Socratism in its dissolution, so these display that of Greek philosophy generally; not indeed that they simply returned to an earlier point of view, but, just as the earlier retrogressive developments had supported themselves by Socrates, so the later ones may be shown to do so by Aristotle. But what is merely decay from the point of view of Greek philosophy, appears also as progress from that of the world’s history. For the systems which arise at this point, though first asserted by Greeks either by birth or education, find their greatest support and their most eminent representatives in the Roman world. They formulate the dissension and the inner misery of mankind before the entry of Christianity. And in the first place it is necessary to consider the two dogmatic systems of Epicureanism and Stoicism.

F I R S T  D I V I S I O N.

The Dogmatists.

§ 95.

In spite of the subjectivism which was shown to exist in the doctrines of the Cyrenaics and Cynics, they alike continued to think the subject as concrete, in union with a whole, so that the practical question was how to live in peace with society or with nature, while in theoretical matters the former did not doubt that Sense and the latter that Thought produced true knowledge. But after the decay of Aristotelianism the two tendencies they respectively supported again become prominent, but in an abstract form and with the stamp of a philosophy of reflection. Hence a point that Aristotle took for granted as self-evident, viz., that our perception and thought reflect reality, is now questioned, and there arises a demand for what Aristotle had expressly called a futile question, viz., that of a criterion of truth. And similarly Aristotle’s conviction, that man is naturally destined to live in moral societies, and degenerates into the most pernicious of beasts outside them, is also given up, and the sage becomes self-sufficient in his solitude, and is conscious of this isolation as likeness to God. Both the Epicureans and the Stoics agree in this, and also in regarding such self-sufficiency as
the final end, to which all theoretical inquiries also are referred as mere means. Their diametrical antithesis lies in the fact that the Epicureans conceive the subject as feeling and the Stoics as thinking, and that hence the former look out for a criterion of truth in the senses and for the satisfaction of the senses, while the latter desire only to find such a criterion and such satisfaction as will suffice for man as a thinking being. And, as everywhere, a diametrical antithesis is possible only through the fact that their manifold agreement reduces both systems to the same level.

A.—THE EPICUREANS.

§ 96.


1. Epicurus, the son of an Athenian colonist, born at Samos in Ol. 109, 3 (342 B.C.), came to Athens in his eighteenth year, when Xenocrates was teaching there and Aristotle at Chalcis. Although he was fond of regarding himself as self-taught, he owed much to both of them, and at least as much to the study of the Cyrenaics and of Democritus. In his thirty-second year he began to teach at Mitylene, and four years later at Athens. His life in his gardens has been idealized by his friends and abused by his enemies to a greater extent than is just. Fragments alone of his numerous writings have come down to us, and they contain nothing of importance. The Herculanean rolls have, however, enabled Orelli, Petersen, Spengel, etc., to clear up many points previously obscure. Diogenes Laertius, who devotes the whole of his tenth book to Epicurus, not only gives the titles of many of his works, but transcribes two of his letters and gives a detailed account of his doctrines, into which, however, there has crept a good deal that evidently belongs to his opponents, the Stoics.

2. As philosophy, according to Epicurus, is not to be anything else than the capacity and art of living happily, it would require no physics, if superstition did not frighten and torment mankind, nor any instruction in correct thinking, if errors did not bring woe upon men. As things are, they must both be premised to the main part of philosophy, viz., ethics; it is natural that, in so doing, Epicurus should, in view of their
subordinate position, have lightened the burden of original invention by borrowing from others. The Logic, or Canon, as the Epicureans called it after the works of their master, supplies a theory of knowledge, aiming at the discovery of a sure criterion of certainty. But the ἀισθήσεις, which with Aristotle is taken as the first form of knowledge, in Epicurus also acquires the highest dignity. In its purity and when bringing only the affection of the organ into consciousness, it excludes all error, and produces manifest evidence, εὑρήκεια. The repetition of sensations leaves traces in us, in consequence of which we expect the recurrence of similar events. These προλήψεις, which are also said to be connected with the designations of words, vividly remind one of "experience" in Plato and Aristotle, arising with the help of recollection. Whatever agrees with sensation and these anticipations may be regarded as certain, and forms the subject of an ὀρθή δοξα or ἔποδρα, and hence all precipitancy must be avoided, in order that this previous anticipation may have time to become something really acceptable, δόξαστων, when it has received its confirmation. Epicurus does not seem to have entered upon any other logical inquiries. He seems to have rejected definitions and to have said nothing about divisions and inferences, all of which is severely criticized by Cicero (De Finib., I., 7).

3. The avowed aim of his Physics is to afford protection against the terrors of superstition. And as he regards religion as coinciding completely with superstition, and as every teleological method, certainly, and every reference of phenomena to a few similar laws, very easily, leads to a religious view of phenomena, he ridicules the first,—language, e.g., is the effect and not the purpose of the tongue,—and advises us to remember, in the case of every phenomenon, that it may be explained in the most various ways—a sunset, e.g., either by the sun's circular motion or by its extinction. Hence he regards the atomistic theory of Democritus, which makes all things arise out of the accidental meetings of atoms moving in the void, as the most sensible. He modifies it, however, by attributing also weight to the atoms, in addition to shape and size (cf. § 47, 4), and by letting them deviate from the straight line; the former in order to explain their motion, the latter because it alone explains their conglomerations, and in order to acquire a basis already at this point for
the free caprice that would else be inexplicable. It is also in
the interests of freedom that the Epicureans will not hear of
the providence of the Stoics. In this manner there arise
innumerable worlds differing in size and form, while in the
spaces between them dwell the gods, caring nothing for the
worlds nor interfering with them. They are assumed to exist
partly because of the consensus gentium, partly in order to
supply ideals of the life of mere enjoyment. With regard to
the myths of the popular religion, it appears that the
Epicureans, where they did not deny them outright, followed
the example of Euhemerus (vid. § 70, 3), who accordingly is said
to have belonged to the school. Man, like everything else, is an
aggregate of atoms; both the breath-like and fire-like soul are
composed of fine atoms, and its envelope, the body, composed of
coarser particles. Both body and soul are dissoluble, like all
else, and although only fools seek death, it is also folly to fear
it, since he upon whom it comes has ceased to exist. The
part of the soul which has its seat in the chest is the noblest,
as being the rational part, in which the eudaimonia emitted by
things, produce sensation, after hitting the organs of sense.

4. The reduction of affections to pleasure and pain gives
the transition to Ethics. It is assumed as self-evident that
pleasure is the only true good, and that all the virtues praised
by the Peripatetics, are valuable only as leading on to pleasure.
Pleasure, however, is sometimes defined negatively as freedom
from pain, in opposition to the Cyrenaics, and also as the
product of reflection, consisting as it does of the greatest
possible sum of enjoyments, which may, if necessary, be
purchased even by suffering. The eudaimonism of Epicurus
is not the reckless hedonism of Aristippus, but sober and
premeditated. And because the pleasure he seeks is found by
calculation, he calls it spiritual pleasure or pleasure of the soul;
but when one considers everything that is included under this
spiritual pleasure, it is possible to doubt whether the Cyrenaics,
with all their preference for sensual pleasure, do not after all
occupy a higher moral position than the Epicureans. Virtue
is practised by the sage only as a means to pleasure, and not
for its own sake; if the indulgence of all lusts liberated him
from fear and disquiet, he would give himself up to it.
Similarly it is only the consideration for his safety which leads
the sage to live in a State, and by choice in a monarchy, and
induces him to respect the contract which is called law.
Marriage is treated with considerable indifference, and the highest place assigned to friendship, the most subjective and accidental of all bonds; but to this also there is attributed a basis in advantage. The practice of Epicurus was better than his theory, and his successors attempted to tone down the latter also.

5. Among his disciples may be mentioned, his favourite Metrodorus, whom he survived, and Hermarchus his successor. At Rome, Amafanius and Rabirius are mentioned by Cicero as the first Epicureans. After them may be mentioned Cicero’s teacher Zeno, and Phædrus, to whom a writing found at Herculaneum was at first attributed. It is now, however, regarded as the work of another Epicurean, Philodemus. But the most important among Roman Epicureans, not only for us, because of the preservation of his work, but probably also intrinsically, is Titus Lucretius Carus (95–52 B.C.), who in his famous didactic poem (De rerum natura, Libb. VI.) aims chiefly at freeing the world from the terror with which superstition, i.e., religion, fills it. He attempts with all the fire of poetic force, to transform the dry matter of atomist physics; and hence Nature, his only goddess, often appears as an all but personal being, while the deviation of the atoms almost seems like the effect of a vital principle within each of them. On the other hand, he lays more stress than Epicurus on the strict subjection of phenomena to laws. In ethical matters, he, like the Romans generally, shows greater earnestness, often at the expense of consistency, although he does not, it is true, diverge so far from the spirit of the Epicurean doctrine as others, who are said by Cicero to have counted disinterested joy in virtue also among the pleasures.


B.—THE STOICS.


§ 97.

1. Zeno, born at Citium in Cyprus, in 340 B.C., and hence a Hellenized Phenician, is said first to have become acquainted with the Socratic doctrines and writings, and then to have
been a pupil of the Cynic Crates, the Megarian Stilpo, and the Academic Folemo, and after twenty years to have come forward as a teacher of philosophy in the στοά τοικία, from which the school derives its name. After actively teaching for more than fifty years, he is said to have ended a life distinguished for its temperance by suicide. Of his writings hardly anything has been preserved. It is probable that his disciples departed farther from the doctrines of the Cynics than he had done himself; this appears to have been least of all the case with the Chian Aristo. Among his disciples should be mentioned Cleanthes of Assus in the Troad, who was distinguished by his zeal and became his successor. There followed him the most eminent of the Stoics, especially in the matter of logical keenness, Chrysippus of Soli, 282–209 B.C., called "the knife of the Academic knots," an extremely fertile writer. His fragments were collected by Baguet in 1821 and supplemented by Petersen with the help of papyrus rolls that had been discovered. They occupy the same position in our knowledge of Stoicism that those of Philolaus do in our knowledge of Pythagoreanism (vid. § 31). The seventh book of Diogenes Laertius also gives detailed accounts about these and some other Stoics. The first knowledge of Stoic philosophy was brought to Rome by a disciple of Chrysippus, Diogenes, who, together with Critolaus (§ 91) and Carneades (§ 100, 2) was a member of the famous Athenian embassy. But it was first really transplanted to Rome by Panætius (175–112 B.C.), who was a pupil of Antipater of Tarsus and inclined to eclecticism. His pupil was the learned Posidonius (135–51 B.C.), one of Cicero's instructors. There follow the Roman Stoics, L. Annaeus Cornutus (20–48 A.D.), C. Musonius Rufus, his friend the satirist A. Persius Flaccus; also the pupil of Musonius, the freedman Epictetus, whose lectures, delivered at Nicopolis after his expulsion from Rome, were much frequented. We are acquainted with his doctrines by the dissertations (Διατριβai) taken down by Arrian, and also by the far more concise Εγχειριδιον. Lastly, there is the emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121–180 A.D.), with whose views we are rendered familiar by the writings he left behind.

2. In complete antithesis to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the Stoics so subordinate theory to practice that they not only define philosophy as the art of virtue, or the effort to
attain it, but give as the reason of its division into logic, physics, and ethics, the fact that there are logical, physical, and ethical virtues. And in their desire to arrive as quickly as possible at ethics and the soul of their system, they, like the Epicureans, avoided the labour of original invention, and depended on Aristotle for their logic, and on him and Heraclitus for their physics. This last selection, as well as their attraction towards the pantheism of the Eleatics, quite corresponds to their antithesis to the Epicureans and their atomism. Some of them indeed, like Aristo, entirely rejected logic and physics, on the ground that the former did not concern us, while the latter transcended our powers. The first part of the system, to which the Stoics, in agreement with the later Peripatetics, gave the name of Logic, because it treats of the λόγος, i.e., thought or the word, together with the production of both, is divided into Rhetoric and Dialectic, the arts of monologue and dialogue respectively, because it is possible to speak either for oneself, for others, and with others. It is, however, a science subsidiary to ethics, as teaching how to avoid errors. This is effected in the first place by the theory of knowledge, in which the soul is conceived as a blank tablet in the first instance, upon which the object produces a conception (φαντασία), either by actual impressions (τύπωσις) or by altering the psychological condition (ἐτερολωσίς), from which there is subsequently generated by repetitions, first expectation and finally experience. For this same reason the Stoics asserted that genera were merely conceptions of ours and nothing real. But to these points, which were assumed also by the Epicureans, there is added, in cases of real certainty, the assent or acceptance and affirmation, συγκατάθεσις, in virtue of which the affection of the soul is declared to be an object. And though this assent may be withheld in many cases, it is not possible to do so in all, as the Sceptics assert. A conception of which this is impossible, and which thus compels us to affirm it objectively, is accompanied by conviction (κατάθεσις). Thus the real criterion of truth lies in the quality of compelling assent, i.e., in what the Stoics called ὀφθαλμός λόγος, and others at a later time, logical necessity. And such a criterion must exist, because there would otherwise be no certainty of action. Hence it is by no accident that the Stoics attached so much importance to the consensus gentium, for it leads to the conjecture that it is an utterance of the universal reason, which
has convinced all. Science arises out of these convictions by their methodical form, the consideration of which forms the second part of the logic of the Stoics. In this, no separation is made between what refers to the formation of correct thought and its expression (the λόγος ενδιάθετος and προφορικός); and with a detailed theory of the parts of speech, five of which are assumed, and with inquiries into solecisms and barbarisms is combined that of fallacies, for the establishment of which the doctrine of the syllogism is thoroughly examined. In addition to a few alterations in the Aristotelian terminology, it is worthy of mention that the hypothetical syllogisms and those with more than two premisses, which, after their neglect by Aristotle, had been noticed already by his successors, now become most prominent. The latter especially, in order to save the inductive proof, for the sake of which also there is added to the criterion of truth just stated the logical determination, that only such things could be esteemed true as admit of a contrary. This assertion, however, follows at once from the Aristotelian doctrine, that only a judgment, and not a mere conception, can have truth. And in the Stoics, as in Aristotle, the transition from the formal and logical investigations to real cognitions, is formed by the doctrine of categories. That this doctrine retains, under changed names, only the first four categories of Aristotle, which correspond to the substratum and its states, while the others which express activities are omitted, is characteristic of a system which in its Physics arrives at a materialism distinguished from that of the Epicureans only by being more full of life.

3. The assertion that nothing has reality and efficacy except the corporeal, which is extended in three dimensions, is extended even to physical states like virtues, because they are active, i.e., produce motions. The corporeality of space, time, and the things existing only in thought, alone is denied, and hence also their reality, as is certain in the case of the last and probable in that of the first two. But inasmuch as a finer and a coarser matter is distinguished, and an active character attributed to the first, a passive character to the second, it becomes possible to find room for the Aristotelian antithesis of Form or End and Matter, without impairing the complete materialism of their doctrine. The principle of Form, which is called indifferently soul, Zeus, nature, or ether, is conceived as resembling fire, and is sometimes called
fire outright; only it is, in antithesis to ordinary fire that merely devours, thought of as an architectonic force that also produces growth. This fire, then, which is identical with warmth, and is the real deity of the Stoics, allows things to pass out of and to return to itself in alternating forms; the deity is thus both their seed and their grave. Hence their doctrine of the λόγος σπερματικός and of ἐκτύρωσις. Sometimes it also happens that the four contraries of Anaximander and Aristotle are combined into two combinations, one active and the other passive, the warm called πῦρ, the cold called ὀλν. The modifications of the deity, however, form a gradation, according as they possess only ἔξος, or also φύσις, or ψυχή besides, or lastly also νοῦς, in addition to the rest. Even the rational soul, however, is a fire-like body, as being part of the universal reason, and the breathing in of the cooler air plays an important part in its generation and preservation. This pantheism, to which the Phœnician origin of the founder of the school probably contributed, and which, e.g., inspires Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus, was harmonized with the religious conceptions of the people by physical interpretations of the myths; and this again displays the antithesis to the Epicureans with their Euhemerism. In consequence of this interpretation, they were enabled in all seriousness to see a deeper meaning in many of the views and customs of the people, which were ridiculed by the enlightened few. This irritated the Epicureans and the Sceptics against them, and even Cicero. The Stoic pantheism was accompanied by complete fatalism, for their providence is nothing but an immutable fate. The strictest causal connection dominates all things; its interruption is as impossible as an origin out of nothing. Hence the possibility of divine prevision and divination. It also follows from this, that after every ἐκτύρωσις and the ἀποκατάστασις that ensues, all things repeat themselves exactly as in the past period, and nothing new happens. Moreover, a conflict between causal connection and teleology is denied, again in antithesis to Epicureanism.

4. In their ethics, in which their system culminates, the Stoics first approximated to the Cynics, but gradually diverged further and further from them, in the direction, moreover, of a greater isolation of man. For the formula of Zeno and Cleanthes, that man should live in agreement with nature, receives already in Chrysippus, the narrower interpretation of
agreement with one's own nature only; and in consequence of this, the sage need no longer know nature generally, but only his own nature. And thus, through the maxim that one should live in harmony with reason, there is gradually made a transition to the wholly formal definition that one should act harmoniously, i.e., consistently, a formula which does not in this case, as in Aristotle, accompany the one with the fuller meaning, but is substituted for it. This consistency is the recta ratio extolled by the Roman Stoics. And by more and more regarding the thinking side of human nature alone, the Stoics come to connect with this formal the material determination, that the πάθη cannot, as Aristotle had taught, become morbid through exaggeration, but are from the very first exaggerations and morbid. Hence there arises an approximation at least to the conception of duty, until then unheard-of in Greek philosophy, which explains the relation of Stoic and Christian conceptions, and the origin of many fables, e.g., of the intercourse of Seneca with Paul the Apostle. The Stoic καθοικον, which Cicero can only translate by officium, differs essentially from the Aristotelian virtue by negating and not merely regulating the natural impulse. Its distinction from the κατορθωμα displays not only a difference of degree, but also an approximation to the antithesis of legal and moral. And since all πάθη excite either pleasure or pain, there follows from their morbid nature the worthlessness of their results, and the Stoic is indifferent to what was most important both to the Cyrenaic and the Cynic. He extols ἀπάθεια as the highest state, much as the Epicureans had extolled freedom from pain. It renders man unassailable, for he who is indifferent is conscious of his superiority to all things. Man attains ἀπάθεια and becomes a sage, by giving importance only to that which is independent of all external circumstances and entirely dependent on himself. Hence the sage bears his happiness within himself, and it can never be impaired, not even if he should be inclosed within the bull of Phalaris. This knowledge, harmonious with itself and supreme over all things, is of such cardinal importance that it is only through it that individual actions acquire any value; the sage does everything best, and knows how to do everything, he envies no one, not even Zeus, he is king, he is rich, he is beautiful, etc. The fool, on the other hand, knows not how to do anything, and does nothing well.
The sage and the fool are diametrically opposed, and hence there are neither individuals who stand midway between wisdom and folly, nor periods of transition. The transition from one to the other takes place suddenly. All differences of degree also of wisdom and folly are denied; a man is either wholly and altogether a sage or a fool. Some of these harshnesses of the system were in later times mitigated by a distinction among the things in themselves indifferent, whereby some are yet "preferred" and others "postponed"; the quantitative distinction among good things, which had just been denied, is, as Cicero already pointed out, thereby again smuggled in. Similarly, their boastful assertion that pain is no evil, is rendered fairly futile by the qualification that it must nevertheless be avoided, because it is disagreeable, contrary to nature, etc. Because the only end is existence for one's self, life in moral associations appears as a mere means, even when it is not regarded as a hindrance altogether. Thus Epictetus answers in the negative the questions as to whether the sage should be a husband or a citizen. The requirements of respect towards custom and tradition, such as care of the dead, are derided. Cosmopolitanism and close friendship between like-minded sages, which Epictetus conceives as a true brotherhood, in which what benefits one benefits all, here takes the place of the natural and moral bonds. (For Epictetus' doctrine of morality, cf. G. Grosch in the Jahresbericht des Gymnasiums zu Wernigerode, 1867.) In many, perhaps in most, of the dogmas of Stoic ethics, it would be easy to show forebodings, although often in caricature, of what was afterwards esteemed true in the Christian community; and it is this which has at all times inspired earnest Christians with respect for the Stoic doctrine. On the other hand, it contained very much that was certain to commend it to the most selfish of all nations, the Romans. Such were its pride in virtue, its resignation to the course of the universe, accompanied, however, throughout by the consciousness that suicide put an end to all suffering. The stress laid on the disposition, as being what alone lies within man's power, the recognition of man's impotence in his relation to the Deity and His action, etc., is formulated by the later Stoics, as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, in sayings which have often been regarded as borrowed from the Gospels. This was not, however, the case, at least consciously. Nor
need we be astonished that Marcus Aurelius, approximating so nearly to Christianity, should detest it. For such phenomena recur everywhere.


§ 98.

The doctrine of the Epicureans and Stoics, as contrasted with the speculations of Plato and Aristotle, must be called dogmatism, requiring as it does a criterion of truth and resting upon fixed assumptions. This had not been the case, either in Plato or in Aristotle, because they included as an essential factor in knowledge, what was afterwards excluded from dogmatism as scepticism. Respecting themselves, Stoicism and Epicureanism are diametrically opposed, and for this very reason involve a reference to something beyond both. The reasonable calculation from which the happiness of the Epicureans results, shows that thought is immanent in their pleasure; and again the Stoic cannot do without delight, in order to know himself superior to all the delights of life. Hence the Epicureans, especially at Rome, were reasonable men, and the Stoics knew how to enjoy their life tastefully. The theoretic completion of this rencontre in life, which is really a practical refutation of both, is, that they are met by a view which combines them in such a manner that the fixed assumptions of each are refuted by those of the other, in the course of which every positive result, it is true, is lost. This is Scepticism, which occupies precisely the same position relative to Plato's and Aristotle's inquiries into antinomies and aporias, that dogmatism did to the positive elements, in their speculations. The Cyrenaic and Cynic elements, which had interpenetrated each other in Platonism, and hence also in Aristotelianism, had on their liberation transformed themselves into the dogmatic philosophies of reflection just considered. A perfectly parallel change is exhibited in this case, where the part of dialectic that dealt with antinomies, experiences a retrogression into mere eristic. The Sceptics are related to the Megarians, much as Epicurus was to Aristippus, and Zeno and Chrysippus to Antisthenes.
SECOND DIVISION.

The Sceptics.

A.—PYRRHO.

§ 99.

Pyrrho of Elis was originally a painter, and took part in Alexander’s campaign to India, and then came forward as a teacher in his native city. He is said to have been influenced not only by the earlier Elean and Megarian School, but also by a disciple of Democritus, who had utilized the latter’s doctrine of the deceptiveness of the senses in the interests of scepticism. As all our information concerning him has come down to us through the medium of the physician, and composer of σίλλοι, Timon of Phlius, it is impossible to distinguish what belongs to the master and what to the pupil. A great deal of what Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus state as the doctrine of Pyrrho, belongs to the later Sceptics. What is certainly his may be reduced to the following maxims: He who would attain the aim of life, viz., happiness, should consider these three points; how things are constituted, what should be our attitude towards them, and finally, what will be the success of such a right attitude. The problem of philosophy is formulated almost in the same words by Kant after 2,000 years (vid. § 302, 1). As to the first point, nothing certain can be said, as every assertion may be met by its contradictory with as good reason, and neither sensation nor reason supply a sure criterion, and it is absurd to appeal to both at once. It follows with regard to the second, that the only right attitude is to say nothing of things (ἀφασία), or, to withhold one’s judgment about them (ἐποχή), for he who pledges himself to anything is nigh unto ruin. Hence every decision must be rejected, and every question be answered by an “I assert nothing definitely,” or by a “perhaps,” and instead of asserting “things are so,” by saying “so it appears to me.” And this is true of moral precepts as well as of cognitions, for just as nothing is true for all men, so there is nothing good or shameful in itself. And the more this advice is followed, the more surely, in the third place, will imperturbability (ἀταραξία) be attained, which alone deserves the name of ἀταθεία. Further,
as ordinary men are always guided by their πάθη, the task of
the sage may be defined as putting off the man. This form
of scepticism is quite harmless for practical life; for here
there is recognised the maxim of following what is universal
custom, i.e., appears good to all.


§ 100.

Although the doctrines of Pyrrho and Timon found some
support, especially among physicians, the whole tendency
nevertheless sinks into greater obscurity for a time, until,
occasioned by the discussions of the dogmatists as to the
criteria of truth, there arises a scepticism developed into a re-
gular school. This takes at first the milder form of the New
Academy, which however in its turn approaches, in the course
of time, nearer and nearer to dogmatism, and calls out as a
reaction against it a renewal of the Pyrrhonic scepticism, en-
riched by a strictly scientific form. Hence the New Academy
and scepticism, though related with each other in many points,
are yet contrasted so antagonistically in many respects, that
they must be kept apart in our narrative.

B.—THE NEW ACADEMY.

§ 101.

1. Arcesilaus (Ol. 115, 1—138, 4), born at Pytana, in
Æolia, is said to have been trained first by rhetoricians, then
by Theophrastus (§ 91), and finally by the Academic Crantor
(§ 80), but at the same time to have conversed with Mene-
demus, Diodorus, and Pyrrho. He came forward as a teacher
in the Academy after the death of Crates. (Cf. Geffers: De
Arcesila, Götting., 1842.) The form of dialogues attributed by
some reports to his teachings, consisted perhaps in speeches
for and against; no writings of his have, however, been pre-
served. He was praised for his good-natured character, but
various discreditable stories were, nevertheless, told about him.
By reason of his divergence from Plato, he is called the
founder of the new, the middle, or the second Academy,
according to the manner of counting the various modifications
of the doctrine. His scepticism was developed chiefly in
opposition to the Stoics, whom he censures, in the first place, for having put conviction as a third form, by the side of opinion and knowledge, seeing that it may accompany both; secondly, for setting up a conviction (φαντασία καταληπτική) at all. There can be no conviction, for neither sense, perception, nor thought affords security. It is, however, an error to suppose that the certainty of action ceases in the absence of a criterion of truth; as for this probability suffices. The suspension of judgment leads to imperturbability, which is true happiness. The immediate successor of Arcesilaus is stated to be Lacydes, from whom some wish to date the beginning of the later Academy, because Arcesilaus still taught at the old place. Lacydes was succeeded by Enander and Hegesias.

2. But all these are thrown into the shade by Carneades (Ol. 141, 2—162, 4), who was the probable founder of the third Academy, and was highly honoured at Athens, and sent to Rome at the head of the embassy in the year 158. Here he called down upon himself the belated wrath of Cato by his show-speeches for and against justice. All his writings have been lost. In addition to Diogenes Laertius, Sextus gives information about him based on the accounts of his pupil Clitomachus, and above all Cicero. Carneades also comes to sceptical results by combating the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, on whom he often jestingly asserts himself to be entirely dependent. In order to illustrate the impossibility of a criterion of truth and of conviction based upon it, he analyzes conception, and discovers that it stands related both to the object and to the subject in which it arises. Its agreement with the former produces truth, its probability depends on its relation to the latter. To decide the former, we have no means, either in perception or in thought. In fact, a comparison of a conception with its objects is an impossibility, for whenever we attempt it, it is always with the object as conceived already, that we make the comparison. Hence the idea of a true κατάληψις must be renounced, even in the mathematics, and we must content ourselves with probability (πιθανότης), which has different degrees, since it is possible to distinguish probable and indubitable conceptions, and again those which have been tested in every way. The contradictions arrived at, if one requires more than probability, are exemplified by the Stoics, especially in the conclusion of their Physics,
in their teaching about the Deity. The assumption of an imperishable and unchangeable being is said to contradict not only the other Stoic doctrines, but also itself. And it is just as little possible to assert of a practical maxim that it possesses absolute truth as of a theoretic dogma. Nothing is good by nature or for all men, but everything by enactment, and according to the differences of the subject. Although, therefore, the sage will everywhere be guided by the existing custom, he will yet abstain from expressing any opinion upon all practical as upon all theoretical questions; he will consider nothing certain, not even that everything is uncertain. This reticence, which results in imperturbability, Carneades is said to have himself practised to such an extent that Clitomachus asserted that he had never been able to discover to which of two contradictory assertions his master inclined.


3. Philo of Larissa, who taught at Rome, is often mentioned together with Charmidas as the founder of a fourth Academy. In Antiochus of Askalon, whose lectures were attended by Cicero at Athens, and who is regarded as the founder of a fifth Academy, the continuous polemics against Stoicism produce the natural result, that scepticism becomes mixed with Stoic elements. This approximation to Stoicism, he justifies by denying the difference between the original and the later Academy, and makes the Stoics agree with the former to a greater extent than their change of terminology would appear to permit. This fusion, which, it should be said, was very favourably received, provoked the stricter scepticism as a reaction.


C.—RETURN TO THE PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM.

§ 102.

Ænesidemus.

1. Ænesidemus of Cnossus, a younger contemporary of Cicero, who taught at Alexandria, was led back to the more
consistent Scepticism of Pyrrho by the manner in which Antiochus combated the Stoics, which seemed to him perfectly dogmatic. Hence he called the eight books of his inquiries Pyrrhonian. They have been lost, and the only reliable information about him we owe to Photius, for Sextus does not always distinguish between what was said by Ænesidemus and what by his pupils and successors. Thus his statement that scepticism served as a preparation for Heracliteanism can be true only of the latter, if indeed the whole assertion did not arise out of a misunderstanding. Ænesidemus, on the contrary, regarded strict scepticism as the aim, and the academic doubt as a mere preliminary exercise for this. The true sceptic does not permit himself to assert with the Academics, that there exists only probability and no certainty; for this already would be a δόγμα. He neither affirms, nor denies, nor doubts, but merely investigates; and σκέψις is not denial but inquiry. The essential point is, that he asserts nothing whatever, so that the expressions, “perhaps,” “I determine nothing,” etc., are the only ones he permits himself. Now this cautious reticence is most readily reached, if one considers all things from certain points of view (τóποι, or τρόποι τῆς σκέψεως), of ten of which Ænesidemus or his school made use, and which are enumerated by Sextus. Thus the difference of the same sense-organs in different subjects, the conflict between the perceptions of different senses, the relativity of most of the predicates we attribute to things, etc., are said to be reasons why there can be no objectively certain assertions, and why every one really has only a right to describe and to make assertions about his own condition, and as to how something appeared to him. Among these common-places, which are theoretical, practical, and religious in character, there is found also that of the untenableness of the conception of cause, a point of attack also for more than one form of scepticism in much later times. Some of the reasons against this conception appear rather weak, but others, e.g., the assertion of the simultaneity of cause and effect, go more deeply into the matter.

2. A successor of Ænesidemus, Agrippa, is said to have reduced the ten modes of scepticism to five, and to have stated them as, the variety in the meanings of words, the progression of all reasoning to infinity, the relativity of all things, and their dependence on disputable assumptions, and lastly, the
fact that all reasoning is circular. Diogenes Laertius gives a list of names which are said to fill up the gap of nearly two centuries between Ἐνεσιδημένος and Sextus.

§ 103.

Sextus Empiricus.

1. Sextus the physician, called Empiricus because he was an adherent of the method initiated by Philinus, lived towards the end of the second century after Christ, probably at Athens and afterwards at Alexandria. Since his writings have been preserved, he is certainly the most important of the Sceptics for us; as probably he was intrinsically. The three books of his Pyrrhonic ὑποτυπώσεις contain an account of the characteristics of the sceptical point of view, and discuss the chief philosophical conceptions from this basis. His main work is more important only for the history of philosophy generally, and not for a knowledge of the sceptical standpoint in particular. It consists of the eleven books Against the Mathematicians, i.e., against all dogmatists: the first book criticizes grammar and represents it as uncertain, the second does the same to rhetoric, the third to geometry, the fourth to arithmetic, the fifth to astronomy, the sixth to music, the seventh and eighth to logic, the ninth and tenth to physics, and the eleventh to ethics. The last five books are also frequently quoted as the discourse against the philosophers; and J. Bekker in his edition of Sextus (Berlin, 1842), put them before the rest with the title of πρὸς Δογματικοὺς. The writings of Sextus are generally quoted according to Fabricius’ edition of 1718 (Leips. Fol., with a Latin translation). A good reprint of this edition was published by Kühn, at Leips., in 1842, in 2 vols. 8vo.

2. Sextus begins by fixing the idea of scepticism in such a way as to oppose to the dogmatists who, like Aristotle and the Stoics, maintain the knowableness of things, Academics who assert their unknowableness. Distinguished from both of these are those who assert nothing at all, and may be called Ephectics, because of this suspense of judgment, or Sceptics and Zetetics, because they neither think they have found truth nor despair of doing so, but seek it, or Aporetics, because they search out the difficulties in every inquiry. The true sceptic does not assert that to every assertion a contrary
assertion may be opposed, but looks to see whether this cannot be done. And in this testing investigation the different modes of scepticism are subsidiary means; they may be reduced to three, according as they concern either the relation of a conception to its object, or to its subject, or lastly to both, or they may all be considered as varieties of the mode of relativity. The subject of inquiry is both the φανόμενα and the νοούμενα; and since in the course of investigation it appears that in respect to both it is necessary to admit the equal force (ισοσθένεια) of contrary assertions, scepticism leads to suspension of judgment, and this to imperturbability. The true sceptic regards everything as undecided, even this, that everything is undecided. Elsewhere, indeed, this assertion is qualified, and the dictum that everything is uncertain, is compared with the one that Zeus is the father of all the gods; since the latter also contains in itself one, and only one, exception. Instead therefore of asserting anything whatever about objects, the true sceptic describes only how he is affected by them, and says nothing about phenomena, but only a little about how they appear. And he shows the same suspense in practical matters. Thus, although he will everywhere do what is required by the usage of the country, he will yet take great heed not to say that anything is intrinsically good or bad. The usual sceptical answers, "perhaps", "not more than the contrary," "I know not," etc., are discussed very thoroughly, and it is shown that if they are taken seriously complete unassailableness must result.

3. In the larger work of Sextus, his attacks on logic, physics, and ethics are especially important for the proper appreciation of his scepticism. The first of these is reproached with the untenableness of all criteria of truth and the uncertainty of the syllogistic method, the second with the difficulties and contradictions in the conceptions of space and time. Ethics finally have to endure an enumeration of the differences of moral precepts in different nations, from which the result is said to be, that there is nothing good or bad by nature and for all. In short, the result arrived at is complete subjectivism in theory and practice.

§ 104.

Scepticism, by attacking both forms of Dogmatism at one and the same time, was certain to bring them nearer to each other and to render them conscious of how numerous their points of agreement were. Hence the longer this contest lasted, the more pronounced did the eclectic colouring of the doctrines of the Epicureans and Stoics become. And it has already been shown how the conflict with the Stoic dogmatism impelled the Academics to syncretism (§ 101, 3). The later Peripatetics too had betrayed a similar tendency (§ 91). And this tendency was certain to show itself still more strongly among the Romans than among the Greeks. The fact that the Roman mind, on its introduction to philosophy, comes to know scepticism at the same time, so that philosophy is not generated by the Romans themselves, but put before them in the shape of complete systems, systems moreover of foreign origin; and that, further, their whole nature impels them to pursue speculation, not for its own sake but for the sake of practical aims, such as oratory or enlightenment, and hence to regard as acceptable whatever can be utilized for those aims, makes it intelligible that there arises in the Roman world a syncretism in which scepticism has to exhibit itself as the sole cement that can combine the different elements, all the more because of their disparity. All those who philosophized at Rome have been more or less syncretists; only in some there predominated the Stoic element, as e.g. in Lucullus, Brutus, and Cato; in others the Epicurean, as in Pomponius Atticus and C. Cassius; in others the Platonic, as in Varro, or the Peripatetic, as in Crassus and M. P. Piso. But syncretism is dogmatism as well as scepticism, and it is just in this that the chief weakness of the system, and its formal inconsistency, consists.

THIRD DIVISION.

The Syncretists.

§ 105.

The rise of syncretism, however, is not only explicable, as indeed even morbid phenomena are, but it is also a necessity in
the Roman world, and this is the reason why syncretism in Roman times produced such great and lasting effect. The principle of the Roman mind (cf. § 93) compels it, in its aspirations after greatness, to aim at making the Roman people the sum of many and, if possible, of all nations. But a nation which boasts of its origin from a colluvies and never wearies of growing by the absorption of neighbouring peoples, which regards the whole globe as its promised inheritance, of which the temple is a pantheon, such a nation can regard as its own and its true philosophy only one that finds room for all doctrines, however different. It is only under a rule like the all-embracing empire of Rome that philosophical syncretism is the secret of all thinking men, that it has a justification in the world’s history, that it is a great and therefore a permanent phenomenon. But this syncretism makes its appearance in two substantially different forms. In the one case it may be called the Roman syncretism, after its chief abode, or the Ciceronian, after its chief representative, or the classical, after the elements which are mingled in it. And since it only mingles ideas already possessed by philosophy, its merit does not consist in the novelty of its ideas, but in the good taste of its manner and in the beauty of the form of its philosophizing; and it is in consequence of these qualities that Cicero could be pointed out as the true anti-barbarian (§ 239, 2), at a time when the later Middle Ages had reduced philosophy to the extreme of tastelessness. In its second form the position of syncretism is widely different; it may be called Alexandrian, after its chief seat, Philonian, after its chief representative, and Hellenistic, after its contents. The inclusion of religious ideas, and especially of Oriental ideas, in philosophy so enriches it that the doctrine of Cicero may often appear shallow in comparison with the frequently profound content of the Alexandrian Syncretists. But as these ideas grew up in an entirely different soil from that of those with which they were to be afterward fused, the combination becomes formless and tasteless, and often monstrous, and Cicero is far superior to Philo in matters of form. For this reason, when, also at the end of the Middle Ages, philosophy had almost completely lost its content, and revelled in merely formal trifling, a remedy was found in the recollection of the Alexandrian and other kindred doctrines (vid. § 237).
A.—CLASSICAL SYNCRETISM.

§ 106.

Cicero.

1. M. Tullius Cicero, born at Arpinum 106 B.C., and murdered in 43 B.C., owed, as he has frequently admitted, his culture to Greece, where he resided for several years in his youth. He became famous above all as an orator, but also as a statesman and philosopher; in respect of the last, with posterity more than with his contemporaries. He was introduced to philosophy by the Epicurean Phædrus, and afterwards enjoyed the instruction of the Epicurean Zeno, the Academics Philo and Antiochus, and the Stoics Diodotus and Posidonius, and in addition, was a prodigious reader. His philosophic activity, to which he continually recurred whenever he was driven away from the public service, chiefly aimed at making known to his countrymen in their own language and in a form freed from exaggerations, the results searched out by the Greek philosophers. Hence he often merely translates. At the same time he never conceals the orator in the form of his writings nor the practical Roman in their tendency. The public to which he imagines himself as appealing, consists of the educated and sensible men of the upper classes, together with whom he indulges in ingenious discussions. Thus, even as the Athenian Sophists prepared the ground for the seed of true philosophy, so Cicero accomplished a similar task for a larger public and for different times. His works have been schoolbooks for thousands of years; and even in the darkest ages they kept alive a knowledge of and an interest in the subjects that had occupied the philosophers of Greece.

2. As the Hortensius, in which Cicero discussed the value of philosophy generally, has been lost, his most important philosophical works are: (1) As to his whole standpoint, the Academica, which were combined out of two versions into but two books of the original four; and which have not been preserved entire; (2) as regards theoretical philosophy, the De natura Deorum in three, and the De divinatione in two books; (3) as regards practical philosophy, the De finibus bonorum et malorum in five, the Tusculanae quastiones in five, and the De officiis in three books, and also the fragments of the De republica. His other writings of a practical character are to
be called popular declamations rather than treatises. There are, as is well known, very many editions of his works. In the same way he himself and his importance have formed the subject of much discussion, as is proved by the copious bibliography found in Ueberweg, etc. The right mean between the over-estimation of many older judgments and the depreciation which is fashionable in these days, is preserved by the detailed and excellent account of Ritter. Herbart also appreciates Cicero's services to philosophy as they deserve.

3. A moderate scepticism was most consonant with Cicero's whole temper and also with the task he had imposed upon himself, for it is always wont to be the theory of men of the world. This is the reason why he calls his philosophy that of the New Academy, and says it enables him to enter into isolated inquiries and to accept whatever seems most probable without committing himself to any system. Hence the method of the new Academy, viz., that of inquiring for the reasons for and against everything, meets with his complete approval; it permits urging one point or another according to circumstances, a licence especially valuable to an orator (cf. De fato, I.; Tusc., II. 3). Finally, and this is not the least of its excellences, it tends to modesty, and is a protection against the absurd exaggerations in which the other systems revel, because they pay no heed to common sense. Among these exaggerations Cicero includes the declamatory descriptions of the sage among the Epicureans and Stoics, the final result of which is, that no sage ever existed. And in such a sense he himself neither is a sage nor wishes to be one. Nor does he wish to describe all that the complete sage knows and is capable of, but only what is probable to a reasonable man, and how such a one has to bear himself. His task is, not that of setting up a new system, but, by embarking on logical, physical, and above all ethical inquiries, of helping to bring it about that the supremacy in the sciences also, and especially in philosophy, should be added to the many crowns of victory which Rome had wrested from the Greeks (int. al., Tusc., II. 2). Next to Plato and the Academicians, Cicero esteems Aristotle and the Stoics most highly, while he has the lowest opinion of the doctrine of Epicurus. He regards it as so frivolous, and hence as so un-Roman, that he asserts that the Epicureans did not at all dare to speak openly in Roman
society. Their real instructor, Democritus, he places far above them.

4. If one considers separately what Cicero has said about the several branches of philosophy, one finds that his statements about *Logic* are mostly negative. He blames the Epicureans for neglecting definition, division, and the art of syllogizing, and praises the Peripatetics by way of contrast. He combats the opinion both of the Epicureans and of the Stoics, in that they imagine themselves to possess a certain criterion of truth: such a criterion does not exist, although the senses, and especially sound common sense, afford a degree of probability sufficient to enable one to act with certainty.

5. With regard to *Physics*, Cicero is fond of pointing to the gaps in the science, and to the fact that there is hardly any point in it that is not disputed. But this is the very reason why he wishes the subject to be studied, in order that it may dampen the conceit of knowledge and produce modesty. Besides, one must admit that even the Epicureans are right on this one point, that the study of the science of nature is the best means of liberating men from superstition. Only the effect of the study must not be limited to this, for it also elevates and improves. In this respect the Stoics have fallen far short of what Cicero expects from sensible men, to say nothing of philosophers. For greatly as he himself approves of sparing the religious conceptions of the people, because they are necessary for the masses in the interest of the State's welfare, he yet has no idea of regarding as truths the stories of the many gods, the trustworthiness of the auguries and all the other oracles: hence the Stoics, with their philosophic justification of polytheism, appear to him the patrons of bigotry and the enemies of enlightenment. Similarly, even more ethical reasons induce him to regard the fate of the Stoics as a delusion, seeing that it is incompatible with freedom. He himself arrives at a belief in a Deity by means of a teleological contemplation of the world, although the occurrence of purposeless phenomena causes him the gravest scruples with regard to this point. He conceives the Deity as one, like in nature to our own spirit, and dwelling in the world just as our spirit does in our body. This similarity is often emphasized to such an extent as to sound almost pantheistic. The fact that the Deity is sometimes described as an immaterial being,
and sometimes identified with a fire-like substance, or even with the ether of Aristotle, is explained by a precisely parallel indecision with regard to the human spirit. Cicero, however, does not at all wish to refer every particular to divine action: for there is much that is effected by nature, or that happens of itself. Besides the Deity, Cicero finds nothing in physics so important as the human spirit. He is convinced that it is something more than the coarse material particles of the world, and he is equally certain about its freedom. Immortality also he regards as probable in the highest degree, although he gives a warning against attaching too much credence to its philosophic proofs. With regard to the character of the future life, he considers it as happy; all the tales of punishments and tortures he declares to be superstitions.

6. But his favourite study is *Ethics*: every inquiry sooner or later leads him on to ethical questions; and he repeatedly declares that philosophy is the art of life, and that the inquiry into the highest good is the cardinal problem of philosophy. The attitude he takes up in so doing closely approximates to the view of the Stoics. Thus in his paradoxes he comments on their pet formulas, as if he quite belonged to them. At the same time, however, he tones down their harshnesses by the inclusion of Peripatetic elements, and hence often appears to be undecided. He is consistent in one thing alone, and that is in his attacks upon the Epicurean doctrine, to the representation and refutation of which he has devoted the first two books of the *De finibus*. For, says he, even in the case of the sub-human beings, it is possible to prove the existence of something higher than mere pleasure, how much more then in man, who even in eating requires something more than pleasure. His censure of the Peripatetics, for having placed virtue in the moderation rather than in the suppression of the instincts, the assertion that all passions are morbid, that with one virtue all the others are given, that virtue has its reward in itself, that the truly happy man could descend even into the bull of Phalaris, etc., all this reminds one of the Stoics and their declamations. Afterwards, however, Cicero comes to himself again: all this is said to be applicable only to the true sage, who is nowhere found, and of whom alone the *recte factum* (κατόρθωμα) can be predicated, while with ordinary men it is sufficient if they do not fall short of the *officium* (*καθήκον*); in
life as it is, happiness is not conceivable without the addition of luck; moderate pleasure is by no means to be despised; at bottom pain is an evil after all, etc. In short, one fancies one is listening to a Peripatetic. He himself does not regard this as inconsistent, for he considers the difference between Peripatetics and Stoics to be chiefly a question of words. What, however, he marks out for special censure in the Stoics is, that they do not direct their attention towards the whole of man, but only towards a single part, viz., his intellectual nature; and thereby impair the highest good, which can only then be fully conceived, when it includes the life agreeable to (the whole of) one's nature.

7. It is characteristic, moreover, that the Roman translator translates all the doctrines of the Greek philosophers, not only into the language, but also in the spirit of his nation. Thus where the artistic Greek used to say, the "beautiful," the words "honourable" and "decorous" (honestum, decorum) are invariably found in Cicero. He does, indeed, protest against the subordination, in this phraseology, of the value of an action to the estimate others form of it, seeing that what is praiseworthy remains praiseworthy though it is not praised; but a proof of the prominence of the civic point of view and the element of public recognition, is to be found not only in the use of the term turpe for wrong-doing, but also in the way in which he finds the first traces of virtue in boyish love of honour, and ascribes to fame a similarity to virtue. The inclusion of this civic point of view also modifies the distinction between what is legally and what is morally reprehensible, as is exemplified, e.g., in his calling literal obedience of the lex Voconia a shameful action, while elsewhere excuses are made for those who interpret the laws in a quibbling manner in the interest of friends. For the one is contrary to consuetudo, the other is not: it is not decent to act like the former, it is noble to act like the latter. The perfectly pure subjectivity of the modern conscience is here still wanting, and the proverbial phrase he applies to a man of honour, that one could play dice with him in the dark, remains a mere phrase.

Ritter and Preller, l.c. § 436-447.
§ 107.


1. **Lucius Annaeus Seneca,** also, who was born at Corduba in 5 A.D. and put to death in 65 A.D., is, as he repeatedly confesses, a Syncretist; for although the Stoic element is the prevalent one in him, he yet borrows much from others, especially from the Platonists, and he expressly boasts that he derived instruction even from Epicurus. The great reputation he enjoyed in the first centuries of the Christian epoch originated the legend of his conversion by the Apostle Paul; and this in its turn was the support of his authority in the Middle Ages, in which he, together with Pliny, was the chief instructor in physics. On the awakening of the interest in classical studies, towards the end of the Middle Ages, Seneca was cultivated almost as much as Cicero. And, as upon Cicero, there came upon him an epoch of exaggerated contempt, which to some extent still continues. Among the numerous editions of his works, the older one of Lipsius (Antwerp, 1605), and the most recent one of Haase (Leips., 1852), may be mentioned. Most of his writings are popular treatises on ethical questions (*De ira, De consolatione, De animi tranquillitate, De constantia sapientis, De clementia*), others are concerned with physics (*Questiones naturales*), and yet others with religious problems (*De providentia*). But he displays the greatest versatility in his chief work, the 124 letters *Ad Lucilium.*

2. The supremacy of the reason over the senses, the similitude to God to be reached by moral action, which is displayed in the equanimity which endures all circumstances, so that the characteristics of the sage are the *laeta paupertas* and the *patri posse divitias,* the self-sufficiency which can exist even without friends, these are the qualities he is continually recommending, and in favour of which he appeals almost as often to the authority of Epicurus as to that of the Stoics. Above all, philosophy is practical; *facere docet, non dicere,* he says; it is the *studium virtutis*; while virtue or wisdom lies above all in consistency; *sapientis est semper idem velle atque idem nolle.* This, as well as his frequent assertions that pain matters not, and that suicide is the *ultima ratio,* is purely
Stoic, as is also the one, that there is one point in which the
sage is superior to the Deity, viz. that he is wise not by his
nature but by his effort. Then again, however, he frequently
decides against the Stoics, and his practical temper leads
him to blame their hair-splitting inquiries, and, in the theoreti-
cal part of his philosophy especially, he shows a tendency
towards the scepticism of the new Academy.

3. But what characterizes him most of all is his separation
of morality from the naturalistic basis it had among the
Stoics, and its connection with religious motives, with an
innate moral sense, and with indignation at the corruption of
the world. All this produces, in his view of the world, a
colouring that reminds one of Christianity, which surprises all
and dazzles many. The way in which Seneca rises above the
limitations of nationality to the idea of a purely human virtue,
nullifying differences of rank and setting up none between
foes and friends; his recognition of the weakness of human
nature, which he sometimes calls caro, and of the necessity
of divine assistance in virtue; his doctrine that perfect sub-
mission to God constitutes true freedom, etc.; all this has
induced not a few, especially in France, to call him a man
stimulated by Christianity. We should, however, prefer to
assign to him the position of a fore-runner, which accords
with his calling the Christians a gens seeleratissima. The
remark of Erasmus; si legas eum ut paganum scripsit
christiane, si ut christianum scripsit paganice, is very much
to the point.

Ritter and Preller, § 452-453.

B.—HELENISTIC SYNCRETISM.

2 vols.

§ 108.

Alexander's brief dominion over the world was out-lived
by the eternal achievement, of which his espousal of an Ori-
ental woman has become the symbol. By founding Alex-
andria, a foundation which has become almost as important as
that of Rome, he created a neutral ground on which Hellenism
could meet Orientalism, and meet it especially in the shape in
which it forms the harshest antithesis to Hellenism. For while
the beauty of the Greek character is rooted in the delight in
the sensible, and is inseparable from the belief that whatever
may happen happens of itself, and in the course of nature,
the sublimity of Judaism consists in the fact that it regards
a non-sensible Deity as creating all things as he pleases, so
that there does not exist any nature properly speaking, and
the world and everything within it is only a single and ever
renewed work of the Almighty. This antithesis, which
leads the Greek to aim at conformity to nature, the Jew at
super- (i.e. non-) natural holiness, must render each a stumbling
block and an absurdity to the other. But under the pro-
tection of the Ptolemies, upon whom Alexander's partiality for
the Jews had descended, there is developed in the Jews a
desire to assimilate all the conclusions the Greek spirit had
arrived at, which was called forth especially by the fact that
they had begun to speak, and therefore to think, in Greek.
And the Greeks, on the other hand, deprived by the two
great Macedonians of the glory of being alone unconquered,
and alone cultured, whose wisdom had in the Sceptics declared
itself bankrupt, now seek to relieve this poverty by the appro-
priation of Oriental ideas. This reciprocal desire generates an
entirely new spirit, which, by a slight extension of the common
meaning of the word, may be called Hellenistic: it is the con-
sciousness of the impulse which drove Alexander to found his
world-empire, and cannot but find fresh nourishment when
the mission of Alexander is inherited by Rome

§ 109.

When the Greek exchanges the Hellenic and the Jew the
Oriental ideas for the Hellenic ideas commingled out of
Hellenism and Orientalism, the former acquires an interest in
that which seems to interrupt the course of nature, in miracles
and prophecies. This conflicts just as much with the genuine
Hellenic spirit, in which Aristotle put miracles on the same
footing with abortions, and Plato assigned prophetic powers
to the lower part of man, as it is contrary to the old Jewish
spirit, that the ablest intellects among the Jews commence to
concern themselves with natural science and medicine, that
they develop a tendency towards fatalism, and that the Apo-
crypha, which arose about this time, contain panegyrics on
beauty. And as in every mixture, there is here also a possi-
bility of the predominance of one of the two elements, and hence orientalizing Greeks as well as hellenizing Jews must be reckoned among the phenomena of the Hellenistic spirit. And it results from the nature of things, that in the case of the former it should be philosophy, in that of the latter, religion which forms the basis; that in the one philosophic doctrines should acquire a religious colouring, while in the other speculation should attach itself to religious dogma. It is natural too, that in either tendency the adventitious element only gradually becomes visible and prominent.

Orientalizing Hellenes.

§ 110.

The name of Neo-Pythagoreans, by which the orientalizing Greeks of this period are usually denoted, is only correct within the limits within which one may call Cicero an Academic. For, in addition to that which they really derive from Pythagoras, one finds in them Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and even Epicurean elements. There were also Oriental elements, especially in the display of dualism, with which it was easy to combine both the Pythagorean doctrine of number and Platonism. For indeed Persian, and above all Egyptian, doctrines were certain to recommend themselves to men most of whom were educated at Alexandria. If Röth’s opinion (vid. § 31) were correct, this would be the time when the genuine doctrine of Pythagoras first began to preponderate over that of his spurious disciples, which alone had hitherto been active. Cicero gives us a scanty account of Nigidius Figulus, Seneca of Sextius, and of his disciple Sotion. Both seem to have received their inspiration from Alexandria, where Pythagoreanism had sprung up in great vigour, and where the writings attributed to Archytas, Ocellus Lucanus, etc., arose. At the same time, the movement seems soon to have separated into two different tendencies, of which, it is true, those representatives whom we know belong to a later period. Moderatus of Gades and Nicomachus of Gerasa in Arabia laid more stress on the doctrine of number, while Apollonius of Tyana seems to have developed rather the ethical and religious elements of Pythagoreanism. Of the latter we know little; for the romance of Philostratus, of which he is the subject, is a source rather of our knowledge of the later Neo-Pythagoreanism of the
second and third centuries after Christ, in its reaction against
Christianity. The greater part of the Orphic writings also
probably arose about this time, or even later.


§ III.

1. But the most definite conception of an orientalizing
Hellenic philosopher is afforded us by the writings of Plutarch
of Chaeronea (50–120 A.D.), which, in spite of the loss of a
large part of them, distinctly show us how there mingle with
his Platonic, Pythagorean, Peripatetic, and—in spite of his
polemics against them—also Stoic doctrines, religious con-
ceptions which betray a Persian and Egyptian origin. And
as Plutarch does not even know the Jews accurately enough
to distinguish their religion from that of the Syrians, and could
still less take notice of Christian doctrines, he must be sepa-
rated from many men in other respects resembling him in
temper, as, e.g., Numenius, and be counted wholly among
the ancients. He stands, however, on the border line of
antiquity; and this position explains the fact that, just as some
were impelled towards a living Christianity by the study of
Seneca, Plutarch affected a still larger number. His works
have frequently been edited. The editions of H. Stephanus,
in 13 vols., 1572, of Reiske, 12 vols., 1774–82, and of Hullen,
14 vols., 1791–1804, are the most famous.

2. Although Plutarch counts himself among the Academ-
ics, and, like his teacher Atticus, whose philosophizing seems
to have been rather a philological commentary on Plato, often
shows an almost slavish dread of departing from Plato, he
nevertheless deviates from him, partly by re-interpreting his
doctrines in an Aristotelian sense, partly by subordinating
theory to practice in the spirit of Post-Aristotelian phi-
losophy, and finally, in part by his dualism, the connection of
which with Persian and Egyptian doctrines he himself confes-
ses. According to this, the Deity is opposed to matter,
which by its irregular motion makes evil possible, and acts on
it as a forming principle. Or again, he regards a good and an
evil original being as acting upon neutral matter. The principle
of motion which is contrary to the divine he calls soul. Hence
the evil world-soul which Plato had spoken of in the Laws (§ 79,
6), is very welcome to him. The power of the good original
being, which, it follows, is not so much a motive power as a
guidance of the lawless motion, is the greater, and hence it is
the highest god. His forming power consists in implanting
into matter the ideas which he also conceives in Pythagorean
fashion as numbers, or in Stoic fashion as στέρματα, and his
rule is providence. Below him there stands, as it were, as a
second providence, the dominion of the subordinate gods, the
constellations; below these again, the activities of the good and
evil demons, to which Plutarch concedes a great deal in spite
of his polemics against all superstitions, especially in the way of
oracles and prophecies. Spirit, soul, and body, the three con-
stituents of man, show how he is the product of all the powers
ruling above him. At the same time, he distinguishes a higher
and a lower principle in the soul, to the latter of which is
ascribed the irregular motion of the passions; for virtue is
conceived in an Aristotelian rather than in a Stoic fashion.
A double death converts man out of his threefold state, first
into a twofold being, and finally into a single spirit. As all
the constellations must from time to time return to their po-
sitions, there follows from their influence the periodical return
of all occurrences, which Plutarch asserts in agreement with
the Stoics. And the same thing happens to him with regard
to the Epicureans and Sceptics: he combats them, and yet
borrows much from them.

3. Kindred spirits of Plutarch's, though far from being his
intellectual peers, were the philosophizing rhetoricians living
in the reigns of the Antonines, Maximus of Tyre and
Apuleius of Madaura, with whom may be classed Celsus, the
assailant of Christianity in later times. The latter's Truth
about the Christians was gathered together from fragments
translated and commented upon by Keim in 1873. Epicurean
elements are very prominent in him.

Ritter and Preller, § 496-500.

Hellenizing Jews.

Görner: Philo und die alexandrinische Theosophie. Stuttgart, 1831. Dähne:
Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrer Religionsphilosophie. Halle,
1834. Cf. the review of Baur in the Jahrb. für wissensch. Kritik, 1835
(Nov.), and Georgii in Illgen's Zeitschr. für histor. Theologie, 1839, 3rd No.

§ 112.

The Hellenizing Judaism has become more important, not
only for the development of Christian dogma, but also for the
further development of philosophy. The educated Jews assimilated many ideas of Greek philosophers, especially of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, which they derived at first from the general culture, and afterwards, in consequence of the interest thus generated, out of books. And as at the same time they hold firmly to the belief that the Jews are in exclusive possession of revealed truth, this produces a contradiction in their consciousness, the solution of which is found in the idea, arising not out of reflection, but naturally and concurrently with their interest in philosophy, that the Greeks derived their wisdom from the Old Testament, though, it might be, by a round-about way. And similarly the doctrine derived from Plato as to the worthlessness of everything material, that of Aristotle as to the exclusion of all matter from the Deity, that of the Stoics as to the value of mere inward feeling and the indifference of every external action, all these contradict many of the stories in the Old Testament as to appearances of the Deity, etc., and also the value which it attributes to many entirely external acts. And here again it is not reflection but instinct that discovers an escape: for the allegorical method of exegesis, according to which the Biblical stories are supposed to contain a deeper and particularly an ethical, in addition to their literal, sense, is not a piece of disingenuousness, but a perfectly natural way of connecting Greek philosophic doctrines with the traditional religion.

§ 113.

1. Traces of Hellenizing are found already in the Greek translation of the Old Testament, called the Septuagint because it was probably undertaken at the command of the council of the seventy. The Septuagint in its turn becomes the starting point of further Hellenizing, which has gone very far already in the Apocrypha of the Old Testament, especially in the Wisdom of (pseudo-) Solomon. Aristobulus, the tutor of the seventh Ptolemy, from whose Εὐγενητικὸς Clement and Eusebius have handed fragments down to us, was animated by very similar opinions, even if he was not the author of the above book. It appears that he did not shrink even from interpolations in order to prove that Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato derived their doctrines from the Old Testament, and further that he read many Platonic, Peripatetic, and above
all Stoic doctrines into his sacred writings by means of allegories. And perhaps because the physical re-interpretations of the Stoics had shown him the way, he expresses the allegorical method by "φυσικῶς." It can also be regarded as proved, that the Egyptian Therapeutae appropriated many elements out of the Hellenizing Theosophy, especially in its Pythagorean tendencies. But this is doubtful with regard to the Essenes, since weighty voices have been raised on behalf of the view that their standpoint displays only a consistent carrying out of a purely Jewish idea, or at the most only a combination with other forms of Orientalism. But in their later fusion with the Therapeutae they also will have to be regarded as the bearers of the Hellenistic spirit. Productions of the same spirit are the book of Enoch, the greater part of the Sibyline prophecies that have come down to us, and perhaps also the very oldest elements of the Cabala, which was not however completely developed until more than a thousand years later.

2. In part at least it is necessary to class among these the writings of an alleged contemporary of Moses, Hermes, named Trismegistus, as being the greatest philosopher, priest, and king all in one. But only in part, for they belong to different authors and times. Their point of view is also in so far the same that they all show a mixture of Greek and Oriental ideas. But not only does the proportion of the elements vary, but they do not all display the influence of the same forms of Orientalism. Thus the Ποιμήναρος, with which all the editions begin, and after which the whole collection is generally, but quite groundlessly, called, first by the αὐξανεσθε καὶ πληθυνεσθε, derived from the Septuagint of Gen. i. 22, further by its constitution of man, regarded like his creator as androgynous because he is a union of soul and spirit, just as the latter is of life and light, and lastly by many other points, so greatly reminds one of the method of Philo (vid. infra, p. 114), that the supposition that the name of "shepherd of men" for the τῆς αἰθεττίας νοῦς (λόγος) was suggested by one of Philo's expressions, deserves consideration. Similarly in the following piece, the λόγος καθολικός, the tone in which it is emphasized that father means nothing but creator, and the exhortation added, that the production of children is a duty to be fulfilled on pain of damnation, originated entirely from Jewish ways of thinking. But far different is the re-
markable essay called the κλεῖς, in which God is always called the Good, which wishes to be known by all, yea and to be all, while to know it is equivalent to goodness and blessedness, whereas not knowing it is equivalent to wickedness and misery, etc. With continual reminiscences of what one reads in the Timaeus, the Gorgias, etc., the world is designated the son of God, and man as its offspring, who through his (spherical) head is also its image; punishment is regarded as expiatory, and godlessness as a punishment; and finally, with truly Stoical pride, the true man is exalted above the gods, and the saying of Heraclitus, that man is a mortal god, and the gods immortal men, is quoted as the word of a good daemon.

In a kindred and wholly Greek spirit, it is assumed in two other pieces (ὁ θεὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ἔμαθεν αὐτοῦ), that in the world, the second god, there is only perfection, while imperfection exists only on earth, and while lastly, there is attributed to the third, viz., man, the wondrous power of converting even evil into good. Quite different again does it sound when, instead of the former denial of any intermediate being, there is interpolated, in the Νοῦς τοῦ ἔργου, between the creator and world the αἰών, who bestows eternity upon it, or, in the πέρι τοῦ κοίνου, the νόος, the first-born of God, related to the latter as the light to the sun, who in man becomes his spirit and the impelling force in the remaining beings. What, finally, is one to say to this, when, in the Μονάς, it is asserted that not all possess νοὸς, but only those who hate the body, and in the faith (πιστεύων) of their return to God dive down into the basin of the spirit (βαπτική); when the better choice and the heavenly way are praised, on which the invisible is preferred to the visible and unity is attained, unity which is the root of all things? Or again, What shall we say when the curious ἐν δρεῖ λόγος teaches the doctrine that no one can be saved without a new birth, in which silence is the mother that conceives and the good the seed that begets, and the will of God that whereby the birth takes place in the spirit, and the instrument of this birth is even called θεῶν πάσης εἰς ὑμνημοσύνης? Compared with this agreement with the expressions of the New Testament, it almost seems a trifle, that in other pieces the λόγος is called ὑμνημοσύνης with the Deity, and the καταία of men and their eyes are often spoken of, etc. And yet it would be hasty to conclude that the author was a member of the Christian com-
munity. For in this very Sermon on the Mount we find trifling plays with the numbers twelve, ten, and eight that would cause no surprise in a Neo-Pythagorean, and at the end a panegyric on the All and One such as would befit a pagan pantheist. In the Asclepius we listen to a vegetarian like Porphyry, who at the same time praises men for constructing wonder-working images of gods and therefore agrees with Jamblichus (infra, § 129). If, then, these writings, in addition to containing elements akin to the Therapeutæ and Neo-Pythagoreans, contain also points of correspondence with Gnostic (§ 122), Neo-Platonic (§ 126), Patristic (§ 131), and Cabbalistic ideas etc., we can understand their lasting authority in the most various circles. Thus Lactantius esteems them very highly, and Stobæus has included extensive extracts from them in his collection. The veneration they enjoyed in later times is shown by the pains taken about them in the times of the Renaissance (§ 236), and above all, that as recently as 1610 it was possible to print a commentary of the extent of that of the Franciscan Hannibal Rossel. Besides the writings which have been preserved in Greek,—for it is a fiction that their author composed them in Egyptian,—which are generally included under the name of Pseudo-Plato, Pseudo-Pythagoras, Pimander, etc., there has come down to us a Latin translation of the Asclepius, falsely ascribed to Apuleius. The others were first translated into Latin by Marsilius Ficinus (§ 237), and hence appeared in the Bâle edition of his works in 1576, together with the Asclepius. The Greek text appeared first in Paris in 1554 (Turnebus, 4to), then together with a Latin translation in the edition of Franc. Flussus Candulla, Bardig. 1574, which was reprinted in the six fol. volumes: Divinus Pymander Hermetis Mercurii Trismegisti cum commentariis, R.P.F. Hannibalis Rossellii. Cologne, 1630. The merit of having brought to light the quotations in Stobæus from the κόψις του (iere βιβλίος), in which Orientalism is displayed more plainly than anywhere else, belongs to Francisco Patrizi (vid. § 244). He further improved the earlier translations and showed that there was no justification for extending the title of the first piece to the following thirteen. Accordingly his collection, which he published two years before his death as an appendix to his Nova de universis philosophia, was inscribed Hermetis Trismegisti libelli et fragmenta quotcunque reperiuntur. It included also the old trans-
lation of the Asclepius. This edition, which in some specimens is dated Roma 1591, in others Venetiae 1793, seems soon to have become scarce. At least Tiedemann complains, in the German translation of these writings undertaken in 1781, that he does not possess it, and translates according to Marsilius Ficinus, retaining also as the title of the whole: Hermes Trismegists Paenander. Berlin, 1781. The newest and most correct edition, also, that has appeared in Germany, that of G. Parthely: Hermes Trismegisti Paenander. Berl., 1854, betrays already in its title that it contains neither the fragments from Stobæus nor the Asclepius. On the other hand, there is to be found a French translation of all the Hermetic writings, together with a valuable introduction originally published in the Revue de deux mondes, in Louis Ménard: Hermès Trismégiste, traduction complète précédée d’une étude sur l’origine des livres Hermétiques. 2me. éd. Paris, 1867.

§ 114.

PHILO JUDÆUS.


1. The Jew Philo is not only the main authority for our knowledge of this tendency, but probably was also its most important representative, a position for which he was adapted by the fact that he had a genius for collecting and compiling rather than for invention. He was born at Alexandria a few years B.C. Although many of his writings have been lost, the larger and probably more important portion has nevertheless come down to us. The Paris edition of 1525, by Turnebus, was reprinted in 1691 at Frankfort. The best are the London edition by Mangey, 2 vols., 1742, the Erlangen by Pfeiffer, 5 vols., 1785, and the Leipsic by Richter, 8 vols., 1828.

2. Generally in allegorizing commentaries on the Old Testament, Philo develops the following doctrines. As the senses are deceptive, and as rational grounds also do not afford complete security, the certainty of knowledge rests in the last resort on the illumination that will be received
together with faith, a divine gift of grace to which the attitude of man is purely receptive. The instrument whereby God has given this revelation was above all Moses, and hence the Jewish priests can most easily attain to true philosophy. The Greeks also, however, attained to it through Moses, only indirectly, as Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the rest derived their doctrines from Moses. The content of revelation, and hence also of philosophy, is concerned above all with the divine nature. It must be conceived as absolutely unchangeable, since every change involves an imperfection, and hence also as in a state of absolute Being and not Becoming, the One that excludes all plurality. Hence \( \alpha \nu \), \( \delta \nu \), or better still \( \phi \ \eta \nu \), are the best appellations of God. And as the absence of differences in His unity excludes all quantitative, so he excludes all qualitative determinations also from the Divine nature; God is \( \alpha \nu \tau o \nu s \), and it follows from this that the contemplative spirit also can distinguish nothing in Him, i.e., cannot know Him. The prohibition against naming God by His true Name is justified by the plea that His true \( \nu \tau \alpha \rho \varepsilon i \) ever remains concealed. The fourth Aristotelian category also, like the second and the third, does not apply to God: as the absolute as such, God stands in no relation of any sort; hence things do not exist \( \delta i \ \alpha \nu \tau o \nu s \), for this would bring Him, the Holy One, into a polluting proximity to matter.

3. The apparent contradiction, that Philo nevertheless infers the existence of God teleologically from the order in the world, and for this reason calls the world the gate of entry into the heaven of truth, is solved, in the first place, by his avoiding the inference from the existence of matter to its cause, and rather inferring from the order in matter a cause of that order, and thus making God only the orderer of the world; in the second place, moreover, by the fact that he does not permit the ordering activity of God to act directly upon matter, but interposes an intermediate being between them as the instrument through \( \delta i \nu \) which the order posited by \( \nu \nu \nu \) God enters into matter. This intermediate being is the Logos, the sum of all the Ideas or archetypes of things, which as the \( \lambda \nu \gamma o s \ \gamma e n i k \omega \tau a t o s \) contains all conceptions within itself, and in which, therefore, things pre-exist immaterially. According as this plan of the world is conceived as thought by God or as already declared, Philo calls the Logos either the Wisdom or the Word \( \sigma o f i a \) or \( \rho \nu m \nu a \), a distinction corresponding to that of the Stoics between
λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός. The relation of the Logos to God is often described as a radiating out and emanation; and the world, which is formed after the image of that archetypal κόσμος ἐσώματος, is more that once called the singly-born son of God, as in Plato. The agreement with Plato, however, ceases, when Philo personifies all the pre-suppositions of real things and puts them into connection with the angelology, which had reached a high degree of development in his time. Thus it is requisite, in addition to the archetypes of things themselves, that God should have the power and the will to create them, etc. These qualities of God, His ἄρεται, δυνάμεις, εξουσία, are thereupon at once hypostasized, and combined with the Essene conceptions of angels and angelic beings, in the gradation which is mentioned also in the New Testament. And thereby Plato’s doctrine finds room not only for the conceptions of Hellenizing Jews, but equally well for those of orientalizing Hellenes: the constellations become god-like beings, the daemons become spirits of the air, the heroes become demi-gods; and he explains idolatry as an exaggerated esteem for things really deserving of veneration. And as this whole gradation forms part of the conditions anterior to the world, the word Logos, i.e., the regular name denoting this instrument, acquires sometimes a wider, sometimes a narrower meaning. The Philonian doctrine is, however, essentially distinct from the later Christian doctrine of the Logos in that its Logos is only the idea of the world; and he therefore expressly declares that this shadow of the Deity must not be called God.

4. The degrees of Being Philo represents as diminishing like the intensity of light radiating into ever larger circles, until at length it finds its limit in matter, which he conceives sometimes in the spirit of Plato and Aristotle as merely μὴ ὤν, at others, more in agreement with the later physiologers and the Stoics, as a mixture of the inert and inanimate principles, which the orderer of things subsequently brings into conformity with law and form by separation. According to the predominance of matter or of form there results the hierarchy of beings, which had been already established by the Stoics (§ 97, 3). He combines with this the biological doctrines of Aristotle in such a way as to ascribe to the plants not only ἔξις, but also φύσις, and also the θετική, μεταβαλλική and αἰτική (sc. δύναμις), and while the ἐμψυχα are in addition said to have
also αὕσθησις, φαντασία, μνήμη and ὀρνι, while νοῦς or λόγος pertains only to the ψυχή λογική, sometimes called ψυχή simply. And because man, the rational being, also partakes of all the subordinate states, he is called the microcosm; and Philo develops in detail how inorganic, vegetable, etc., characteristics are displayed in man. And he not only opposes the human to the sub-human as the whole to its parts, but in order to lay the proper stress on man's specific dignity, he sometimes represents a special principle in the shape of the πνεῦμα θεόν as being active in his creation, or at others calls in the aid of Essene conceptions of spirits of the air circling round the earth. And in harmony with his practice of always conceiving logical sequence as a succession in time, Philo represents the genera as issuing out of the Logos before the species, and in the case of man also the generic and sexless ἄνθρωπος γενικός or ωὐράνιος as being created before the sexual and specific man.

5. Matter, being that which limits Being, i.e., all perfection, is consistently conceived as the hindrance to perfect action also, and the whole of Philo's ethics really reduces itself to the admonition to free oneself from matter. This object suicide, the expedient of the Stoics, would not accomplish; on the contrary, since it is desire alone that binds us to matter, it is necessary to kill this first, and to aim at a condition in which it is necessity alone, and no longer our own inclination, that chains us to the body. And as, according to Philo's allegorical interpretations of the Scriptures, the stories of the Old Testament contain also deeper ethical truths in addition to their historical accuracy, that which is related of Adam and Eve is at the same time the history of the spirit, as it is led astray by sensuality. And as Egypt is the symbol of carnality, he can also express his ethical requirements to this effect: that every one should aim at becoming a Moses, living in Egypt only on compulsion, whose will is set upon wandering forth into the land of the spirit, etc. The main stages to be traversed up to this perfection are recognised in the histories of the chief patriarchs.

Ritter and Frelle, § 477-493.
CONCLUDING REMARK.

§ 115.

Just as the world-empire of Rome includes the East and the West, in short the whole civilized world, so syncretism includes everything that oriental and occidental wisdom had produced. This union, in the one case of the empire, in the other of the most various doctrines, was achieved mechanically; and hence those who like Cicero or Philo affect it, seem on account of this variety to be inconsistent thinkers. But the same thing holds good in this case as was shown in the case of the Sophists (§ 56 and § 62), viz., that a mixture of the most various views had to come first, before their organic fusion became possible. Such a mixture of wholly different doctrines makes each appear a necessary supplement of the rest, makes it as impossible in future that one of them should be alone held valid, as the Sophists rendered it impossible that Eleaticism should thenceforth rule supreme. The political parallel of this phenomenon is to be found in the fact that after the sway of the abstract civism of the Romans, all attempts to obtain exclusive recognition for a single nationality alone, where all were justified, were sure to fail. But it is a further point that as all syncretism involves a degree of scepticism, the intermixture of Eastern and Western wisdom raises a distrust against all the existing forms of science, just as within the Roman world-empire men were not only rendered free from all the limitations of nationality, but also doubtful about all the aims and interests which until then had swayed them. It is, however, necessary that both the truth and also the untruth of all previous wisdom should be admitted, if a mode of regarding the world, to which all previous ones stand in the relation of immature beginnings, is to prevail. And such a view of the world, transcending both Orientalism and Occidentalism, is the Christian, which arose in the East and was developed in the West, and to the superior position of which even the story it gave birth to, viz., that Seneca and Philo were converted by the Apostles Paul and Peter, testifies. Christianity shows itself as an all-transforming principle also in the field of philosophy. For, as far as philosophy could penetrate, without receiving an impulse from this new principle, so far it
has succeeded in advancing, in a way that irresistibly brings
before our eyes, as we look back, the course of many a far-
famed stream. For in the first period we saw what had
sprung from the most various sources, gradually drawing
nearer and nearer; in the second all these branches had united
into a great stream flowing along in majesty; in the third it
once more separated into many branches, which seem to lose
themselves partly in the sands of scepticism, partly in the
marsh of syncretism, but which nevertheless are really tribu-
tary to the ocean of Christian philosophy.
PART SECOND.

MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.
MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 116.

The way in which Roman imperialism breaks up national lines, from above by the formation of a world-power, from below by the emphasis of private interest, may be regarded as a type of that which Christianity accomplishes. The latter goes further in one respect, for it denies the distinction not only between Greeks and Jews, but also between the free and the unfree, between the old and the young, and does not stop with vindicating man's value considered merely in one aspect, as a subject of the State, but recognises the worth of his personality as a whole. In another respect, however, Christianity does not go so far, since in its view age and property are not sufficient to give man true worth, but it is necessary that the individual be filled with an objective, divine content. This twofold relation of Christianity to Roman imperialism is due to the fact that, while the latter wavers between two extremes, at one time (proudly) assigning to the individual man a divine worth, at another time (in self-renunciation) denying to all that is human any value whatever, Christianity unites both in the (humbly-proud) thought that man, without value in himself, attains to the dignity of a child of God by giving up his worthless individuality. This righteousness is distinguished from the haughty self-righteousness of Hellenism by its element of renunciation, and is the consciousness of a regained unity with God, that is, of reconciliation with Him. This consciousness is the (new) spirit, which knows itself to be in opposition to the (heathen) flesh and the (Jewish) letter.
§ 117.

Christianity, as a conscious reconciliation of mankind with God, may be called a union of the two, or divine humanity, expressions which correspond with the Biblical "Kingdom of Heaven." The aim of Christianity is that no one shall be outside of this union except by his own fault, and hence the reconciliation of mankind with God must begin in such a way that it can be made certain to all, without distinction of talents or of education. That is to say, the divine humanity must first appear as a God-man, discernible by the senses, whose person and history form the whole content of the message of salvation, and who, since He is Christianity in nuce, for that very reason is the (i.e. the only) Christ, of whom it is therefore said that He (alone) is the Spirit. But by this it is not meant that this original mode of existence is adequate to the conception of Christianity. On the contrary, this beginning, like every other, must come to an end. The condition in which Divine-humanity exists as a God-man must, as the lower, give place to the higher (humility to exaltation and glory), where Christ exists in Christians as man in men, where the Gospel of Christ has become the Gospel of the Kingdom, and the saying, There is none other Name whereby we must be saved, is replaced by the necessary supplement extra ecclesiâm nulla salus. Both sayings mean the same thing: that reconciliation with God is all in all.

§ 118.

If the consciousness of reconciliation with God is the peculiar principle of the Christian spirit, or of Christianity, every age in which this idea agitates men’s minds will have to be regarded as coloured with this spirit, or designated as Christian. The same thing must be said of philosophy, when the idea of reconciliation wins a place in it, and when the conception of sin at the same time gains importance, a conception which points back on its part to that of creation. Every philosophy in which this takes place is an expression of the Christian age, and can no longer be reckoned among the systems of antiquity. At the same time it is not only possible, but antece-dently probable, that the first who philosophize in this new spirit will be not at all, or at least not very closely, connected with the Christian community. Those members of the com-
Community who possess mental endowments great enough to become philosophers, are busied with the proclamation of salvation. And again, the cool reflection, without which a philosophical system cannot be produced, is a proof of lukewarmness in a time when only reckless and fiery zeal (divine foolishness) is considered a sign of the true Christian. In its early days a congregation must be hostile to philosophy; and apostolic natures always will be. Therefore Paul and Luther were its antagonists, and the opinion, originally Jewish, that philosophy is a work of evil demons, found favour in the early Church even among the most highly educated, as, for instance, the "Satire" of Hermias proves. Centuries later, Descartes and Spinoza (vid. §§ 266, 267, 271), that is, a Catholic and a Jew, were the first to introduce the spirit of Protestantism into philosophy. For the same reason, heretics and heathen were the first whose philosophy betrays the influence of the Christian spirit.


§ 119.

Christianity, the greatest of all innovations, like every epoch-making principle, assumes at its appearance a negative attitude toward that which has hitherto existed (Christ brings not peace but a sword). If the complex of all that exists be called the world, the new (the Christian) spirit will thus reveal itself as the world's antagonist, and therefore must be an object of hatred to those who are conscious of being children of the (natural and ethical) world. It is easy to explain the hatred of a Seneca, a Tacitus, a Trajan, a Marcus Aurelius, a Julian toward a religion which boasts that its founder was born in opposition to the course of nature, and died the most ignominious death known to the State. The demand to be (this new) spirit by means of the denial of the world coincides with the demand to be clerical. It appears, as the highest in the first period of Christianity, the Middle Ages. The following period, the modern age, first recognises the higher command, to transfigure the world through the spirit, that is, the command to be, not clerical, but spiritual
(vid. § 258). To those with mediæval ideas, to whom alienation from the world was the highest thing, this spiritualization of the world appeared as a retrogression to the position of antiquity, as a secularization. It unites, in truth, that which the ancient and the Middle Ages aimed at and should have attained.

§ 120.

The philosophy of the Middle Ages cannot make its principal divisions physics and politics, as had been done by the philosophy of antiquity, which was throughout secular. These subjects lose their importance, while all those investigations which have to do with the relation of the individual to the Godhead, or with the Godhead itself, come into the foreground. Religion and theology become the chief thing. In addition to these, ethics comes into prominence. It is marked very early with an ascetic colouring, which, in opposing the ideas of antiquity, allows, at most, links of connection with that which had made its appearance during the decline of Greek speculation. It is likewise one of the important differences between ancient and mediæval philosophy that the philosophizing is no longer done, as in antiquity, by men experienced in worldly affairs, but by unpractical students, and, especially later, by the clergy.
FIRST
PERIOD OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.

PATRISTICS. (Cf. § 148.)


§ 121.

This negative attitude which the Christian spirit assumes toward the world shows itself first as flight from the world. From this arises the tendency to supernatural (or rather unnatural) monastic holiness, as well as the disposition to stand without the bounds of all civil communities. In this position, so secluded from the world, the little flame, grown from the kindling spark, must increase in order to be able later to set the world on fire. The first Christians are like homeless strangers in the world. Their fundamental principles do not accord with existing conditions, and therefore, when they come into contact with those conditions, they attack them and experience their vengeful reaction. To this contrast between the new principle and the existing state of the world corresponds in the realm of philosophy a similar contrast between the new ideas and the wisdom of the past. Where they first come into contact a mighty fermentation must result. This fermentation, arising from the contact of the new ideas with the old world of thought, is, in respect to its form, a strife between history and philosophical propositions, since these new ideas become manifest at first only as history. It is thus clear why this standpoint in the history of philosophy should be represented by two diametrically opposite tendencies, in which, on the one side, the philosophical form is sacrificed to the new ideas, and logical processes are transformed into history, and, on the other side, the respect for the form of philosophical propositions causes the
merely historical to be despised and thus undervalued in comparison with the new ideas. Doubt may therefore arise whether the exponents of the first, the Gnostics, are to be classed among philosophers, and whether the others, the Neo-Platonists, are to be regarded as belonging to the Christian age. These two lines of thought, with that of the Church Fathers who go beyond them both, and in whom the turbid fermentation clarifies itself, form the content of the first period.

FIRST DIVISION.

**The Gnostics.**


§ 122.

The desire to justify to the reason that which faith accepts must give rise to reflection upon the relations of the different religions, since even those who are not Christians are not devoid of understanding. The elements which have been pointed out by various scholars as the most essential in Gnosticism thus belong of necessity together. These elements are the relation of πίστις and γνώσις, and the relation of Christianity to heathenism and Judaism. The Gnostics are, therefore, the originators not only of a rational theology, but also of a doctrine of comparative religion, and they may therefore, since both of these fall within the province of the philosophy of religion, be called religious philosophers. It may be regarded as unphilosophical, and as such blameworthy, that the content of belief should everywhere be made the norm, and accordingly, that content being history, historical accounts (genealogies of the æons and the like) should take the place of mental deductions, and theology be made a history of the development of the Godhead. But while Gnosticism, in the opinion
of the philosopher; does too little, that little appears to the believer altogether too much. It is an offence to the Christian community that there should be philosophical speculation, even in the form of history; and at a time when philosophizing about belief is considered heretical, as calling faith into question, the Church rightly sees in every religious philosopher a heretic. The earliest traces of Gnostic heresies make their appearance in the apostolic age, not, however, in their later scholastic form, but rather in the garb of esoteric doctrines, since their antinomian tendency causes them to shun the light. Here belong the erroneous teachings of the Simonians, who were connected with Simon Magus, as well as the false doctrines which Paul combats in Corinth, Thessalonica, Ephesus and Colossæ. Cerinthus also belongs to this class, and many of the positions which the early Church comprehended under the name Ebionism come under this head. They are all distinguished from the Jewish teachings of the Essenes and of Philo by the doctrine of the Incarnation, whether it be of the Godhead, of the Logos, or of the Holy Spirit—a doctrine peculiar to Christianity and irreconcilable with Judaism.

§ 123.

1. As a public sect demanding a place in the Church, Gnosticism first makes its appearance in the second century, and at about the same time in Egypt and Syria. Egyptian Gnosticism which develops in Alexandria, not without dependence upon Hellenizing Orientalism (§ 112), is the most interesting from a philosophical point of view. It accords Judaism a comparatively high position, and we may, with Neander, call it Judaizing Gnosticism. Basilides, the first to be mentioned in this connection, reminds us of Philo, not only by his unnamed God whom he places at the summit, but also by the various personified powers, every seven of which constitute one of the Sonships emanating from the supreme God. The Holy Spirit also, who here forms the bridge from the divine πλήρωμα to its opposite, had already occupied a place in Philo’s system (§ 114, 4). The doctrine, however, that matter considered as a chaos is disposed by God, is peculiar, and goes beyond the standpoint of Philo. It is true, that this procession of the seed of all things from the (because not existing, hence also)
Unnamed is not to be identified with conscious creative activity. Nor can it be called emanation, for Basilides conceived of the process as a progress, and thus teaches a doctrine of evolution whose end is redemption, pictured, to be sure, in a very physical manner. That an ἀρχων, subordinate to God, is ordained to form this chaotic mass, is not to be looked upon as an innovation. It had already been taught by Cerinthus that such an ἀρχων unconsciously carries out the plans of the highest God, and is considered by the Jews (with a few exceptions) as identical with Him. Below the Archon stand the subordinate beings, likewise divided into sevens, and forming with him the number 365 (αβραακς), by means of which providence (προνοια) carries out its designs. It is probable that there is a connection here with theological doctrines of Egypt which Basilides learned from Egyptian priests, either directly or through the medium of the teachings of Pherecydes, from whom he borrowed a great deal. Jesus, also, is a work of the Archon. At His baptism, however, to the astonishment of His Creator, the first emanation from the highest God, the νοῦς or διάκων, joins itself to Him, and having accomplished the work of redemption, afterwards deserts the man Jesus and leaves Him to suffer. Man applies the work of redemption to himself by means of belief, which Basilides conceives of in a purely theoretical way, while his son and pupil Isidore attempts to add the practical element.


2. A much greater reputation was gained by Basilides' contemporary, Valentinus, perhaps because he taught in Rome as well as in Alexandria, and was there excluded from the Church as a heretic. He teaches that the powers which proceed from the Original Father or the Deep (προπάτωρ, βυθός) and which he calls αἴωνες, on account of their eternity, underlie the distinction of sexes, and emanate from the original source in pairs. This view arose under Pythagorean influence. To the original source is given at one time no one, at another time Silence as a consort, to the νοῦς Truth, to the λόγος Life, while the lowest place is occupied by θελητός and σοφία. As a result of the ungoverned desire of the latter for a union with the Highest, there springs up the lower wisdom (Achamoth), which is contained and acts in matter, the latter being conceived of quite in the Platonic way. Achamoth causes the
Demiurge, the God of the Old Testament, who stands in a subordinate position, to accomplish, unconsciously to himself, its own return and the return of all things into the fulness of Being. To this end, man is especially useful. Achamoth first leads him, through the enjoyment of the forbidden fruit, to make himself ὑλικός, but by that means places him in a position to sanctify material being. According to his relation to matter, man is ὑλικός, ὕψικτος, πνευματικός. From the last class the Demiurge (himself psychic) chooses by instinct the kings and prophets, and finally the Christ promised by the prophets, who, by union with one of the highest Ἀεόνs, becomes the Redeemer through whom the Achamoth and all the πνευματικοί go over into the Pleroma, while the Demiurge assumes the place of wisdom, and remains there until matter falls into non-existence. Among the numerous followers of Valentinus the names of Ptolemaeus, Heracleon, and Marcion are prominent. The differences between the representatives of the oriental and occidental tendencies were looked upon as so important, that the former were regarded as quite un-Christian, the latter, as only heretical. These differences also explain why the notices in Irenæus, Hippolytus, Clement, and Origen agree neither with each other, nor with the extant fragments of Gnostic works.


3. The Syrian Bardesanes, born at Edessa, probably in the year 154, who enjoyed the name of Confessor on account of his zeal for the extension of Christianity, approaches Valentinus in many points. He is said to have preached the doctrines of the latter, according to some only in his earlier years, according to others in later life, while still others maintain that he taught them all the time, but in a form peculiarly modified, so that they really constituted for him only a point of departure. The acceptance of Judaism reaches its extreme in the *Homilies* and *Recognitions*, falsely ascribed to Clement of Rome, which are probably the work of various authors. In these the Apostle Peter is introduced as the teacher of a Jewish Christian Gnosticism, which emphasizes so strongly the sole causality of God, that, in opposition to all dualism, matter becomes an expansion of God, and the Devil his left hand, with which He punishes, as with His right hand, the Son of God, He rewards. Hatred for the heathen
becomes often in these works hatred for the Apostle to
the heathen.


§ 124.

A position diametrically opposed to that of the Judaizing
Gnostics is occupied by those who may be called *Paganizing*,
since they were led by their hatred for Judaism to substitute
purely heathen ideas for Christian doctrines. This is espe-
cially true of Carpocrates and his followers, who, on the
one hand ascribed to Pythagoras and to Plato a dignity equal
to that of Jesus, and on the other despised the Jewish stand-
point. It is also true of the school of Mani which arose
somewhat later. Mani’s doctrines, drawn partly from Parsee-
ism, partly from Buddhism, were the cause of his execution
as a heretic. His efforts toward a reformation had as their
object the elevation of Christian doctrine to the higher know-
ledge promised by Paul, by means of the exclusion of Jewish
and the introduction of dualistic elements. His sect, the
Manichæans, endured for a considerable time. The Ophites,
related to Valentinus, and the Cainites, perhaps connected
with Basilides, went far in their paganizing tendency. They
ascribed to those things pictured by the Old Testament as
especially bad, e.g. to the serpent, to Cain, etc., the possession
of true wisdom. The discovery of the lost books of the work
of Hippolytus (*vid. § 135, 3*) has contributed greatly to our
knowledge of the various sects which are customarily em-
braced under the name Ophites, as has been shown by Möller
in his work mentioned in § 121, as well as by others. In
other respects these heretical tendencies have less of specu-
lative than of practical interest. Their negative attitude
toward the Old Testament led some of them to complete
antinomianism. Others, especially the Manichæans, declared
war only against the ceremonial law, while at the same time
they enjoined strict morality. But with them, as in Parseeism,
the ethical is confounded to a great degree with the physical,
and the process of redemption exhibits itself almost as a
process of nature.

§ 125.

Finally, the Christianizing Gnostics are to be mentioned as a third class. While assigning to Judaism a very subordinate position, they do not wish thereby to give prominence to heathenism, but only to the specific worth of Christianity. To this class belong Saturninus and especially Marcion. The latter's abstract conception of Paulinism brings him into a relation with Paul similar to that which Antisthenes occupied toward Socrates (vide § 71). As nature reveals to the heathen at most only the Almighty, so the law reveals to the Jews only the Righteous One. The revelation of the Good and the Compassionate One in Christianity is to be looked upon as absolutely new, and therefore sudden. Christianity stands here in an entirely negative relation to heathenism as well as to Judaism. From the former follows Marcion's Docetism, which goes so far as to deny the birth of Christ, from the latter his contempt for the Old Testament conception of God and of the Messiah. The death of Christ and the persecution of the Christians are looked upon as the work of the Demiurge, i.e. the Jewish God. Great as is Marcion's significance in Church history, his peculiarly practical tendency makes it unnecessary to consider him at length in a history of philosophy.

SECOND DIVISION.

The Neo-Platonists.


§ 126.

Precisely that which might lead superficial observers to identify Gnostics and Neo-Platonists makes them diametrical opposites, namely, that the same elements are contained in the teachings of both. Although by many modern scholars the oriental, and further, the Christian element in Neo-Platonism may have been too strongly emphasized, it can be entirely denied least of all by those who call Neo-Platonism
a reaction against the intrusion of the new spirit. The name Neo-Platonism, which may be retained, since its use is so firmly established, is really too narrow, and it has been rightly remarked that its representatives might as well be called Neo-Aristotelians. But this designation, too, is insufficient, for ante-Platonic and post-Aristotelian elements are to be found in their teachings, and they combine all that philosophy has worked out before them in a peculiar theory of the universe, and that not as syncretists, like Cicero and the Sophists, but in a systematic form, as Empedocles and the Atomists had done. Nevertheless, those who have tried to represent them as the culmination of ancient speculation are wrong. They overlook the fact that Plotinus, Jamblichus and Proclus are widely separated from the representatives of classic Greek philosophy in time, in nationality, and in residence, but above all by their relation, partly negative and partly positive, towards ideas with which the human reason has been busied only since the introduction of Christianity. Doctrines of emanation and of ascetic morality can, if necessary, be united with the letter but never with the spirit of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy.

§ 127.

As Gnosticism had its immediate predecessors in the Hellenizing Jews, so Neo-Platonism has its in the orientalizing Greeks (§§ 110 and 111), as well in the more mathematically educated Pythagoreans as in the philological commentators of Plato. If Christian or even Jewish elements could be demonstrated to exist in Plutarch, he would have to be assigned the place which now belongs to Numenius, a Syrian born in the reign of Antoninus Pius. It is characteristic of his position that the Church Fathers call him a Pythagorean, while he calls Plato a Greek-speaking Moses. Between the first God, or the Good, and the third God, or the world, whom with Plato he calls the only begotten son of the first, he inserts the Demiurge, related to both of them, and thus approaches so near to the teaching of Plotinus that the latter was early accused of plagiarizing from him. The scanty notices which we possess in regard to Numenius we owe to Eusebius, who has preserved fragments from the work περὶ τὰ γαθοὶ. In many respects, e.g., in the idea that the irregular
movement of matter breaks itself as it were, upon the One, the Good, he reminds us of Plutarch, in other respects of Philo and of Valentinian Gnosticism. Still more than upon Numenius Christian ideas worked upon Ammonius Saccas (§ 243), who, according to a tradition, was an apostate from Christianity, from which he became estranged on account of the hostile attitude of its followers toward arts and sciences. As his principal doctrine, is to be regarded the complete agreement of Plato and Aristotle, to both of whom it seems he wished to give their full dues. Probably many orientalizing elements, especially doctrines of emanation and of asceticism, were mingled with his interpretation of them, and certainly a polemical tendency against the religion from which he had separated himself. Not only has his activity in Alexandria therefore caused him always to be regarded as the real founder of Neo-Platonism, but he deserves this position also because the various tendencies which soon made their appearance within the circle of his successors depend all of them alike upon him, and emphasize each a particular side of his teaching. In Roman Neo-Platonism, as represented by Plotinus, Greek elements prevail, and among these the Platonic occupies an especially prominent position, so prominent that injustice is often done to Aristotle in a way that reminds us of Numenius. In the Syrian school, of which Jamblichus is a type, orientalizing Pythagorism has most weight, together with an equally oriental leaning toward theurgic practices. Finally, in the scholastic Athenian Neo-Platonism, represented by Proclus, who, in one of his chief works, simply makes extracts from Plotinus, while in the remainder he follows Jamblichus, the Aristotelian element, on account of the formal completion which is here given to the system, occupies the most prominent place. All three tendencies share, however, in hatred or contempt for Christian teaching; whether Gnostic or anti-Gnostic, and regarding it as the enemy of science they place over against it heathenism as the ground of science. To heathenism, then, science owes so much that she comes to its defence with rational grounds, and seeks to point out in its myths combinations of ideas in historical garb. The logical metamorphoses which Homer thus undergoes are exactly opposite to the transformation of abstract logical conceptions into fantastic narratives among the Gnostics.
A.—PLOTINUS AND ROMAN NEO-PLATONISM.


§ 128.

1. Plotinus was born in the year 205 in Zykopolis in Egypt. After he had in vain sought to satisfy his scientific aspirations with various teachers, he became, in his twenty-eighth year, a pupil of Ammonius, and remained such until the death of the latter. In order to become familiar with oriental wisdom, he is said to have taken part in the campaign of Gordian against Persia. In his fortieth year he founded his school in Rome, and remained at the head of it until his death (270 A.D.). The promise which he had made his master, to spread his teaching only orally, he is said to have first broken when he saw that his fellow-pupils, Herennius and Origen, had not kept theirs. Longinus also transgressed the commands of Ammonius. Porphry collected the twenty-one treatises which had been written before he came to Plotinus, as well as the thirty-three later ones, and arranged them according to their subject-matter in groups of nine (*Enneads*), indicating at the same time their chronological order. The Latin translation of Marsilius Ficino, in which Plotinus' works first appeared (1492), and the Greek edition of P. Bema (Basel, 1580), were for a long time the only editions. In 1825 Creuzer published the text, with the translation of Marsilios, in the Oxford edition of three quarto volumes, and in 1855, with the support of Moser, he had Didot of Paris issue a much cheaper and at the same time more correct reprint. The edition of Ad. Kirchhof, *Plotini opera recogn.* Lips., 1856, 2 vols., 8vo, much better meets the demands of philological criticism. In this the Greek text alone is given; the chronological order is restored, but at the same time the *Enneads* as well as the pages of the Oxford edition are indicated, so that it is easy to find a passage whenever it may be cited in the ordinary way. A praiseworthy attempt to arrange the treatises of Plotinus according to their subject-matter, and at the same time to preserve in so far as possible the chronological order,
has been made by Richter in the fourth instalment of the work mentioned above. His monograph on Plotinus is the best that we have.

2. Inasmuch as Plotinus does not, like Plato and Aristotle, approach his peculiar principle gradually, but grasps it immediately by intellectual intuition, and starts from it as from the surest of all things, he must necessarily urge still more strongly than his predecessors that that principle is absolutely unconditioned, is in no way relative. Unity, Being, Good, God, are the various expressions for this highest principle, which is touched neither by the Platonic categories, rest and motion, egoism and altruism, nor by the Aristotelian substance and accident; but is rather the ἑπερωτήστιν in which no opposition exists, not even of willing and being. It is because it wills, and it wills because it is. This πρῶτος θεός, who is not to be conceived of as transcendental, but so exists in all, and embraces all, that when he wills and loves himself he loves and wills all—this God is what Plato called at one time the Good, at another time God (Enn. iii. 8, vi. 8). As the expression, First God, indicates, Plotinus does not stop with this first principle. Although he does not mistake the difficulty which lies in the way of a procession of plurality from unity (v. i, 6), he yet attempts to solve it. Sometimes he proceeds in a strictly logical way, pointing out that plurality excluded from unity must on that very account be from it and outside of it; ordinarily, however, he conceives of the First as a producer which, in the same way that flame emits light and snow cold, sends forth from itself, neither unconsciously nor in a wholly arbitrary way, a Second as an eternally begotten. The expressly stated principle, that the second always contains less than the first (iii. 2, 7), makes his system contrary to every doctrine of evolution; makes it, that is, a system of emanation. The first decadence of being, the first begotten of God, is, according to Plotinus, the νοῦς, who, inasmuch as he proceeds from the One, but at the same time has the One as his true ground, and therefore object and end, becomes in this reflexive relation (ἐπιστροφή) a knowledge of the One; so that although the One itself does not think, nevertheless the one thinking it is to be designated as its εἰκών (v. i, 7). When, then, Plotinus characterises the thinking of the νοῦς as free and pure thinking, which has to do with itself alone, in distinction
from the unfree which busies itself with another, it is clear that the combination of Plato and Aristotle, derived from Ammonius, is so arranged by him that Plato's ἄγαθος occupies the first, the νοῦς of Aristotle the second place. If the former was of such a nature that none of the categories applied to it, the latter, on the contrary, the νοῦς, is said to be rest as well as motion, to combine in itself unity and difference. Each first one of these categories belongs to the νοῦς as thinking; each second one to it as the thing thought; and therefore it is no leap when the νοῦς becomes the content of all thought and of all types of things (v. 9, 6), in which content all conceptions are contained, as species in a genus; so that in it, as the κόσμος νοητός, all things, even the mortal and the temporal, exist in an eternal, ideal way (v. 8). The resemblance to Philo's doctrine (vid. § 114), as well as to Plato's, is striking at this point; only it must not be forgotten that in the latter every individual being has its idea. From the νοῦς proceeds now, as the third and therefore still more subordinate principle, the ψυχή, that is, the general life-principle or world-soul, a faded out copy of the νοῦς, working on that very account rationally but without reason, that is, in the way which Aristotle had called demoniacal (vid. § 88, 1). As thoughtless children work more outwardly than those who are absorbed in themselves, in the same way things fall as it were out of the general soul, which does not retain them for itself, but puts them to work at once (iii. 8, 3). In all natural occurrences there is therefore thought (θεωρία), that is, the ideas which the soul receives from the νοῦς, and which she sows or plants in matter, as λόγως σπερματικῶς. The intermediate position which is thus assigned to the soul causes Plotinus to speak often of an upper soul related to the νοῦς and of a lower one approaching matter, to which he gives the names of the heavenly and earthly Aphrodite, in accordance with his custom of employing myths. To the earthly Aphrodite he gives also the special name φιστίς.

3. The (Platonic) Good, the (Aristotelian) νοῦς, and the (Stoic) Universal Life, which is sometimes named Zeus, form what has been called the trinity of Plotinus, which actually approaches nearer than that of Philo to the Christian doctrine, in so far as the νοῦς is not only κόσμος νοητός, but also νοητὸς θεός, and the world is known not only as set in motion by an outside power, but as possessing inherent principles of motion.
Nevertheless the internal relations are those of emanation, and therefore subordination, and hence the difference remains very great. Plotinus does not succeed in overcoming those relations because he does not yet venture to put the negation, the ἐπερέτης, in God Himself. This makes it impossible for him to rise above not only the relation of subordination, but also the Platonic-Aristotelian dualism. It is true that matter, which he places over against God, is with him as little as with them a corporeal stuff. It is without qualities, without nature, unreal, the limit of being, the not-yet being, which is known only in the sense that darkness is seen, for whose knowledge a sort of ecstasy is necessary, etc. Indeed, Plotinus goes beyond Plato, since he looks upon space as something formed, and therefore matter as something still more abstract. He goes beyond Aristotle when he denies that matter is στέρημα (vid. inter al., ii. 4; iii. 6). But he, too, fails to reach the point of showing whence matter is. It must be regarded as a vacillation between dualism and monism, when at one time he conceives of matter as a lapse from being, at another time as postulated only by our thinking. He appears to avoid these extremes best when he says that the soul, not being able to endure the sight of emptiness, has helped out the poverty of matter. Here, however, the figurative expression proves his incapacity for consistent logical thought, apart from the fact that the question still remains: Whence that emptiness? It is of a piece with such indetermination that Plotinus comes to the defence of the beauty of the material world, upon which is based especially his polemic against Gnostics and Christians, and yet at the same time considers it a disgrace to be born, and conceals his birthday as a day of shame. The entrance of being into not-being is not comprehended, and therefore nothing remains but to bewail it.

4. But although the ground of it is concealed, the entrance has nevertheless taken place, and therefore among the hither-to considered principles there exists a gradation of natures, to whose consideration the Physics is devoted. A new proof of the subordination of Aristotle to Plato is the fact that the categories of the latter are held to have value in the realm of the intelligible; those of the former, on the contrary (their number being reduced), only in the realm of the physical. The highest grade of these beings is formed by the gods, the
lowest by inorganic natures in which life only slumbers. The
gods are the stars, whose souls swell in the contemplation of
the good, but whose bodies work upon the world surrounded
by them (i. 3, 9, cf. vi. 9, 8-9). Under them are the
demons, dwelling in sublunar space, among whom Plotinus
often reckons the popular gods (iii. 5, 6; ii. 9, 9). Finally,
the world penetrated with a rational soul (iv. 4, 27) bears in
addition to inorganic beings and to plants, in which λόγος
already appears, and in addition to beasts, in whom διάνοια
is seen, also man, a picture of the universe, the world in
miniature. As in all substances the form is the highest, so
also in man the soul, whose immortality is thoroughly dis-
cussed. Originally one with the universal soul it first became
bound to a particular part of the corporeal All by its ceasing
to contemplate the νοει alone, and beginning to think and
crave itself (iii. 9, 2). The act of incarnation therefore co-
icides with the attainment of individual consciousness; it is
freely willed, and at the same time it is punishment (v. 8, 7;
iv. 8, 4). With its entrance into the body the soul too is
seized by the revolution of the All to which it belongs as
a part. It cannot complain because it has itself chosen
its place there (iv. 3). Freedom and necessity are not at
strife here, for the lot of man is his self-chosen demon; the
part which each one plays in the drama of the world is en-
trusted to him because he has wished it (iii. 2). The descent
of the soul into the earthly body takes place moreover gradu-
ally, so that it binds itself first (as divine) to the heavenly
body, then (as demoniacal) to the fine atmospheric body,
finally (in the incarnation) to the coarse earthly body (iv. 3).
In consequence of this union man is a complex, κόσμος, whose
body is a part of the corporeal All, and whose soul is related
to the universal soul, be it as species to genus or as a part to
the whole, and who moreover with his highest element, the
νοει, reaches beyond nature, indeed, beyond the universal soul,
even to heaven (iv. 7). The relation of these three princi-
pies, which are often called directly the first, second, and third
man (vi. 7, 6), forms the chief content of the Plotinian
psychology. The body, which is a part of the All, and stands
in sympathy with it (iv. 5, 3), makes the soul, which without
it would live entirely within the rational sphere, into a nutri-
tive, sensitive, and in every way lower one. In it, as the bond
between body and spirit, the impressions of the senses meet
the ideas which stream into the spirit, the ideas of which the νοῦς had been the content, and which we discern when we consider the latter. From this double relation, in which the soul stands toward the external world and toward the νοῦς, result three spheres, the lowest or sensuous soul, whose highest function is the φαντασία (iv. 3, 99), the intermediate or properly human soul, to which reflexion belongs, διάνοια and λογιζομαι, by virtue of which not only the lower δόξα, but also πίστις and science originate (i. 1, 7 and 3, 4; v. 8, 7); finally, the highest part of the soul, that with which it attains to heaven, that is, to the νοῦς. In virtue of this participation in the νοῦς man raises himself to the immediate, motionless contemplation of ideas, and possesses in this what reflexion and science strive after (iv. 4, 12), is pure νοεῖν or φρόνησις, and grasps the eternal in immediate contact (vi. 8, 11; i. 2, 6). But if now the intermediate sphere, the λόγος, to which λογιζομαι belongs, is at the same time the proper seat of self-consciousness, it follows that there is unconscious knowledge which is higher than conscious. This appears in moments of ecstasy, when the self-activity of the soul entirely ceases, and the soul completely becomes the ideas which it contemplates, the material for the νοῦς which acts in it (iv. 4, 2). In these moments of ecstasy the soul contemplates the One, not as something strange or external, but as in itself, and rests in it, inasmuch as it loses itself in complete union with it, a condition which goes beyond all reason and science (vi. 9; v 5, et al.).

5. It is this elevation to the inner or spiritual man which the Ethics of Plotinus represents as the end of all conduct. Evil does not consist in being material, but in inner dependence upon matter. Therefore the highest end, the freedom from matter, is not attained by suicide as the Stoics think. The soul on account of its material inclinations would immediately enter again into a form of material existence, since it is only what it thinks, and only as it thinks (i. 9). True freedom exists when the dominion of the lower (material) man is broken and the higher man comes into power. This takes place first through the subjection to the reason of the desires and affections which have been called forth in the soul by the body. Since this was the Platonic conception of virtue, Plotinus agrees completely with Plato as far as the four cardinal virtues are concerned. In one point only does
he disagree with the latter, in the fact, namely, that those virtues which he calls also political, are for him only the first step in the solution of the ethical problem (i. 2, 7). We are brought much nearer the proper end, a likeness to the Deity (ομοόσιος), by ascetic purifications (καθάρσεις), which are aimed not so much at the regulation as at the rooting out of the struggle (i. 1, 2). In the ἀπάθεια exists the true likeness to God, and it is at the same time freedom, for only the νοῦς is free and self-contained (ἐφ' ἕαυτον), and only he who has taken the νοῦς as his divinity (i. 2, 3; iii. 4, 6). Not in the fact that man lives in accordance with nature, for plants also do that, but in the fact that the νοῦς rules in him, consists his true blessedness (i. 4, 1–4). With Plotinus, however, the theoretical side of blessedness is much more prominent than the practical. It is not conduct which makes blessed, but possession, thought and inner activity. The last end is and remains the contemplation of the eternal. All practice is for the sake of theory, (iii. 8), and the wise man is blessed in his self-proficiency, even if no one should see his blessedness. He has grasped the eternal, and in that satisfies himself, and no loss nor pain touches him. Whoever still fears anything is not yet complete in true virtue (i. 4). Of the three ways which lead to this end those of the erotic poet and musician need a sign-post, that of the dialectician or philosopher is surer (i. 3), leading as it does from the external and material to the inner and spiritual, namely to the contemplation of ideas. But since the νοῦς, which embraces the ideas, is not the highest, there goes beyond νοεῖν and philosophy love for the One and the Good, in comparison with which even dominion over the world is to be thrown away as nothing (vi. 7; i. 6). Retirement from the whole external world is necessary for the attainment of this standpoint. We must wait quietly until God comes, or rather until He shows that He does not need to come, since He has always been in us (v. 5, 8). We must believe in this illumination, in which, daring as it sounds, the contemplated and the contemplating become one, so that ecstasy, devotion, actual union take the place of contemplation of another (v. 3, 14; vi. 9, 10). In this union consists true blessedness, which cannot be interrupted by death. As thinking of the material makes the soul material, so that the one who can think only of vegetation condemns himself to the life of the plant (iii. 4, 2), in the same way the one who forgets
the earthly and attains to complete inwardness, being raised, as more than an individual man, above all change, will live to the All and to the One (v. 8, 7). As already here below, the more perfect a man is the more does he forget fatherland, friends, etc., in that condition he will still more have forgotten all, yea, even himself (iv. 4, 1; i. 5, 8). There nothing will disturb or interrupt the contemplation of the One; time will vanish in eternity, and blessedness become pure presence (vi. 9; i. 5).

6. Among those who, with Plotinus, represent Roman Neo-Platonism, Amelius, Eustochius, and others sink into insignificance when compared with Malchus, who was born in Phœnicia (in Tyre or Batanea), in the year 232. While he was in attendance upon the school of Longinus, he had changed his name into the Greek form Porphyry. In his thirtieth year he became a pupil of Plotinus, later his biographer and the editor of his works, and after his death taught in Rome until the year 304. Besides his Life of Plotinus, with which he accompanied his edition of the works of his master, we have from his pen a Life of Pythagoras, which is perhaps a fragment of a lost history of philosophy. It has been often printed, among others by Didot in his edition of Diogenes Laertes. His critical spirit, which had been still more sharpened in the school of Longinus, caused him to differ with his master whenever the latter appeared to be uncritical.

He therefore came to the defence of the categories of Aristotle, and wrote (perhaps before he came to Plotinus), his Ἐισαγωγή ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε φωνῶν (reprinted in many editions of Aristotle's Organon), in which are treated the five conceptions (later called Praedicabilia and also Universalia), γένος, διάφορα, εἴδος, ἵδιον and συμβεβηκός, and from which particularly two points are brought into especial prominence in the following age: first, the so-called Arbor Porphyrii, that is the gradation from the most general (γενικῶτατος) conception of the oustia, through the subordinate conceptions σώμα, ἐμφάνισις, etc., down to the eidiκώτατον (ἀνθρωπός), and finally to the ἄτομον (Πλάτων), since which it has been the custom of logic to repeat, that ens is the highest of all conceptions. The second point referred to is the fact that at the outset of the work it is mentioned, as a very important problem, not however to be solved here, whether species and genera are something actual outside of ourselves or are mere ideas; further, if something actual, whether corporeal or incorporeal; finally, if
incorporeal whether χωριστῆ, or existing only in things. The answer to the first question would have shown the relation of Porphyry to the Epicurean sensualists, to the second his relation to the Stoics, to the third his relation to Plato and to Aristotle. The way in which he answered the first and second can be gathered from the climax which the three form. The problem stated by him plays a very important part in subsequent ages (vid. infra § 158 ff.). Though Porphyry in this introduction shows himself more closely related to Aristotle than his master was, he nevertheless agrees entirely with the latter in his Αἱ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἀφορμαί (first printed in the Latin paraphrase of Marcilio Ficino; later, in Greek, with most completeness in the Paris edition of Creuzer’s Plotinus), which contain an extract from Plotinus’ doctrine of spirits. In regard to religion also they agree perfectly, as appears from Porphyry’s transformation of the Homeric myths into logical processes, and further from his attacks, not only upon the Gnostics, but upon the Christians in general. The thirty-two chapters of his Homeric Studies (Venet., Ald., 1521), as well as the allegorical interpretation of a Homeric passage in the Nymphis Grotto, are still extant. The fifteen books against the Christians, on the contrary, have entirely vanished, in consequence of the fact that by command of Theodosius II. they were diligently hunted out and destroyed, and also because of the loss of the replies of Methodius and Eusebius. A few unimportant patristic notices alone remain. Porphyry’s religion, like that of Plotinus, was above all ethical, and had, when compared with contemporary phenomena, a purely Greek character. To this is due his polemics against the theurgic tendency which was pressing itself forward, and with which was combined a Platonism perverted by Egyptian, magical and other elements. As a result he composed late in life his Epistle to the Egyptian Priest Anebon, which called forth the reply to be mentioned below.

B.—JAMBLICHUS AND THE SYRIAN NEO-PLATONISM.

§ 129.

1. JAMBLICHUS, of Chalcis in Cælesyria, distinguished alike for his learning and his genius, is connected not so much with the more philological Platonists, such as Plutarch, as with the mathematically educated Neo-Pythagoreans. He introduced into Neo-Platonism, not without the influence of oriental ideas, a speculation in which mathematics and mystics are mingled in a peculiar manner, and which led him to a bitter criticism of Amelius and Porphyry. On this account many ascribe to him a work which was first noticed by Marcilio Ficino in a Latin report: De mysteriis Αἰγυπτiorum, and afterwards published in the Greek original by Gale. In this work a priest Abamon, espoused the cause of his pupil Anebon, to whom Porphyry had written. Jamblichus is hardly the author. Of his numerous undoubted works the most are lost; thus his commentaries on the Platonic Dialogues, of which we know only through Proclus, and likewise his commentary on the Analyticon of Aristotle. All that is extant seems to belong to one larger work, the first book of which, περὶ βίου Πυθαγορικοῦ, was first edited in 1598 by Arcenus Theodoretus. This was followed by a second book, the λόγοι προτρεπτικοὶ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, which contains a mixture of Platonic and Pythagorean doctrines. It was also edited by the same man, and later and much better by Kiessling. The third book, περὶ κοινῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης, has been edited by Fries (Copenhagen), as well as by others; the fourth, περὶ τῆς Νικομάχου ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς, by Tennulius, 1668; and the seventh Θεολογοῦμενα τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς, best of all by Ast, Leipsic, 1817.

2. The unlimited respect with which Jamblichus is called master, not only by less weighty men, such as Chrysanthius and Maximus, the teachers and friends of the emperor Julian, and by the emperor himself, but also by Proclus, testifies to the importance of the man. In fact, the greater part of that which appears in Proclus as an addition to the teachings of Plotinus, was learned from Jamblichus; and this has been overlooked merely because it could be discovered, in the absence of Jamblichus’ works, only by close attention to every
hint of Proclus. (Kirchner has bestowed upon the subject the attention required.) As the most important innovations of Jamblichus, must be regarded the detailed execution of a logical process moving in triads, which will be noticed in connection with Proclus (§ 130), and in the second place, his theory of the orders of gods, which has made him especially famous, and which for a long time was a favourite doctrine, particularly with those who fought Christianity on philosophical grounds. When, according to Plotinus, the soul had participated in the νοῦς, and this in the One or the Good, Jamblichus believed that this participation itself disturbed the unity, and he raised himself, therefore, to the thought of the still more abstract ἀμεθέκτων, and assumed still further such an absolute supra-mundane (ὑπερούσιος) unity (ἐν αὐτός). These unities are in the highest sense his gods. Inasmuch, however, as he then always distinguishes the individual elements of a conception according to the scheme of trinity, he is led to discriminate, in correspondence with the three conceptions νοῦς, ψυχή, and φύσις, between θεοὶ νοεροί, ὑπερκόσμιοι, and ἐγκόσμιοι, which stand, as actual gods, below the ἐνας ἀμεθέκτως. This entire series of gods is so placed above the series fixed by Plotinus (One, Spirit, Soul, Nature), that everything is really thought twice, —once in the reality of the present, and again in the supra-reality of the future.

3. Among the successors of Jamblichus, Theodorus seems to have gone still further in the threefold division, and to have given offence to the others by an altered terminology. The most of Jamblichus’ followers seem, however, to have been won much less by his scientific importance than by the fact that he attempted, in his work on the statues of the gods, as well as elsewhere, to furnish a philosophical basis for the belief in magical influences, in the power of theurgy, etc, which then ruled everywhere, even among the Christians. The modern age also has often noticed and blamed in Jamblichus only this weakness, which was common to the whole period in which he lived.
C.—NEO-PLATONISM IN ATHENS.—PROCLUS.

§ 130.

1. In Athens, where, since the time of Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius, the various schools of Greek philosophy had been continued under teachers paid by the State, Plutarch, the son of Nestorius, founded, in addition to the State schools, a private institute, where he commented upon both Plato and Aristotle, according to the method of Ammonius and of the more philological Neo-Platonists. His successor, Syrianus, leaned more toward the Neo-Pythagoreans, treating both philosophers, particularly Aristotle, as a mere preparation for the true wisdom, which is especially proclaimed in the Orphica. Proclus, or Proculus, a pupil of the former, though only for a short time, and a member and very soon an assistant in the school of the latter, was the man through whom Neo-Platonism received its highest formal development,—a work for which his entire training had fitted him. Born in Byzantium, in the year 412, he was brought at an early age to Lycia, and there prepared for the rhetorical profession. He then continued his studies in Alexandria, and won great fame as a rhetorician and a master of style. The Aristotelian Olympiodorus induced him to give up this calling and mathematics and philosophical studies then became his sole pursuit. The analytical investigations of Aristotle, whose Organon he is said to have known by heart, especially fascinated him. As long as he lived he called Aristotle, as well as Plato, "the divine." With the latter he first became acquainted in Athens, where, as remarked above, he first had Plutarch as his teacher, and Syrianus as assistant in his studies. He became the successor of the latter, to whom, according to some, is to be referred his cognomen Διάδωξις, while others refer it to Plato. In addition to Plato, whose exegete and paraphrast he remained until his death, he assigned to the Orphica, and to the other productions of the Neo-Pythagorean spirit, a very high rank. At the same time he was initiated into all sorts of mysteries, and fostered his glowing piety by the celebration of festivals of all kinds, so that he boasts himself a hierophant of the whole world. This has reference only to pre-Christian religions, for Christianity he hated and fought. An excuse for
this may be found in the fact that in his day Christianity had assumed the rôle of persecutor, and it was perhaps due only to the monophysite controversies that he himself was left in peace. Before the death of this θεοσβέστατος ἰωάν (as the bombastic biography of Marinus calls him), which took place in his seventy-third year, it is said to have been revealed to him that he belonged to the hermetic chain of bearers of mystical wisdom. In addition to his hymns in honour of various gods, and his mathematical and grammatical works (the latter of disputed authenticity), Proclus produced much of a philosophical character, for the most part in the form of commentaries upon Plato, where he shows himself most of a philosopher when his interpretation is worst. Cousin's Procli philosophi Platonici opera (Paris, 1820) contain his commentaries upon Timæus, Alcibiades, and Parmenides, also his (youthful) works upon Fate and Providence in the Latin translation of Wilhelm von Moerbecka. Entirely independent works are his Στοιχείωσις θεολογική, and the six books εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος θεολογίαν, which have been edited by Ἀξιλίους Πορτός (Hamb., 1618). The former work (Institutio theologica) contains an outline of Neo-Platonism as represented by Plotinus, and is therefore given quite suitably in Didot's edition of Creuzer's Plotinus. On the other hand, the second work (Theologia Platonica) contains the changes made by Jamblichus which Proclus adopts. In these two works, therefore; the elements appear sundered which Proclus was destined to combine, and on that very account, in spite of his dependence upon both, he represents a third tendency in Neo-Platonism.

2. That Proclus calls science theology cannot be looked upon as a departure from Plotinus; and his frequent use of ἐν instead of ἐνωσίς is only a verbal difference, and that all the more since ἐν, ἀγαθὸν likewise occur. On the other hand, it is an actual variation when, with Jamblichus, he takes the first principle itself as a trinity, representing, in agreement with the Philebus of Plato, the ἀπεριον and πέρας as bound in concrete union, by means of which concretion absolute unity becomes the content of all unities, Deity the content of the gods. These three elements, of course, do not stand toward one another in a relation of deterioration, but show rather an evolution, since the third is the highest. On the other hand, according to Proclus as well as Plotinus, that, in consequence,
of which the second proceeds from the first (trinitarian) principle, is a deterioration (ὑφεσις). As to its relation, the second has as predicate what the first is; but it is a general rule that having is lower than being (Theol. Plat., 130). Proclus seeks to make clear to himself the necessity of this πρόδοσος, and employs for that purpose a hint given by Plotinus, namely, that since unity excludes plurality, the latter must stand over against the former; the negation of plurality which lies in unity is not to be conceived as στερητική, but as γεννητική (Theol. Plat., 108). Being, as the predicate of all, stands naturally before and above all. Since, however, life as well as being belong to the νοῦς, the ζωή (as Plotinus himself has pointed out) must be placed before the latter, and thus obtains here the second place. This, too, must be thought of again as a system (διάκοσμος), therefore as a triad, in which δύναμις and ἐπαργία are the elements which unite themselves in the ζωή νοετή. As Plato was the guide in the first triad, Aristotle is in the second. The νοῦς then follows life as the third principle. It is intelligible, after the way in which Aristotle and Plotinus had thought of the νοῦς, that the three elements in this should be given as μένειν, προείναι, and ἐπιστρεφέω; still more so, when we think of what Jamblichus had taught. These three triads, which reveal to the initiated, that is, in a mystical way, the life of God, and which are sometimes designated as God, most godlike, godlike, contain the content of all true being; the first ὄντος, the second ζωτικός, the third νοερός. The content of the unities is therefore brought into connection with the gods, the content of the life-principles with the demons, and finally the system of the νοῦς with the spirit world. As Jamblichus had united the number four with the trinities, for the purpose of bringing out the number seven, Proclus does the same, and thereby the twelve gods obtain their rights, although they remain always subordinate gods. If we compare the teaching of Proclus, as we did (§ 128, 3) that of Plotinus, with the Christian doctrine of the trinity, the greater resemblance will be seen to lie, not in the fact that Proclus assigns to the spirit the third place, but in the fact that he is at the point of dropping emanation (ὑφεσις), and thus the relation of subordination. He says often (e.g. Theol. Plat., 142) that in the three triads the three elements of the νοῦς repeat themselves, as also the three of the ὄν. If this were carried out, the νοῦς would have to be thought of as the highest, and
thus deterioration give place to advancement, emanation to evolution. This, however, does not take place. These remarks are isolated gleams of thought, and the ἐνοσίς is always treated as by far the highest in the system.

3. In *Physics* Proclus differs very little with Plotinus. Like him, he agrees with Aristotle, that in every being matter and form are united. The Platonic distinction between the temporal, the sempiternal, and the eternal, which corresponds with the Aristotelian division of theoretical philosophy (*vid. § 85, 3*), is adopted by Proclus, and connected with the distinction between the somatic, psychic, and intellectual (pneumatic). The former stands under fate, the latter under providence. The soul has the power to place itself under fate or under providence, according as it becomes bad by a leaning toward the one, or good by a leaning toward the other.

4. With Proclus also the highest ethical aim is the apprehension of the divine. None of the four Platonic-Aristotelian degrees of knowledge is sufficient to reach this. The divine must be experienced, grasped with the entire essence (ὑπάρχεις) of the soul. The latter, in going into itself and burying itself in its own ἀδύναμος, grasps God who lives in it. This moving in the hidden man is called enthusiasm, also holy frenzy. Since the knowledge of self and the contemplation of God are treated in the Platonic *Alcibiades*, this dialogue is valued very highly by Proclus. But with him the μανία, also called πίστις, which rests not upon reason, but upon immediate inspiration, holds the highest place. This is in striking contrast with the Platonic and Aristotelian statements, but so much the less in contrast with what the apostle says of divine foolishness and of the certainty of that which is not seen. This certainty is to be increased through appeals to the gods, and through theurgic practices, which Proclus honours perhaps more than Jamblichus and the author of the Egyptian mysteries, while his true dependence upon Plato associates him with Plotinus; and in his respect for Aristotle he surpasses the two former as well as the latter. In him Neo-Platonism reached its culmination. This remains true even if the mental endowments and the originality of Plotinus, as well as of Jamblichus, be ranked above his.

5. Besides Proclus are to be named his biographer Marinus, and in addition to him Isidorus, Zenodotus, and Damas-
cius, men without originality, who transmitted, commented upon, or at most spun out what their predecessors had produced, until they made it ridiculous. When Justinian, in the year 529, closed the schools of philosophy through anxiety for the Christian doctrine, he did not realize that if he had let them continue, the anti-Christian philosophy would not have been in the least dangerous, because it would have perished of itself, but, being compelled to emigrate toward the Orient, it would, centuries afterward, exercise an influence upon Christian thought more powerful than he had ever feared.

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THIRD DIVISION.

The Church Fathers.


§ 131.

The Christian community, grown strong in its retired position, is able to pass on to a second mission without ceasing to stand in a negative attitude toward the world, in which attitude we found above (§ 119) the distinguishing characteristic of the Middle Ages. This second mission is the attack and the subjugation of the world. To this end, however, it is necessary that it place itself upon a level with its opponent and exist as an institution recognised by the world, and in so far worldly. It must become first of all, therefore, a Church. What the early Congregation does not have and does not need, is inseparable from the conception of the Church; namely, a doctrinal formula by means of which the conceptions, orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and heresy may obtain a fixed meaning. For the apostolic activity, which embraced only the preaching of salvation, scientific confirmation and the help of worldly power would have been unnecessary, indeed a hindrance; but for the transformation of the κήρυγμα into a δόγμα, science is needed; for the introduction of the δόγμα as a valid statute, the help of the State; and if the statute is to rule everywhere (i.e. be catholic), the aid of the universal
State. By means of these two agencies the congregation becomes the Church, or the Church as such takes its rise. Those who assist in this transformation are therefore rightly designated as (co-) producers, or Fathers of the Church. The position of mother was occupied by the State.

§ 132.

The formation of dogma, the transformation of history into eternal truth as such, takes place by means of philosophy; and those who accomplish this transformation are philosophers. From this, however, it does not follow that the dogmas are philosophical propositions. From the latter they are distinguished,—to leave out of consideration the sanction which the highest authority of the congregation gives to them,—by the fact that they express only the result, not at the same time the process; therefore they are only assertions, not arguments. Inasmuch as the Church Fathers always make the historical revelation their starting-point, and proceed thence to the eternal truth which follows from it, their relation to history is at the same time positive and negative. These points of contact with the Gnostics as well as with the (Neo-Platonic) philosophers, which are at the same time points of difference, have obtained for them the name of the true Gnostics, the genuine philosophers, and at the same time explain the fact that they lean upon both and attack both. It can scarcely be asserted that without the Gnostic identification of the theogonic, cosmogonic and incarnation process, the congregation would have come to the point of maintaining so energetically that God is not inanimate and indifferent to the fate of the world. Likewise only the enthusiasm for the world felt by their heathen models prevented them from conceiving of the temporal as one with evil, a conception to which their ascetic disposition rendered them very liable.

§ 133.

Inasmuch as the point is to fix the content which is to be regarded as true, the Church Fathers must naturally lean upon that philosophy which had come nearest, as far as its content is concerned, to the Christian ideas. This is in practice eclectically moderated Stoicism, in theory the eclecticism and Neo-
Platonism which proceeded from Alexandria. There is therefore no inconsistency to be seen in the fact that at this time mistrust toward the Anti-Platonists prevails, and the word "Peripatetic" passes for an heretical designation, while a thousand years later the state of things is exactly reversed. It is the true discernment which assigns to different ages different missions. This fine sense for that which is premature or untimely, and for that which is adapted to the age, must be considered more than anything else,—often indeed more than the content of the condemned doctrines itself,—in connection with the way in which the contemporary and later Church judges a person. Slowly and as it were hesitatingly does the Church give up her distrustful attitude toward science. At first she endures it as a necessity, when it seems the only means of defending the congregation against attacks of all sorts. The Apologists for Christianity against Judaism, heathenism, and heresy are therefore the first in whom philosophy is permitted and not branded as heresy.


§ 134.

1. The first to be mentioned in this connection, and at the same time the most important, is Justin, the philosopher and martyr (103–167). Justin's works were first edited by Rob. Stephanus in 1551, and since then very frequently, among others by Prudent. Maranus, Paris, 1742, and by Otto, Jena, 1842, in 3 vols. (also in his edition of the Apologists mentioned above). In J. P. Migne's Patrologiae cursus completus they fill the sixth volume of the Patr. græc. Among the writings ascribed to him, the two Apologies and the Dialogue with the Jew, Trypho, are certainly from his hand. The former are apologies for Christianity, addressed to the emperors Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius, in which the author, who had been educated in the Stoic and Platonic philosophy and had afterwards become a Christian, refutes the slanders against the doctrine and the life of the Christians, and displays, on the other side, the theoretical and practical weakness of heathenism. The impossibility that the Unbegotten, the Underived is not One, is placed over against
polytheism. At the same time, Justin is far from wholly denying to the heathen, and especially to the philosophers, the possession of truth. He sees in Socrates a revelation of the Logos. He calls Plato, and even Heraclitus, like the pious Jews Abraham and Elias, Christians, and ranks them together also because the Greek philosophers have known the sacred books of the Jews. In the third work the non-observance of the Jewish ritual is especially defended, as well as the doctrine,—so offensive to the Jews,—of the death of Christ upon the cross. The doctrine of the Divine Logos, which works in every rational being and became flesh in Christ, the doctrine, further, of the Fall, which proceeded from the freedom of the will, and the doctrine of Original Sin resulting from the fall, and finally the doctrine of the New Birth, are developed, the first two according to the principles of Platonism, the last in close agreement with Stoicism. Inasmuch as the genesis of the Son, while placed indeed before the creation, is yet not decisively conceived as eternal, and inasmuch as the Holy Spirit is put even below the angels, there exists in Justin's trinity a relation of sub-ordination which resembles the doctrine of Plato at least as closely as it does the later Catholic doctrine. Likewise, in his doctrine of the ἄνω, he does not go beyond Platonic dualism. The later Church, however, balances against such divergencies the fact that his Apologies were adapted to the age, and that he suffered martyrdom as a result of the second one.

Cf. Semisch: Justin der Märtyrer. 2 vols. Breslau, 1840, 42.

2. Intellectually related to Justin is Athenagoras, whose apology, addressed to Marcus Aurelius, and whose work upon the resurrection are found in Maranus' edition of Justin's works, and in Otto's Corpus Apologetarum, as well as elsewhere. The former work was first published by Petrus Nannius in Paris and in Lyons in 1541, the latter by Rob. Stephanus in Paris in 1551. The former seeks to prove from the conception of self-existence that monotheism is the only rational religion. At the same time it is shown that the doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit is not in conflict with monotheism, while polytheism rests upon a confounding of God and matter, which has been fostered by the deceit of demons. Like Justin, Athenagoras sees in the teachings of the philosophers the activity of the Divine Logos.
philosophers, however, thought that they had themselves found the truth, while the prophets and apostles knew that they were only like mouthpieces for the breath of God. In the work upon the resurrection the leading thought is, that man is not soul alone, that a mass of faults and of virtues presuppose the bodily element, and that reward and punishment must have reference to the whole man.

§ 135.

1. Related to the writers already named, whose apologies are especially directed toward influencing the powers of the State, are those who are led to defend Christianity on account of scientific attacks made upon it. Among these a worthy place is occupied by Theophilus, who wrote three books against Autolycus, a scientifically educated heathen. He was born a heathen, and died in the year 186 as Bishop of Antioch. (His work was first published by C. Gesner in Zürich in 1546, and since then frequently, among others by Prud. Maranus, 1742, and by Otto in his Corpus Apol.) The doctrine of the Trinity in God, here for the first time designated as Trias, further the doctrine of the λόγος ενδιάθετος and προφορικός are very ably defended. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit, however, is very indefinite, since the Spirit is at one time coordinated with wisdom, at another time distinguished from the latter. On the other hand, an essential advance upon Justin's dualism is to be recognised in the fact that the source, whence things were created, is no longer called υἱὸς ὄντων, but οὐκ ὄντα.

2. Irenæus, who was a pupil of Polycarp, and was executed as Bishop of Lyons in the year 202, defends the Christian doctrine, in partial dependence upon Theophilus, not so much against heathen philosophy, as against the Gnostic heresies which had proceeded from the latter. His principal work, Against the falsely so-called Gnosis, in five books, is extant only in an ancient, verbally faithful, Latin translation (Adversus hæreses, first published by Erasmus in Basel in 1526, since then frequently, among others by Massuet in 1710, and latest by Stieren, Leizp., 1853, in 2 vols. [still better by Harvey: S. Irenæi libros quinque adversus Hæreses. Cambr., 1857, in 2 vols.—Tr.]. In Migne, vol. vii.). Although in his argumentation he appeals chiefly to Scripture vol. I.
and tradition, he does not despise reasoning, for the purpose of showing the unenableness of the Gnostic doctrines of the Æons, which he compares with the heathen theogonies, and for the purpose of exhibiting the correctness of apostolic teaching.

3. Of a pupil of Irenæus, Hippolytus, who suffered martyrdom as Bishop of Portus Romanus, no more was known for a long time than the fact that he had written a work against all heresies, in which the composition of Irenæus had been used. Bunsen (Hippolytus und seine Zeit, Leipz., 1852) has proved that the Philosophumena which were formerly ascribed to Origen form the first book of this Ἐλεγχος, and that the books published by Ern. Miller in 1851 form the last six. There are wanting only the second, third, and half of the fourth book, in which, as in the first, the Greek systems were exhibited from which the heretics were said to have drawn. In the last book Hippolytus' own opinions are set forth. The principal points are the doctrine of the one God, to whom the four elements do not stand in opposition, but to whom they rather owe their origin, and the doctrine of the Logos, who is at one time in God, and then expresses, as a revealing voice, the thoughts contained in Him, and finally appears in visible form. (The best edition of Hippolytus is that of Dunker and Schneideewin, Götting., 1830.)

4. At about the same time that these apologetico-polemical works were composed in Greek, Minucius Felix, a Roman Jurist, wrote a Latin work, which describes the conversion of the heathen Caecilius by the agency of the Christian Octavius. The author, who had been educated in Stoicism and had afterward become a Christian, defends Christian opinions, taking his stand mainly upon their moral character. This and the euhemeristic interpretation of polytheism the later Latin apologists, to be mentioned below, have borrowed from him. His Octavius was published first in Heidelberg in 1560, since then frequently (e.g. Zürich, 1836, Vienna, 1867). Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus (born at Carthage in the year 160) is the first to draw from him. His temperament and position as convert caused him often to exchange apology for polemics, and to condemn, like all else that is heathen, philosophy, with whose weapons nevertheless he himself often fights. At first he contends against Gnostic heresies, then, in the interest of Montanism,
against Catholic doctrine. Oehler's edition of his works in 3 vols. (Leipz., 1853) is the most important. His countryman Thasius Cæcilius Cyprianus, who was likewise born a heathen and suffered martyrdom in the year 258 as Bishop of Carthage, follows, full of respect toward his "Master." In his apologetico-polemical productions he imitates Minucius Felix and Tertullian closely, but he is of particular importance in connection with the constitution of the Church. His works, often printed, have been most recently published by Hartel in 3 vols. (Vienna, 1868–71). Arnobius, who lived half a century later, was likewise an African. His work Adversus nationes Libri VII., has been published by Oehler (Leipz., 1846) and others. It impresses one often with the feeling that it was rather the untenableness of heathenism which alienated the author from it, than the glory of Christianity which won him. Firmianus Lactantius, according to Jerome a pupil of Arnobius, although he studied in Africa, was of Italian birth, which made it easier for him to earn the name of "the Christian Cicero." None of his contemporaries in fact approaches him in elegance of style. His works have been published many times. The most important are the Divinarum institutionum Libri VII. The first edition of the Institutes (in venerabili monasterio Sublacensi) appeared in 1465, fol. Among recent editions is to be mentioned Firmiani Lactantii Opera ed. O. F. Fritzsche, Lips., 1842–44.


§ 136.

Not only during particular persecutions and attacks, but continually, on account of their calling, the teachers of the Catechetical School of Alexandria had cause to represent the Christian doctrine as in accord with reason. Like Pantænus, who is commonly designated as the first of the line, his great pupil Clement (called Alexandrinus, to distinguish him from the Roman Clement), was born a heathen, but early in life became a Christian. In the year 187 he became the successor of Pantænus, and died about 217. His works were first published in Greek and Latin by Petrus Victorius, in Florence, in 1550, better by Fr. Sylburg in Heidelberg
in 1592, and by Dan. Heinsius in Leyden in 1616, and still better by John Potter in Oxford in 1715. In Migne's Patrologia grec. they fill vols. 8 and 9. His λόγος προτρεπτικός, or Cohortatio ad gentes, seeks to demonstrate the irrationality of heathenism. Its continuation, the Παυδαγωγός, shows the true guide to virtue to be Christ, who under the old dispensation had led by fear, but under the new by love. Finally, the third and most important, the Στροματεῖς in eight books, seeks to show that Christianity is the highest philosophy, and that the Greek philosophy, like the Jewish law, is related to it as a fragment. Belief in the revelation (πίστις) is conceived as the root, knowledge (γνώσις) as the crown; and the means of attaining to the latter is the comprehension (ἐπιστήμη) of that which is believed. The true Gnosis is distinguished from the false by the fact that it produces fruits of morality and true brotherly love, but does not therefore look down upon belief with contempt. Nor is it inconsistent with this, that he assigns to it superiority over belief, which he often compares to the "persuasion" and "wonder" of Plato, and thus identifies it with his "true opinion" (vid. § 76, 2). As to the content of this true Gnosis, life and motion are assigned to God without identifying the process of world-growth with that of divine growth. A great many points of contact are to be seen, not only with Gnosticism, but also with the teaching of Numenius (vid. § 127) and of Plotinus.


§ 137.

1. That Origen (185–254), a pupil of Clement, probably also one of Ammonius Saccas' listeners, does not bear so good a reputation for orthodoxy as his teacher, is not to be explained by the content of his doctrine, for he agrees much better with later Catholic teaching than Justin Martyr does, nor by the fact that Arius has borrowed extensively from him, for this is far out-balanced by the circumstance that very prominent heretics were converted by him, e.g. Beryll of Bostra, and that Dionysius the Great and Gregory the Miracle-worker, were his personal pupils and honoured him highly, and that Athanasius owes much to his works. It is to be explained rather by the fact that he was the first
who, led by his own inner impulse, attempted to represent the Gospel as a system of doctrines. From the Catholic standpoint, therefore, his youthful work upon the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion ranks far below his later apologetic-polemic work against Celsus (in eight books). The former, in four books, is extant only in the very free translation of Rufinus. After a number of his writings had been separately published, the first complete edition of Origen’s works was issued by Merlin in Paris in 1512. The edition of Huet, begun in 1668, was never finished, but contains a very valuable introduction by the editor. The Greek and Latin edition of the Benedictine de la Rue, 1733–39, fills four folio volumes. Lommatzsch published a reprint of it in Berlin, in 25 vols., 1831–47. In Migne’s Patr. græc. vols. 11–17 are devoted to Origen. The greater part of his works (which are said to have been six thousand in number) have disappeared.

2. The fact that Origen, in addition to the historical sense of Scripture, which he calls the somatic, accepts not only a moral sense (psychic), as Philo does, but also a speculative (pneumatic) sense, puts him in a position to constitute, in addition to the πίστις, a γνώσις, and nevertheless to combat the perverted interpretations of the heretical Gnostics. The series just mentioned shows that the theoretical side of religion lay nearest his heart, and similarly his conversions consisted for the most part in the refutation of doubts. In the doctrine of God, as well as elsewhere, he holds fast, in agreement with the great philosophers of antiquity, to the superiority of definiteness over indefiniteness, and therefore constitutes limits to the Divine omnipotence. In the doctrine of the Trinity he makes an advance upon Justin, in considering the genesis of the Son as eternal, and the Holy Spirit as raised above all creatures; and yet even he does not wholly overcome the relation of subordination. As regards the revelation of God ad extra, Origen teaches, not indeed the eternity of the present world, but the previous existence of many other worlds, so that the creative activity of God has never had a beginning. At the same time he maintains decisively that God found no existing material, but created all from nothing. The spirits, created before all other beings, have fallen, and have been placed, according to the degree of their guilt, in various spheres of existence, some as souls in human bodies.
(In place of the separate fall of each soul, was put later that of the entire race, which it is difficult, it is true, to combine with the pre-existence of individual spirits.) Material existence is therefore not the ground but the accompaniment of sin. Christ, with whose soul, likewise pre-existent, the Logos is joined, becomes flesh in order to give Himself to Satan by His death as a ransom for man. His work is appropriated through belief, which alone justifies, but which has holy works as its fruit. At the same time, belief is never thought of as only a personal relation to Christ, but always as membership in the community of believers. As all are destined for this community, it appears to Origen to be a failure of the Divine purpose if a restoration of all things does not bring all into the right way. Even the last enemy will be destroyed, not in substance, but only so that he will cease to be an enemy of God.


3. A half-century after Origen, Methodius suffered martyrdom. He was a bitter opponent of Origen, and yet intellectually much like him. His profound utterances concerning Adam and Christ, Eve and the Church, as well as his statement that every one is to a certain extent a Christ, are among the most interesting things of the third century. His works were edited by Combeis in 1644, and again in 1672; and by Allatius in 1656. In Migne, *Patr. gr.*, vol. 18.

§ 138.

When the feeling of belonging to a small chosen company vanishes in the Church, and persecutions do not again call it forth, a life absorbed in mere memories and hopes ceases more and more, and the desire arises to trust oneself to that part of the accounts and promises of the apostles which is true eternally and therefore true in the present. Since many answers are given to the question as to what that is, there arises in the congregation the need of having expressed in fixed formulæ not only what has actually happened, but also what is true and is considered so by all. This need is met on the other side by the desire of the State, which must know.
what the fundamental convictions of so large a part of its citizens are, before it can put them on a plane with all the rest, and which moreover will work with all its means toward a unity of opinion, since religious strifes are against its own interest. When, at such a time, men arise who, like Origen, feel the internal impulse to make a doctrine, containing formulated truth, out of the historical accounts of the evangelists, this attempt will not only meet with the approval of the State, but will also be welcomed now by the congregation. With the persecutions the need of apology ceases, and in the place of the apologists, who had been endured by the congregation, arise the framers of dogma, who are honoured by it. This does not take place suddenly. The doctrinal formula ripens gradually, and he is looked upon as its author who reaps the harvest which had been cultivated by his predecessors.

§ 139.

The more the circumstances just mentioned (§ 138) work together, the more normal will be the progress of the formation of doctrines. Therefore the most pleasing spectacle is afforded by the rise of that dogma, with whose rational formulation the beginning must be made, because it forms the pre-supposition of all others: viz., the dogma of the Trinity. The diametrically opposite extremes of Judaizing Monarchianism, as represented among others by Sabellius, and of paganizing Arianism, make a decision necessary. At the same time an emperor reigns at whose summons more than three hundred bishops assemble, and who, entirely in the interest of the State, wishes above all a fixed formula which is declared as binding by all, and promises in return to secure, indeed, if necessary, to compel, its acceptance throughout the educated world. Finally, the greatest Church Father that the Orient has produced labours as an organ of the congregation. With apostolic zeal Athanasius grasps the message of salvation. Ready for martyrdom, he defends all that the apostles and prophets have recounted and promised, and is thereby safe against the perversions of the heretical Gnostics. Profoundly initiated, however, into the true Gnosis of a Clement and an Origen, he proves himself mentally related to the latter, when he is not satisfied with the use of biblical expressions alone in the formulation of a dogma. He is
quite right in this, because the very point is to formulate that which the Bible has left unformulated. The strictness, often approaching despotism, with which he insists upon order and agreement in doctrine and worship, gives him a resemblance in disposition to Cyprian and other Occidental teachers of the Church. Finally, he has enough of true worldly wisdom not to despise the assistance of worldly power in establishing the formulated dogma. He opposes, however, all meddling with the process of formulation itself, while the Arians, on the contrary, become more or less court theologians.

§ 140.

Athanasius.


1. Athanasius was born in Alexandria in the year 298 or 299, became bishop there in 328, and died in 373. Although he was five times sent into exile, and was thus separated from his bishopric twenty years, he yet laboured in that position with the greatest zeal and effect, and at the same time carried on his work as an author. His extant writings enable us to form a judgment as to what he accomplished in the latter respect. His works were published in Heidelberg in 1601 (editio princeps), 2 vols. fol.; in Paris by Montfaucon in 1698, 3 vols. fol.; Emend. cur. Giustiniani Patav., 1777, 4 vols., fol. In Migne, vols. 25–28.

2. Before the outbreak of the Arian strife, Athanasius, in his attacks upon heathenism, that is the deification of the creature, and in his defence of the doctrine of the Incarnation, aimed against the Jews, had already shown himself to be a man who knew how to penetrate, in spite of an Origen and more deeply than he, into the fundamental questions of Christian doctrine, without weakening his reverence for the letter of Holy Scripture and of tradition. He was deacon and private secretary of the Bishop Alexander of Alexandria, at the time when the latter declared himself against the heresy of Arius; and in the epistle of the Bishop addressed to the Catholic Church his spirit may be recognised. Arius was a
presbyter who had been educated in the school of Antioch, and was distinguished for learning, sharpness in dialectics, and strictness of morals. Inasmuch as a direct relation of the Godhead to the world seemed to him to dishonour the former, he saw in the Logos a demiurgic intermediate being who is not eternal, and does not possess and cannot communicate adequate knowledge of God. This highest of all creatures, whose unity with the Father consists in agreement with His will, is incarnate in Christ, and therefore represents in Him the place of the rational soul. Asterius, a related contestant, taught a similar doctrine, but equalled Arius neither in ability nor in earnestness of disposition. At the Council of Nice, which was called especially on account of Arius, Athanasius was present in attendance upon his bishop. He contended orally with Arius, and contributed most to the acceptance of the formula ὑμοῦσιος, and to the defeat of a formula composed of Biblical expressions such as was desired especially by Eusebius of Cæsarea, the most learned man of his age, and such as would have been welcome to the Arians also. His greatest activity begins however after the council, when he defends, in numerous works, the decisions of Nice against the Arians as well as against Eusebius, who inclined toward the latter. Among these works the principal ones are that upon the decrees of the Nicene Synod, and above all, the four Orations against the Arians. These two, as well as the work upon the synods of Seleucia and Rimini, unfold the dogma itself. The history of it is treated more fully in the Apology against the Arians. The chief point is, that Arius is accused of a leaning toward heathenism, therefore of agreement with the dualism of Plato, and of the heathen Neo-Platonists. The assertion, that an intermediate being must be assumed between the eternal God and temporal things, is said to be senseless, because, if this intermediate being were temporal, another intermediate being would be needed between him and God, if eternal, another between him and finite things, and so on indefinitely. Without the correct doctrine of the Logos, the true conception of the creation cannot be formed. If God were not (eternally of Himself) manifest, He could not become (outwardly) manifest without a change of nature. Genesis is thus a pre-condition of creation, but essentially different from it. The Logos, through whom therefore the world is created, is not a
demiurge, but the eternal Son, of like nature with God; the forming power, who must neither be thought of as a creature nor be confounded, as by Sabellius, with the Father. As the genesis of the Son is not temporal, neither is it arbitrary. It is necessary, i.e. it is not compulsory, but follows from the nature of God, like His goodness, which is a product neither of His will, nor of a compulsion exercised upon Him. In the epistle of Athanasius to Serapion, the Holy Spirit, like the Son, is conceived as God and as of like nature with the Father, and therefore the expression Triad is adopted, with which the distinction of persons (υποστάσεις) can be very well joined. In the work against Apollinaris, which some deny to have been written by Athanasius, υποστάσις denotes nature and πρώτοτον is used as the designation of person. It is not a creature therefore, but the eternal Son of God that has become man in Christ, and has thereby made possible an actual knowledge of God. It is He who, through incarnation, death, and resurrection, has delivered man from the death to which he had become subject by sin. The creative power, which the Son of God reveals in becoming incarnate, He has exhibited further in His miracles, and finally in the effect of His work. The time had not yet come to frame dogmatic definitions of the way in which the Divine in Christ is related to the human; and Athanasius, feeling this, desires to have the Biblical expressions retained upon this point. That the ground for this did not lie in his own uncertainty is shown by the decision with which he maintains against Apollinaris, that in Christ the eternal Son of God does not occupy the place of the rational soul, nor is joined to a supernatural body, but that the entire man (flesh) has been put on by Him, and therefore God and man are united in Him, not mixed and not separated.

§ 141.

The Trinitarian strifes did not come to an end with the Council of Nice. Through the influence of the court, at one time the decided Arians, among whom Eunomius was afterwards especially distinguished, at another time the less decided Eusebianists succeeded in driving Athanasius and the bishops that were of his mind from their congregations, and in inventing, at Antioch, Philippopolis (Sardica), Sirmium,
Rimini, and Seleucia, constantly new compromising formulæ to which court favour lent a brief life. With the apparent victory of Arianism, when even the Roman Bishop Liberius yields to the imperial commands, begins its definite fall. In the Occident Hilary, Bishop of Poitiers, in the Orient the great Cappadocian Bishop Basil arise as allies of Athanasius. But not until seven years after the death of Athanasius and two years after the death of Basil is the Nicene symbol, supplemented by the adoption of the homoöusie of the Holy Spirit, confirmed at the synod of Constantinople. This result is due chiefly to the efforts of the two Cappadocian Gregories (of Nyssa and of Nazianzus) and of the reigning emperor. In the doctrine of the Holy Spirit not all that Athanasius had already dogmatically established was adopted. From this omission resulted an uncertainty in regard to this dogma, which later gave rise to strifes, and finally to the separation of the Roman and Greek Churches. It is no superiority in the doctrine of the latter, that it holds more closely to the indefinite expressions of the Bible.

§ 142.

The definitions in regard to the revelation of God in Himself are followed naturally by definitions in regard to His eternal manifestation, that is, His manifestation to man. Since this has its culminating point in Christ, these statements have to do with Christ's Person. The two extremes, the mixture and the severance of the Divine and human in Him, appear already, in the time of Athanasius, in the heresies of Apollinaris and of Photinus. A leaning toward the former one-sidedness is seen in subsequent ages, especially among the theologians educated in the Alexandrian School. The Antiochian School, on the other hand, its diametrical opposite, tends more toward the latter extreme. The fact, however, that Athanasius and Theodore of Mopsuestia declare themselves in the same way against the mixture and the severance, proves that deep piety and earnest scientific zeal can flourish in both schools and lead to the same end. When Nestorius, educated in the school of Antioch, and still more his follower Anastasius, advanced, in their polemics against the expression "God-bearer," to a complete separation of the Divine and the human, unfortunately no Athanasius arose to refute them.
The impure zeal of Cyril of Alexandria and of his successor Dioscuros, and the fact that Eutychius, occupying an extreme position exactly opposite to that of Nestorius, joined himself to them, make this episode in doctrinal history one of the saddest. Despotic emperors are influenced by money, women, and eunuchs, and in turn work upon a clergy, for the most part blameworthy, who allow their belief to be dictated to them. After Nestorius has been condemned at Ephesus, Eutychius suffers the same fate at Constantinople; both justly. On the other hand the result gained at the second synod of Ephesus (the "rober-synod"), at which the Monophysites took revenge upon the Nestorians, was purely a party victory. The statements to which Leo the Great gives utterance in his epistle to Flavian, and which obtain symbolical authority at the synod of Chalcedon, are word for word those of Athanasius and of Theodore. The compromising formulæ dictated by the emperor, such as Zeno's Henotikon and Justinian's Edict de tribus capitulis have rather impeded than hastened the general recognition of the dogmatic formula, which constitutes, not a mean between Nestorianism and Eutychianism, but a higher unity above them both.

§ 143.

The Occident, in the beginning, shares in the formation of doctrine only by sanctioning what the Greeks have already determined. This takes place especially in connection with the Bishop of Rome, who throws the weight of his position in favour of the established formula. In rarer cases a tendency to speculation, as among the Greeks, leads the Occidentals to participate in the work. Among those who thus participated was Hilary of Poitiers. He defended the Trinity against the Arians with the weapons of speculation, breathing, it is true, the Greek atmosphere. As speculative grounds had led him from heathenism to Christianity, he made use of them until his death (366) for the defence of the Nicene symbol. (His works were published by the Benedictines, Paris, 1793, and fill vols. ix. and x. of Migne's Patr. lat.) Otherwise the Occidentals are led chiefly by practical interests, and thus pass quickly from objective doctrinal definitions to the task of exhibiting their practical usefulness to the individual. This is especially true of the
three Africans, and of Lactantius who was influenced by them. They have already been mentioned in connection with the apologists (§ 135, 4). It is yet truer of the two men whom their contemporaries, and still more subsequent ages, have rewarded with the greatest honour, St. Ambrose (340–397, Apr. 4) and St. Jerome, who died at a great age on Sept. 30, 420. The former was above all a priestly statesman and an ecclesiastical prince. He knew how to join to the nobility of high birth the nobility of a lofty mind, and to immovable strength the greatest mildness of character. His chief effort was to advance religious life and worship in the congregation (particularly in that of Milan); and he is especially distinguished for his directions for the clergy and his lyric performances. His works were published by the Benedictines, Paris, 1686, in 2 vols., and are contained, of course, in Migne’s *Patr. lat.* Jerome, the most learned man of his age and a pioneer in widely various directions, lent his favour especially to asceticism. He has besides exerted a tremendous influence by his critical work and his activity in translation, above all by his Latin translation of the Bible (the Vulgate). He was a man of great talent and a distinguished master of style. Speculation was more foreign to him. His works were published in Venice in 1766, in 11 vols., and are contained in Migne’s *Patr. lat.* A fine characterization of the two men is given by Ebert in the work cited in § 135, 4. The man who was to be the organ of the Western Church, when she finally came to take part in the establishment of dogma, owes very much to both of them. The Western Church, in accordance with Occidental subjectivity, takes a part in this labour, when the relation of the individual to the Deity which works in him, therefore the relation of freedom to grace, is to be formulated. Looked at in a purely theoretical manner, this problem is the most difficult, and its solution is impossible where there is lacking a clear insight into the nature of Deity and into its union with humanity. It was necessary that Athanasius and Theodore of Mopsuestia should have accomplished that in which their service lies before he could arise who, in formulating the *Anthropology* of the Church, brings its theology and its christology at once to their conclusion. Augustine is the greatest and the last of the Church Fathers. In him are found at the same time the beginnings
of an activity which goes beyond that of the Church Fathers and forms the vocation of the next period.

§ 144.

Augustine


I. Aurelius Augustinus, born in Tagaste in Numidia, on the thirteenth of November, 354, received from his mother Monica a religious education. Nevertheless evil tendencies showed themselves very early. Brought back by earnest study, especially of Cicero, from moral delinquencies, into which he was betrayed while in Carthage, he fell into religious doubt which threw him into the arms of the Manichæan sect (§ 124). He belonged to this sect at the time when he began work as a teacher of rhetoric at Tagaste, a calling which he afterward followed in Carthage. He first became dissatisfied with the physics of the Manichæans, because they busied themselves with astrology, and was still more weaned from the sect when their celebrated bishop Faustinus was unable to solve his difficulties. In the year 383 he went to Rome, where he gradually fell completely into the scepticism of the new Academy. In the following year he obtained a position as teacher of rhetoric in Milan, and here the sermons of Ambrose, particularly his interpretation of the Old Testament, which was rejected by the Manichæans, completed his estrangement from the latter. He entered again the ranks of the catechumen which he had left to join the heretics. The study of Latin translations of Platonic and Neo-Platonic works was the means of convincing him that theoretically the teaching of Scripture was the most satisfying. He made the blessed experience of its practical power when it led him to put on Christ. After he had given up his position as teacher, he lived for a time in and about Milan. To this period belong the works: *Contra Academicos*, *De vita beata*, *De ordine*, *Soliologia*, *De immortalitate animae*. Others were commenced at the same time. He then spent a year in Rome, where he wrote *De moribus ecclesiae*, *De moribus Manichæorum*, *De quantitate animae* and the first book of *De libero arbitrio* (the second and third books were written in Hippo). In the year 388 he
finally returned to Africa, and in his hereditary home in Tagaste led a sort of convent life which was devoted to pious practices, conversation with friends, and literary activity. The works *De Genesi contra Manicheos*, *De musica*, *De magistro*, *De vera religione* were written here. Upon a journey to Hippo Regius (to-day Bona) he was consecrated presbyter, against his will, by the bishop Valerius, and became preacher in the principal church there, but at the same time continued his convent life with friends of a like disposition. In his sermons he discussed all the points of faith, even to the subtlest dogmatic definitions. He did the same in his catechisms, whose purpose he expresses in the later written work *De catechizandis rudibus*. His literary activity at this time is directed partly against the Manichæans (*Liber de utilitate credendi ad Honoratum*, *De duabus animis*, *Contra Adimantum*), in the endeavour to separate from them those whom he had himself formerly induced to join them, and partly against the Donatists (e.g., among other works, *Liber contra epistolam Donati*, *Psalmus contra partem Donati*). He composed in addition his interpretations of the Sermon on the Mount, of some portions of the Epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians, and the works *De fide et symbolo* and *De mendacio*. In the year 395 he was appointed, at the wish of Valerius, associate bishop; and, although in this position he himself always regarded Cyprian as his model, he can be as well compared with Athanasius. Among the works which he wrote as bishop are to be mentioned the four books *De doctrina christiana*, the *Confessiones*, the *Disputationes* against the Manichæans Faustus, Felix, and Secundinus, the fifteen books *De trinitate*, the four *De consensu Evangelistarum*, *Libri tres contra epistolam Parmeniani Donatistarum episcopi*, *De baptismo contra Donatistas libri septem*, *De bono conjugali*, *De sancta virginitate* and *De genesi ad literam libri duodecin* against the Donatists Petilianus and Cresconius. To this period belong also the works against the Pelagian heresy, first the three books *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, which do not attack Pelagius directly, then *De fide et operibus*, and *De natura et gratia*. His *De civitate Dei* occupied him thirteen years, since he could work upon it only at intervals. It contains, besides a refutation of the heathen theory of the world, an exhibition of the relation of the *civitas Dei* to the *civitas mundi*, and has been not incorrectly called, at one time a
theodicy, at another time a philosophy of history. *De gratia et originali peccato libri duo*, *De anima et ejus origine libri quattuor*, *Contra Julianum Pelagianum libri sex*, *De fide spe et caritate* and *De gratia et libero arbitrio* were also written at this time. In the revision of his works (*Retractationes*) accomplished shortly before his death (which took place on Aug. 28, 430), Augustine counts ninety-three in all, which does not of course include his epistles. His extant writings are given in the various editions of his complete works, among which the best known are the *editio princeps*, Basil., 1506, xi., fol.; *ex emend. Erasmi*, Basle, 1523, x., fol.; Antw., 1577, xi., fol.; Paris, 1679-1700, xi., fol.; Paris, 1835-40, xi., 4to. In Migne’s *Patr. lat.* they fill vols. 32-47. Of separate works the *Confessions* and the *Civilis Dei* have been oftener published.

2. In order to rescue himself from the scepticism of the Academy, Augustine seeks for an immovable point of departure for all knowledge, and finds this in the self-confidence with which a thinking being asserts his own existence, which remains certain in spite of all doubts, indeed, becomes certain through them. From this starting-point, which he asserts to be incontrovertible, particularly in the *Soliloquia* (ii. 1 et al.), in *De libero arbitrio* (ii. 7 et al.), and in *De vera religione* (72 et al.), he proceeds, especially in the second work mentioned, to distinguish in this self-assurance certainty of being, of life, of feeling, and of rational perception, and thus gives to it a fourfold content. If now we reflect upon the highest grade of being, it is found that our reason, when it knows and judges, presupposes certain principles common to all, in short that it is ruled by the one unchangeable truth, which for that very reason it places above itself. This unchangeable truth, which is at once the system of all rational truths, coincides for Augustine with the divine Logos; and he thus comes, as Descartes later (*vid. § 267, 2*), from the assurance of self, which is free from doubt, to the certainty of God, in whom we know and judge all (*Confess.*, x. 40, xii. 25). In this identification of knowledge with the divine Logos in us, Augustine is conscious of his agreement with the Platonists, whom he very often characterizes as the true philosophers, and considers far superior to the Aristotelians; and at the same time the opposition between revelation and reason, belief and knowledge, vanishes for him. His method is confessedly to pro-
ceed from the former and to raise himself to the latter. Everywhere belief is the beginning. In so far belief and authority go before reason. This, however, is true only in respect to chronological order; judged according to their worth, knowledge and insight stand higher, but they are not for the weak, and will not be completely attained in this world even by the most gifted (De util. cred., c. 9, 21; 16, 31; De ord., ii. 9-26; De Trinit., ix. 1). Divine grace and man’s own assent, which lies in the will, are often given as the essential elements of belief (De prædest. sanct., c. 2). To the former we owe also the gift of the infallible Scriptures. Since the name philosopher denotes a friend of wisdom, and God is wisdom, the philosopher is the lover of God. Scripture commands to flee, not from all philosophy, but only from that of this world (Civit. Dei, viii. 1, 10). Whatever leads to the knowledge of God has value, and therefore Physics is justifiable, which, if it did not lead to this result, would be quite useless (Confess., v. 7, x. 55). God, as the proper object of all knowledge and of all philosophy, cannot be grasped by means of the ordinary categories. He is great without quantity, good without quality, without space present, without time eternal, etc. (Confess., iv. 16, 28, 29). Indeed, He is never to be called substance, because no properties belong to Him. He is perhaps better called essentia, because nothing except Him deserves this name (De Trinit., vi. 5). Inasmuch as His being transcends all limit, His nature is better described negatively than positively. With limit is excluded from God also all manifoldness. He is the absolutely simple, and a distinction of properties in Him must never be made. Being, knowledge, will, are in Him one. But if nothing is to be distinguished in Him, He is of course the hidden, the unknowable.

3. Augustine however does not stop with this hidden God, but proceeds to conceive Him as He reveals Himself. This takes place in the doctrine of the Trinity, which Augustine frees from the last remnant of subordinationism, inasmuch as he conceives as eternal not only the Son or the Logos, in whom the eternal Being is Himself revealed, but also the Holy Spirit, that communion of the Father and the Son, in whom they both meet each other in love, and who for that very reason proceeds from them both. The divine substance exists only in the three Persons, but exists in each entire; and Augustine repeats, often at the expense of the distinction
between the Persons, that in every divine work all these act together. He does not, however, stop with accepting the doctrine of the Trinity upon the authority of Scripture and of the earlier Church Fathers, but endeavours to make this doctrine (as in general all the doctrines of faith) comprehensible (vid. § 151), an effort which becomes later the sole occupation of philosophers. He necessarily regarded the doctrine as in accord with reason, all the more since he conceded the possession of it to the Neo-Platonists, who had no revelation. This he grants especially to Porphyry, in whom the error of Plotinus is made good, inasmuch as the postponere of the third element gives place to the interponere. It is a necessary consequence of the fact that Augustine sees in the world a self-revelation of God, and in man especially His likeness (Civit. Dei, xi. 24), that, in his endeavour to make the doctrine of the Trinity comprehensible, analogies should be employed, and reference should be made to the trinity of general, particular, and related being in all things (De vera religione, vii. 13), and particularly to the esse, nosse, and velle, or to the memoria, intelligens, and voluntas of man (De Trinit., x. 8–9), as a witness for the divine triuneness.

4. The Godhead does not stop with being eternally manifest to itself, but proceeds to reveal itself likewise ad extra. This takes place in creation, which Augustine so unites with the eternal generation that his doctrine of the Logos becomes the link between theology and cosmology. He thereby succeeds in avoiding both rocks upon which theories of creation are wont to be shattered. The first is Dualism, which necessarily appeared especially dangerous to him after his own personal experiences. In opposition to the assertion of matter independent of God, he maintains that the world was created from nothing, and, aside from the divine will, is absolutely nothing. In verbal agreement with the Old Testament, he asserts that if God should withdraw His creative power, the world would immediately vanish (Civit. Dei, xii. 25), and thus the conception of preservation is absorbed by that of creation. He distinguishes with emphasis the Son, the de Deo genitus, from the mundus de nihilo factus. He therefore denies a generation of the world; that is, since genitura = natura, he denies, as does the Jew, that the world is more than a thing made by God, that it is nature. With this conception agrees his later opposition to the assumption
of a world-soul (formerly accepted by him), which would give
the world too much independence. The danger of Pantheism
lies very near the assertion of the complete nothingness of
all things. This is the second rock to be avoided in a theory
of creation. Augustine is less studious to avoid it, and there-
fore remains nearer to it than to the opposite extreme. In
spite of all difference between the eternally begotten Son,
without whom God would not be, and the world, created not
in but with time, there exists a relation between the two.
The Logos, namely, as the complex of collective ideas, which
the unenvious God actualized in the world, is the prototype
of the world, while the latter is the image of divine wisdom.
But the former, besides being the world-idea, is also the idea
of God, the alius Dei, while the world is the alius Dei (Civit.
Dei, xi. 10, xii. 25; De genes. ad lit., iv. 16, etc.). The answer
to the three questions quis, per quid, and propter quid fecerit?
shows how the entire Trinity is active in the creation of the
world. Although Augustine guards against asserting that
the creation of things is necessary, or that God needs them,
nevertheless it cannot be denied, on the other hand, that he
ascribes to things, more than Pantheism would admit, not only
an apparent, but a real existence.

5. The fact, however, that Augustine remains much nearer
Pantheism than Dualism is shown especially in his doctrine of
man. The latter is the centre of creation because he joins what
the angels are with visible corporeality composed of elements.
The spirit or soul of man is a substance different from the
body (De anima et ejus origine, ii. 2, 2), at least relatively
simple (De Trinit., vi. 6, 8), and therefore immortal (Soliloq.
de immort. animae). It is so united with the body that it is
everywhere wholly present, although certain organs serve for
certain functions, as the cerebrum for feeling, the cerebellum
for voluntary motion, etc. (De genes. ad lit., vii. 13). But the
spirit appears, besides, independent of the body, so that seven
different grades can be distinguished in it. The three lowest,
anima de corpore, in corpore, circa corpus, have been already
correctly distinguished by Aristotle, but there must be added
to them anima ad se, in se, ad Deum, in Deo (De immort.
anima, De quantit. animae). The proper kernel and centre of
the spiritual personality is formed by the will of man; man is
properly nothing else than will (Civit. Dei, xix. 6). Since
man, like all things, is a product of being and of non-being,
his will can either allow that of the former, that is the divine will, to operate in itself, and then it is true or free will, or it can turn itself from being, and then is empty (self-)will and unfree. If, with Augustine, we understand by freedom the being filled with the divine will, the *bona boni necessitas*, it is not impossible, nor even difficult, to reconcile man's freedom with divine omnipotence and omniscience. It is this conception of freedom which must of necessity have made the strife with Pelagius an irreconcilable one, even if the interference of a jurist (Cœlestius) had not embittered it. The glaring contrast between a life entirely outside of grace and of the Church, and a life in both, was less familiar to the man educated in monkish asceticism than to Augustine; but the danger of a proud sanctification by works threatened him far more. To the member, further, of the British Church, which held itself always open to Oriental and especially to Antiochian influences, a Theodore's or a Chrysostom's formal conception of freedom was of necessity the familiar one. This formal freedom, the *aequilibrium arbitrii*, in which every man can decide for the good as well as for the evil, is in Augustine's opinion an unchristian delusion. Unchristian; for, if every one could choose the good, what need of a redeemer? A delusion; for in reality the conduct of man is the necessary fruit of a good or bad tree. The natural man,—that is, the man who wills of himself and wills his own will,—is evil, is a slave. Only divine grace makes man free, grace partly as prevenient, partly as active, partly as supporting, and partly as bestowing the gift of perseverance (*donum perseverantiae*), which seals all previous effects. Whoever becomes free, depends therefore solely upon God. He predestinates thereto whom He will. The remainder have no cause for complaint if He leaves them in the state in which they are. Only God’s continuous activity enables man to do good; properly, indeed, not to do, for man is entirely passive, grace is irresistible (*De corr. et grat.*). God does not give grace because we wish it, but we wish it because He gives it (*Ep.*, 177, 5). All this is a necessary consequence of the view that preservation is a continued creation from nothing. In a completely dependent world no part of it can show independent activity. These assertions appear milder when Augustine says: *qui te creavit sine te non te justificabit sine te*; and so too when he gives utterance to other similar expressions, to which his practical nature, averse to all quietism,
leads him. Whether a man belongs to the elect cannot be determined by single good works; the best proof of it is the donum perseverantiae (De corr. et grat., 12, 13).

6. The inability to do good, and therefore the rejection of all those whom God does not make free from sin, is a fact. This however is not the relation originally established by God. In the beginning man, who at first, in order that all men might be blood relations, existed as one man, was in a condition in which it was possible for him not to sin. Destined to attain to a position where he can no more sin, to pass from posse non peccare to non posse peccare, he should, by obedience to God, have wiped out the posse peccare in himself, and with it mortality (De corr. et grat., 12, 13; De pecc. mer., i. 2, 2). This however did not take place. On the contrary, the love of God grew cold in man, and the temptation of the devil who had fallen before him brought him, already fallen, to a complete apostasy. His punishment, inability to do good, was handed down to all men, who had existed in Adam in germ, and therefore had sinned (Civit. Dei, xiv, 11; De corr. et grat., 12, 37; 6, 9). That Augustine expresses himself only with hesitation for Traducianism (propagation of the soul), which fits so well his theory of original sin (cf. Ep., 190; Ad Opt., 4, 14, 15), and often wavers between it and Creationism or even Pre-existence (cf. among other passages Retract., i. 1), has its ground, perhaps, in the fact that the example of Tertullian seemed to show that Traducianism involved the corporeality of the soul. The descendants of fallen man, begotten in lust, and thus at the same time poisoned, are incapable of good. It is more difficult to comprehend how the original man, born sinless, could fall away from God. In the same degree in which Augustine denies to man all independent activity, must the rise of evil, that is of self-seeking, appear impossible. Consistent Pantheism has in fact always experienced this. Augustine, although he does not go so far as the latter, nevertheless often approaches the denial of evil, as for instance when he shows a tendency to conceive of it as an absence of good, not as its opposite (Civit. Dei, xi. 9), or when he says that evil exists only in the good (De lib. arb., iii. 13), that it is nothing positive and therefore needs no causa efficiens, but has only a causa deficiens, is an incausale, that evil is not commission but only omission, that evil cannot be perceived for the same reason that darkness cannot be seen, etc. (Civ.
Dei, xii. 7, 9, et al.) The tremendous power of sin forces him indeed often to the (anti-pantheistic) confession that evil is a positive power over against God. But the fear of assuming a being outside of God causes him always to return to the conception of it as a mere shadow in the picture of the world, as a thing necessary for the sake of contrast, that is, in fact, to deny its reality. The difficulties, which resulted from the Augustinian doctrine of the absolute self-nothingness of the creation, furthered the spread of Semi-Pelagianism. In the form indeed in which the latter arose in the teaching of Cassianus, it was condemned; but at the same time the Predestinationists, probably pure Augustinians, were declared heretics. The Augustinianism of the Church is already moderated in the work De vocatione gentium, probably by Leo the Great. Later it became an ecclesiastical rule: Augustinus eget Thoma interprete.

7. Belief, the means by which man becomes a participant in grace, is, according to Augustine, not a self-active appropriation but a pure gift of mercy, a supernatural illumination (De pecc. merit., i. 9; De prædest. sanct., ii. 12), in which man is certain of his state of redemption. For this very reason the proper content of belief is formed by the doctrine of the incarnate Son of God. The heathen philosopher did not, as in the case of the Trinity, have any idea of this doctrine. Since, now, only that conduct has value which is an action of belief, it follows that even the most highly extolled virtues of the heathen are worthless, indeed crimes (Civit. Dei, xix. 25). Only among Christians does boldness, in virtue of the true foundation, become the martyr's joy, and temperance the destruction of passion, etc. The Incarnate One however is not only the liberator of the individual from sin and guilt, but also the proper centre of mankind as a whole, and for that reason appears in the middle of its history, a goal for those who lived before Him, a starting-point for those who live after Him (De vera relig., 16; De grat. et lib. arb., 3, 5). The history of mankind is divided into six periods, corresponding to the six days of creation, and in the last of these we live. Through this whole history runs the contrast between the redeemed, who form the kingdom of God, the civitas Dei, and those who have condemned themselves, and thus form the kingdom of the world, or of the devil. The former are vessels of mercy, the latter vessels of wrath (Civ. Dei, xv. 1 ff.). Among those
rules the love of God, among these the love of self (Ibid., xiv. 28). Cain and Abel (after the death of the latter, Seth) represent in the beginning this contrast, which finally reaches its culminating point in the moral corruption of the Roman Empire, and in the Christian Church which makes stand against it (Ibid., xviii. 2). The State, which is necessary only to fallen man, is destined to become useless. But as long as it has its use, the Church, an institution of peace standing above it, is to promote peace between ruler and subjects. The last judgment, and after it the new earth inhabited by those who have risen, is the goal of history. Condemnation, both bodily and spiritual, is, like the blessedness of the elect, eternal (Ibid., xxi. 9, 10, 23, 28, xix. 28). The latter consists in perfect knowledge of God and of His government of the world. For this reason, neither the recollection of one's own suffering, nor the punishment of the condemned will trouble him who shall see all with the eyes of knowledge (Ibid., xxii. 29, 30).

§ 145.

With the victory of (moderated) Augustinianism the activity of the Church in forming doctrines ceases. It was not necessary to establish further dogmas, for those which were to be regarded as constituting unchangeable truth had been already discovered. Nor was it any longer possible; for, with the disappearance of the republican form of Church government, there vanished also the assurance that the dogma alone would secure canonical authority and not at the same time the method by which an individual proved the dogma. When, later, at a time whose mission was not to make dogmas but to give them a definite form, papal authority attempted to establish dogmas (e.g., transubstantiation and the conceptio immaculata virginis), it was desired to stamp theological speculations as dogmas. It was forgotten that in dogmas the κηρύγμα, the original revelation, offers the material for philosophical reflection, while in theological speculations, on the contrary, the material is furnished by the dogma framed from that revelation. Therefore dogma and theological proposition are related as doctrine and proof, as judgment and the reasons for the judgment. The first duty of the Church, after the establishment of dogma, is to enter into the doctrinal conception and to accustom itself to the constitution which it has formed for itself, and through
which it has formed itself. It must grow stronger in itself as the congregation formerly, before it became a Church, had to grow stronger in order to be able to begin external activity. He in whom a philosophical spirit lives, that is, he who understands his age, will therefore devote himself not so much to the solution of new problems as to the conservation and establishment of that which has been hitherto discussed in philosophy. This is accomplished when the results of past speculation, by means of compilations, of commentaries, and of translations, are made accessible to ever-enlarging circles, and become more and more generally recognised truths.

§ 146.

The activity which collects and discusses dogmas is formal when compared with that which produced them. From this results the respect for those writings of antiquity which establish the rules of scientific form, and for that philosopher who was the all-embracing polymathist. Plato, over against Aristotle, especially Aristotle the logician, begins to take a subordinate place; and where Platonism remains the highest authority, it is in the form which it had received from Proclus, with whom the Aristotelian element played so prominent a part (vid. §§ 127 and 130). In the Oriental Church are especially prominent Nemesius (De natura hominis, published in the Bibl. vet. patr., Paris, 1624, vol. ii., as well as elsewhere), whose Aristotelian arguments and Biblical expressions are mingled in a curious way; Æneas of Gaza, who, in his dialogue Theophrastus (written in 457), most often attacks Nemesius with Platonic, but also combats the Neo-Platonists with Biblical, arguments; and Zacharias Scholasticus, who took part in the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 536) as Bishop of Mitylene, and whose dialogue Ammonius is chiefly devoted to a refutation of the doctrine of the eternity of the world. The latter doctrine is also combated by the Alexandrian John, although he was much more of an Aristotelian than those just named. He called himself Grammaticus, but was called in the Middle Ages Philoponos. His commentaries on the works of Aristotle, written in the sixth century, are extant and have often been published, especially in Venice. His somewhat younger contemporary, Simplicius, interprets Aristotle more after the manner of the Neo-Platonists. He is of