it. It may be said that as God appears in the universe in a limited way, the universe appears in individual things in a limited way, so that the universe forms as it were the mean between God and things (Doct. ign., ii. 4). The universe, as this limited image of God, must partake also only in a limited way of the predicates of God. God is the absolutely greatest, than whom nothing greater and better is conceivable, while the universe is not, to be sure, such that nothing greater is conceivable, but is the best under the given circumstances. It is the relatively most perfect. God is the eternal; to the universe belongs the predicate of endless duration, which is a limited image of eternity (De genesi). God is the absolutely infinite; the universe the limitless, whose centre, since there are no limits, is everywhere, that is, nowhere (Doct. ign., ii. 11). Finally, the universe exhibits a limited image of the Trinity, in the fact that in it the idea contained in the Divine word joins itself, as form, with matter, the possibility of being, to produce a unity which appears in motion, this really animat
ing principle of the world. Since motion is this principle there can be nothing in the universe which is entirely destitute of motion. Even the earth moves (Doct. ign., ii. 7). Passing from the universe as a whole to the individual elements of it we find in every nature otherness, which is not really actual, and which for that very reason cannot be looked upon as a gift of God, added to being proper, in virtue of which it is a participation in and a mirror of God—if this fortuitous appearance of a deficiency (defectus) can be called an addition. Since in virtue of this everything differs more or less from its model in God, just as every circle deviates from perfect roundness, there are no two things in the world exactly alike (Doct. ign., ii. 11). This varying reproduction of one and the same thing has however the result, that an absolute harmony exists among things, that they form a cosmos (De genes.). It is due to the fact that there are limits to things, that the universe is an actual order, a system. But since, now, we are hardly able to think of an order without summoning numbers to our aid, and since the order of numbers appears especially in the fact that the number ten, composed of the quaternary of the first four numbers, constantly recurs in our numeral system, it is not at all surprising that in Nicolas' exhibition of the order in the universe the number ten and its powers play an important part. Absolute unity, which is without distinctions, is placed, as the divine, before the first three powers of ten, as the sums of the three quaternaries \(1 + 2 + 3 + 4\), \(10 + 20 + 30 + 40\), \(100 + 200 + 300 + 400\), which are considered at length as symbols of the rational, intellectual, and sensible, in the work De conjecturia. Elsewhere weight is again laid upon the fact that the orders of purely spiritual beings, the familiar heavenly hierarchies, give with the Deity the number ten, and that there corresponds to them as the opposite extreme the same number of grades of purely sensible beings, and that finally in the mean between the two, in man, who is the microcosm, or the human world, and at the same time God in miniature, or the human God, the same number repeats itself again (int. al. De conj., ii. 14). Man in his likeness to God is, like God, the content of things, but he does not contain them, as God does, in a creative, but in an imitative manner. God's thinking produces things, man's thinking represents them. And therefore the forms of things in the Divine mind are the models which
precede them, while their forms in the human mind are the universal images gained by abstraction. The former are ideas, the latter are concepts (De conjunct., ii. 14). For that very reason, however, man, although he draws his concepts, numbers, etc., out of himself, is nevertheless able by them to grasp the things. His numbers as well as the things mirror the same thing, the divine archetypes, the primitive numbers in the Divine mind. Individual men also, like all individual things, are different each from the other, and they none of them think exactly alike. Their thought of God and of the world can be compared with the way in which differently curved concave mirrors reproduce objects; except that these living mirrors are themselves able to change their curved surfaces.

5. The doctrine of God as the infinite, of the universe as the limitless, and of things, especially man, as the finite, is followed, in the third and last part of Nicolas’ chief work, by the doctrine of the God-man as the infinitly-finite (Doct. ign., iii. De vis. Dei). He makes the attempt to show on purely philosophical grounds that, if a concrete thing (contractum) should appear so great that no greater would be conceivable, this could be only a spiritually-sensuous being, that is, a man who was at the same time God; that for such Godlikeness it was necessary that the likeness in God, that is the Son, should unite with man; that everything goes to show that Jesus was this God-man; that the supernatural birth was necessary; that by belief in the God-man believers become Christiformes and partakers of His merit, thereby also Deiformes and one with God, without injury to their personal independence. Since the Christiformitas is different in each one, and in none becomes a complete likeness to Christ, the complex of believers forms an organism, which therefore presents a diversitas in concordantia in uno Jesu. Since in this union of different individuals it is the Holy Spirit that unites them, the way which mystic theology follows is plainly a circle in which God is both the starting-point and the goal. The becoming Christ and God without confusion and loss of individuality is constantly given as the end which God had in the creation, an end which is reached when our love for God is one with our being loved by Him, our seeing God one with our being seen by Him.
§ 225.

CONCLUDING REMARK.

A justification is needed of the fact that here the question, whether the philosophers last considered (§ 217 ff.) are to be counted among the Schoolmen or to be assigned to the following period, is answered in a manner different from that commonly accepted, especially in relation to Nicolas of Cusa, who, according to many writers, opened an entirely new road in philosophy. This is all the more necessary, since it has been admitted that those who are to be considered in the next period exerted an influence upon the development of these men. A decisive reason for this arrangement, to which the chronological is forced to yield in the present case, is the relation of Gerson, Raymond, and Nicolas to the Roman Catholic Church. The nature of scholasticism was stated to consist in the fact that it undertook to justify by means of reason and philosophy the dogmas framed by the Fathers, and that it was therefore ecclesiastical, *in specie* Roman Catholic philosophy, a thing which could not be said of Patristic philosophy, since the latter helped to form the Church. A necessary consequence of this, and therefore no non-essential circumstance, was its bondage to the ecclesiastical language, the Latin. Another no less characteristic circumstance was its dependence upon the scientific centre authorized by the Church, upon Paris, as a consequence of which it became customary to call the scholastic style the "Parisiensis." It is true that a change is beginning in all these respects. Gerson writes a good deal in French, Raymond has never been a teacher in Paris, Nicolas pursues his studies outside of Paris, indeed, as it seems, he pursues his theological and philosophical studies outside of all Universities. At the same time it is only a beginning. Gerson continues to claim for Paris the right to render the final decision in scientific questions; Raymond as well as Nicolas write in the official language of the Church, though the latter admits that he finds it difficult, and is driven to invent the strangest words. All three, however, maintain unwaveringly the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and of its dogma, and the orthodoxy of none of them is attacked as long as they live. They therefore do not belong to a new age, even though they learn from those who represent that age. They do not adopt from the latter that element which has been called from the modern
stand-point the pre-Reformation element; they appropriate only that which is in agreement with the dogmas of the mediæval Church. The question whether the last of them, Nicolas, to whom the position was assigned above (§ 223) of one who unites in himself all the tendencies of scholasticism, and therefore brings them to a conclusion, still belongs to the scholastic or to the following period, is almost like the vexed question whether the first glimmering of dawn belongs still to the night or already to the day. Similar doubts arose in regard to the originator of scholasticism, Erigena. Some might be in doubt whether he was already, others whether Nicolas was still, a Schoolman.
THIRD
PERIOD OF MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

TRANSITION PERIOD.


INTRODUCTION.

§ 226.

Crusading Christendom had looked for its salvation from two causes (cf. sup., § 179): from the conflict with Anti-christ and from the possession of the Holy Land and Sepulchre. Both proved to have a saving efficacy, although indeed in another manner than had been thought of. The former proved so, inasmuch as the crusaders became acquainted among the infidels, in whom they expected to find monsters, with a sense of art and science, a tenderness and nobility of sentiment, and finally with a cultus which if it was abstract was yet simple,—all of which could not fail to make an impression and to leave behind lasting traces. Similarly the latter cause proved efficacious, inasmuch as the experience that Palestine was in no respect holier than Germany, that Jerusalem was just as lacking in holiness as Paris, and that the Holy Sepulchre was empty, made plain to them that salvation and holiness are not confined to one locality, and that the only Redeemer who can save is He who having risen lives in believers’ hearts. Richer in experience, poorer in sensuous expectations, Christendom returns to European conditions, which, during the Crusades and, in a great measure because of them, had been essentially transformed. Everything appears more rational, spiritualized, it may be said. The relationship between rulers and subjects has begun to be rationally regulated, in France through the growth of the power of the king, hitherto weak as against the vassals; in
England, on the other hand, through the limitation of the despotic ascendancy which the kings had arrogated to themselves. Out of rude highway robbers, which for the most part at least they had been, the knights have been transformed into well-bred men, lovers of art, and, by contact with the Saracens and under their influence, what is called the romance of knighthood has been developed. Amongst the dwellers in towns, acquaintance with foreign lands has called forth the spirit of enterprise, and an inclination for many institutions, especially of a financial kind, which they had found in the East, has roused the feeling for order and security, while both together have elicited that consciousness of the third estate which forms the foundation of the true sense of civic life. Simultaneously there appears in the towns the hitherto unheard of phenomenon, that laymen should concern themselves with science, as they had learned to do abroad. And even the very humblest countrymen appear less destitute of rights than hitherto, for in the sacred Fehmic Courts there arise here and there institutions which assure the execution of the adjudgment to every one to whom weak tribunals had failed to secure the justice which they had awarded. There is this growing dominion of reason and mind in all the conditions of life; the Church alone does not exhibit it. She indeed remained in Europe, but because she stood still, she has allowed herself to be overtaken by the advancing world. For that reason she no longer, as in previous conflicts with the world, appears bold and sure of victory; but, mistrustful and anxious, she watches each new movement of the time-spirit, foreboding now, as she needed not to forebode before, that each new conquest that the world achieves must become dangerous to her.

§ 227.

As long as the two powers which the Middle Ages held to be mightiest, the Pope and the Emperor, kept steadily to the principle that each of them was bound to use what was allotted him by the swords of both, for the defence of Christ, so long did the two resplendent institutions of the Middle Ages, the feudal state culminating in the Empire, and the hierarchy of Rome, mutually support one another. Men like Charlemagne, Otto I., Henry II., Gregory VII., and Innocent III. exhibited approximations to the ideal of mediæval glory.
But the same Emperor, at whose court, according to the legend, there originated treatises *de tribus impostoribus*, was brought to lose to his vassals the most important imperial privileges; and again in cases where Popes aspired to purely worldly lordship over the princes, they were themselves the means of bringing about a condition of affairs in which Kings laid violent hands on a Pope "who denied immortality," and in which the anti-popes whom they had nominated called one another Antichrist, and thereby brought the Papacy itself into danger of contempt. More and more the paths of the worldly and the spiritual powers diverge, although by that very fact the Empire on the one hand, was bound to fall asunder, seeing that it could only hold its authority as Holy and Roman, while similarly the Church could only become and remain catholic so long as the all-embracing secular power granted her the protection of its arm (cf. *supra*, § 131). The Church looks with ever sharper aversion upon the foundations of all national life—on property, on marriage, on obedience freely conceded because it refers only to laws voluntarily approved—as mere worldliness, and her favourite children are obliged to bind themselves by vows to renounce all these. This separation from the world which was demanded of the truly elect (the clergy), stands to the flight from the world which had shown itself in the youthful community, in the little gathering of the chosen, as a tendency to celibacy, the abandonment of property, and as voluntary suffering (v. § 121), in the same relation as the forced and artificial does to the natural, and as the efforts after repristination made by the forces of reaction stand to the institutions of the good old times. Quite in accordance with this state of affairs, the principle of nationality, which in pre-Christian times had out-rivalled all others, but which still more than in the empire of the Romans was bound to disappear in the medieval Empire where all spoke one tongue (*vid. supra*, § 116), asserts itself in the State as soon as the latter places itself in a negative attitude to the kingdom of Christ. And the principle is now conscious and reflective, which in antiquity had never been the case. It was national interests which brought into prominence princes fighting against the Popes, it was national interests which created adherents for them, often unconsciously, even among religious minds. As the Church had chosen its champions more especially from among the regular clergy who belonged
to no country, to whom before long there are allied the members of a new order, which, on account of its clear consciousness of the end for which it is destined, became the order of orders and for the most part devoid of the feeling of patriotism, so on the other hand, it is intelligible that political opposition to the encroachments of the Church should be universally allied with nationalism, i.e., with special accentuation of the principle of nationality.

§ 228.

As Scholasticism from its nature as the philosophy of the Church corresponded to the conditions under which the world had to fulfil the aims of the Church, and repeated (of course always in succession, according to § 4) the individual phases of that condition, so a complete dissolution of the elements of scholasticism, of which it has already been shown in treating of the period of their decay how they had begun to assume diversity of character and how they must separate in the end, corresponds to the long death struggle of the Middle Ages which begins with the close of the crusades. These elements had been, faith and secular learning, which, even before the Schoolmen had attained to an ecclesiastical theology the Church Fathers had blended into an ecclesiastical theory, i.e., into dogmas. Now that one of these elements succeeds in again freeing itself from the other, the antagonism between Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism, in the adjustment of which the patristic philosophy had consisted (vid. supra, § 132), will again to a certain extent repeat itself. It would also be no difficult matter to establish numerous points of contact between the theosophists of this period and the Gnostics, as likewise between the followers of secular learning and the Neo-Platonists. (Stöckl has made numerous pertinent observations on the former in his attacks on the anti-scholastic Mystics.) Yet it is necessary to maintain a recurrence “to a certain extent” only, inasmuch as in relation to the Gnostics and Neo-Platonists the system of Church doctrine, and further the body of Church learning were still in the future, while now, on the other hand, in relation to the two opposing tendencies, these are in the past. The anti-scholastic character is common to both, the followers of divine wisdom or Theosophists on the one hand, and the followers of secular wisdom or Cosmoso-
phists on the other. It announces its points of contact especially among the earliest exhibitors of these tendencies, while among those who belong to the period of their culmination, how forgotten of the world are the followers of divine wisdom, and how nearly do the followers of secular wisdom verge on being forgotten of God!

FIRST DIVISION.

Philosophy as Divine Wisdom.

The Theosophists.


§ 229.

Alongside of all their kinship, partly based on demonstrable influences, with the Mystics of the earlier period, the Theosophists of the transition period are, however, essentially distinguished from the Victorines, from Bonaventura, and even from Gerson. While, that is to say, the latter attached themselves to the firmly established dogma of the Church, and thus to what had been the outcome of the original preaching of salvation, but never on that account ceased to speculate from the Church standpoint, the former link their profound speculations to the original θεωρία (cf. § 131), and so take their stand rather upon the basis of the congregation than on that of the Church. This circumstance obviously explains how it was that they were looked upon with mistrust and even condemned as heretics by the Roman Catholic Church, and similarly how Protestants looked upon those of them who did not actually side with themselves, as the precursors of their own view. According to the conception of scholasticism established above, the older Mystics cannot be separated from it, and the single example of Bonaventura would suffice to prove that mysticism and scholasticism are in no way opposed. It is only the Mystics of the transition period, those precisely who have been designated Theosophists, who are anti-scholastic. From what has been said above, it will be regarded as no unessential circumstance, that the Victorines and Bonaventura wrote in Latin, the latter even as a poet, while the Mystics of the four-
teenth and following centuries wrote in the vulgar tongue, the earlier of them being of the number of those to whom their own language owes an incalculable debt. It must also be regarded as characteristic that they developed their doctrines not in commentaries on the Sentences, but in sermons addressed to the people. Gerson's sermons are addressed to the clergy and professors, and are therefore in Latin

§ 230.

A.—MASTER ECKHART AND SPECULATIVE MYSTICISM.


1. Born about the year 1260, probably in Thuringia, having become thoroughly versed in the Church Fathers and the Schoolmen, as well as in the Aristotelian philosophy, by his studies at Cologne and his later residence in Paris, Brother Eckhart appears in the last decade of the thirteenth century as Prior of Erfurt and provincial vicar of Thuringia. Then, after a three years' residence in Paris the "Brother" gives place to the "Master," for at that time he became Magister. In 1304 he exercises the functions of Provincial of the Dominican order in Saxony, in one of the following years those of the Vicar-general in Bohemia, and distinguishes himself in both positions by his beneficent reforms and by his sermons. After the completion of his term of office as Provincial in 1311, and a residence in Paris for the year still required of him as Magister legens, there follows a period in which he is lost to history and in which he appears to have been in relation, probably in Strasburg, with the Beghards and Brethren of the Free Spirit. Later, his activity in the school and the pulpit of his monastery at Cologne gathers many scholars round him; among them Suso and Tauler. The most vehement opponent of the Beghards, Heinrich von Virneburg, Archbishop of Cologne, censures his doctrines, and as Eckhart will not submit himself, requests the confirmation of his judgment by the Pope, whereupon the former in 1327 formally with draws his doctrines, but soon thereafter dies. Such is the usual tradition. According to Lasson, the withdrawal, which
moreover was conditional, took place before the Pope had
expressed his opinion. But neither does this view corre-
spond to the facts of the case. Preger has documentarily
proved that the so-called withdrawal is nothing more than
a public declaration of Eckhart's, made at the same time as
his protest against the competence of the archiepiscopal in-
quision, in which he maintains all his doctrines along with
the formula (usual in all cases) that he renounced whichever
of them should be proved to be heretical. It was not till
two years after his death that the papal Curia gave utter-
ance and pronounced that declaration a sufficient with-
drawal. Eckhart's learned works, of which Tritheim has
specified many, are mostly lost. His sermons which appeared
for the first time in the Tauler collection at Basel, 1521–22,
have been published complete, along with some smaller essays
by Pfeiffer. (Deutsche Mystiker des vierzehnten Jahrhun-
derts. Vol. ii. Leipsic, 1857.)

2. The fundamental thought to which Eckhart always
recurs, is that God, in order from the dim and dark divinity
in which He is mere essence to become a real and living God,
must utter and apprehend Himself, "profess Himself and
speak His word" (Pfeiff., pp. 180, 181, 11). Now the word
which God utters, is the Son, to whom the Father communi-
cates all things, so that He retains nothing at all to Himself;
therefore, not even the power of production, so that the Son
likewise produces and "in the same origin in which He
originates, the Holy Spirit originates also and flows forth"
(p. 63). Inasmuch as the Spirit links the Father and the
Son, He is Love ("Minne") and very desire itself; therefore,
"His essence and life" consist "in that He must love, be He
lief or loath" (p. 31). God remains, inasmuch as He utters
Himself, in Himself; His going forth is His return (p. 92),
and this out-going and in-coming took place, takes place and
will take place, only because He is an eternal flowing forth
(p. 391). But further, corresponding with this Divine outflow-
ing, there is also postulated an outflowing of that which is not
God. Since God alone is real existence, the latter is what
He is not, Nothing (non-being). The creature is therefore
not only created out of nothing, but taken in itself it is itself
nothing (p. 136). Were God to withdraw His own from
them, things would again become nothings (p. 51). This own
is Himself, for to God alone can "isness" be attributed, for He
alone is (p. 162). That which things really are, they are in God (p. 162), or, what is the same thing, the true reality in them is God. This true reality in things God utters in uttering Himself; He is to such a degree their being and essence, that Eckhart even goes the length of saying that God is all things and all things are God (pp. 163, 37, 14). God is in things not according to His nature, not as a person, but things are full of God according to His essence (p. 389). Because He is in the creatures, He loves the creatures, yearns for Himself in them. With the same yearning with which God yearns for the only begotten Son, He yearns also for me, and in this way the Holy Spirit goes forth (p. 146). With the same love with which God yearns for Himself, He yearns for all creatures. Not however as creatures (p. 180). That, namely, which makes them creatures and things, is their otherness, their being here and now, their number, quality and mode, without which all were only one essence (p. 87). But all these are properly nothing, and therefore for God non-existent. From all these, from time, space, quality, mode we must abstract if we desire to see that in them which really is; this naturally is in all things good, all the limitation and all the evil of things are to it mere nothing. As the coal only burns my hand, because my hand has not the warmth of the coal, so the pangs of Hell properly consist in non-being, so that it may be said: It is nothing which pains in Hell (p. 65). Naturally, however, the creature so far as it stands by itself is not good (p. 184).

3. God therefore is revealed in all things, only in each in a special manner, and therefore in a manner infected by nothingness; they are copies of Him. But because God is a thinking being, the non-thinking beings are only His foot-prints, but the soul is His very image (p. 11). Above all such is man, in whom the soul is bound up with the body, and whom Eckhart, not indeed always, but frequently places above the angels (int. al., p. 36). As God is all things because He contains all things in Himself, so the soul also is all things because it is the noblest of things (p. 323). In the three highest faculties of the human soul, knowledge, the military or wrathful faculty (irascibile) and the will, Father, Son and Holy Spirit are mirrored (p. 171). As all things seek to return to the first principle from which they sprang, so also does man, only with man this return is conscious, and therefore
God knows Himself in man as known by him. But since all things are contained in idea in the human soul, they are carried back to God by the return to God of the thinking soul (p. 180). Between God and the creature there comes about a relationship of mutual surrender, which is equally essential to both. To see and know God and to be seen and known by Him are all one (p. 38). Hence God can as little do without us as we without Him (p. 60). The mutual union between God and man, the yearning or love, is on the side of God an action, but not an arbitrary one, for “to Him it is more necessary to give than to us to take” (p. 149); this however does not relieve us of gratitude, much rather do we thank Him that He must love us. On man’s side that union is in the first place a suffering, to which, however, there is joined an activity of alternate self-surrender and self-assertion: the soul is to be “a virgin who is a wife,” i.e., it is to receive in order to bring forth (p. 43). Since this love is not actually in us, but we in it (p. 31), and since it consists in the fact that God thinks and wills in man, man must surrender his own thought and will, must will nothing but God. He who desires something besides God finds it not, he who only desires Him finds with and in addition to Him, all things (int. al., p. 56). When the man’s will becomes God’s will, good; but when God’s will becomes man’s will, that is better: in the former case man only submits himself, in the latter, God is born in him, and thereby the aim of the world’s creation is attained (pp. 55, 104). This being born of God in the soul unites both in that unity in which there can happen no greater sorrow to God, than that man should do anything against his own blessedness, and to man, no greater happiness than that God’s will should come to pass and God’s honour be regarded. The man who entirely surrenders his will to God, “seizes and binds” the will of God, so that the latter may not do what the former does not will (p. 54). In this surrender man becomes through grace what God is by nature (p. 185). At the same time it must never be forgotten, that there is a great distinction between the individual (Burchard, Heinrich), and man or humanity. It was the latter, the nature of humanity, that Christ assumed; and well so, for had He only become a particular man, that would have availed us little (p. 64). But now, so far as I am not Burchard or Heinrich, but man, what God bestowed on Christ is mine also.
It is indeed bestowed on me more than on Him, for He possessed all things from all eternity (p. 56). But to that end, all that goes to make up a particular man must be given up, and I may not make the smallest distinction between myself my friend, and any one beyond the sea, whom I never saw. The particular personality must cease, in order that the man may be (p. 65). Where the mode of the person, the creature, is gone out, where God is born in the soul, the man knows himself like unto Christ, as Child and Son of God; then nothing is any longer withheld from him; as God works in him to will, so does He also to know, and hides nothing from him (pp. 66, 63). We apprehend God, not by our natural understanding, for to it He is impossible of apprehension, but because by Him we are elevated into the light in which He reveals Himself.

4. What separates man from God is only the clinging to himself and what is his. With the cessation of this, separation from God also ceases. So far, therefore, as man abandons himself he becomes God, and therefore all things (p. 163). Abandonment of self, emptiness of all that can be called mine, and poverty, are the names of this condition (pp. 223, 280, 283).—“Thou shalt sink thy thine-ness, and thy thine shall become a Mine in His Mine,” Eckhart cries to the soul and promises it as the reward therefor, union with God, not as He is this or that (particular thing), but as He is above all particular determinations, and to a certain extent nothing (pp. 318, 319). Man is to take up into himself pure Godhead without any “co-essence” (accidens) (pp. 163, 164). The means to that end is humility and eager desire, which God cannot withstand, which compel Him (p. 168). Because the soul has its true home in God (p. 154), blessed union with God is rest; it is the aim of the creation of the world (p. 152). Rest however is not inactivity, it is “freedom and movement” (p. 605). Eckhart does not desire that from his assertion that the eternal life consists in knowledge, it should be inferred that it does not consist in yearning love, i.e., in the will; accordingly he warns his readers against all inactive quietism, especially in the sermon on Martha and Mary (pp. 47–53), which is remarkable on general grounds. Only, works are not to be exalted apart from disposition of heart. Absence of intention excuses all transgressions; without pious intention, all fasting, watching and praying avail nothing. In general let men not trouble
themselves at first as to what they are to do, but surrender the soul to God and then follow its inclination. As, according to Eckhart, the individual faculties of the soul correspond to the three persons of the Divine essence, the surrender of only one of these faculties to God permits only of the apprehension of one aspect of the Godhead. The unexplained totality of the Godhead must much rather be comprehended by the innermost principle of the soul, that little fortress (*castellum*); so shall we bury ourselves in the depths of the Divine. Thereby the immediate intuition is united with as immediate a consciousness, and therefore the word "spark" (*fünklein*) is here used with its reminiscence of the *scintilla conscientiae* of the Church Fathers and the Schoolmen. Once one is in the right path, one sees, that to the individual, God is ever more dear, things ever more indifferent (pp. 178, 179). The soul is set between the two, between time and eternity. Appropriated by nature to neither of the two, the soul is free to surrender itself either to the one or the other. If it hold fast to nothingness, to the distinction between to-day and to-morrow and yesterday, it lives in perdition, because it exists in God but yet against its will (p. 169); but if it desires not to hold fast to nothingness, contemns the temporal, including its own will and opinion, then it is blessed and for the same reason, because it is in God, and willingly. Then all things become to it an eternal now, as they are to God; time becomes to it as eternity, and the three higher faculties of the soul become the seats of the highest virtues of faith, hope and love (p. 171 ff., somewhat different at p. 319 ff.). The last of the three, the really eternal life, consists in the composure to which all is right that God does, even were it that He should leave us alone and comfortless as once Christ was (p. 182). At this stage God is born in the human soul, and so reveals Himself and so repeats the eternal generation in the human soul, that just as God in the soul again becomes man, so man is deified or made like unto God (pp. 643, 640). Such a man may be called Christ, even God, only that he became through grace what God by nature eternally is (pp. 185, 382, 398).

5. Eckhart's influence upon Heinrich Suso was of the most decided character (cf. M. Diepenbrock: *Heinrich Suso's genannt Amandus Leben und Schriften*. Regensburg, 1829). Born in Swabia in the year 1300, of the von Berg family, he called himself for the sake of his mother's piety after her
family name Seuss or Süss, which Latinized became Suso. After his death he received the surname Amandus. Early entered into the Dominican order, his poetical spirit found its chief contentment in the "sweet draught," held out to him by the "high and holy" Master Eckhart. "Love," which he apprehended in its chivalrous sense as well, became the leading thought of his life, to which he gave expression, partly as a wandering preacher, partly as an author, in metrical or unmetrical writings. He died at Ulm, on Jan. 25th, 1365, in the monastery of his order. Among his writings, which were probably all written in German, and partly translated by himself into Latin, that "On the Nine Rocks" was formerly counted, but it is now pretty generally attributed to Rulmann Meerswein, a pious layman of Strasburg. The book was written in 1352, and portrays in a vision the corruption of all ranks, and the nine steps which must be climbed if man is to attain to the extinction of his self-will.


6. For Johann Tauler (1290–1361) also, the instruction and the ravishing eloquence of Eckhart, rather than his own scholastic studies, became the groundwork on which rested his early won reputation as a preacher. From the way, however, in which in riper years the brilliant and celebrated orator is converted into the heart-stirring messenger of the faith, through the influence of a pious layman (Nicolas of Basel, who was the head of the secret society of Mystics, called The Friends of God, and who was subsequently burnt at Vienna as a heretic [cf. K. Schmidt: Nicolaus von Basel Leben und ausgewählte Schriften, Vienna, 1866], was long thought to be this "Friend of God in the Oberland." Recently, however, Preger and Lütolf [in Jahrb. für schweizerische Geschichte, 1 Bd., 1876] have opposed this view),—it appears that at first he only appreciated the rational, it might almost be said, the intellectual side of Eckhart's mysticism, and perhaps more than Eckhart himself brought it into play in his preaching. But after the layman above-mentioned had drawn his attention to the fact that his discourses glittered more than they warmed, there was a change. The practical side is much more prominent in the sermons he delivered during the first ten years after his conversion. As Eckhart dwelt especially on the being of God, the Friends of God on the other hand,
especially on the will of God, this influence on Tauler is intelligible. Ruysbroek (v. § 231), whose society he sought at this time, may have strengthened him in this tendency. It is now, not as with Eckhart the mystical repetition of Christ in us, which he preaches, but rather the exhortation that we should follow the example of Christ's poor and humble life. But his treatise On Following after the Poverty of Christ's Life, is counted one of his most excellent. Where sentences of a purely speculative character occur in his works, they coincide, often verbally, with those of Eckhart. The oldest edition of his sermons is that published at Leipsic in 1498; then follows that of Augsburg, 1508, then Rynmann's Basel edition, 1521; Surius' Latin paraphrase [Cologne, 1548, Fol.], is based on the Cologne edition of Peter von Nymwegen, 1543. Editions in modern languages are frequent. Amongst those in High German, that of Schlosser (Frankfort, 1826), and, as the most recent, that of Kuntze and Biesenthal (Berlin, 3 vols.), may be mentioned. It cannot appear strange that Luther placed Tauler very high, while Doctor Eck, on the other hand, calls him one of the dreamers suspected of heresy.


7. The unknown author of German Theology (published by Luther, 1518, afterwards frequently) shows much more agreement with Master Eckhart than do these personal disciples of his. A great part of the propositions contained in the fifty-sixth chapter of this little book is to be found verbally in Eckhart. Scarcely one will be found to disagree with what Eckhart has said, except that in his case the sermon form has often given rise to a liveliness of expression verging on hyperbole, which the quiet tone of the later treatise does not demand. But it is to make too much of this distinction to say that Eckhart's pantheism is avoided in the German Theology: Eckhart is not so very pantheistic, the Theology not so free from that tendency as such a criticism would infer. The fundamental ideas: That God is the perfect, because the One, because He is all and above all; that things on the contrary, are imperfect, because divided into parts and particularized as this and that,—that the Godhead only becomes God by uttering itself ("veriht"),—that God indeed, even without the existence of the creature, is
Revelation and Love, but only essentially and originally, not formally and actually,—that the creature only falls away from God by willing the I, me, and mine, instead of God. so that Adam, old man, Nature, the Devil, to be self-interested, I and mine, all mean exactly the same thing,—that only in the humanised God or the deified man i.e., in him in whom, because he has surrendered himself, Christ lives, is salvation to be found,—that the will is free and noble so long as God lives in it, but by turning away from God it becomes the affair of the body, i.e., unfree will,—that Hell itself becomes Heaven so soon as the private will ceases, etc.,—all these doctrines are already found in Eckhart. But the German Theology has grasped them more concisely, and because its author knew of the errors of the “free spirit” which he often denounces, they are expressed in such a manner as to minimise the danger of misunderstanding. Eckhart, who is often especially striking on account of the boldness of his expression, frequently suggests the thought that he is intentionally paradoxical. In that way it was not altogether without fault of his that he was and is regarded as heterodox. He certainly is not so to such a degree as is often thought by those who have not read him, or at least not thoroughly.

§ 231.

B.—RUYSBROEK AND PRACTICAL MYSTICISM.


1. Johannes, to whom instead of his forgotten family name, that of his birthplace Ruysbroek (also Rusbrock, Rusbroch and the like) was ascribed, was born in the year 1293, became in his four-and-twentieth year, having been decently educated, priest and vicar of St. Gudule, at Brussels, but retired to the Augustine monastery at Grünthal in his sixtieth year, perhaps moved thereto by the Friends of God above mentioned. There he died in the capacity of Prior on the 2nd December, 1381, having acquired by his mystical raptures the surname of Doctor extaticus. Most of his writings are in the language of Brabant (Flemish), but his disciple Gerhard, and after him Surius, translated them into Latin, and in this form they were printed in the year 1552,
and afterwards in 1609 and 1613. Among the fourteen writings which this collection contains—(Speculum aeterna salutis, Commentaria in tabernaculum fæderis, De precipuis quibusdam virtutibus, De fide et judicio, De quatuor subtilibus tentationibus, De septem custodis, De septem gradibus amoris, De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum, De calculo, Regnum Dei amantium, De vera contemplatione, Epistolæ septem, Cantiones dux, Samuel s. de alta contemplatione)—that on the ornament of the spiritual marriage is the most important.

2. Unity with God, which with Ruysbroek also is the highest end, is in his view to be attained either by a practical asceticism, or by the inner life, in which we so surrender ourselves to God, that He is hourly born in us, or finally by the highest degree of contemplation, in which even the lust of the inner life ceases and gives place to pure rest and calmness. The main distinction between Ruysbroek and Eckhart consists in the fact that the latter always represents the union as already attained, while the former rather portrays the process of attainment and therefore the means thereto. He is accordingly never tired of enumerating the different sorts of Christ's indwelling, the different meetings with Him, the individual moments of favour, prevenient grace, free will, good conscience, etc., and it may be regarded as characteristic that while Eckhart is always pleased to show that man is a Christ, Ruysbroek exhorts him to become a Peter, a James, or a John. A comparison of the two must therefore throw upon Eckhart an appearance of Pantheism. The distinction, however, between the unity with God which the pantheist teaches, and the unio mystica, consists especially in the fact that the latter is conditioned by the blotting out of sin, while the former is immediate and natural; so that Ruysbroek accurately hits the mark, when, after portraying and classifying a number of pantheistic errors, in the end he especially censures pantheists for this, that in their way rest is attained by mere nature. Eckhart, certainly, often passes by the conditional processes which lead to that end somewhat hastily. It need not surprise us to find that as regards this point of difference, Eckhart has more points of contact with Erigena, Ruysbroek with the followers of St. Victor.

3. The doctrine of the trinity, however much Ruysbroek tries to separate it from that of creation, stands in his works
in the closest connection with it: by the eternal generation of
the Word all creatures from eternity have proceeded forth from
God. God apprehended them in Himself, before they became
creatures under conditions of time, under the form of a certain,
but not an entire, otherness. This eternal life of the creatures
is the proper ground (ratio) of their temporal, created existence;
it is their idea. By it, their type, things are like to God who
perceives Himself in them, so far as He perceives Himself in
their original type. In their original type things have their
likeness to God; their aspiration after the original type as
the ground of their being, is therefore an aspiration after
likeness to God. In man, with whom this aspiration is
conscious, its attainment coincides with the dominion of love,
which gives to men the form of God. In the highest stage
the consciousness of God and of ourselves ceases; we become
not God, but love, and of ourselves become rest and bliss.
The condition of the attainment of the end is that man
himself should die. This dying is on the theoretical side,
a giving up of knowledge and a plunge into the darkness
of non-knowledge, in which the sun of revelation arises; on
the practical side, it is a giving up of our own doing and
working for the sake of being wrought upon by God. By
this abandonment of self and overthrow of the private will,
man attains to the point at which God’s will is his highest
joy, and therein consists true calmness and rest.

4. As Suso, Tauler, and later the German Theology con-
nect themselves with Eckhart, so Ruysbroek also has fol-
lowers who depend on him, and develop his doctrines. The
first to be named is Geert de Groot (Gerhardus Magnus),
who was born in 1340, was educated in Paris, and taught
philosophy at Cologne for some time with approbation, but
thereafter, on a sudden change of mind came forward as
a popular preacher, and as the result of his acquaintance
with the grey-haired Ruysbroek, became the founder of
the Brotherhood of the Common Life (Collatienbrüder,
Fraterherren, Hieronymianer, etc.), which soon found itself
in possession of many households of brethren. Gerhard
died on Aug. 20, 1384, but the Brotherhood further followed
out his purposes, among which not the least important was that
of winning the common people to the religious and churchly
life by the use in the Church of translations of the Scriptures
and the vulgar tongue. In the oldest of these households
of the Brethren, at Deventer, there was now trained the man
to whom the Brotherhood owes its greatest fame, Thomas
(Hamerken, Latinised Malleolus, but usually entitled after his
birthplace, Kempen, near Cologne, à Kempis). He was born
in the year 1380, instructed at Deventer from his thirteenth
to his twentieth year, and after a seven years' noviciate entered
as a regular canon the cloister of St. Agnes, near Zwolle,
which had sprung from the Brotherhood, and there he lived,
in the end as Superior, till his death (1471). His works were
first published in 1494, and afterwards at Antwerp by the
Jesuit Sommalius, in the year 1609 (3 vols. 8vo), which latter
edition is the basis of many others, especially of the Cologne
edition, in 2 vols. quarto, 1725. Among them none has be-
come so famous as the De imitatione Christi, lib. 6, iv. (in the
second vol. of the octavo edition). This work, containing no
author's name in the oldest MSS., even in those prepared by
Thomas himself, has also been ascribed to others. Thus it
was ascribed to St. Bernard; by others to Gerson. With the
greatest appearance of probability, the Benedictine Constantius
Cajetanus, in the year 1616, sought to ascribe it to Johann
Gersen, Abbot of Vercelli, who lived in the thirteenth century.
That he was credited, may be proved, amongst other evidence,
by the preface to Du Cange's glossary. It is essentially a
mere repetition of his reasoning which has appeared in modern
times, by Gregory, in Paris, in 1827, by Paravia, in Turin, in
1853, and by Renan, in Paris, in 1862. As, however, he had
already been conclusively refuted by Amort, it was only nec-
essary for Silbert, Ullmann, and others to repeat what Amort
had already said. That Nicolas of Cusa, who probably owes
much to the Imitation, in passages where he mentions Eckhart
with honour names alongside of him "abbatem Vercellensem"
(Apolog. doct. ignor., fol. 37), is not weighty enough evidence
to weaken the many counter reasons, amongst which the fact
that the treatise contains so many Germanisms is not the least
important. As matters stand at this date, Thomas must be
regarded as the author of this work, which, next to the Bible,
may perhaps have been the most frequently printed. Including
all translations, there must exist about two thousand edi-
tions, of which there are a thousand in French alone. This
circumstance by itself is sufficient to show that the work cannot
be judged from the scientific point of view, but has a larger
public than concerns itself with scientific matters. For the
same reason it is also an unfortunate fancy to compare the *Imitation* with the *German Theology*. To do so is to harm both writings, which are, each in its way, so worthy of admiration. The *Imitation of Christ* is meant only to be a book of devotions, and as such is excellent, perhaps unsurpassed. That the Jesuits have especially brought it into use, has harmed it in the eyes of narrow anti-Jesuits. It is interesting, when we compare this book with the homiletic writings, e.g., of Bonaventura or Gerson, to see how much the doctrines which subsequent Protestantism rejected, e.g., mariolatry, here fall into the background.


§ 232.

**Significance of the German Ecclesiastical Reformers for the History of Philosophy.**

1. The fact that the two men among the reformers of the faith who had a bent for philosophy, and in fact were only accidentally led aside from it to theological activity, should have made no impression, or only a moderate impression on the progress of philosophy, while Luther, the enemy of philosophy, gave its advance a direction, if not, indeed, an original impulse, as well as impressed it with a peculiar character which remains to this day, ceases to be so surprising when we consider that the philosophy which was so prized by the two reformers above-mentioned, was that of the Renaissance. When we come to consider it (v. § 235), it will be seen that because it took its rise in a misunderstood want of the age, it does not indeed coincide, but gains relationship with that reaction which failed to understand the age or its problems, and therefore must remain, if not so absolutely as the latter, yet relatively unfruitful.

2. The great Swiss Reformer, **Ulrich Zwingli** (Jan. 1, 1484, to Oct. 11, 1531), is not, like his great Thüringian contemporary, driven out of the hitherto zealously defended Roman Catholic view of the universe, because his deep consciousness of sin leads him to see in it a comfortless salvation by works, but exhibits an inner development of quite another sort. The main cause of the awakening of this at no time zealous Catholic to an interest in theology, was Wyttenbach's
demonstration that the Romanists had falsified the words of Scripture. The impression which this made upon him was indeed so potent as to induce him to surrender the cherished plan of his life, of devoting himself to the advance of Humanism, for a life of practical activity in the Church, especially devoted to preaching the Bible doctrines. In like manner he never felt the accusations of reproachful conscience so heavily, that in horror of his own inner depravity, the single manifestations of this depravity, and the difference between them, seemed inconsiderable. One always feels with the strenuous moral preacher of Glarus and Zürich, that what above all made him what he was, was the resentment with which the patriot perceived the selfish interest of mere birds of passage in his fatherland. Finally, the attempt to induce him to take the step which Luther had taken on the promptings of his own inner nature—to renounce the world by assuming the monastic garb—had miscarried in his case, and so he always maintained his sensitiveness to the world’s wants and an open ear for its wisdom. But as to the form of the world’s wisdom to which at that time he owed obedience, there could in this case be scarcely a doubt. Humanism, to which Zwingli was early won, being itself a manifestation of the Renaissance, could not but make him ready to receive a philosophy which belonged to the same circle of phenomena, and accordingly the philosophy which he zealously studied at Vienna was in all probability the Florentine Platonism. Conjecture concerning the subsequent period of his career becomes more certain. Wyttenbach, whose influence on Zwingli was so decisive, had come to Basel from Tübingen, and had therefore breathed for years the air of Würtemberg, and with it imbibed the ideas which Reuchlin, the friend of Marsilio and Pico, had spread abroad in his fatherland. If we consider, finally, that he subsequently visited Italy, and that Pico’s works had been for some time printed, not indeed at Basel, but at Venice, it is impossible to be surprised at the fact which has been established in particular by Sigwart, that in his writings sentences occur whose verbal agreement with Pico’s oration: On the Dignity of Man, prove that they have been directly borrowed from it. Only the mystical element, which is foreign to Zwingli, is, where it occurs in Pico, entirely ignored.

3. Like Zwingli, Philippus Melanchthon (Philipp Schwarzerd: 16 Feb., 1497–19 April, 1560) also starts from Humanism, and even as Magister in Tübingen still regards it as the highest task of his life to lay Aristotle, the greatest of all philosophers, before the world in a correct Greek text, so that the world may learn to know him as he actually taught and not as he was distorted by the Schoolmen. We observe that the young scholar takes up the side of the Hellenists of Padua in opposition to the Arabians (v. § 238, 1). Luther's impressive personality induces the newly appointed Professor at Wittenberg to moderate his admiration for the detested Aristotle. He had subsequently the good fortune to modify Luther's dislike, particularly of the Logic, and the zeal with which Luther demands that Aristotle should be taught, but "without commentary," proves that Master Philippus had converted him from the Arabian, with which alone he had previously been acquainted, to the Hellenistic conception of Aristotle.

Where Melanchthon's splendid influence on popular education, which has earned for him the honourable title of Praeceptor Germaniae, begins, we again find him in the character of an admirer of Aristotle. But it will not on that account occur to any one to call him the German philosopher, for in him the Churchman and the Scholar always preponderate. Because it is for the good of the evangelical Church and education, dialectics, physics and ethics shall be taught, and they shall be taught in such a way as to afford the proper preparation for the future preacher. This is his intention in writing his Compendia, in which Aristotle's doctrine is expounded, but in such a manner as to be compatible with the Creation out of Nothing, and the like. The Dialectic which exists in three forms (Compendiaria dialectics ratio, Dialectics libri quatuor, Erotemata dialectics), is related to the Introduction of Porphyry and the Organon of Aristotle, but borrows also, in some points, from Agricola, whom Melanchthon held in high esteem (v. § 239, 2), and whose posthumous work, De inventione dialectica, contains much which was regarded in subsequent times as the discovery of Ramus (v. § 239, 3). The Physics, in the preparation of which he availed himself of the help of Paulus Eberus, places in the foreground the subjects with the treatment of which Aristotle's Physics begins—the idea of God and the proofs for His existence, with the addition of the Peripatetic doctrine,
that all things exist for the sake of man, but man for the sake of God's glory, which consists in being known. The closing chapter of Aristotle's Physics is treated in a separate book (de Anima). As regards the Ethics, the following treatises belong to this branch of the subject: In ethica Aristotelis commentarius, Philosophiae moralis epitome, Ethicæ doctrinae elementa, Commentarii in aliquot Ethicæ libros Aristotelis. The task which Melanchthon here sets himself is to show that Aristotle derives his moral dictates from natural law, but that the latter, as the unwritten part of the Divine law, could not possibly be in opposition to the written law, and therefore that the natural law is to be found in the Decalogue as well as in Aristotle. The significance of Melanchthon is excellently characterised in the work of Arthur Richter, referred to below, when he regards him as the scholar, not the philosopher, philosophising and as having rendered philosophy great services in the way of information, but not in the way of theoretical advance. But in the province of natural and civil law more can be admitted (v. § 252, 2), because there the circumstance that jurists of practical and theoretical experience attached themselves to him, and, by his substitution of the doctrine of the Bible for canonical law, were emancipated from superstitious reverence for the latter, made him a co-operator in bringing about the evolution of the philosophy of law through the phases which are depicted below (§ 253–266).


§ 233.

TRANSITION TO THE CULMINATION OF MYSTICISM.

1. In every respect matters shape themselves differently with Dr. Martin Luther (10 Nov., 1483–18 Feb., 1546). With the passion with which he seizes upon everything, and which has made him the greatest personality of this epoch, he throws himself upon the study of theology, which at that time and especially at Erfurt was as much as to say that he became an Aristotelian in the sense of subsequent Nominalism (§ 215). The degrees of Bachelor and Master, and the dignity of
Sententiarius prove that his study was not fruitless, and likewise explain his subsequent hatred, when enlightened by profound experience, of the "Commentaries," in particular i.e., of the expounders who had made Aristotle an instrument of Romish dogma. Even more than by this personal experience, he is distinguished from the two leaders referred to in the preceding paragraph, by a deep mystical trait, which is entirely lacking in both of them. Weisse rendered a valuable service in the work mentioned below, by again drawing attention to this mysticism of Luther's, and by emphasizing the fact that Osiander, so often branded as a heretic, stands much nearer to Luther than his judges. He is untouched by no tendency of the mysticism then dominant. The speculative tendency belonging to the upper and middle Rhine, early captivates the venerator of Tauler and the subsequent translator of the German Theology; at the same time he learns to know and to love in Staupitz a worthy representative of practical mysticism, which belongs to the lower Rhine. Now if mysticism, as has been shown above, arose, not through a misunderstanding which obscured the wants of the age, but just because those wants were rightly understood, this fact already gives Luther, in contrast with the two others, the advantage of one who swims with the current of the future. But such a nature as his does not allow itself to be merely borne along, but rather gives a certain modification to the spiritual tendency to which he surrenders himself. His great mission (vid. infra, § 261), to show how the individual must repeat in himself the process through which the Church has passed, from the preaching of redemption to the doctrine of redemption, from the latter to the establishment of a system of doctrine (§ 151), requires that, in unfolding the result so won, he should pass through all these stages, but of course in the reverse order. Thus, at first, he will be misled by what the masters of the Church have said, and goes back to the Fathers, to pure Augustinism; but there too he cannot stay, Paulinism expels Augustinism, i.e., he takes his stand at a point where there is nothing but the original gospel, no δόγμα, only κηρύγμα. These three stages which may be designated by the three terms, Romish, ecclesiastical, evangelical (apostolical), are reflected also in his mysticism. Although at first the latter resembled the mysticism of Eckhart, to whom the idea of a commentary on the Sentences was still possible, it nevertheless soon loses
the magisterial quality calculated to impress scholars, and
even goes the length of being accessible to all who are un-
touched by any scholastic or patristic tradition, and stand
quite outside the Roman Catholic Church. This process of
development in all Luther's views, including his mysticism,
served therefore as a filter by which mysticism, freed from all
impure elements of the past, was handed down to subsequent
times. In this purified form, the mystical thoughts contained
in Luther's writings become a fruitful seed; and as to the
saying of his faithful contemporaries, that he might well have
become a praepitor Germaniae, but not indeed a philosophus
Teutonicus, so much must be conceded to Luther, that even
while he himself despised the idea of becoming a philosopher,
he inspired one to whom the name has rightly been ascribed
(v. § 234).

Cf. Köstlin: Martin Luther. Sein Leben und seine Schriften. Elberfeld,
1875. Weisse: Martinus Lutherus. Lips., 1845; and also: Die Chris-
tologae Luther's. Leipzig, 1852.

2. One of the first to show how fruitful a seed Luther's
mystical doctrines contained, is Schwenkfeld; and it was
perhaps the feeling that the latter expressed the actual out-
come of his own teaching, that made Luther so hard in his
judgment of this noble man. Born at his father's seat at
Ossing, in the year 1490, Caspar Schwenkfeld von Ossing
was won over to the Lutheran reforms in the year 1519.
His earnest character and pure zeal for truth would not
permit him to stop at that stage. To use his own words, he
was unable merely to follow, he must advance on his own
account, and all his life he despised and censured seeing
through other men's eyes. As early as the year 1527, he
published from Liegnitz, where he occupied a ducal office, his
Epistle to all Christian believers on the ground and cause of error
in the article of the Sacrament of the Supper, in which he con-
tests the carnal conception of the sacraments of Catholics and
Lutherans, but also the views of Zwingli and the Anabaptists,
and develops his own doctrine, which he characterises as the
via media between these four sects. It is the same doctrine to
which he remains faithful during his whole life, and which,
taking this as predicate, in the sentence, "This is My body," he
also regards as the only doctrine exegetically tenable, viz.,
that in the partaking of Christ, the spiritual food, the external
act in which Christ's memory is celebrated and His death proclaimed, must be related to the command bidding us do so by faith and self-surrender. The persecutions by the Lutherans, which he thereby drew down upon his head, obliged him in the very next year to leave his native country, and from that time onward he moved from place to place, lived in concealment, especially in Swabia and on the Rhine, and died in the year 1561, probably at Ulm. That in all the controversies into which he was really drawn, for he was himself a man of a peaceable disposition, Schwenkfeld always comes back to the sacrament, is to be explained from the fact that he saw in the Lutheran doctrine of the sacraments, the culmination of that tendency in Lutheranism which he always censures as carnal. The thing, namely, with which he ever and anon reproaches them is, that they confuse the inward and eternal with the outward and temporal, and so in place of the true and only saving faith, substitute the historic or rational faith. What is perfectly true of the eternal Word of God, who became flesh in Christ, and as glorified man sits at the right hand of God—that in Him alone is salvation—they attribute to the written word of scripture, and even to the word which comes from the mouth of their pastors in the pulpit. What is perfectly true of the glorified Christ, that the participation in His glorified flesh and blood alone guarantees to believers forgiveness of sins, they refer to the carnal participation in the bread and wine, and assert that thereby Christ unites Himself even with the unbeliever. In place of the ecclesia interna, apart from which there is nevertheless no salvation, they have substituted their only too depraved ecclesia externa, without excommunication or Church order, without regeneration and sanctification, and so hush consciences instead of rousing them. More and more, he says, the glory and honour of Christ are by them diminished, His influence fettered by their preaching, finally their pastors set in the position of guarantors of forgiveness, instead of their calling being taken for its witness. Of collections of the works of Schwenkfeld, I am acquainted with the following: The Epitolaer of the noble and divinely favoured Herr Caspar Schwenkfeld von Ossing in Silesia, etc., First Part, 1566 (s. l., perhaps Strasbourg), fol., which contains a hundred letters written in the years 1531–33. The Second Part, published 1570 (s. l., id.), contains firstly, four epistles to all Christian believers, secondly,
fifty-eight letters to particular persons, which form the first of the four books into which this second part was meant to be divided. I am unaware whether the subsequent books appeared. In addition to this collection, there is the first (and only published) part of the *Orthodox Christian Books and Writings of the Noble, etc.*, 1564, fol. (s. l.). Therein are contained twenty-three essays: a Confession of the year 1547, an Account of C. S.’s calling, an Epistle on the Holy Trinity, 1544, an Exhortation to the True Knowledge of Christ, the (great) Confession, in three parts, On the Gospel, On Sin and Grace, Adam and Christ, an Epistle on Justification, On Divine Sonship, Clear Witnesses to Christ outside of the New Testament, an Epistle on Saving Knowledge of Christ, Summary of Two sorts of Estates, Three Christian Epistles, On the Eternal Life of God, a Catechism on the Word of the Cross, German Theology for Laymen, On the Three Sorts of Human Life, 1545, On the Christian Warfare, Summarium on Warfare and Conscience, On Heavenly Medicine, On Christian Men, on the article of Forgiveness of Sins, A Consideration of the Freedom of Faith, A Short Confession of Christ. Besides these I know of individual printed writings: *On Prayer*, 1547; *On the Office of Teacher of the New Testament*, 1555; *Christian Church Questions; Repudiation of Dr. Luther’s Malediction*, 1555; *Two Responses to Melanchthon; Short Repudiation of the Calumnies of Simon Muses*, 1556. As early as the year 1556, in his Second Response to Melanchthon, Schwenkfeld says that he has written more than fifty pamphlets. He mentions several, mostly such as have been here referred to, but of some I have been unable to get possession. The Wolfenbüttel Library must possess many more of Schwenkfeld’s MSS.

3. In more than one respect Sebastian Franck of Donauwörth is associated with Schwenkfeld. Born in the year 1500, he was very early awakened by Luther whose preface to the *Turkenchronik*, Franck translated along with the latter. In Nürnberg, where he lived for some years, he came into closer intimacy with Schwenkfeld and Melchior Hofmann, from whom he perhaps received the first impulse to give himself entirely to mysticism by a study of Tauler’s writings and the *German Theology*. After experiencing hostilities of all sorts, which drove him, distinguished as he was for scholarship, profundity, patriotism, from Nürnberg,
Strasbourg, Ulm and Esslingen, he died at Basel in the year 1545. For Karl Hagen, who alone hitherto has thoroughly considered the question of his philosophic importance, to call him the herald of modern philosophy, may be too much, but it is certainly more correct than for expositions of Church History and the History of Philosophy not even to mention his name. The tone of dismissal with which Melanchthon speaks of him; the bitterness of Luther, who much better recognises his importance; the circumstance that even Schwenkfeld abjures him, because his piety is too spiritualistic and sectarian; but above all the fact that those who have despoiled and even plundered his writings never mention him by name—all combined to draw attention away from him, and his writings gradually disappeared. This was the case even with regard to the works which repeated publication shows to have found a great welcome, namely, the two histories: History-bible (Chronica), and German Chronicle (Germaniae Chronicum), and the geography: World-book (Cosmographia). Much more was it the case with the others which never had such a large circle of readers. How much Franck was forgotten is shown by the number of errors which could be pointed out in the graduation thesis of Wald, mentioned below. Nopitsch in his continuation of Will's Nürnberg Gelehrten-Lexicon gives the complete list of Franck's writings (pp. 347–355). A monograph which should appreciate him as a philosopher with the same penetrating justice with which the prize essay of Bischof, mentioned below, appraises his value as a historian, is still wanting, although Hase's book referred to by Bischof is a good one. The phrases here following are extracted from the two writings, both printed in Ulm by Varnier, and therefore not before the year 1536: *On the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil* (said to be appended to his German translation of the Moria of Erasmus). This is not true of my copy of this translation (1696). The “Praise of Holy Folly,” appended to the translation, cites “the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil,” but is not the same work. I am acquainted with the writing only in the Latin translation: De arbore scientiae boni et mali ant. Augustino Eleutherio, Müllhusti per Petr. Fabrum, 1561. Somewhat later there appeared without date the Paradoxa, of which the second edition appeared in 1542. Franck calls the two hundred and eighty propositions in which he lays down his doctrines,
paradoxes or "wonder speeches," because everything that is true and rational before God and the children of God, must appear to the world as error, or as a strange riddle, since the world looks on God as the Devil and on the Devil as God, holds faith to be heresy and heresy faith, so that one only requires to take the reverse of what passes current in the world to have the truth. According to the true philosophy of the children of God, God is, as His very name expresses, the highest, the only good, which is known only by Himself, whom none can either hurt or help, since He is the absolutely self-satisfying one, who, "without affection, will, or personality," by His eternal word or Fiat, i.e., by wisdom and spirit, created things, not at any particular time, but from eternity creates and sustains them. Things, since they are created out of nothing, when regarded apart from that which God puts into them, i.e., the divine in them, are nothing; therefore God is in everything as the "free-following power," which makes each existence what it is, or constitutes its I, — in the metal as the sheen, in the bird as flight and song, in man as that which makes him man, the will. While, that is to say, the bird does not so much fly and sing, as it is flown and sung, willing and choosing are the proper act of man. In this God leaves man quite free, does not force him at all, and while the man is limited in his action, inasmuch as that only happens which must happen, at the same time he is unfettered in his choice or will. If man choose to surrender himself to God, to renounce all will for other things, then God wills Himself in him; if man chooses the opposite, and wills to be himself, it is still God who is perverted in the perverse man, through whom He wills or who wills in him. Although this latter act of will in man is evil-doing or sin, yet God works or does no sin. God, that is to say, can do all things, except one: do nothing. But man by willing himself, since without God he is nothing, wills nothing, but God in permitting (willing) this, wills, since sin serves to punish sin, not nothing but something, and is therefore as little guilty of the sin, as the flower is guilty, when the spider makes into poison what the bee makes into honey. However great the difference may be for man, according as his choice is the one way or the other, this difference does not touch God at all, and when the sinner experiences the wrath of God, he is like any one who runs against a rock and experiences a shock, although the
rock never struck him. Man has therefore the choice whether he will acquire the experience and knowledge of a life which, without thought of God, he lives to himself (the forbidden tree), or whether he will experience a life in which he denies himself and allows God to live in him (tree of life). The choice is present, not past. For, as the timeless God does all things timelessly, eternally, as He has created each of us timelessly (from all eternity), and surveys our whole life as present, although it appears to us as if we lived at one time and died at another, so the history of Adam is also the eternal history of man, i.e., of all men, for all mankind are one man. In man, therefore in every man, there are two principles to be distinguished, the human and the anti-human, the flesh and the spirit, Adam and Christ, the seed of the serpent and the seed of the woman, the old or outer and the new or inner man. According to which of the two an individual submits himself to, and which of the two he willingly permits to live in himself, he receives his name, and so stands before God. Therefore the sins of his outer man do not harm the spiritual man; but likewise it avails not the carnal that the "little spark" and conscience exhort him to good. Moreover, seeing that this takes place eternally, it is impossible to think of an irrevocable decision taken once for all; in every moment, the transition from the carnal to the spiritual mind is possible. But the contrary is also true, for only a short time intervenes between the moment when Christ esteems Peter blessed, and that when he calls him Satan. Since Adam and Christ are to be found in all men, it is explicable that Christians are maintained to have existed before the appearance of Christ. That every man is an invisible Christ, that God is also the God of the heathen, that Socrates stands near to Christ, that the Old and New Testaments are one in spirit, etc., are perpetually recurring propositions with Franck. For that reason he censures as a dangerous error the habit of looking on the work of redemption as only begun fifteen hundred years ago; already in Abel the lamb was slain, and Abraham saw Christ's day. Jesus Christ only proclaimed what existed from eternity; He brought us nothing new. He only gave us the kingdom so far as He revealed to us that we had long possessed it. Since Christ's appearance, what previously was only known to an Abraham or a Hermes Trismegistus, is now preached to all the world. We must, however, guard against
seeing in the "History" which is proclaimed to us, and especially in the letter of it, more than a mere instrument of knowledge or "figure." It is never to be forgotten that the history of Adam and Christ, is not Adam and Christ. As figure or outward drapery, on which in itself nothing depends, which has value only so far as it attains its end, Franck regards all that is historical in the Scriptures, as well as all ceremonial acts. He is never tired of emphasising that all sects and all unrighteousness may receive specious warrant from Scripture, which is not itself the Word of God and of life, but only the shadow and image of it—of the Spirit which maketh alive. As everything in general seeks honour according to its own nature, the fish in the water, so does God the Spirit, in the spirit; before Pentecost there were no Christians. To ignore this, is to transform the saving faith, which is an indwelling of Christ in us, into an assent to a mere history of Christ outside of us. Such an one is of absolutely no avail to us, for he cannot suffer instead of us. On the contrary the Christ, who was and is man eternally, eternally therefore in us also, if we will receive Him, eat and drink of Him, suffers and dies. Faith consists in the quiet putting on of Christ, which saves us by itself alone and without any works, although indeed it brings forth the fruits of sanctification and is attested by them. Faith, to be one with God, goes before love which goes out towards our neighbour, as the first table of the law of Moses goes before the second. It consists in a man being dead to himself as to his bitterest foe, and being united to God so that he serves not God, but himself. He who not so much does this, as suffers it in the stillness of the Sabbath, is a Christian, even though he has never received the name of Christ, and belongs to the Holy Church, which is something quite other than a visible cathedral,—the invisible community of the children of God. When it is maliciously reported of such, and of the eternal gospel written in their hearts, that they are raising a tumult, it is the tumult which the sun creates among the bats. But faith, and the theology of the children of God, is not an art to be learned from men, it is experience.

4. Spiritually akin to Schwenkfeld, and still more to Franck, is Valentin Weigel. Born in 1533 at Hayna, now Grossenhayn, near Dresden (hence called Haynensis and Hainensis), he passed his school days at Meissen, then studied thirteen years at Leipsic and Wittenberg, entered the office of pastor at Zschopau, which he occupied, with the love and respect of all, till his death, on the 10th June, 1588. He avoided all the attacks of the orthodox by subscribing to the public formulas of agreement, and developed his mystical doctrines in the presence of trusted friends only, or wrote them down only for their benefit. Of what he himself published only a funeral oration is known, which is reproduced in the monograph by Opel, mentioned below. His colleague and successor Bened. Biedermann, and his precentor Weickert, were the first to undertake the spread of his doctrines; not, however, without his own assistance. In the long period in which Weigel's works were only circulated in MS. several pieces appear to have been inserted, which, when publication began, were regarded as his. This holds not only with regard to the Theologia Weigeliana, which, as is implied in the preface, was written after Weigel's death; but it has been shown to be probable by Opel, that all the writings are unauthentic in which the apocalypticist Lautensack is mentioned with praise, because he declares the Revelation to be the most important book of the Holy Scriptures, but at the same time insists that it should be called not the Revelation of John, but of Jesus Christ, since Christ is its sole content. The first writings of Weigel which appeared publicly and are undoubtedly genuine, were published by Krusicke, the Halle bookseller. Such are the Libellus de vita beata, 1609; A beautiful Prayer Booklet, 1612; The Golden Hill, 1613; On the Place of the World, 1613; Dialogus de Christianismo, 1614. At this point the mention of his own name seems to have appeared a doubtful course to the publisher, for on the title pages of the subsequent works there appears a fictitious printer, Knuber, of Neuenstadt (probably Magdeburg), who not only reprints several of the above-mentioned works, but also publishes others, though of course without critical revision. Such are Ποντι σεαντον (of
which only the first part is genuine), 1615; Informatorium, 1616; Principal and chief Tractate (of very doubtful authenticity), 1618; Church and House Homily (unknown to me), 1618; Soli Deo Gloria (not without interpolations), 1618; Libellus disputatorius, 1618; Short Account, etc., 1618. Only in the Philosophia mystica, a collection of the writings of Paracelsus and Weigel printed by Jenes at Newstadt in 1618, has the publisher Bachmeier revealed himself in the appendix. Of Weigel's works it contains: the Short Account and Introduction to the "German Theology;" Scholasterium christianum; On the Heavenly Jerusalem; Consideration of the Life of Jesus, and That God alone is Good. Opel gives a complete list of all Weigel's works, authentic and unauthentic. The spare selection above-mentioned is specially referred to in the following representation of Weigel's doctrine. As regards his predecessors, he indirectly recognises his dependence on Osiander and Schwenkfeld, when he anticipates that his doctrines will be regarded as "Osiandrian" or as "Schwenkfeldism." He makes direct reference to no authority more frequently that to Paracelsus (v. § 241). After him come the German Theology, Tauler, and, though less frequently, Thomas à Kempis (v. § 230, 2:7). Luther is less frequently cited; his earliest writings alone are unconditionally praised. Melanchthon is treated almost contemptuously, as no theologian, but a grammarian, physicist, etc. Unnamed but often made use of, is Nicolas of Cusa (v. § 224). From none, however, does he borrow with more ingratitude than from Sebastian Franck, who is never named, but often almost verbally copied. The bad repute into which the Donauwörth mystic had been brought by the severe censures of Luther, Melanchthon, and even Schwenkfeld, were a warning to the quiet-loving Zschopau pastor, not to betray the fact that he was a venerator of his. Thus it came about that Weigel was regarded as the discoverer of many doctrines which he merely assumed. The main points of what he regarded as truth, either traditional, or newly discovered, are as follows:—

5. At creation, which with a self-sufficient God who "needs nought" is the result, not of a want, but of pure goodness, there exist three worlds (called also heavens): the divine world (the third heaven to which the children of God are transported); secondly, and comprehended by it, the
invisible world of angels (usually called heaven); finally, the
earth, which comprises the three elements and all that is
formed of them, in short all the visible. All three worlds
are united in man, the microcosm, or “little world. His
mortal body is formed of the earth-clod, i.e., the extract or
quintessence, the “fifth essence,” of all visible substances, for
which reason he again takes all these up into himself for his
maintenance, both in food and in apprehension by sense and
imagination. His spirit, which although it survives the body
is likewise transitory, and returns to the stellar world, is of
sidereal origin and exhibits the angel in man, for the starry
firmament has its being from the angels. Corresponding to
the maintenance of the body the spirit draws its nourishment
from heaven, and consists in the arts and sciences which are
won by reason with the help of the stars. To body and
spirit there is added a third element, the spiraculum viæ, the
immortal soul breathed into by God, which requires divine
nourishment, the Sacraments, etc., and possesses understand-
ing, the faculty of the highest knowledge, intellectual or
mental. Through the soul man is an image of God, and as
in the character of microcosm, he apprehends the world, so
now he apprehends God from his own nature. In almost all
his writings Weigel contests the view, that seeing and know-
ing are the effect of the object (“gegenwurf”); rather are
they wrought by the eye and only awakened by the object;
hence man only knows and understands what he bears in
himself. This also holds especially of God. In opposition
to the theologians of the letter, who, as if blind men could be
made to see by the sunlight, seek to bring men to salvation
by means of doctrines and confessions, it is to be maintained
that Nosce te ipsum is the Holy Spirit, which leads to the
knowledge of God. Him in whom the word of God is not,
and who does not receive it into himself, the letter, that
shadow of the eternal word, will not teach. Thus it is that
the fact that all sects take their stand upon the letter, proves
them “double-dealers.” The true theologian, the divinely
wise man, searches in himself, the image, for Him whose
image he is. Then he finds that in God, the All-One, from
whom all doubleness or alteritas is excluded, no distinction
exists between what He is and what He utters. Therefore
also, the light in which He dwells is purely Himself, and He
is His own dwelling. In this resting in Himself, God only
seeks Himself. All His desire tends only to whence He came, i.e. to Himself alone, and in this self-love which in Him only is no sin, He is the triune God. To Him this self-desire is the key of David, with which He opens all the closed springs of truth and knowledge. It is otherwise with the creature made in the image of God. Man as created, like every creature, is maintained and comprehended by God, and like all things has his dwelling in Him, and indeed by necessity, for all that comes of God is in Him and cannot escape from Him. But because man is created in the image of God, it is given him not by necessity, but by grace, to exist in himself, "to have a dwelling in himself." While, therefore, God is only one, there is in man doubleness, alteritas; God therefore alone is good, but in man there is good and evil. So long as the evil is only secretly present, and only the good is openly present, there is no harm done and no sin present. Such was the case, while Adam (man) was in Paradise, or rather while Paradise was in man. The Paradise of innocence, namely, is the condition in which man has not yet appropriated the power of dwelling in himself, only seeks to be an image of God, does not desire himself as his sole dwelling, like an actual God beside God. In this Paradise stands the tree of temptation along with the tree of life. It may always be supposed that such real trees actually existed externally to the first man, but the main point is not on that account to be forgotten, that they existed in Adam, for Adam (i.e., every man) is his own tree of temptation. The poisonous snake, the back-bending one—(reflection?) which by means of the above-mentioned doubleness lurks as seed in man, brings man, as it brought Lucifer before him, to use for his own ends that key of David which was meant only for God, to turn to himself, to look upon himself, and thereby to know himself (the good and evil in himself). As self-conceit is implied in the very first act of self-wonder, Adam, by eating of the fruit of self-knowledge, i.e., appropriating or assuming it to himself, revealed and therefore made harmful and sinful, the hitherto hidden, and therefore harmless evil. He now knows himself as one who, like God and therefore beside God, dwells in himself and lives by his own life. He does not indeed attain to separation from God who besets Adam behind and before, so that sin is therefore a perpetually vain conatus to get free of God. Adam, however, by his self-accession and finding of
himself has thereby fallen into unrest and unhappiness. That is to say, the former relation between good and evil has been reversed, what was formerly hidden is now revealed and become harmful; on the other hand, what was formerly revealed is now hidden and no longer of any use. But it must not be thought, as is done by the pseudo-theologians bemused with the letter, that Adam’s fate is a long past history. Much more is Adam in us, and each of us is Adam, and therefore each also his own tree of knowledge and his own serpent which, by appropriation and consciousness (eating and knowing), change what was harmless hitherto, into depravity and judgment.

6. If the fall consists in the desire to live for oneself, the resurrection can only be regarded as dying to self. Hence the decision with which Weigel demands, that one must abandon one’s self and all one’s own (the I-ness, selfness, mineness), in which self-abandonment consists the “calmness,” the condition in which we meet God, not with activity, but with passivity, not as workday but as “Sabbath.” If we cease to live to ourselves, permit God to live in us, He becomes in us the perceiving eye, perceives Himself in us and through us, and the heavenly Adam or Christ is born in us. Therefore, both the “high and weighty persons,” Adam and Christ, the old or outer, and the new or inner man, are in us and make war upon each other. As with the desire to live for self the seed of the serpent made its appearance, so with the death to self, there appears the seed of the woman, and Christ arises in us. In us, for it is an error of the literalists, that it is the merit of a stranger, the work of another than ourselves, by which we attain bliss, per justitiam imputativam, therefore, “that we drink on his score.” As nothing which goes into a man defiles him, so nothing which is external and strange to him can sanctify him. But as each of us is Adam, so also each of us in whom the old Adam died, is a son of God. As an exhortation and “memorial” to us, that we must crucify the flesh, the incarnation of God took place ages ago, from which we call ourselves Christians. But that is of no avail to him who lives for himself; he is no Christian. On the other hand, he who is dead to self is a Christian, even though the Confession of Augsburg and the Formula Concordiae declare against it, and even though he be numbered among the Jews or the Turks; he is a member of the Catholic
Church, i.e. of the invisible community of those who are born again and anew, and in whom Christ lives. As the birth of Christ coincides with the death of the old man, Weigel, in what is perhaps his most remarkable writing, the Dialogus de Christianismo, can even go the length of identifying Christ with death, and puts the distinction between his own theosophy and Lutheran orthodoxy in the mouth of Mors, who intervened between them. The special reproach which is made to the orthodox, is that by their confessions (creeds) they have established a human authority over spirits, so that individuals are now forbidden to see and find out for themselves what God's Word teaches. Further, that even where they set Holy Scripture above their formulas, they set the letter of the Bible above the spirit which inspired it, so that, seeing that the Bible was not written by aid of the Bible, they really have no word of God at all. In general they externalise everything; making no distinction between the inner and the outer man, they cannot understand that even Christ had sins, but yet that he did not commit sin, that not all who are in God walk in God, etc. They have no notion of the meaning of bliss, or the lack of it. Accordingly in all his dialogues the orthodox, comforting himself with the merits of Jesus, goes cheerfully to the grave—and is damned; while the theosophic layman experiences before his death all the sufferings of Christ on the cross, the being deserted of God, etc., dies without the sacrament, receives no honourable burial,—and goes to bliss. To believe is to have Christ live in one, but therefore also to bear the fruits of this new man. But the literalists, who call themselves Christians, show how little God lives in them, by condemning all who belong to another sect, by waging war, by executing traitors, etc., and vainly imagine that they belong to Him who finds in all nations those who are pleasing to Him, who forbids killing, and willeth not the death of the sinner. The man who knows what salvation is, i.e. he who has tasted of it, knows that the man in whom Christ were born would be blessed in Hell, while he in whom the old Adam lives, cannot be made blessed by God Himself, even in the highest heaven. No man can be, and therefore no man ought to be forced into salvation; faith accordingly is not every man's affair, and pearls are not to be cast before swine. Weigel's oft-repeated saying: "If I am free from myself I am free from the foul fiend, for every man is his
own worst foe," may be regarded as the sum of his whole doctrine.


7. All those mentioned in the above paragraphs came to their mystical doctrine through their theological studies, or at least along with them. They remain therefore, as is shown in their terminology, in a constant connection with the teaching of traditional dogmatics and traditional exegesis. Where they differ from it, they only assert that on the point in question, exegesis has hitherto been erroneous. The affair takes another form where an individual undisciplined by university studies, whose inner religious life, though indeed nourished by zealous reading of the Holy Scriptures, was much more fed by deep self-absorption, became acquainted with the writings of the above-named theosophists. Not being in a position to become acquainted with the middle terms which link biblical and ecclesiastical tradition with the luxuriant growth of mystical ideas in his own spirit, he was obliged to regard the latter as quite new revelations, imparted for the first time to himself, and to seek names for these new thoughts within the limits of the vocabulary of the unlearned man, or far which, at least, it supplies the material. In this way mysticism becomes entirely stripped of the learned robe which she had borrowed of earlier science, and becomes what is generally called theosophy, in distinction from theology: in place of gentle discursive reflection there comes the intuition of enthusiasm, and nothing is set before the reader as the result of the researches of the writer, but as dictated to him by the self-revealing Godhead. What assures to this form of theosophy, more than to others, an effect on the further development of philosophy, and therefore a place in its history, is the fact that it is a phenomenon postulated by the age, and therefore, although expressed in a fantastic form, an interpretation of the age and so also a philosophy (v. § 3).

§ 234.

C.—JACOB BÖHME AND THEOSOPHIC MYSTICISM.


1. Jacob Böhme (Böhm) was born in 1575, at Altseiden-
berg, near Görlitz. After receiving a comparatively good school education, in the course of which he even, as it appears, acquired the rudiments of Latin, he was apprenticed to a shoemaker, and having been made a Freeman of the craft in 1592 betook himself to his Wanderschaft. During the latter, being repelled by the confessional controversial writings, he read, along with the Bible with which at an earlier period he was already familiar, all sorts of mystical writings, among them those of Paracelsus and Schwenkfeld certainly, but probably also circulating MSS. of Weigel. Returning to Görlitz in his nineteenth year, he there became a master of his craft, married in 1599, and as the father of six children lived a quiet life, distinguished by industry and piety. The sight of a pewter vessel lighted up by the sun seems to have been the occasion which, in 1610, first called forth in chaotic unity, the thoughts which he sought to develop three years later in his Aurora. When the MS. became known to wider circles through Herr von Ender, a follower of Schwenkfeld, and as a result a couple of Paracelsian physicians, Walther of Glogau and Kober of Görlitz, and besides them several Görlitz citizens, attached themselves to Böhme, the result was to evoke the wrath of the senior rector, Richter. In consequence, Böhme was forbidden by the magistrate to write. For seven years he obeyed this command, then declared he could do so no longer, and the following works were written:—in the year 1619: Of the three Principles of the Divine Being, with the appendix; On the Threefold Life of Man. In 1620, Forty Questions on the Soul, with the appendix, On the Eye turned Inward; On the Incarnation of Jesus Christ; Six Theosophic Points; Six Mystical Points; On the Earthly and Heavenly Mystery. In 1621, On Four Complexions; A Defence against Balthasar Tilken; and two controversial writings, Against Esaias Stiefel. In 1622, Signatura rerum; On True Repentance; On True Calm; On the Supra-sensual Life; On Regeneration; On the Divine Intuition. (The five latter were printed without his previous knowledge, in 1623, under the general title: Way to Christ.) In the year 1623 were written: On Election by Grace; On Holy Baptism; On the Holy Supper; Mysterium Magnum. Finally in 1624: Dialogue of an Illuminated and an Unilluminated Soul; On Holy Prayer; Tables of the Three Principal Revelations; Clavis, or Key of the Chief Points;
One hundred and seventy-seven Theosophic Questions. Besides these there are extant his Theosophic Epistles written 1618–1624. The publication of the Way to Christ renewed the attacks of the local clergy, against which Böhme was finally secured by a journey to Dresden, where he came into contact with the highest clergy, and perhaps with the Elector himself. Soon thereafter he died of the first illness which had ever overtaken him, on the 7th (17th) November, 1624. His works were first published by Betke, in Amsterdam, 1675, then in a completer form by Gichtel in ten volumes, Amsterdam, 1682. The Amsterdam edition in six vols., of 1730, is most prized. Others prefer the Leipsic edition in eight vols., edited by Ueberfeld in 1730. I am acquainted with neither. The newest edition (which I have used) is that of Schiebler, Leipsic, 1831 ff., in seven octavo volumes.

2. As Böhme's main endeavour is simultaneously to apprehend God as the fundamental source of all existence, and at the same time not to deny the enormous power of evil, it is easy to understand how to those who lean towards pantheism he should appear a Manichæan, while to those again who betray an almost blind fear of Pantheism he should appear a pantheist. But how far he stood from pantheism is shown by his unceasing polemic against the believers in election by grace, who make God the origin of evil, even of sin. He of course knows the danger which is involved in the flight from pantheism, and at this danger he may have pointed when he relates, that the sight of evil had brought him to melancholy, in which the devil had often inspired him with "heathen" thoughts, on which he desired here to be silent. True understanding is only won, when the spirit breaks through to the inmost birth of the Godhead. (Auror., xix. 4, 6, 9–11). The fear that this is impossible for man, is the inspiration of the devil, to whom indeed it is due that men do not attain to it. Not without purpose are we images of God and gods, destined to know God (Auror., xxii. 12). Because we are so, self-knowledge leads to the knowledge of God, and only because it is too lazy for the task, does the reason speak so willingly of the incomprehensibility of God, in presence of which she stands like the cow before the new barn-door (Myst. Magn., x. 2). That in which and from which God's essence and inner birth may be known, is borne alike within himself by the wisest and the least learned.