AN OUTLINE

OF

ERDMANN'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

BY

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BASED UPON THE

ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

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The following "Outline" of Erdmann's *History of Philosophy*, prepared by Professor Henry C. King, of Oberlin College, is published with my sanction and commendation.

WILLISTON HOUGH.

MINNEAPOLIS, February, 1892.
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE RELATIONS OF THE SYSTEMS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

(ERDMANN.)

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<th>I.</th>
<th>Realism = Idealism</th>
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<td>i.e.</td>
<td>Locke and Hume = Leibnitz and Berkeley</td>
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| II. | Individualism = Pantheism |
| i.e. | |
| | Eighteenth Century = Seventeenth Century |

| III. | Cosmosophy = Theosophy |
| i.e. | |
| | Antiquity = Middle Ages. |

= means, combined with.  || means, opposed to.

| Critico-Realistic Dogmatism  | Critico-Sceptical Idealism |
| i.e. | i.e. |
| Reinhold  | Maimon and Beck |
| Critical Individualism  | Critical Pantheism |
| i.e. | i.e. |
| "Science of Knowledge"  | "System of Identity" |

| Modern Naturalism  | Modern Theosophy |
| i.e. | i.e. |
| Oken  | Baader |

(Krause)  

Hegel  

(Schelling's "Positive Philosophy")
# ANCIENT, MEDIÆVAL, AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED.

Based on Erdmann.

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<th>The Periods</th>
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<td>Modern Philosophy</td>
<td>From Descartes (1596–1650).</td>
<td>Developed under influence of ideas called forth by the Reformation — Protestantism.</td>
<td>Man — the Microcosmos and Microtheos.</td>
<td>Has embraced all departments — Metaphysics, Theory of Knowledge, Aesthetics, Ethics — but with special emphasis on Metaphysics and later Theory of Knowledge.</td>
<td>&quot;To transfigure the World through the Spirit.&quot; &quot;The Demand to be Spiritual.&quot;</td>
<td>Recognizes both the here and the hereafter, the real and the ideal, the natural and the supernatural.</td>
<td>Men of very various tendencies and training.</td>
<td>&quot;Knowledge of Man.&quot;</td>
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AN OUTLINE OF
ERDMANN'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

(See Chart, page 4.)

THALES TO PLUTARCH, 600 B.C. TO 100 A.D.

First Period.—Immaturity. Pre-Hellenic in spirit. No distinction between knower and known. Like is known by like.

I. The Pure Physiologers. "Native Hylozoism."
   B. Anaximander. The Indefinite.
   C. Anaximenes. Air.

II. The Pure Metaphysicians. Seek original thought-determination.
   B. The Eleatics.
      (I) Xenophanes. The One. The Existent.

III. The Metaphysical Physiologers. Thought-principle, yet physically applicable.
   B. Empedocles. Four unchangeable elements.
   C. The Atomists. Democritus. Infinite number of non-qualitative atoms.

Second Period.—Greek Philosophy at Its Height.—The Attic Philosophy.
Pericles (450), to Alexander (300).
1. The Reason. 2. Final Cause.

I. Anaxagoras (b. 500 B.C., cir.). The Problem stated.
II. The Sophists. Further Discriminations.
   Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias.
   All truths in the subject, but only in so far as it is universal. Virtue is knowledge.

IV. The Socratic Schools. Abstractly developed on different sides.
   B. The Cyrenaics. Momentary pleasure, the good. Aristippus.

V. Plato (427-348 B.C.). "Socratism apprehended from every side."

VI. Aristotle (385-322 B.C.). Socratism systematized, symmetrized and developed.
   "Hellenism fully comprehended."
   Fourfold idea of cause; conception of final cause. 3. Still dualistic.
   4. Emphasizes physical inquiry. 5. Practical and theoretical virtues.
   Virtue a mean. 6. No Utopian state. 7. Beginning of Aesthetics.

5
Third Period. — Decay. Epicurus (b. 342 B.C.) to Plutarch (d. 120 A.D.).
1. More individualistic, more subjective, more Roman, more ethical.
2. One-sided tendencies.

I. THE DOGMATISTS.
B. Stoics. Zeno (b. 340 B.C.). Philosophy, the art of virtue. Complete fatalism. Apathy, the highest state.

II. THE SCEPTICS.
C. Return to Pyrrho. Anesidemus; Sextus Empiricus. Complete subjectivism.

III. THE SYNCRETISTS. Philosophic response to Roman world.
A. Classical, Roman, Ciceronian.
B. Hellenistic, Alexandrian, Philonian.
   (II) Hellenizing Jews. a. Hermes. b. Philo Judæus (b. a few years B.C.). Doctrine of the Logos, as the idea of the world.

MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.
(See Chart, page 4.)

GNOSTICISM TO HOBBES (d. 1679). 100–1600.

First Period. — Patriotics. 100–800.
1. Negative attitude of Church to World shown first in "Flight."
2. Strife between History and Philosphic propositions.

I. Gnostics. 1. Sacrifice of Philosophy to History — to new ideas of Christianity.
   2. Seek relations of faith and knowledge, of Christianity to Judaism and Heathenism.
   3. Three classes — Judaizing, Paganizing, Christianizing.

II. Neo-Platonists. 1. Sacrifice of History to Philosophy. 2. Contempt for Christian teaching. 3. Combine all that philosophy has hitherto taught; yet they are not the culmination of ancient philosophy, since they have negative and positive relations to ideas of Christianity.
C. Proclus (b. 412), and Athenian Neo-Platonism. Aristotelian element. Formal completeness.

III. Church Fathers. 1. Combine and transcend these opposite tendencies.
   2. Special mission — philosophically to formulate truths of original gospel; and thus help the Congregation to become the Church.
A. Apologists. Justin Martyr, e.g.
B. Apologists and Dogmatists. Origen (185–254).
D. Compilers and Commentators. Oriental, John of Damascus, e.g. (d. second half of 8th century). Occidental, Isidore, e.g. (b. 560).

I. THE RISE OF SCHOLASTICISM. 800–1200. The Church conquering the world.

A. Scholasticism as a Fusion of Religion and Reason.

(I) Erigena (b. 800). Sums up and anticipates entire problem of Scholasticism. Compare Charlemagne.


"Universalia sunt in rebus."


C. Scholasticism as Mere Religious Science.


(III) The Victorines, Pietists of the 12th century.


II. SCHOLASTICISM AT ITS HEIGHT. 1200–1300.

1. Philosophtic Reflection of the Crusades. 2. Learning from anti-Christian philosophers.

A. Mohammedans and Jews, Forerunners of the Christian Aristotelians.

(I) In the Orient—Avicenna, e.g. (978–1036).

(II) In Spain—Averroës, e.g. (1120–1198).

B. Christian Aristotelians. Philosophy a wholly ecclesiastical science. Reason is "Aristotle with annotations." "Advancing beyond their predecessors, without letting anything fall."


Speculative Dogmatics.


Mystical Contemplation.


Philosopher, Theologian, and Mystic united.


1. All elements of Albert completely interwoven. 2. The climax of Scholasticism as Ecclesiastical Philosophy. 3. The Thomist watch-words: "units formae"; "mater individuatus; "perseitas boni."


III. THE DECAY OF SCHOLASTICISM. 1300–1400. Aristotle, as authority, is superior to Church. Answering to failure of Crusades.

A. Roger Bacon (b. 1214). Anticipated this "reverence for the world."


1. His Individualism, and Arbitrariness of God (as opposed to Thomas), become the two cardinal doctrines of the "Nominalism of the 14th century"—of "Occamism."

2. Theology and Philosophy no longer agree.

C. William of Ockam (d. 1347). "Venerabilis Inceptor."

"Doctor Invincibilis."

Triumph of Ockamism. 1. Separates Philosophy and Theology. 2. Logic deals with signs only. 3. Individual only is real. 4. Arbitrariness of God.

D. Reactionary attempts to unite Philosophy and Theology in different ways.

(I) Pierre d'Ailly.

(II) Gerson.


(IV) Nicolas of Cusa (1401–1464). Combined the most various tendencies in Scholasticism.
Third Period. — Transition. 1400-1600. 1. “Growing Dominion of Reason and Mind,” but Church mistrustful. 2. Complete dissolution of elements of Scholasticism; hence Theosophists and Cosmosophists. 3. Anti-Scholastic. 4. The principle of nationality.

I. PHILOSOPHY AS DIVINE WISDOM. THE THEOSOPHISTS.
   1. Speculation linked with original gospel proclamation. 2. Mystical.
   A. Master Eckhart (b. 1260, cir.) and Speculative Mysticism. Tauler (1290-1361), and “Theologia Germanica.”
   B. Ruysbroek (1293-1381) and Practical Mysticism.
      (II) German Reformers. Transition to culmination of Mysticism, through Luther (1483-1546), “a filter for mysticism”; Schwenfeld (1490-1561), not mere historic faith; Sebastian Franck (1500-1545), faith an experience; Weigel (1533-1588), Man a microcosm and image of God, freedom from self.
   C. Jacob Böhme (1575-1624) and Theosophic Mysticism. 1. “Stripped of learned robe.” 2. “Intuition of enthusiasm.” 3. “Man not only carries all creatures in himself, but also the Divine Trinity.”

II. PHILOSOPHY AS SECULAR WISDOM. THE COSMOPHISTS. “Attempt to philosophize as if a divine wisdom inspired by Christianity had never existed.”

   (I) Revival of Platonism. Marsilio Ficino, e.g. (1433-1499).
   (II) Revival of Aristotelianism. Leonicus Thomas, e.g. (b. 1456).

B. The Secular Philosophers proper. Aim to make Philosophy wholly independent of Church.
   (I) The Natural Philosophers.
         ii. Cardanus (1500-1576).
         iii. Telesius (1508-1588). “The most important” of the group. Philosophy, pure secular learning. “A few natural forces, bound by unalterable laws.”
      iv. Patritius (1529-1593).
      v. Campanella (1568-1639).
         Bruno (1548-1600). Both Pantheistic and Atomistic tendency.
         i. Sceptical Men of the World. Montaigne, e.g. (1533-1599).

(II) The Political Philosophers.
MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

(See Chart, page 4.)

FROM DESCARTES (1596-1650).

First Period. — Philosophy of the 17th Century. Pantheism.
1. Formulated motive of the 16th Century — ignoring the individual.
2. Period of Organization.

I. DESCARTES AND HIS SCHOOL.

II. MALEBRANCHE (1638-1715).

III. SPINOZA (1632-1677).
1. Culmination of Cartesianism on pantheistic side. 2. Pre-Christian. Anti-Christian and Non-Christian tendencies, naturally culminating in the principle of the Philosophy of Antiquity. 3. Mathematical point of view, and purely deductive method. 4. Starting point, the logically Unconditioned, the one Substance, wherein all things consist. 5. Substance, modes, attributes.

Second Period. — Philosophy of the 18th Century. Individualism.
1. Philosophic reflection of extreme subjectivity and individualism in all spheres. 2. Period of Disorganization.

I. REALISTIC SYSTEMS. Exalt the Material (1) negatively, by showing insufficiency of the human spirit — Sceptics and Mystics; (2) positively, by adding that the external world supplies the deficiency — Empiricism.
A. The Sceptics. Denial of Trustworthiness of Faculties. Bayle, e.g. (1647-1706).
C. Empiricism. Must let external world say what is true, just, and good.
(1) LOCKE (1632-1704). Speculative Side.
1. Passivity of Mind. 2. Double source of ideas — internal and external. No "innate ideas." 3. But one complex idea — substance — has reality corresponding
(IV) Brown, Condillac, and Bonnet (1720-1790). Speculative side especially.
1. Complex ideas by association. 2. No ideas except from external world.
(V) Mandeville (b. 1670) and Helvetius (b. 1715). Practical side especially. Egoism.

D. The Sensationalist Enlightenment.
(1) English Deism. Begins.

   b. The Encyclopedists. Go much further.
      c. Buffon (b. 1707) and Kebinet (b. 1735). Help the movement.


II. IDEALISTIC SYSTEMS.
   1. Develop at a bound. 2. Resulting Enlightenment, more cosmopolitan.

A. Rational Idealism. Mind the only source of all knowledge—a priori Philosophy.
      (III) Wolff; His School; His Opponents.
      b. His School. Spread, or Development. Baumgarten (1714–1762) and Meier (1718–1777) — Aesthetics especially.
      c. His Opponents. Buddens, Rüdiger, Crusius, Darjes.

B. Empirical Idealism. The mental as something individual to be discovered empirically.
      a. Collier (1680–1732). No real external objects. God produces ideas of them in all spirits.
      b. Berkeley (1684–1753). 1. All ideas simply states of our spirits. 2. The ideas, which are common to all, put in all simultaneously by God. 3. Will, the only activity.
   (II) Philosophy as Introspection. Transcend semi-individualism of predecessors.

C. The German Enlightenment. Its formula: “To raise man, so far as he is a rational individual, into a position of supremacy over everything.”
   (I) Religious Enlightenment.
      1. Three Sources: (1) Pietism, — Arnold, Dippel, Edelmann (1688–1767); (2) Wolffian Philosophy, Wolffian School, Töllner, Reimarus (1694–1768); (3) English Deism, through J. S. Baumgarten, Semler (1725–1791), Bahrdt. 2. Pietism and Wolffianism agree in (1) No creeds; (2) Morality chief element in religion; (3) As to all questions of evil. No eternal punishment; no original sin; no devil.
   (II) Social Enlightenment — a vast educational enterprise. Through
      a. Monarchs — especially Frederick the Great (Reign, 1740–1786).
      b. Experiments in Rational Education. Basedow (b. 1723), Steinbart, Schlosser, Rochow.
      c. Secret Societies — especially the Illuminati.
III. NEITHER REALISM NOR IDEALISM. "PHILOSOPHERS FOR THE WORLD."

1. Philosophical Interpretation of the Enlightenment. 2. Characterized by
Syncretism, and lack of system. 3. Without national or university
character. 4. "Philosophy for the world," by men of the world, in
tasteful form, and as to content against everything one-sided.

A. Those tinged with Realism.
   (I) French, e.g. Maupertuis.
   (II) Swiss and Alsation, e.g. Lambert.
   (III) At Geneva, Prevost.
   (IV) Popular Philosophy at Göttingen. e.g. Garve (b. 1742).

B. Those tinged with Idealism. Purely German.
Mendelssohn (1729-1786), Nicolai (1733-1811), and Lessing (1729-
1781), the center. Lessing a critic of all views of the 18th cen-
tury; yet passing beyond it, only in particular points, as Art and
Religion.

The syncretism of Lessing's friends, and the critical scepticism of Lessing
prepare for the critical philosophy of Kant.

Third Period.—Philosophy of the 19th Century. Mediation. From Kant
(1724-1804).

1. Three Problems:—
   (1) To transcend opposition between opposite tendencies of 18th Century.
   i.e. To transcend opposition between Realism and Idealism — content,
or To transcend opposition between Empiricism and Rationalism —
method.
   i.e. To transcend opposition between Locke and Leibnitz.
   and To transcend opposition between Hume and Berkeley.
   (2) To transcend opposition between the Philosophies of the 17th and
   18th Centuries.
   i.e. To transcend opposition between Pantheism and Individualism.
Problem of Reorganization, hence
   To transcend opposition between Pantheism and Atheism, in Mono-
theism.
   To transcend opposition between Necessity and Caprice in Concrete
Freedom.
   (3) To transcend opposition between the Philosophies of Antiquity and
   the Middle Ages.
   i.e. To transcend opposition between Naturalism and Theosophic Hatred
of the World.
   and To transcend opposition between Deification of and Contempt for
the State.

2. The period begins with Kant as Epoch-maker, who partly solves each
problem.

3. Kant's Solutions carried further by his successors.

I. CRITICISM.
A. KANT (1724-1804). Critical or Transcendental Philosophy. Investigation
as to what is antecedent to all knowledge as its condition or pre-supposition.

1. Kant solves the First Problem most fully of all; in all three Critiques:
   (1) By conceiving philosophy as knowledge of both Realism and Idealism.
   (2) Knowledge has two stems: (a) sense, receptivity; (b) thought,
   spontaneity.
   (3) Phænomena and Nonphænomena.
   (4) Man intrinsically dual.

2. Kant solves the Second Problem less completely; in Dialectic, Practical
   Philosophy and Critique of Judgment.
   (1) Absolute Freedom, yet conscience as voice of race, and "homo nou-
       menon."
   (2) Especially in Critique of Judgment. By recognition of Feeling and
   of End. Organism.

3. Kant solves the Third Problem in part; most fully in Critique of Judg-
   ment and in "Religion within the Limits of mere Reason."
B. Kantians and Anti-Kantians.
   (I) Reception of Criticism.
      a. At end of nineties, Kantian philosophy in almost every German
         University.
      b. Schiller (1759-1805). Did much to spread. Transcends in
         Aesthetics.
      their battle cry, though in different senses.
      a. Hamann (1730-1788). God-intoxicated. Theosophist. Medi-
         ñeval.
   (III) The Semi-Kantians.
         Realism.
         Cf. Hermes.

II. The Elementary Philosophy and Its Opponents. The First Problem
reopened.
solution of First Problem. Deeper foundation for Critique of Pure
Reason.
   1. Extends Kantism in (1) Deeper Foundation and (2) Nearer
      Determination.
      (1) Deeper Foundation. Kant’s “two stems” branches of one faculty of
         Presentation; and a progressive Deduction.
      (2) Nearer Determination. (a) Kant’s Nomina cover both Nomina —
         Ideas of Reason, and Things-in-themselves — non-conceived
         objects. (b) “Things-in-themselves” are causes of our presenta-
         tions.
   2. As Empirical an interpretation as possible of Kant.
B. Reinhold’s Opponents — “Critico-Sceptical Idealism.”
   (I) Schulze (1761-1833). Criticism ought to say — No things-in-themselves.
   (II) Maimon (1754-1800). Sceptical interpretation of Kant. Kant’s
      Ideals of the Reason, illusions of imagination.
   (III) Beck (1761-1840). Extreme Idealistic interpretation of Kant. Only
      possible bond is between phenomena and their presentations.

III. The Science of Knowledge and Its Offshoots.
A. Fichte (1762-1814). “Critical Individualism,” or “Individualistic Ideal-
ism.” Completer solution of First Problem. Deeper Foundation for
Critique of Practical Reason.
   1. These varied interpretations of Kant show need of new fusion of Realism
      and Idealism. Hence Fichte seeks Ideal-Realism.
   2. Seeks the one root of the Theoretical and Practical Reasons in a Fact-Act,
      back of consciousness.
   3. Ego posits Ego and Non-Ego as mutually determining themselves—
      “the whole Science of Knowledge in a nut-shell.”
   4. Things-in-themselves, a limit which the reason sets itself for sake of its
      own activity, hence “nothing in themselves, but only for us”—
      “what we shall make out of them.” Practical Idealism.
   5. The Philosophical Interpretation of the French Revolution — the existent,
      a limit which must be broken through.
B. Reception of the Science of Knowledge.
   (I) Opponents — all previous views.
   (II) Adherents. Schelling in his earlier views. Reinhold in his inter-
      mediate position.
   (III) Standpoint of Irony. Schlegel’s (1772-1829) earlier position. Ego
      not in earnest in what it allows to be valid, hence Irony—
      intellectual and moral.
C. Offshoots of the Science of Knowledge.
   (I) Fichte’s Altered Doctrine. 1. Adds to one-sided idealism, extreme
      realism—i.e. Spinoza. 2. Adds “Absolute Being” hence two
      sorts of being, and so of ideals. 3. Here standpoint of Religion,
      rather than moralism.
   (II) Schlegel’s Later Doctrine. Main problem of all philosophy—the
      relation of the Infinite and the Finite.
   (III) Schleiermacher (1768–1834).
      1. Gives dignity to the subjectivism of the ironical standpoint by a
         religious and ethical spirit. 2. Supplemening and toning
         down Fichte’s idealism. 3. Religion, the Feeling of Absolute
         Dependence upon God.
IV. THE SYSTEM OF IDENTITY. “Critical Pantheism,” or “Pantheistic Realism.”
A. Schelling (1775–1854) and the System of Identity. Solved more per-
   fectly the First Problem. Deeper Foundation for Critique of Judgment.
   Helps to completer solution of Second Problem by bringing out with
   Fichte a further antithesis.
   1. Aims to add to Fichte’s Ideal-Realism, Real-Idealism—a philosophy of
      nature.
   2. Fichte’s Ego becomes Reason, or Intelligence; his Non-Ego, Nature; and
      upon both sides there must be subject-object, hence System of Identity.
      “Spinozism of 19th century.”
   3. Philosophical Reflection of the Empire of Napoleon.
      (I) Spinozistic Form of the System (1801). Identity of Spirit and
         Nature in Reason.
      (II) Platonic Presentation of the System (1802–1804). Identity of
         Infinite and Finite in the Eternal.
      (III) Platonic-Spinozistic Presentation (1805). Identity of the Real and
         Ideal All in Phenomena—the reflection of the one distinctionless
         eternal All.
B. Reception of the System of Identity.
   (I) Opponents—include Fichte.
   (II) Adherents—in part many scientists.
   (III) Emendators:
      a. Adding other elements.
         i. Protestant Religious Modification. Eschenmayer and Schu-
            bert.
      b. Modifying from Within. Wagner and Troxler.
V. PANTEISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND THEIR MEDIATION UPON A CRITICAL BASIS.
A. Herrbart and Schopenhauer. Start from Kant. Negative Relation to
   Fichte and Schelling. Opposites.
   (I) Herrbart (1776–1841). “Individualistic Realism.” Method. Psy-
      chology.
      Will and Idea.” Pessimism.
B. Von Berger, Solger, Steffens. Reconciliation of Pantheism and Individual-
   ism. Positive Relation to Fichte and Schelling.
   (I) Von Berger (1772–1833). From side of Fichte. Emphasizes
      Ethical Subjectivism.
   (II) Solger (1780–1819). From side of Schelling. Emphasizes Ästhetic
      Subjectivism.
   (III) Steffens (1773–1845). From side of Spinoza and Schelling. Em-
      phasizes Religious Subjectivism.
C. Schelling’s Doctrine of Freedom (1809).
   1. Problem, to overcome Pantheism and Dualism by investigation of
      Human Freedom.
   2. Overcomes Pantheism by incorporating it and emphasizing Personality
      and Freedom.
   3. The Mediaval-minded Theosophist suggests the Third Problem, as before
      he had suggested the Second.
VI. COSMOSOPHY, THEOSOPHY, AND THEIR MEDIATION UPON A CRITICAL BASIS.
A. OKEN AND BAADER. Diametrical opposites; advocated separately the earlier and later views of Schelling.
B. KRAUSE'S (1781-1832) PANENTHEISM. 1. Philosophy — the theory of the Absolute, but of the all as in God.
   2. "God essentiates everything finite in, under, and through, Himself."
   3. Yet does not give due recognition to Subjective side.
   4. Analyzed most precisely the præs of Nature and Spirit, and so restores Ontology.
   5. Philosophy a closed circle.
C. HEGEL'S (1770-1831) PANAGISM. Reason is everything.
   1. Like Krause, converts the præs of Nature and Spirit into a system of categories — universal relations of reason.
   2. From this Ontology, passes to Philosophy of Nature.
   3. Thence, like the "Doctrine of Freedom," to Spirit, as that to which Nature is subordinated.
   4. Thence back to the absoluteness of the beginning, through Art, Religion, and Philosophy — a closed circle.
   5. The Great Mediating System — claims to have taken up all earlier systems.
   7. The Restorer of (1) Ontology, of (2) positive Religious Doctrines, of (3) the conception of the Moral Organism.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY SINCE HEGEL.
I. DISSOLUTION OF THE HEGELIAN SCHOOL. 1. Philosophical Reflection of the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848. 2. Expressions (even if misdirected) of impulse toward Restoration. 3. Brings again into question the three points in which Hegel had been a Restorer. Hence three divisions.
A. Phenomena in the LOGICO-METAPHYSICAL Sphere. Mainly Anti-Hegelian.
B. Phenomena in the Sphere of the Philosophy of Religion. Mainly Hegelian.
   2. The Question of the Basis of this Reconciliation — that it made substance subjective — raised inside the School itself, because of the very indefiniteness of these categories in Hegel.
   3. Hence three questions: (1) Whether and how substance can be subjective — the Personality of God — the Theological Question. (2) Does substantiality belong to the subject or is it a pure accident — Freedom and Immortality — the Anthropological Question. (3) How does (the Divine) substance appear in the (human) subject — the Christological Question.
   a. Left Wing Hegelianism. Feuerbach and Richter. No continued personal existence.
   b. Right Wing Hegelianism. Göschel. Everything individual is immortal.
(II) The Christological Question.
   b. Right Wing. e.g. Erdmann.
   c. Intermediate: (1) The Centre. e.g. Conradi. (2) Weisse and I. H. Fichte.

(III) The Theological Question.
   a. Left Wing.
      i. Pantheistic side. Strauss, Michelet, Baur.
      ii. Atheistic side. Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer.
   b. The Right Wing. e.g. Erdmann.
   c. The Centre. Conradi and Votke.

C. Phenomena in the Spheres of Ethics and Politics. Mainly "Ultra" Hegelians.
   (III) Feuerbach (1804–1872). Ends in Religion of Nature, Egoism;
      "Man is what he eats."


II. ATTEMPTS AT A RECONSTRUCTION OF PHILOSOPHY. "Philosophies of Restoration."


B. Attempts at Innovation. Philosophies of Restoration, for not really new; their Spirit one of Restoration in at least one of the three main points.
   (I) Materialistic Works.
      b. Scientific Materialism. Tobias.
   (III) Idealistic Naturalism. Lange (1828–1875).
   (IV) Idealistic Naturalism and Sensualism. Czolbe (d. 1873).

   (I) Those whose starting point was principally one system.
      a. Neo-Kantians. e.g. Liebmann. "We must return to Kant."
      Criticises thing-in-itself.
      b. From Reinhold. Ernst Reinhold.
      c. From Fichte.
      i. Fortlage (d. 1881) — anti-monadological tendency.
      ii. Bayer. Ethical.
      iii. Younger Fichte (d. 1879), Ethical Panentheism.
      d. From "System of Identity." e.g. Carus (d. 1869).
      e. From Herbart. Waits (b. 1821). Psychology.
      g. From Schelling's Doctrine of Freedom.
      i. Sengler, K. P. Fischer, L. Schmid.
      ii. Schelling's Positive Philosophy.
         Philosophy two parts. (1) Negative — all that must necessarily be thought. God, the goal. (2) Positive. Philosophy of Religion. God, as its Principle. Concrete Monotheism.
      iii. (1) Beckers. (2) Deutinger (d. 1865), Wm. Rosenkrantz (d. 1874).
      h. From Hegel.

WEISSE (1801–1866), ROSENKRANZ (b. 1805), Kuno Fischer (b. 1824), Weisschenborn (d. 1874), Carrière (b. 1817), Cieszkowski.
(II) Those whose starting point was from more than one system.
   a. From Hegel and Schleiermacher.
      i. Roth (1799–1867) and Wirth in Theology and Ethics.
      ii. George (1811–1873) in Metaphysics.
   b. From Hegel and Herbart.
   c. From Hegel and Schopenhauer.
      von Hartmann (b. 1842). "Philosophy of the Unconscious"; to mediate between Hegel's Pantheism of the Idea, and Schopenhauer's Pantheism of the Will—and between Optimism of Hegel, and Pessimism of Schopenhauer. (Hartmann's Opposite—Dühring (b. 1833). "Philosophy of Reality.")
   d. From Hegel and English Realism.
      Ulrici (1806–1884).
   e. From Reinhold, von Berger, Plato, Aristotle, etc.; most from Ancient Philosophy.
      Trendelenburg (1802–1872). Historical Philosophy.
(III) Union of Science and Speculation.
   a. Fechner (1801–1887)—a Scientific Panentheism.
   b. Lotze (1817–1881).
      1. Influenced by (1) Poetry and Art to Philosophy. (2) Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in general. (3) Method of Herbart. (4) Most decidedly of all by Weisse. (5) Study of Medical and Natural Science—leading to entire rejection of Hegel, and to his own Realism. (6) Leibniz's monadology, especially as indicating the way to his position.
      2. A full recognition of Mechanism.
      3. Yet a "Teleological Idealism," which is still Realism. True "Spiritualism."
      4. "The true reality that is and ought to be, is not matter and is still less Idea, but is the living and personal Spirit of God, and the world of personal spirits which He has created."

D. Attention to the History of Philosophy. Itself a mark of the influence of the Hegelian Philosophy.
   (I) Historians whose purely philosophical works are almost entirely ignored—Sigwart, Zöllner.
   (II) Historians whose purely philosophical works are given far inferior place—[Erdmann], Ritter, Frantl, Kuno Fischer.
   (III) Historians whose historical works, against their own judgment, are valued much above their purely philosophical works—Ernst Reinhold, Michelet, Chalybas, Trendelenburg, Braniss.
   (IV) Preponderance of the historical element in the speculations themselves, e.g. Wirth, Hillebrandt, Ulrici, Chalybas.